Airpower in the War Against ISIS - Benjamin S. Lambeth

This review has been submitted to Airforce Magazine.

Title: Airpower in the War Against ISIS
Author: Benjamin S. Lambeth
ISBN: 978-1-68247-557-7
Publisher: Navel Institute Press
Year: 2021
Hardcover
Pages: 304

In "Airpower in the War on ISIS," Benjamin S. Lambeth presents a comprehensive and meticulously researched analysis of the role airpower played in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Published in 2021, the book offers an insightful perspective into the strategic employment of air assets during one of the most significant and complex conflicts in recent history.

Lambeth, a seasoned defense analyst and author, brings his expertise to the forefront, delving into the key aspects that made airpower a critical component in the war against ISIS. His work focuses not only on the operational aspects but also on the broader strategic implications and the challenges faced by the coalition forces in countering the terrorist organization.

The book starts by providing a concise historical context of ISIS's rise, highlighting the group's rapid expansion and the destabilizing effects it had on the Middle East. By understanding the gravity of the threat posed by ISIS, readers gain a deeper appreciation for the complexities that confronted the coalition partners in devising an effective response.

Lambeth then meticulously dissects the various airpower strategies employed by the coalition forces. He sheds light on the use of precision airstrikes, drone surveillance, intelligence gathering, and the utilization of cutting-edge technology. Through compelling case studies and real-world examples, the author demonstrates how these tactics evolved and adapted over time to meet the evolving challenges on the ground.

One of the book's strengths lies in Lambeth's ability to paint a vivid picture of the air campaign's successes and setbacks. He draws on a rich collection of primary sources, testimonies, and interviews with key military figures, which adds depth and credibility to his analysis. Additionally, the author's unbiased approach allows readers to form their own judgments about the efficacy of airpower in the broader fight against terrorism.

While Lambeth praises the coalition's effective use of airpower in degrading ISIS's military capabilities and destroying its infrastructure, he does not shy away from addressing the shortcomings and limitations of the approach. He explores the complexities of urban warfare, the risk of civilian casualties, and the propaganda value that ISIS derived from coalition airstrikes. Such a balanced examination of the subject matter sets this book apart from other works on the same topic.

Furthermore, "Airpower in the War on ISIS" also delves into the dynamics and coordination challenges between the coalition partners. With an array of countries contributing air assets, each with its own objectives and rules of engagement, Lambeth critically examines how these diverse interests affected the overall effectiveness of the air campaign.

Lambeth's writing style is clear, concise, and accessible, making this book suitable for both experts and lay readers interested in the subject. The author avoids jargon and technical verbiage where possible, ensuring that the central ideas are readily understandable without compromising the book's intellectual depth.

However, one potential criticism of the book is its narrow focus on airpower. While Lambeth addresses this limitation early on, some readers might find themselves wishing for a more comprehensive analysis that considers the broader aspects of the war on ISIS, including the role of ground forces and political considerations.

In conclusion, "Airpower in the War on ISIS" by Benjamin S. Lambeth is an essential and enlightening read for anyone interested in contemporary military affairs, counterterrorism strategies, and the complexities of modern warfare. The book offers a well-researched, unbiased, and critical examination of the air campaign against ISIS, revealing both its successes and limitations. With its comprehensive coverage and expert insights, this book stands as a valuable contribution to the understanding of airpower's role in contemporary conflict scenarios.

Mobile Warfare for Africa – On the Successful Conduct of Wars in Africa and Beyond - Lessons Learned from the South African Border War - Roland de Vries, Camille Burger, Willem Steenkamp

This review has been submitted to The Canadian Army Journal 

Title: Mobile Warfare for Africa – On the Successful Conduct of Wars in Africa and Beyond - Lessons Learned from the South African Border War
Author: Roland de Vries, Camille Burger, Willem Steenkamp
ISBN: 978-1-912174-08-9
Publisher: Helion &Company
Year: 2017
Softcover
Pages: 388
Photos/Maps: 73/42

‘Si vis pacem para bellum – If you want peace, prepare for war’. This was the foundation upon which the South African Defence Force (SADF) was developed in order to counter the threats manifesting themselves throughout Southern Africa. The authors of this work (originally published in 1987 and reproduced in 2018) have all been involved in the historical analysis and doctrinal development of the SADF; none more so than Maj-Gen (ret’d) Roland de Vries, widely considered to be the ‘father’ of the SADF’s bush war doctrine. The degree of practical, ‘hands on’ experience translated in this work and the extent to which additional primary sources were tapped, ranging from senior German Afrka Korps Officers, African officers from across the continent and senior British and African Union security officials, affirms the depth of analysis and breadth of experience that has gone into the research for this book.

