MiG Alley: The US Air Force in Korea 1950-53 - Thomas McKelvey Cleaver

This review has been submitted to Strategy 

and Tactics Magazine.

Title: MiG Alley: The US Air Force in Korea 1950-53
Author: Thomas McKelvey Cleaver
ISBN: 978-1-4728-3608-3
Publisher: Osprey Publishing 
Year: 2019
 Hardcover
Pages: 326

Conventional wisdom relating to the Korean War has the UN Forces (read US Air Force) maintaining an incredible kill ratio vs the MiG 15’s of the Koreans and Chinese. Drawing upon primary source material, the author has shown conclusively that, rather than the 14:1 kill/loss rate normally quoted, in reality the air campaign was far closer with rates approaching 1:1 during the first half of the war and 1.3/1 in the latter years. 

Cleaver has undertaken an excellent review of the air war, citing from interviews, intelligence reports and mission assessments from both sides in a (successful) effort to overturn traditional perceptions. The flow of the narrative follows the timeline of the conflict and the reader is therefore able to trace the development of tactics, doctrine and aircraft and the impact that it had as the war progressed. 

Cleaver incorporates within the narrative, a clear and concise discussion of the capabilities of the primary combat aircraft of the adversaries: MiG-15 for the North and the F-86 Sabre for the UN. In the course of his assessments, he is able to prove that, from a technical perspective, the MIG-15 was an equal match for the F-86 and overall, a far superior aircraft to F-51D, F-80 and the navy F9F Panther. His suggestion that the discriminating factor for success became the expertise of the pilots at the controls and the development of doctrine that drew upon the advantages each airframe had over the other, is well supported by primary source analysis. For example, with its multiple cannon and advantage in rate of climb and dive speeds the MiG was best suited as a hit and run platform that could do devastating damage with only one or two strikes; whereas the Sabre, with its 6 x .50 guns and close in maneuverability, was ideal in a more traditional dog-fighting role. 

The author has focussed a great deal of the book on a balanced evaluation of flight documents and after action reports; his analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the pilots (Soviet, Chinese, Commonwealth and American) is fascinating as is his investigation of bias and hubris amongst them. Cleaver adroitly encapsulates the Air War in Korea within the broader spectrum of the international struggle developing between East and West. Thus it was that the nations involved went to great lengths to conceal/manipulate losses and victories as a means of propaganda.

His conclusions are of particular interest as they are not standard in nature. Rather than simply look at win/loss rates and the fact that the ‘North Korean’ air force was not able to operate south of the 38^th parallel, he draws far more nuanced deductions. He posits, for example, that the goal of the North was to prevent UN forces from being able to bomb Northern Korea with impunity. In this respect they were successful in that B-29 losses were such that daylight bombing was suspended and fighter bomber efforts were limited. In fact, as Cleaver points out, the air interdiction campaign of the UN was never able to isolate the North Koreans and Chinese on the battlefield.

A fascinating book and well worthy of a read for those who wish to achieve a deeper understanding of the strengths and limitations of air campaigns. Cleaver has undertaken a comprehensive analyses of his subject, well supported by primary source material, that he presents in a logical and easily understood manner. He has also added a very human dimension to his work with the inclusion of personal anecdotes from participants on both sides of the conflict. Strongly recommended.