Theirs the Strife: The Forgotten Battles of British Second Army and Armeegruppe Blumentritt, April 1945 - John Russell

This review has been submitted to Iron Cross Magazine 

Title: Theirs the Strife: The Forgotten Battles of British Second Army and Armeegruppe Blumentritt, April 1945
Author: John Russell
ISBN: 978-1-914059-39-1
Publisher: Helion and Company
Year: 2020
Softcover
Pages: 502
Photographs/maps: 97/100

In "Theirs the Strife," John Russell delves deep into the often-overlooked events of April 1945, focusing on the lesser-known battles between the British Second Army and Armeegruppe Blumentritt during the waning days of World War II. Russell's meticulous research and engaging narrative shed light on a crucial yet forgotten chapter of the war, offering readers a fresh perspective on the final stages of the conflict in Europe.

Russell begins by setting the stage, providing a comprehensive overview of the situation in April 1945. The Allied forces, having crossed the Rhine, were rapidly advancing towards the heart of Nazi Germany. Meanwhile, Armeegruppe Blumentritt, a German formation tasked with defending the northern front, was desperately trying to delay the inevitable collapse of the Third Reich. The British Second Army, led by General Miles Dempsey, found itself at the forefront of this final push.

One of the strengths of Russell's book is his ability to bring the key figures to life. General Dempsey, his subordinates, and their German counterparts are portrayed as real individuals facing unimaginable challenges. This humanizing approach allows readers to empathize with the soldiers and commanders on both sides, making the narrative all the more compelling. Of particular note is the styles of leadership exhibited by the different commanders; Blumentritt, on one hand, desperately keeping his forces motivated and fighting despite the obvious fact that Germany had lost the war and Dempsey, equally striving to keep his forces focussed on forcing the destruction of Germans all the while knowing that the end was very close.

Russell's writing style is both accessible and engaging. He seamlessly blends personal accounts, official documents, and strategic analysis, providing a well-rounded view of the battles. This approach not only keeps the reader engaged but also adds depth to the historical events, enabling a better understanding of the decisions made by military leaders.

The author's research is meticulous and evident throughout the book. Russell draws from a wide range of primary and secondary sources, including diaries, letters, official reports, and post-war interviews. This depth of research is particularly evident in his descriptions of the battles themselves. Readers will find themselves immersed in the chaos and brutality of the frontline, gaining a newfound appreciation for the sacrifices made by those who fought.

One of the book's standout features is its exploration of the tactical and logistical challenges faced by both sides. Russell highlights the complexities of maneuvering large armies in the final stages of a war, where supply lines are stretched thin, and the enemy is desperate. His analysis of the strategic decisions made by Dempsey and Blumentritt adds a layer of depth to the narrative, revealing the intricate chess game that unfolded on the battlefield.

Furthermore, "Theirs the Strife" offers valuable insights into the moral and ethical dilemmas faced by soldiers on both sides as the war neared its end. Russell does not shy away from discussing the atrocities committed by the Germans or the moral quandaries faced by Allied soldiers in the face of such horrors. This exploration of the human side of war adds a thought-provoking dimension to the book.

While "Theirs the Strife" is a compelling and well-researched work, it is not without its minor flaws. Some readers may find the sheer amount of detail daunting at times, and the book's narrow focus on a specific time and place may limit its appeal to a broader audience. This fact is offset however, by the authors generous use of maps and photographs to aid in the visualization of the conditions and tactics faced and utilized by both sides.

In conclusion, John Russell's "Theirs the Strife" is a valuable addition to the literature on World War II. By resurrecting the forgotten battles of April 1945, Russell sheds light on the courage and determination of the soldiers who fought on both sides. His meticulous research, engaging narrative, and humanizing approach make this book a must-read for history enthusiasts seeking a deeper understanding of the final days of the war in Europe. While it may not be a comprehensive account of World War II, it is a compelling exploration of a critical and often overlooked chapter in history.

Lords of the Sky: Fighter Pilots and Air Combat from the Red Baron to the F-16 - Dan Hampton

Title: Lords of the Sky: Fighter Pilots and Air Combat from the

Red Baron to the F-16
Author: Dan Hampton
ISBN: 978-0-06-226209-7
Publisher: Harper Collins Press
Year: 2014
Softcover
Pages: 623
Photos/Maps: 107/12

Lords of the Sky by Dan Hampton is a captivating journey through the annals of aviation history. With meticulous research and a knack for storytelling, Hampton takes readers on an exhilarating flight from the earliest days of aviation to the cutting-edge technology of modern fighter jets.