Above all, this is a teaching and information manual. The SADF was involved with numerous operations involving actions against both conventional militaries as well as asymmetric/guerilla style forces. Their experiences, captured in this book, covered the spectrum from small unit deep penetration operations, brigade level conventional multi-arms engagements, hearts and minds tasks to multi-element interdiction involving combinations of land forces and fixed and rotary wing assets.   

The narrative culminates in a series of case studies that provide context and concrete application of the lessons gleaned from the Bush War. They are all identically structured in order to facilitate understanding, with detailed maps and photographs. Each case study is directly tied to a chapter in the main text in order to deliver a real life example of the concepts being provided; all are stand alone and may be reviewed independently or in conjunction with the larger narrative.

Throughout the book, and in addition to the case studies, the Angolan Bush War (also known as the South African Border War), is referenced by the authors to provide foundational context to their perspectives. Fought between 1966 and 1989, it extended across modern day Angola, Zambia and Namibia and involved kinetic and asymmetric elements of warfare; ranging from low to high intensity clashes. From this laboratory of African conflict came many of the lessons that were applied in other theatres and regions. Drawing upon these lessons, the authors explain in depth, not only the development and application of tactics and doctrine but also how these lessons were applied to the development of equipment and, more specifically, vehicles and weapons systems that best suited the varied African environments.

Helion has again produced a book of the highest quality and the addition of an included but separate ‘atlas’ book enables the reader to follow the case studies and lessons learned with great ease. This book represents the culmination of literally decades of hard learned lessons in the harshest of classrooms, the battlefield. It not only is an engaging and fascinating read but also serves as an outstanding treatise on methods of combat that will stand any professional soldier, historian or casual militarist in good stead regardless of their geographic location, element or experience level. 

Air War in Northern Ireland: Britain’s Air Arms and the ‘Bandit Country’ of South Armagh; Operation Banner 1969-2007 - Steven Taylor

This review has been submitted to Canadian Army Today Magazine

Title: Air War in Northern Ireland: Britain’s Air Arms and the ‘Bandit Country’ of South Armagh; Operation Banner 1969-2007
Author: Steven Taylor
ISBN: 978-1-526-72154-9
Publisher: Pen and Sword

Year: 2018

Hardcover
Pages: 157
Photos/Maps: 1/16 

The British involvement in Northern Ireland has had numerous works written about it ranging from oral and first person accounts to asymmetric warfare techniques that were followed and the political machinations undertaken at the local, national and international level. What has not had much light shed upon it was the role played by the air arm of the British military engaged and how it supported land operations in the field. The author undertakes in this work, to address this historical oversight and to round out the narrative of UK/PIRA (Provisional Irish Republican Army) operations during the time of ‘The Troubles’. 

The book is a relatively fast read. While it provides an excellent overview of the nature and challenges of the air operations, it does not drill down terribly deeply into the methodologies used in planning combined operations, the challenges faced by the various elements as they strove to work together and the means by which doctrine was adjusted to meet the dynamic nature of the IRA’s modus operandi. 

There are; however, a series of themes that flow through the narrative. Each serve to highlight the challenges and benefits encountered by both the UK and IRA in undertaking and responding to the unique operating environment of Northern Ireland. These include: 1. The close proximity of the porous border of the Republic Of Ireland to South Armagh meant that PIRA operatives had a means of escape readily available to them from any pursuit; 2. The international reach and support given to the PIRA from Libya and the United States; and the role played by US law enforcement in disrupting efforts by the PIRA to attain advanced weaponry to counter the air threat; 3. The increasing focus and frustration experienced by the PIRA as they sought a means to overcome the advantages air support provided to the British; 4. The ingenious methods and countermeasures developed by each side to counter advances by the other; 5. The necessity of the PIRA to maintain the support of the population and its impact upon their ability to strike at British air assets. Each of these streams of narrative interweave to provide a broad picture of the complexity of air operations in the region.   

Taylor does provide a more detailed look at the nature of the British air assets and the multitude of roles that they played. While helicopters carried the brunt of the operational load, numerous fixed wing aircraft types provided invaluable reconnaissance and tactical support to ground operations. This discussion is enlightening as it further reinforces the technological advantages and limitations of different air platforms as well as the massive logistical effort required to keep these resources operating. 

The quality of the book from P&S is very good. The map outlining the operational theatre of Northern Ireland is clear and the text very readable. The author has provided a very comprehensive bibliography that provides a significant array of websites, primary source documents and further material for the interested reader. This book is a good starting point from which to examine the nature of air operations in an asymmetric and first world environment.

Return of the Barbarians - Jakub J Grygiel

Title: Return of the Barbarians

Author: Jakub J Grygiel

ISBN: 978-1-107-15857-3

Publisher: Cambridge UP

Year: 2018

Hardcover

Pages: 222

The study of history in order to glean methods and hints at how to deal with modern day challenges is well appreciated by strategists and historians. Notwithstanding that, there are many who fail to appreciate the similarities between modern asymmetric warfare and the battles of the past. Grygiel has undertaken an effort to draw a direct line between much of what is happening today and instances where this has been experienced in the pre-modern era.

