Friday 31 January 2020

The 64th Army at Stalingrad 1942-43 - Dann Falk


This review has been submitted to War History Online.

Title: The 64th Army at Stalingrad 1942-43
Author: Dann Falk
ISBN: 978-1-732-60741-5
Publisher: Falken Books
Year: 2019
Softcover
Pages: 289
Photos/Maps: 21/32

Much has been written from the German perspective on the lead up to and the subsequent titanic struggle for the city of Stalingrad; however, Falk’s work has provided a perspective rarely presented, that of one of the Soviet Armies that faced the German onslaught. Fighting to the point of annihilation, the 64th held the key territory south of the city and west of the Volga River, thereby ensuring that the flow of resources via that key waterway continued to get through.

The author has taken a holistic approach in his rendition of the creation and operations of the 64th. He commences with an introduction that provides a ‘big hand/small map’ synopsis of the conduct of the Great Patriotic War; providing the reader with a comprehensive background to the environment and nature of the conflict into which the 64th was deployed. Each following chapter commences on the first of the month and is broken into a narrative that relates key dates/events during that period. Starting on 1 December, 1941 and concluding with the month of February, 1943, they all follow the same format: a synopsis outlining its assigned Command, the Commander, Units (by element) and Strength (broken into listed combat strength and actual ration strength). This is very helpful as it enables the reader to appreciate at a glance, the real time effect of operations upon the 64th. Following that synopsis, key events by date within the month are discussed in chronological order.

Another element of the work that is not readily found in many of the narratives of the Eastern Front is the emphasis that the author places on the logistics aspects of supporting the 64th. He goes into great detail outlining not only the nature and scope of the daily demands required by an Army on operations but also the challenges associated with stockpiling and delivering these resources. This, while concurrently suffering from the effects of air and land interdiction by the Germans and the requirement to continuously fall back in the face of Wehrmacht offense. This approach allows those not well versed in the conduct of large scale operations to better appreciate the complexities of warfare on a scale heretofore unheard of in the annals of war.

Also included in the work are a series of unique maps created by the author. Clear and concise, they are free of much of the clag that cause many of the maps in books to be of limited or no value. The bibliography is also worthy of note as it includes extensive primary and secondary source material not only in English but also from Russian and German sources. Additionally, a broad set of endnotes adds noteworthy depth and scope to the narrative.

Overall, this is a very interesting work shedding light upon an element of Eastern Front operations rarely covered in conventional literature. Well laid out, concise and informative, it retains its interest for the reader despite the breadth of statistical information provided. It is strongly recommended both as an informative source of Soviet operations but also as an excellent counterpoint to the myriad of German work on the Eastern Front.

Saturday 18 January 2020

Case White: The Invasion of Poland 1939 - Robert Forczyk


This review has been submitted to Canadian Army Review

Title: Case White: The Invasion of Poland 1939
Author: Robert Forczyk
ISBN: 978-0-253-35688-8
Publisher: Osprey Books
Year: 2019
Softcover
Pages: 406
Photos/Maps: Advance Copy/8

Conventional historical wisdom suggests that the German invasion of Poland in 1939, triggering the beginning of WW2, was a foregone conclusion of victory for the Germans. Images of Polish cavalry charging German armoured forces and being destroyed have been used to portray the futility of the Polish resistance. Forczyk has addressed a number of these fallacies in his new, comprehensive analysis of Case White.

Commencing with an in-depth review of the events in the region of Northeastern Europe following the end of World War 1 and leading up to the 1930’s, Forczyk paints a broad canvass of the political, economic and social challenges that destabilized the region. This also clearly indicates the complexity of the interactions of the personalities and their influence on local relations. It is a little known fact that the German military had significant respect for the post war Polish commander Pilsudski (his memoirs were recommended reading for German Officers). However, his death in 1935 and the subsequent diminishment of trust between the German and Polish governments soured relations.

The account of the preparation and fighting is very balanced. It is easily forgotten that for both sides this was their first introduction to large scale, combined arms operations. Forczyk’s narrative easily encapsulates the challenges faced by the various combatant’s; their successes and failures. The Germans had developed the capability for close air support using Stuka dive bombers but found, for example, that their methodology for coordination was too slow in many cases to be effective. Additionally, in many cases, application of panzer doctrine was spotty and inconsistent, resulting in heavier losses than anticipated. The author is also commended for incorporating not just the operational elements into his study but also the impact of logistics. In many cases the German support elements were not able to keep up with the more mobile panzer forces.

 Conversely, the Polish forces proved themselves to be tenacious fighters but under poor strategic guidance. As Forczyk relates, the Poles were (and allowed themselves to be) mislead by the promises of assistance from the West. This reflected an inconsistent approach to modernization that was impacted by economic and personality based limitations. Additionally, a failure to realistically plan for mobilization and defensive operations (that emphasized non-critical regions of the country), combined to undermine Polish potential for effective defensive operations.

The third critical element of Case White was the Soviet invasion of Poland from the East. Typical of the Soviet leadership at the time, units were only provided with two days notice of the impending operation. Nor were there any formal plans developed for the integration of German and Soviet forces. Forczyk’s book describes in detail not only the ad hoc nature of the operational relationship between two ‘Allied’ nations but also the reprehensible response of the Polish allies, England and France, to the Soviet invasion. Tepid would be far too generous a word; as he states, Germany got war and the Soviets nothing for their actions.

Forczyk’s Case White is an outstanding book; deeply researched and eminently readable. His attention to detail, extensive annexes and copious endnotes provide a wealth of knowledge to the reader outside of the narrative itself. Case White is a highly recommended addition to anyone’s library and sheds light on what rapidly became a forgotten or secondary element of the Second World War.