The information presented was written by Chris Buckham; however, it was published in The Canadian Army Journal. Therefore, the material is reproduced here by the author with the permission of the journal. If you would like to republish this information or refer to excerpts please contact the Editor Canadian Army Journal (ANDREW.GODEFROY@forces.gc.ca). Website for the Journal is: http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/default-eng.asp?view=more
Author: Dodge Billingsley
ISBN: 978-1-909384-77-4
Hardcover
Pages: 181
Photo's/Maps: 11/30
Publisher: Helion Publishing
Between 1994 and
2009 the Russian Federation and the Chechen fighters fought two distinct wars
over the question of independence for Chechnya. These wars were interesting in
that, while they were both fought between the same adversaries, the nature,
doctrine and skill sets evident in each conflict were, in fact, unique and gave
each conflict a very individual character. The author, an experienced conflict
reporter, was embedded regionally during the fighting and was able to interview
a number of Chechen combatants on how they planned and executed operations.
One of the most
evident and consistent conclusions drawn by the author was the critical
limitations imposed upon the Chechen's by their lack of a coherent or reliable
logistics system. Throughout both wars they were utterly unable to hold
territory for any length of time due to their inability to resupply and
maintain their forces. Thus, during the initial fighting in 1994/1995, while Chechen
forces had artillery, tanks and other advanced weapons systems, they quickly
became ineffective due to a lack of munitions, spares and recovery
capabilities.
The Chechen’s were
also hampered by their ad hoc fighting and command and control structures.
Units were formed around individuals from common towns or villages and were
loyal only to their elected leaders. Often they would depart a battlefield for
personal or clan reasons without notification to their central command. Orders
from the centre were extremely general, often only outlining roughly where they
were to deploy. Individual unit leaders would then determine tactics and plans
without consulting neighbouring sections. This often resulted in fractured
responses and a lack of confidence between units in the reliability of others.
Nevertheless, as the
author relates, the Chechen’s were not lacking in courage or tactical
capability. Employing advanced defensive techniques, they were regularly able
to counter Russian offensive doctrine and inflict significant damage upon
armour and air assets. They were also able to take advantage of local support
for food, shelter and information depending upon the region within which they
were operating. This changed as the second war dragged on and fatigue amongst
the civilian population for the conflict combined with Russian success at
promoting interse conflict between Chechen groups sapped sources of local
support.
Another area that
strikes the reader, where the Chechen's excelled, was their ability to
improvise weapons systems out of everyday parts. Thus, despite the fact that
they lacked access to formal weapons systems such as rocket launchers, they
were able to maintain stocks by building their own. For example, they would
salvage the driveshaft covers from MAZ trucks to serve as the launch tube for
57mm S-5 rockets and similarly, the driveshaft covers from Ural trucks for 80mm
S-8 rockets. Sites for these weapons were developed by utilizing half
-binoculars or something similar. The rockets themselves were usually salvaged
from shot-down helicopters.
Billingsley has
drafted his text in a series of vignettes, each accompanied by a colour map,
that serve to highlight a different aspect of Chechen techniques in asymmetric
warfare. He emphasizes Chechen strengths and weaknesses under different
fighting scenarios providing a detailed account of the battles as recounted by
individuals present on the field, followed by a commentary that encapsulates
the lessons to be drawn for the encounter. His chapters are broken out by
operational type such as 'Defense of an Urban Area', 'Raids', 'Ambush and
Counterambush' and 'Defense of Lines of Communications' and may thus be read as
a collective or individually without breaking the flow of the narrative.
I liked
Billingsley's style of writing and the methods he used to summarize the
chapters. I found that it provided a quick and accurate synopsis of the lessons
to be gleaned from the Chechen experience. While the book is focused
exclusively upon the Chechen's themselves, it is evident as one reads of the
later battles of the 2000's, that the quality and professionalism of the
Russians had also improved dramatically. Included with the book is a good
bibliography of books and video's for additional reading.
Helion has produced
another quality book worth, to the reader, the investment of time and money.
The authors unique insights, enabled by his close working relationship with the
Chechen's, makes for a technical but interesting read. His narrative is blunt,
honest and balanced and he does no shy away from critical conclusions of the
Chechen efforts where warranted.
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