The author has focused his attention primarily on the later period of the Roman Empire. During that period, the Empire was beset, especially from Germania on the opposite bank of the Danube, by persistent small scale strikes by groups of barbarians. These groups would strike randomly and quickly, pillage and burn before rapidly departing. Because they were operating out of an uncivilized region with no centralized Government, it was very difficult for Rome to draw upon its traditional, conventional means (diplomacy, deterrence or military) of dealing with adversaries such as the Parthians. Compounding the effects of these raids was the psychological fear that they produced; far in excess of their actual damage.

Grygiel succeeds in connecting this environment to the modern one of asymmetric terrorism. Through the advent of technology, these groups are able to strike at random from decentralized cells with little to no warning. These attacks, often very high profile in nature (such as the Madrid train bombing), result in deep disruption amongst the targeted nations far in excess of the damage done. Further, traditional conventional militaries are not equipped to effectively counter these attacks. Therefore despite the advent of technology many of these terrorist cells are still able to operate with a high degree of impunity.

 Much of the success of the barbarians centered upon their ability to undermine the confidence in the population in the State’s ability to provide protection. As Grygiel points out, this resulted in the local population taking on the responsibility for protection themselves. However, and again this is typical in much of today’s Western world, much of the Roman population had lived within the protection of the Empire for hundreds of years and therefore, did not have the knowledge or ability, to fight and respond effectively. This further exacerbated the challenge of response as regions began isolating themselves from Rome as they barricaded themselves within fortified towns and cities.

Grygiel asserts that much could be learned from the responses attempted by Rome to counter these threats from small, mobile barbarian cells. It is an interesting and compelling argument that he puts forward. Of course the tools available to the Nations of today are far more sophisticated than the ones of the Roman Empire, but the enemy is also far more sophisticated. The lessons of history remain for us to use should we look; Grygiels book suggests that very little happening today is new and that much remains a rehash of previous experiences. A fascinating read.

Aden Insurgency: The Savage War in Yemen 1962-1967 - Jonathon Walker

Title: Aden Insurgency: The Savage War in Yemen 1962-1967

Author: Jonathon Walker

ISBN: 978-1-473827-63-9

Publisher: Pen and Sword

Year: 2014

Softcover

Pages: 332

Photos/ Maps: 17/10

Anyone following the news these days will be aware of the ongoing civil/proxy war taking place in Yemen. Regional forces as well as rebel and government elements are locked in a ferocious war where no action, however barbaric by modern standards, appears off-limits. Unfortunately, this is not a new or unique situation for this region of the world as Walker so aptly discusses in his book.

Aden was originally a strategically critical naval station that provided a stop off point midway between the far flung Eastern and Western elements of the British Empire. The region outside of the immediate area of this port was viewed as a semi-autonomous area that was exemplified by brutal tribal conflicts and regional proxy engagements between Egyptian, British and Saudi forces or their client forces.

Walker provides an outstanding baseline analysis of the political and tribal intrigue that permeated the area. Ferociously independent tribes and a brutal, austere environment provided the back drop for ongoing British operations as they attempted to prevent the expansion of Egyptian influence into the region. Walker expertly and concisely navigates the international and political intrigue that typified this conflict. He also provides an adroit analysis of the strain placed upon the British forces as they attempted to maintain stability in newly independent colonies while learning to deal with the unique nature of warfare in the Aden/Yemen region.

Further complicating the issue was the proxy war being assisted by the British between the rebels who had taken control of Yemen (assisted by the Egyptians) and the Yemeni Royalist forces (supported by the British). While on the one hand the British were overtly engaged in operations within the Aden Protectorate, they were also clandestinely working with the Royalists; the complexity of this conflict was truly stunning and could have served as an excellent learning tool for the more recent Afghan conflict.

Drawing upon interviews with the major players in the years following the conflict, the author is able to draw out opinions and observations that uniformed or government service would have prevented. One of the more prevalent of these was the role British domestic politics played in announcing a timeline for British withdrawal. This changed the entire character of the Aden insurgency as groups originally aligned with the British now were forced to look out for their own best interests knowing what fate awaited them with the departure of their erstwhile allies. Another key lesson to be derived from the conflict.

While the gravity and violence of this war has generally been overshadowed by the US engagement in Vietnam, it nevertheless stands as an outstanding school room for future operations within the region. The complex social and political dynamic characterizing Aden serves as both a warning and a lesson for non-regional powers attempting to subdue or influence these peoples. Walker has done a good job at contextualizing the ferocity and complexity of this fight.