The book spans a wide range of historical periods, beginning with the Wright brothers' groundbreaking invention of the airplane and continuing through World War I, World War II, Vietnam, the Cold War, and beyond. Hampton masterfully weaves together the stories of key figures, legendary battles, and technological advancements, offering readers a comprehensive understanding of the evolution of aerial warfare.

One of the book's strengths lies in Hampton's ability to bring historical events to life. His vivid descriptions of dogfights and aerial combat put readers right in the cockpit, experiencing the adrenaline and danger alongside the pilots. Whether recounting the daring exploits of World War I flying aces or the intense dogfights of the Vietnam War, Hampton's prose is both thrilling and informative, making it difficult to put the book down.

Furthermore, Lords of the Sky goes beyond the technical aspects of aviation and explores the human side of the pilots. Hampton delves into the personal lives, fears, and triumphs of these aviators, providing a deeper appreciation for the sacrifices they made and the courage they displayed. By humanizing the pilots, the book transcends a mere chronicle of aircraft and battles, offering a more holistic perspective on the impact of aviation on individuals and societies.

The depth of research in Lords of the Sky is commendable. Hampton draws upon a wealth of primary sources, including pilot interviews, diaries, and official records, to present a comprehensive and accurate account of aviation history. The book is enriched with fascinating anecdotes and obscure stories, shedding light on the lesser-known aspects of aerial warfare. Whether it's the top-secret development of  aircraft armaments or the tactical strategies employed by famous fighter squadrons, Hampton leaves no stone unturned in his quest to educate and entertain.

While the book covers an extensive period, some readers may find that certain eras receive more attention than others. The author's passion for World War II aviation is evident, and as a result, this period is more extensively covered. However, this bias does not detract significantly from the overall quality of the book, as each era explored still provides valuable insights and gripping narratives.

In conclusion, Lords of the Sky is an enthralling and meticulously researched exploration of aviation history. Dan Hampton's ability to blend historical accuracy with captivating storytelling makes this book a must-read for aviation enthusiasts and history buffs alike. From the early pioneers of flight to the dawn of supersonic jets, Hampton's vivid prose takes readers on an unforgettable journey through the skies. Lords of the Sky is a testament to the bravery, innovation, and sheer audacity of those who dared to conquer the heavens

Mobile Warfare for Africa – On the Successful Conduct of Wars in Africa and Beyond - Lessons Learned from the South African Border War - Roland de Vries, Camille Burger, Willem Steenkamp

This review has been submitted to The Canadian Army Journal 

Title: Mobile Warfare for Africa – On the Successful Conduct of Wars in Africa and Beyond - Lessons Learned from the South African Border War
Author: Roland de Vries, Camille Burger, Willem Steenkamp
ISBN: 978-1-912174-08-9
Publisher: Helion &Company
Year: 2017
Softcover
Pages: 388
Photos/Maps: 73/42

‘Si vis pacem para bellum – If you want peace, prepare for war’. This was the foundation upon which the South African Defence Force (SADF) was developed in order to counter the threats manifesting themselves throughout Southern Africa. The authors of this work (originally published in 1987 and reproduced in 2018) have all been involved in the historical analysis and doctrinal development of the SADF; none more so than Maj-Gen (ret’d) Roland de Vries, widely considered to be the ‘father’ of the SADF’s bush war doctrine. The degree of practical, ‘hands on’ experience translated in this work and the extent to which additional primary sources were tapped, ranging from senior German Afrka Korps Officers, African officers from across the continent and senior British and African Union security officials, affirms the depth of analysis and breadth of experience that has gone into the research for this book.

Above all, this is a teaching and information manual. The SADF was involved with numerous operations involving actions against both conventional militaries as well as asymmetric/guerilla style forces. Their experiences, captured in this book, covered the spectrum from small unit deep penetration operations, brigade level conventional multi-arms engagements, hearts and minds tasks to multi-element interdiction involving combinations of land forces and fixed and rotary wing assets.   

The narrative culminates in a series of case studies that provide context and concrete application of the lessons gleaned from the Bush War. They are all identically structured in order to facilitate understanding, with detailed maps and photographs. Each case study is directly tied to a chapter in the main text in order to deliver a real life example of the concepts being provided; all are stand alone and may be reviewed independently or in conjunction with the larger narrative.

