Battle for Angola: The End of the Cold War in Africa 1975-89 - Al J Venter

This review has been submitted to the Canadian Army Journal.

Title: Battle for Angola: The End of the Cold War in Africa 1975-89

Author: Al J Venter

ISBN: 978-1-911096-41-2

Publisher: Helion

Year: 2017

Hardcover

Pages: 527

Maps/Photos: 5/100’s (colour, b/w) 

Al Venter is one of the most prolific writers of the myriad of African wars that has beset that continent in the years following independence. His works have an added level of authenticity due to the fact that he is anything but an armchair historian, he has actually participated in and been wounded in a number of them, including the Border Wars with Angola. Much of the history of the African Wars has been forgotten with the advent of ISIS, Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria but there is much to learn about symmetric response to both symmetric and asymmetric enemies.  

In his review of the wars, the author encompasses the conflicts technological, doctrinal and societal impacts and how these changed over the course of the war. He also draws upon first-hand accounts of operational commanders, weapons designers and soldiers to provide for a more nuanced and realistic sense of the success and challenges faced by the protagonists. Included in this are discussions of the asymmetric elements of the war; specifically UNITA and SWAPO as well as the Angolan Army (and their material and personnel supporters Cuba, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact). Much of the book is a discussion of the tactical and operational effectiveness of these organizations, their doctrine and how it was countered by both the Portuguese (before independence in 1974) as well as the South Africans. The role of mercenary groups such as Executive Outcome is also deeply intertwined within these conflicts. Venter discusses the influence of other regional conflicts and the role that they played in South African planning; the Rhodesians’ Fire Force concept, lessons learned from Biafra, the Portuguese Special Forces and tribal Bushmen all played a role and are analyzed in depth. 

The technological advances that resulted from the nature of the conflict as well as the self-sufficiency required of the South Africans (due to the international arms embargo) is very interesting. The requirement for vehicles that were specifically designed to provide effective protection against mines while still enabling a robust cross country capability resulted in the development of an entirely new class of vehicles: Ratels, Eland’s and Buffel’s all put South Africa at the very forefront of Infantry Fighting Vehicle technology.  

Venter’s work encompasses the complex nature of the war spanning the strategic Cold War period, the regional conflicts between the various tribal and national groups and the tactical nature of the traditional and asymmetric elements of the war. His analysis is deep and thoughtful and based upon first hand and expert knowledge. His discussion of the various paramilitary and Special Forces and some of their more notable successes and failures further enhances the scope of the work. This is a highly readable account of the struggle for South West Africa and the impact that it had both internationally and regionally. Helion has published a superb book replete with high quality photographs; the bibliography is extensive. There are many lessons to be learned from the engagements in Africa and without a doubt Venter and his work is an outstanding source.

The German Failure in Belgium, August 1914 - Dennis Showalter, Joseph P Robinson, Janet A Robinson

This review has been submitted to Strategy and Tactics magazine.

Title: The German Failure in Belgium, August 1914

Author: Dennis Showalter, Joseph P Robinson, Janet A Robinson

ISBN: 978-1-476-67462-9

Publisher: McFarland Books

Year: 2019

Softcover

Pages: 217

Photos/Maps: 22/9  

Germany entered the First World War confident that it would be able to deal a crushing blow to the Western Front Allies within a few weeks, thereby freeing its forces to turn East in order to deal with Russia in turn; events turned out quite differently. The authors have undertaken an in-depth analysis of what circumstances and practices contributed to this over-estimation. The book is a succinct and insightful review; not long but telling in its conclusions.  

The authors look at two distinct but critical shortfalls amongst the German execution of the invasion plans of the West. They are: critical failings within the planning itself, and most tellingly, a failure of reconnaissance. Each exacerbated the shortfalls of the others and resulted in crucial errors in decision making, ultimately leading to the failure of the German efforts in the West.  

Von Moltke committed a number of key errors in the development of the plan itself. These were related to both strategic and operational planning and reflected interesting elements of the German General Staff’s relationship with other government departments. Moltke made the decision to avoid crossing the Maastricht Corridor of Holland in order to provide for a potential neutral access point to the North Sea should Germany require it. This judgement was clearly a Foreign Affairs and Kaiser responsibility; however they were not part of the process. It is estimated that the resulting Liege bottleneck cost the Germans at least three days. He also decided to reshuffle the allocation of cavalry assets away from the Northern Wing of the German advance without any reduction in the task allocation. They were therefore unable to complete any of the activities effectively. Additionally, he created ad hoc Cavalry Corp’s with Headquarters that had not been exercised in peacetime, resulting in confusion and inefficiency. Finally, in the planning phase, the Germans assumed away elements that ran contrary to their vision of how the invasion would work; specifically, the fact that the Belgian Army would fight and not allow for free passage. 

The authors then presents a detailed account of the first four weeks of the War; focussing on the challenges that arose as a result of the issues identified above. For an Army and General Staff that had an almost mystical reputation, fundamental errors in planning exacerbated challenges in execution. These were further compounded by a failure to fully appreciate the reconnaissance capabilities of the nascent air and cavalry elements. This failure in reconnaissance resulted in the Germans not having the visibility of the battlefield that was essential to the effective control of the complex operation that they were trying to execute. The conclusions postulated by the authors as to why this occurred are reasonable and applicable to modern command staffs.   

An comprehensive bibliography and notes section round out this excellent text. The author’s style is succinct and very readable. They have taken an interesting and unique perspective on the shortfalls which, as they point out, the Germans came very close to overcoming despite them. An outstanding addition to any library or reading list.