Winning Wars Amongst the People: Case Studies in Asymmetric Conflict - Peter A. Kiss

This review was submitted to Army History magazine.

Title: Winning Wars Amongst the People: Case Studies in Asymmetric Conflict

Author: Peter A. Kiss

ISBN: 978-1612-347-004

Softcover

Publishers: Potomac Books

Pages: 289

Maps: 5

Asymmetric conflict is the modus operandi of the modern insurgent fighter and the Wests traditional methods of addressing using conventional forces has proven challenging in the extreme. The author has endeavoured to outline through an analysis of a series of unique, but related (insofar as asymmetric warfare has a common methodology), engagements, the characteristics of what he refers to as 4th generational (4G) warfare. He uses the examples as case studies in order to facilitate explanation of the causes, means of response and how successful (or not) authorities  were in both containing and reversing the insurgencies/instabilities. 

Each case study: Rhodesia 1962-1980, Punjab 1980-1994, Kosovo 1996-1999, France 2005 and modern day Hungary is broken down and analyzed using the criteria of response outlined in the beginning chapters of the book. These criteria relate to the paradigm shift required to address the characteristics of 4th generational warfare. Kiss spends the initial part of the book outlining what constitutes the shifts between generations of war, paying particular attention to the nature and characteristics of 4G. Thus, the 1st to 3rd generations have their origins in the Westphalian school where conflict centres upon the nation state and inter-national conflict. This represents the more traditional view of warfare.

Conversely, fourth generational warfare is defined by a series of traits that stand in unique contrast to the previous generations:

            1. sovereignty is limited;

            2. state loses monopoly over war;

            3. a majority of the population is neutral;

     4. belligerents behaviour is not constrained by the               responsibilities inherent in state existence                         because they are not a state;

            5. there is no clear victory or defeat;

            6. the conflict is more a clash of wills than a trial of                      strength; and

     7. belligerents will utilize means that are not                         considered to be military in nature (ie                               street politics and riots).                                                                                    

Kiss outlines that the people are medium within which the conflict between the government and non-government belligerents unfolds. The use of military force, as opposed to its traditional role of being the final arbiter, is now merely one of a series of supporting means utilized to reach each sides goals. 

He then goes on to outline how it has come to pass that the State, as the final international structure of interaction, has diminished in stature and influence. He focuses on two distinct areas of development: economic and political integration as well as eroding sovereignty. The first comes as the result of the transfer of state authority to supranational organizations such as the UN, the rise of international business and criminal organizations (who do not owe their existence to a particular nation) and newly accepted theories of international conduct (ie the Right to Protect) that supersedes national authority. Additionally, Kiss makes very lucid and telling observations regarding the diminishment of the state due to the internet, ease of international travel, the failure of the state to guarantee the security of its citizens, demographic changes and the failure of minorities/immigrants to accept the values and standards of the host nation. 

What all of this is leading to is a growing challenge to the States effectiveness at being able to overcome 4G insurgencies. The State, regardless of the nature of its leadership, is forced by its very existence to operate within a series of guidelines and limitations that the 4G insurgent is not. However, Kiss also advances the notion that pure terrorism (defined as being violence without goal) does not exist and therefore, terrorists/insurgents will always have an end state that they are working towards. Thus it becomes the challenge of each side to best determine how they are going to tailor their challenge/response in order to outlast the other.

The author's real world examples emphasize the timelines, complexities and uniqueness of 4G conflict. Each is representative of a different facet of this warfare and displays methods that were military successes but political failures (Rhodesia), asymmetric successes (Kosovo) and counterinsurgency successes (Punjab). He concludes each example with an outline of the lessons to be learned. His study of the outbreak of French minority violence is particularly sobering as it serves both as a lesson in response techniques and a cautionary tale for the future of intra-state relations.

Kiss's book is a thoughtful and insightful look into a mode of warfare that is rapidly becoming the norm for traditional nation states to address. It is a style not confined by borders, ethnicity, religion nor economy but is influenced by all. His style is clear and lucid and his arguments for the future convincing. His work is well worth studying for those involved with developing policies that will serve as the framework of responses for nation states in future conflicts.

Operation Telic: The British Campaign in Iraq 2003-2009 - Tim Ripley

This review has been submitted to the British Army review.

Title: Operation Telic: The British Campaign in Iraq 2003-2009

Author: Tim Ripley

ISBN: 978-0-9929458-0-0

Publisher: Telic-Herrick Publications

Year: 2016

Softcover

Pages: 470

Photos/ Maps: 35/6

The War in Iraq was not popular nor was it clean. After Afghanistan, it seemed to many that the challenges of asymmetric warfare would be left behind in Iraq; a second rate conventional army led by an unpopular, sociopath would be a relatively easy adversary after the Taliban. The British led by Prime Minister Tony Blair, joined the United States as its primary ally, for a number of reasons, not the least of which was continued influence in the Middle East as well as a key position at the ‘table’. The war was not popular with the British people and PM Blair expended a significant amount of political capital to win over Parliament. What was to be however, a short, sharp engagement and a victory for democracy turned into a six year war of nerves and attrition between the allies and the factional forces of post Saddam Iraq. Op Telic the book, iterates the challenges, successes, shortfalls and frustrations encountered by the UK forces from a political, doctrinal, inter-ally and CIMIC perspective.

