ISBN: 978-0-674-04891-1
Pages: 342
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Photos/Maps: 16 b/w// 6
Ben Shepherd has written
an engaging and very thought-provoking book. Given the relatively recent
experiences of the western countries involved in the Yugoslav breakup and the
subsequent Bosnian War of the early to mid 1990's, his observations and
conclusions bridge the historical gap and provide enticing context for the reader. The
similarities between the issues of the Austro-Hungarian period and the period
of German occupation relating to intercene rivalries are striking in their
close relationship to the modern day events in the region.
Shepherd commences his
narrative far before the Second World War, during the period leading up to the
First World War, analyzing the makeup of the German/Austro-Hungarian Officer
corps. He traces the influences and metamorphoses of the leadership of the Army
as it is rapidly expanded beyond its traditional recruiting zone to meet the
demands of the First World War, contracted again following the defeat of the
Central Powers and then expanded once again as WW2 loomed. What is fascinating
about the forty year period with which he introduces his book, is the degree to
which he shows the army command being dramatically influenced by the
fundamental transformational changes within 'German' (read Austrian and German)
nation state and the effect that this has upon, the views and conducts of the junior
officers of 1914-1918, transformed into the senior officers of 1939-1945.
Once he has established
this framework, he then delves into the nature and environment of the
operations themselves; specifically focusing upon the physical and demographic
challenges faced by the Germans as well as the shortcomings associated with
their evaluation of the regional issues. Shepherd succinctly relates the
evolution of the nature of combat within the region from conventional to
asymmetric and is able to convey to the reader the convoluted and confusing
nature of the conflict.
For the modern strategist,
a number of lessons may be drawn relating to how and why the Germans enjoyed
success in some areas and continued frustration in others. Notably:
a.
The development
of hunter groups to track and engage insurgents. The Germans, specifically of
the 718th ID, recognizing that they, as an occupation Division, did not have
the depth of capability that a normal front line division would have, played to
their strengths and developed a concept of highly mobile, well-armed units that
would take the fight via swift tactical strikes to the enemy;
b.
The Germans had
never been faced with insurgent style of warfare on the scale that they were
dealing with in Yugoslavia. Doctrinally, they were not well equipped to deal
with how to fight a war of this nature. Therefore their reactions tended to be
very heavy handed, generalized and brutal which, while successful to a certain
degree, did not facilitate a long term pacification program;
c.
Doctrinally, there
did not appear to be a common approach to dealing with the rebels. Thus the
success of the hunter group tactics of the 718 ID were not mirrored by other
divisions operating within the same region;
d.
As stated above,
the Germans had not been faced with a concerted program of resistance before
Yugoslavia. They therefore underestimated the forces necessary to keep the
region pacified. This lack of resources led the Germans to respond in a number
of ways: utilizing surrogate forces such as the Ustacha and Chetniks as well as
by overreacting to attacks by judging any civilians in the region as guilty by
association and therefore subject to summary judgement. This type of behaviour
resulting in a further alienation of the population writ large and an
undermining of the credibility of the Wehrmacht as it was seen to be abrogating
its authority to groups whose actions were nothing if not more brutal and
depraved; and
e.
The Germans
divided the command and control of their forces between different regional
commands resulting in diverging centres of gravity and an inefficient use of
scarce resources. This situation was alleviated later on in the conflict but
served to dilute their response power for the early years of the war.
Shepherd identifies six
major players in the Yugoslav tapestry: Bosians, Chetniks (Serb resistance),
Ustacha (Croat government fighters), Partisans (communist rebels), Italians
(occupation forces) and the Germans. The convoluted relationship enjoyed by all
of these groups was, to say the least, phenomenally confusing. Each had
multiple agenda's and one's enemy today may very well be one's ally tomorrow.
This precluded the Germans from developing a consistent long term stabilization
strategy as a dearth of resources forced them to rely significantly upon one
group or another. Shepherd's relating of this ongoing Gordian Knot saga is
commendable.
The author shares his
focus between the divisional commanders of the primary German divisions engaged
in long term operations within Yugoslavia; their individual histories and
influences and the general behaviour of the divisions during their tenure in
command. This is very interesting for the reader as it studies the influences
that the experiences of the commanders had on their responses to these regional
crisis. It is a worthy attempt at connecting the psychological histories of
these men with their command actions.
The book has extensive
notes section that provides critical additional information for the reader and
a somewhat limited bibliography highlighting primary source material on
specific Divisional Commanders. One area that was somewhat distracting was the
tendency of the author to make observations relating to extreme forms of
behaviour or outlook (such as anti-Semitism or the impact of social Darwinism
within the officer ranks) only to mitigate the impact in the next sentence with
a moderating comment suggesting that the item should not be
over-emphasized. Also his comments
relating to the effects of specialization within the officer corps limiting
"out of the box" thinking would appear to be contradicted by the fact
that the German army of both the First and Second World Wars displayed
considerable ability to improvise.
Overall, I greatly enjoyed
this book and feel that it is very worthwhile for aspiring leaders to learn
from. The challenges of the Yugoslav region have not changed from one hundred
years ago and Shepherd has done a praiseworthy job of making sense out of a
tremendously complicated region of World War 2.
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