Throughout the book, and in addition to the case studies, the Angolan Bush War (also known as the South African Border War), is referenced by the authors to provide foundational context to their perspectives. Fought between 1966 and 1989, it extended across modern day Angola, Zambia and Namibia and involved kinetic and asymmetric elements of warfare; ranging from low to high intensity clashes. From this laboratory of African conflict came many of the lessons that were applied in other theatres and regions. Drawing upon these lessons, the authors explain in depth, not only the development and application of tactics and doctrine but also how these lessons were applied to the development of equipment and, more specifically, vehicles and weapons systems that best suited the varied African environments.

Helion has again produced a book of the highest quality and the addition of an included but separate ‘atlas’ book enables the reader to follow the case studies and lessons learned with great ease. This book represents the culmination of literally decades of hard learned lessons in the harshest of classrooms, the battlefield. It not only is an engaging and fascinating read but also serves as an outstanding treatise on methods of combat that will stand any professional soldier, historian or casual militarist in good stead regardless of their geographic location, element or experience level. 

The German Failure in Belgium, August 1914 - Dennis Showalter, Joseph P Robinson, Janet A Robinson

This review has been submitted to Strategy and Tactics magazine.

Title: The German Failure in Belgium, August 1914

Author: Dennis Showalter, Joseph P Robinson, Janet A Robinson

ISBN: 978-1-476-67462-9

Publisher: McFarland Books

Year: 2019

Softcover

Pages: 217

Photos/Maps: 22/9  

Germany entered the First World War confident that it would be able to deal a crushing blow to the Western Front Allies within a few weeks, thereby freeing its forces to turn East in order to deal with Russia in turn; events turned out quite differently. The authors have undertaken an in-depth analysis of what circumstances and practices contributed to this over-estimation. The book is a succinct and insightful review; not long but telling in its conclusions.  

The authors look at two distinct but critical shortfalls amongst the German execution of the invasion plans of the West. They are: critical failings within the planning itself, and most tellingly, a failure of reconnaissance. Each exacerbated the shortfalls of the others and resulted in crucial errors in decision making, ultimately leading to the failure of the German efforts in the West.  

Von Moltke committed a number of key errors in the development of the plan itself. These were related to both strategic and operational planning and reflected interesting elements of the German General Staff’s relationship with other government departments. Moltke made the decision to avoid crossing the Maastricht Corridor of Holland in order to provide for a potential neutral access point to the North Sea should Germany require it. This judgement was clearly a Foreign Affairs and Kaiser responsibility; however they were not part of the process. It is estimated that the resulting Liege bottleneck cost the Germans at least three days. He also decided to reshuffle the allocation of cavalry assets away from the Northern Wing of the German advance without any reduction in the task allocation. They were therefore unable to complete any of the activities effectively. Additionally, he created ad hoc Cavalry Corp’s with Headquarters that had not been exercised in peacetime, resulting in confusion and inefficiency. Finally, in the planning phase, the Germans assumed away elements that ran contrary to their vision of how the invasion would work; specifically, the fact that the Belgian Army would fight and not allow for free passage. 

The authors then presents a detailed account of the first four weeks of the War; focussing on the challenges that arose as a result of the issues identified above. For an Army and General Staff that had an almost mystical reputation, fundamental errors in planning exacerbated challenges in execution. These were further compounded by a failure to fully appreciate the reconnaissance capabilities of the nascent air and cavalry elements. This failure in reconnaissance resulted in the Germans not having the visibility of the battlefield that was essential to the effective control of the complex operation that they were trying to execute. The conclusions postulated by the authors as to why this occurred are reasonable and applicable to modern command staffs.   

An comprehensive bibliography and notes section round out this excellent text. The author’s style is succinct and very readable. They have taken an interesting and unique perspective on the shortfalls which, as they point out, the Germans came very close to overcoming despite them. An outstanding addition to any library or reading list.

Dak To and the Border Battles of Vietnam, 1967-1968 - Michael A. Eggleston

This review submitted to Canadian Army Today Magazine.

Title: Dak To and the Border Battles of Vietnam, 1967-1968

Author: Michael A. Eggleston

ISBN: 978-1-4766-6417-0

Publisher: Mcfarland Books (McFarlandBooks.com)

Year: 2017

Softcover

Pages: 224

Photos/Maps: 19/24

The battles in Vietnam were reaching a peak as the 1960’s moved into their final years. Generally, the sense has been that the United States was fighting the wrong war for the wrong reasons and that the advantages lay predominantly with the North Vietnamese. Included in these were the willingness to absorb causalities, the sense that this war was of national importance, the ineffective and corrupt nature of the Southern Vietnamese government, the ineffectiveness of the Southern Vietnamese Army and the control that the communist regime in Northern Vietnam exercised over its people and resources. While much of this was true, the United States and its Allies were not without deep capabilities and the North Vietnamese not without weakness and internal division.