That it is able to cover such ground effectively is testament to its brevity and accuracy. The author was able to draw upon the recollections of the key players down to platoon level as well as the primary documentation of the various units engaged in Iraq over the period of the conflict. The author was also able to display the level of complexity associated with warfare of this nature. What is evident is the degree to which government engagement and planning did not appear to extend beyond the military defeat of the Iraqi’s. The US has been correctly criticized for its failure to plan beyond the fighting, but the British government was not clear of this failure either.

It is clear that the West had very little appreciation of what would result once the strongman and his henchmen had been removed and the traditional animosities and hatreds, suppressed for so long, allowed to burst forth. Ripley does an excellent job of tracing the rapid onslaught of internal dissent focussed on the UK forces as well as factional fighting within the Basra region. Caught in a spiral of unanticipated violence, political turmoil at home and divergent priorities amongst the Allied forces, Ripley describes a UK force struggling to deal with retraining, internal shortfalls, pressure to downsize and engaging in public works that it had never trained for. It became obvious very quickly that the lessons learned against the IRA did not have relevance in the Iraqi theatre many assumed they would.

The UK Forces showed considerable capacity for adaption and improvisation as the later years of the conflict illustrated. Nevertheless, Ripley’s book describes a military left, to a significant degree, at odds with its political masters in the UK and with a marked sense of cynicism and resentment amongst its soldiers and airmen. It also describes a society and force out of step with the realities of combat and the dangers associated with them. That the UK forces were brave and dedicated is beyond question, but the appetite for casualties and risk as well as the domestic and media attention paid to the slightest level of collateral damage has changed the nature of warfare for the West.

Ripley has crafted an excellent, balanced account of the British experiences in Iraq. He draws attention to a significant number of issues and challenges that have still not been resolved involving the soldier and their battlefields. His book is key to understanding the complexities of the modern theatre of operations and the issues that influence them. It is critical that training reflect the lessons learned, not the least of which is that the government that you may be fighting to support may be actively working against you. Based upon the conclusions of Ripley’s book, the term 360 degree battlefield may now be applied to not only to the physical fighting space, but also the domestic and international political realm as well as the media and legal spaces. The soldiers of today do not have a benign operating environment as Op Telic aptly shows. 

A War of Logistics – Parachutes and Porters in Indochina, 1945-1954 - Charles R Shrader

This review has been submitted to Army History Magazine.

Title: A War of Logistics – Parachutes and Porters in Indochina, 1945-1954

Author: Charles R Shrader

ISBN: 978-0-8131-6575-2

Publisher: University Press of Kentucky

Year: 2015

Hardcover

Pages: 488

Photos/Maps: 15/13

The War in Indochina is best remembered today for the decisive French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954; however, the conflict that led up to that was protracted, brutal and new. New in terms of the style of warfare being fought and the impact that the result would have well beyond the borders of Indochina. The author has approached the war from an unconventional perspective, one that has been heretofore a facet but not a central theme of works on the war; that of logistics and its role in the victory of the Viet Minh and the loss of the French. This was a war won and lost entirely on the strength and weakness of the respective logistics capabilities and doctrine of the adversaries.

Shrader has effectively woven an insightful evaluation and analysis of the operational doctrine of both parties while maintaining his central theme of the key impact of logistics. Commencing with a strategic view of the conflict, he looks at the psychology and hubris of the post war French and their assumption of superiority over the Viet Minh. This, combined with an unstable national approach from France, precluded the resources from being assigned in terms of manpower as well as material that ultimately was needed for success.

He leads into the successful recognition by the Viet Minh of the necessity to not only outfight but also to outlast the French. The three stage operational approach combined with a successful utilization of the strengths of the Viet people – human capital – enabled for a flexible and dynamic asymmetric approach to conflict that the European approach of the French struggled to counter.

Shrader discusses at length how, from the French approach, heavy weapons and combined arms operations heavily based upon the lessons learned during the European conflict served as the central method of engagement. Artillery, armour, aircraft and naval contingents enabled the French to control set points but surrendered the countryside to the more mobile and agile Viet Minh and by extension, the initiative. The nature of the French approach to warfare resulted in a heavy logistics bill that had difficulty being met. Strategically, long lines of support stretching back to France or Japan due to a lack of an integral industrial capability in Indochina meant long delays in the meeting of demands. Operationally, the necessity of the French to establish isolated forward operating bases in order to counter the inflow of the Viet Minh forces and supplies required a reliance upon air or naval resupply methods that were costly, inefficient and resource intensive themselves.

Conversely, the Viet Minh acknowledged their inability to counter the French in set piece battles and, for the most part, did not allow themselves to be drawn into fights where they may be subjected to superior French armament. Shrader identifies how the Viet Minh leaders played a superior international hand by securing their lines of support from China. In addition, their requirements were far less extensive. The author has undertaken extensive in-depth research that backs up his conclusions. The typical Viet Minh soldier, for example only required approximately half of the daily weight of requirements compared with his French counterpart. The depth to which the author goes in his analysis of the typical demands of the respective forces is highly educational and telling for the reader; the French demands far outstripped their capability while the Viet Minh adjusted their tactics in line with their logistics capability and expertise.

The book also illustrates the flexibility of the Viet Minh logistics methodology compared to the French. Being far less technologically encumbered, they were significantly more agile in their mobility and much less rigid in their operational doctrine; thereby being able to manipulate their procedures far faster than the French. Unlike the French who were, for the most part, confined to pre-existing Indochinese transport infrastructure and vehicles, the Viet Minh developed a national level mobilization process whereby non-combatants were obliged to support operations through their use as porters. Regional command structures were created that facilitated the uninterrupted flow of supplies from one section to the next through its transfer between regionally assigned porters. They also developed the science of camouflage to previously unseen levels and maintained field craft discipline rigidly. The French were never able to develop a counter strategy to effectively undermine this tactic.

Shrader makes it clear that the French were not incompetent, merely hamstrung through a lack of logistics flexibility, non-responsive doctrine, a paradigm of their adversary based upon pre-existing hubris, a non-supportive National Government and a logistics dogma rooted in a European operational theatre. They were able to achieve some successes against the Viet Minh and their use of air and riverine resupply systems supported off road operations well. Unfortunately, the depth of capacity was heavily in favour of the Viet Minh as theirs was viewed as a national struggle and, consequently, given the support required through a more universally supported approach. The French certainly had the upper hand during periods of the conflict such as when they cut off Viet Minh access to critical rice growing regions (which served as a trade currency as well as supply for the Viet Minh). The logistics limitations suffered by the French were simply too great to enable them to follow up on their local successes.

Shrader’s book is an excellent study of the critical importance that logistics plays in the effective execution of tactical operations and strategic campaigns. For a vast majority of the conflict French technology heavily outweighed the Viet Minh; that they were unable to defeat them is testament to the ability of the Viet Minh to offset French advantage through non-traditional tactics and supply doctrine. The author has presented a balanced and in-depth study of this conflict and his conclusions are well supported through the use of primary source material from both sides. This is a book well worth reading for operators and supporters alike.  

Three Sips of Gin – Dominating the Battlespace with Rhodesia’s Elite Selous Scouts - Tim Bax

This review has been submitted to British Army Review. 

Title: Three Sips of Gin – Dominating the Battlespace with Rhodesia’s Elite Selous Scouts

Author: Tim Bax

ISBN: 978-1-909384-29-3

Publisher: Helion and Company

Year: 2014

Softcover

Pages: 423

Photos/ Maps: 134/1

The Selous Scouts were an organization that acted as the forward eyes and ears of the Rhodesian military during their long and brutal bush war with the ZIPRA and ZANLA revolutionary groups. This autobiography of the experiences of the author as he made his way into the Rhodesian military first as a member of the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) and then as a member of the Selous Scouts is multifaceted as he discusses his personal experiences, the doctrine of the two units in which he served, the larger challenges of the national and international environment during this period and the leadership styles of those with whom and for whom he served and their immediate effect upon his life and character.

One of the key themes that runs throughout the book is the paradigm with which the RLI and Selous Scouts approached their operations. Dynamic, out of the box thinking and a recognition of the need for leadership that could make decisions at the very lowest level combined with a high degree of aggression and expertise were hallmarks of these Rhodesian units. Bax recounts numerous operations that were successful due to the unorthodox nature of their execution and the confidence of the command structure in allowing for a broad span of independence amongst members. His willingness to relate tales of failure and embarrassment about himself and those who were seen to be some of the finest leaders within the RLI and Selous Scouts, provide balance and recognition that even the best will not succeed at times; lessons in humility that are never reiterated enough.

His discussions about particularly successful commanders reinforce both the primary strength and weakness of these asymmetric units – that being the extremely rare number of individuals who can truly lead in these environments and the critical loss of capability when they are not present. His narrative also reveals the challenge that governments and conventional forces have in fully appreciating and utilizing these units to their full potential.