Eggleston’s book sheds light upon some of the key events in the entire Vietnam War: the period leading up to the Tet Offensive. Much has been written about the actual Tet Offensive, while relatively little has looked at the American and North Vietnamese strategies leading up to this Offensive. Each side achieved its initial aims with the Border Battles: the Vietnamese to draw American forces out of the cities and into the countryside and the US to draw Vietnamese forces into more traditional set piece battles where they could be destroyed.

This is an excellent book to read in order to gain an appreciation of the nature of the conflict during this period. He expertly combines a sweeping synopsis of the history and nature of the war up to the Border Battle period and then delves in more detail regarding the scope of this engagement. Of particular poignancy, the author has drawn upon firsthand accounts of participants from both sides; by including them as written, he ensures that the reader has great difficulty putting the book down due to their realism and the raw emotion elicited. I have rarely come across such descriptive and emotive recollections.

This is a book focussed on the soldiers and their experiences at the front; in the thick of battle. Eggleston does not spare those who were not equal to the leadership task nor those who failed in their responsibilities to their soldiers. It is interesting to note the comments related to the American leadership practice of senior commanders trying to conduct operations from helicopters (the idea being that one would be able to maintain a much better grasp of the battlefield). Additionally, discussions about the terrain and the unique nature of fighting the regular North Vietnamese Army units vice Vietcong are also very enlightening. Finally, the failure of the North Vietnamese to appreciate the ability of the US command to reposition its forces undermined the ability of the North to achieve its desired end state with Tet.

I recommend this book. It is not an in-depth analysis of the politics of the war, more a treatise on the nature of tactical level combat in the Vietnam theatre and its effects upon soldiers at the squad and platoon level. Disturbing, enlightening and poignant in equal measure.

On Tactics: A Theory of Victory in Battle - B.A. Friedman

This review has been submitted to Strategy and Tactics Magazine.

Title: On Tactics: A Theory of Victory in Battle

Author: B.A. Friedman

ISBN: 978-1-682471-63-0

Publisher: Naval Institute Press

Year: 2017

Hardcover

Pages: 241

The authors starts this work with the premise that Tactics, as a concept of war fighting, requires a reanalysis in light of the changes that have occurred in both the nature and execution of warfare. The re-examination focuses upon the elevation of tactics to a level that supplants the ‘operational’ level of command and a discussion on the traditional principles of warfare and their application to the modern battlefield.  

The book is not an easy read and requires patience to really glean what the author is looking to achieve. That is not to say that it is not well written but doctrine in and of itself requires thought and focus. In that light, this book demands considered deliberation.

He starts from the Clauswitzian school of the principles of war and decries the standard scholastic approach of rote learning and application. He emphasizes the need to avoid the trap of doctrine and its principles becoming dogma. Notwithstanding this position, Friedman does suggest an abridged, updated version that he identifies as being Tenets of War vice Principles. He postulates the difference as being one where Principles are rigid whereas Tenets are not. It is somewhat challenging to see where the line between the two is drawn but certainly, his suggestion is a good place for discussion and engagement. He divides his Tenets into three distinct categories: Physical, Mental and Moral. Follow-on chapters address each in more detail.

A central aspect of his analysis is his rejection of the Operational level of war. His position is that anything involving operations below the level of strategy is in fact tactics. To define an intermediary level is to inject un-necessary friction and confusion in the application of the Tenets. He does however, readily acknowledge the utility of an operational designation for those aspects that do not have a clear ‘home’ within the tactical or strategic levels (logistics, cyber, asymmetric, etc).

His assertion that those areas outside of the strategic/tactical sphere are in fact elements of operational art but not strategy or tactics in and of themselves is somewhat confusing. After all, in the modern age, cyber warfare for example, has become a means of engaging ones adversaries without any physical interaction and could therefore be defined as a method of achieving strategic aims.

The main body of the book is followed by a series of appendices that expand upon his positions vis-à-vis asymmetric warfare, the operational level of war, centre of gravity, training and structure. These are very helpful in clarifying how these various elements are incorporated (or not) into his assertion that Strategy and Tactics are the only two viable levels of war.

Overall, this work is an interesting salvo into an area that does deserve review. His position is certainly understandable; however, rejection of an operational level of command does run the risk of muddying the delineation of responsibility between commanders. Changes in capability, technology and methodology certainly underscore the need to look at how militaries control and command in war. This work suggests some interesting proposals.