Bax also provides excellent descriptions and analysis of the effectiveness of the ‘fire-force’ doctrine built around the Alouette 3 helicopter and the four man tactical unit or ‘stick’. His discussion about the international embargo necessitating Rhodesia’s unique tactical and operational doctrine clearly displays the influence of external factors on capability. His discussion plainly show that Rhodesia’s dominance lay not in equipment but the training of its soldiers and the methodologies developed to use the equipment that it had to greatest advantage.

His numerous renditions of the hijinks and trouble that he and his fellow soldiers got into while off-duty and the results would never be tolerated in today’s more politically correct militaries but they speak to an issue that has been subsumed beneath the mantle of acceptable behaviour; this is the nature of esprit des corps and morale. An entertaining and useful book.   

ISIS: The State of Terror - Jessica Stern and JM Berger

Title: ISIS: The State of Terror

Author: Jessica Stern and JM Berger

ISBN: 978-0-00-812096-2

Publisher: William Collins Books

Year: 2015

Softcover

Pages: 398

Photos/Maps: 0

There are many books available on the market that describe the history, doctrine and methodology of ISIS; so many so that it is often difficult to see where they provide as unique perspective. In the case of this book, they have focused a significant portion of their analysis upon the use by ISIS of electronic messaging and operational style. They do provide context through a look at the history of ISIS and their operational methodology; however, the areas that were particularly educational centred upon the use of technology, operational doctrine and their explanation of Islamic theology. They have also provided, at the end of each chapter, recommendations to counter the issues addressed in that chapter.

The initial portion of the book, in a similar vein to other publications, reviews the rise and fall of Al-Qaeda, the opportunism and motivation for the creation of ISIS and its noteworthy ability to adapt and morph to best take advantage of the environment within which it finds itself. Following this, the authors address the attraction of ISIS to the foreign Islamic element as well as the formalization of its message. These sections are well written and engaging; however, they do not provide ‘new’ information but do present it a very readable and easily understood manner.

As indicated earlier, the strength of the book follows with its study of ISIS’s method of its use of the electronic medium in order to facilitate the promulgation of its message. Of particular note, is the challenge that arises in the West between the message of ISIS, the medium of Twitter (as an example with its open rules of content) and free speech. The authors present a fascinating study of this debate and how it was played back and forth between companies and governments. This question has been exploited phenomenally well by ISIS and has set a standard for future terrorist ‘PR’ campaigns.

Additionally, the authors look at the philosophy of shock and terror used by ISIS as a means of conquest and control. To the West, it appears to be counter-productive to terrorize the population into submission. Nevertheless, as the authors point out, this has been a very effective method used repeatedly throughout history in order to smooth the process of conquest and indoctrination. This approach also entices those radical foreign elements who see this approach as a means of ‘robust’ Islamic response to perceived Western aggression.

The production value of this book is satisfactory. The authors have provided copious notes and source material. The book is very well written in a style that opens the subject up to a wide audience. Their unique focus highlights the capacity for ISIS to adjust their style and doctrine in order to take advantage of modern techniques and technologies while concurrently adopting traditional conquest methods that shock a world long past using these ‘modus operandi’. A book very well worth reading.

Eisenhower’s Guerrillas - Benjamin Jones

This review was published in Soldier Magazine.

Title: Eisenhower’s Guerrillas

Author: Benjamin Jones

ISBN: 978-0-19-994208-4

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Year: 2016

Hardcover

Pages: 384

Photos/Maps: 19/5

This is a fascinating book on the nature of the asymmetric warfare undertaken in the months and years leading up to the invasion of mainland Europe by Allied forces. It highlights clearly the challenges surrounding this form of operation including: the effects of multiple organizations with different goals trying to operate in the same region (the politics of resistance), the significant obstacles to logistically supporting these personnel and the subsequent impact on their efficacy and the effectiveness of the Germans at countering the Allied efforts (and how it changed as the war progressed). Worth a read.

Predator: The Secret Origins of the Drone Revolution - Richard Whittle

Published in "Warhistoryonline".

Title: Predator: The Secret Origins of the Drone Revolution

Author: Richard Whittle

ISBN: 978-0-8050-9964-5

Publisher: Henry Holt and Company

Year: 2014

Hardcover

Pages: 353

Photos: 26

Predator missions and strike footage is today considered to be rather mundane in the world of news media; real time video of ‘bad guys’ being struck by hellfire missiles or smart bombs is no longer the stuff of science fiction. However, it was not that long ago that this level of technological sophistication left its viewers incredulous. Whittle’s book traces the history not only of the development of the UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle), its transition from a purely reconnaissance to a weapons platform and  ultimately its adoption and employment in operations throughout the world. He also discusses the challenges related to UAV operations, especially with the addition of weapons to its arsenal and specifically command and control and legal hurdles that had to be dealt with. 

Whittle’s premise, that the UAV was a revolutionary surveillance and weapons platform that changed the very nature of warfare, is justified by the end of the book but is also tempered by the degree of difficulty that the UAV program faced by conventional thinking and bureaucratic inertia. Like many breakthrough technologies, it was envisioned and developed by civilian companies who found it very difficult to convince the government and military of its relevance on the modern battlefield. 

 

The book highlights a number of interesting consequences of the UAV program and the advent of new technology onto the battlefield: 

a.       The marked increase in the challenges of micro-management as senior officers used the ‘real time’ technology to provide oversight, advice and assistance well below their traditional span of control;

b.      The challenges of bureaucracy as an impediment to change and, concurrently, what can be accomplished in incredibly short periods given the right motivation and backing (referring here to the success of the Big Safari organization in implementing technological advances in the UAV and communications systems);

c.       The challenge of command and control when multiple agencies operate within the same (developmental or operational) battle space. In the case of the Predator, various agencies such as the USAF, CIA US Army and Navy all had proverbial fingers in the pie thereby frustrating clear lines of authority;

d.      The time delay relating to authority for launch when it is centralized at the most senior levels; and

e.      The legal confusion related to what kind of weapon was represented by the Predator UAV. For example, could it be controlled and launched on third party soil, did it violate international treaties and did it represent a violation of Federal law with regard to CIA oversight?

 

Like most revolutionary programs, the UAV (Predator) project was replete with examples of incredible brilliance and breath-taking myopia. Whittle has translated the convoluted development of the UAV into a very readable and engaging book. There are many lessons to be derived from this experience for any entrepreneur or capital procurement program officer. It is very true the adage presented in the book that change requires a ‘seminal’ event to break comfort zones. The UAV project benefitted from one such event in the form of the September 11 attacks and has not looked back.

Guerrillas of Tsavo: The East African Campaign of the Great War in British East Africa 1914-1916 - James G Willson

Title: Guerrillas of Tsavo: The East African Campaign of the Great War in British East Africa 1914-1916

Author: James G Willson

ISBN: 978-9966-7571-3-5

Publisher: Self-published by James Wilson

Year: 2014

Softcover

Pages: 356

Photos/Maps: 511/28 

The campaign that was fought in Africa during WW1 has been largely overshadowed by every other theatre but was extremely significant in the lessons that were (or were not) learned, the operational doctrine developed and the new paradigm that it left the Africans involved. Wilson, a local Kenyan businessman and historian, has become an expert on the Tsavo region and the fighting that took place there and his passion and deep knowledge of what transpired is patently evident in this book. 

It is important to realize that for the major combatants, Britain and Germany, Africa represented very different fields of effort. The one area of common ground was that neither side envisioned Africa being anything more than a brief sideshow to the major efforts on the Western Front: Germany seeing no way of defending/supporting its colonies given the strength of the Royal Navy and Britain simply assuming that the German colonies would capitulate given their isolation. It is interesting that the civilian leadership in both locations preferred to avoid any form of conflict altogether and it was the military contingents that drove the recruitment, planning and execution of operations. 

Notwithstanding geography, Africa was unique in the fact that, in no other theatre was the influence of a single commander more keenly felt. In this case, Gen Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, commanding the German forces throughout the campaign, developed doctrine and an operational appreciation that effectively prevented the vastly superior Allied forces from ever assuming the initiative. Lettow-Vorbeck correctly determined that his Centre of Gravity/Effort was the tying down of as many allied forces as possible, thereby preventing them from being utilized elsewhere. In this approach, he was successful beyond anyone’s wildest estimations. German forces at their peak numbered 3,007 European Officers and 12,100 Askari (locally trained soldiers) as well as several thousand carriers/porters. Conversely, Allied forces (British, Portuguese and Belgian) numbered in the region of 137 Generals, over 300,000 soldiers and many hundreds of thousands of porters. The scope of success of the German effort in Africa may be recognized by the fact that they did not surrender until a week following the armistice in Europe and when they did, it was as an undefeated, still operationally effective force.  

Wilson has authored a very interesting book. He provides an analysis of the social and political situation in Africa at the time of the commencement of hostilities and also provides the reader with detailed maps and geographic information. He then follows the campaign in a daily format tracing the activities of both contingents throughout the 1914, 15 and 16 campaigning season. As he does so, he emphasizes different doctrines and methodologies used by each side and to what degree they were effective. This is especially telling as the German asymmetric approach, while unique at the time, will be seen as very familiar to subsequent armies and campaigners. The lessons that Lettow-Vorbeck taught in his approach to warfare were decades ahead of his time but they have not been studied by modern military scholars and as a result, remain largely forgotten. They form, however, the basis for most subsequent asymmetric conflicts.  

This is a well-researched and engaging book. I would strongly recommend that it be reviewed and studied by any student of military history wishing to understand how the correct application of limited force can have far-reaching consequences.