Commanding the Pacific: Marine Corp Generals in World War II - Stephen R. Taaffe

This review has been submitted to Leatherneck Magazine.

Title: Commanding the Pacific: Marine Corp Generals in World War II
Author: Stephen R. Taaffe
ISBN: 978-1-68247-708-3
Publisher: Navel Institute Press
Year: 2021
Hardcover
Pages: 232
Photos/Maps: 0/9

"Commanding the Pacific: Marine Corps Generals in World War II" by Stephen R. Taaffe delves into the remarkable contributions and strategic leadership of Marine Corps generals during one of the most pivotal conflicts in modern history. Taaffe's extensive research and insightful analysis bring to light the crucial roles played by these military leaders in shaping the outcome of the war in the Pacific theater. A meticulous attention to detail underpins the authors analysis. With a focus on the fifteen General Officers who led the Marine Corps six divisions and two corps throughout the Pacific War, the book offers a profound exploration of their actions, decisions, and the lasting impact they had on the outcome of the war. 

Taaffe's book offers a comprehensive account of the major Marine Corps generals and their leadership during World War II. The author provides a detailed examination of the pivotal battles and campaigns fought in the Pacific, such as Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Peleliu and Iwo Jima, while interweaving the stories of the generals who commanded these operations. Through meticulous research, Taaffe brings to life the strategic decisions, tactical innovations, and the immense challenges faced by these commanders. 

One of the book's strengths lies in its ability to present a balanced perspective on the Marine Corps generals. Taaffe portrays them as fallible human beings, highlighting their successes as well as their shortcomings. By delving into the complex personalities and leadership styles of these commanders, the author provides a nuanced understanding of their decision-making processes and the factors that influenced their strategic choices. Not the least of these factors being the highly constrained tactical environments within which the Marines were operating, against opponents who had time to develop intricate and deadly defensive works. This approach facilitates the reader appreciating the challenges associated with undertaking intricate operations from non-fixed support bases against enemies that were as much the unforgiving tropical environment as well as a highly motivated and competent Japanese. 

Taaffe's writing is engaging and accessible, making the book appealing to both military history enthusiasts and general readers. He skillfully combines historical analysis with personal anecdotes and vivid descriptions of the battles, evoking a sense of the immense sacrifices made by both the generals and the men under their command. The author's storytelling prowess adds depth and emotional resonance to the narrative, making it a compelling read from start to finish. 

Furthermore, "Commanding the Pacific" goes beyond individual biographies and battles to explore broader themes of military strategy and leadership. Taaffe examines the Marine Corps' evolving doctrine, the challenges of amphibious warfare, and the intricacies of joint operations with other branches of the military. This broader perspective offers valuable insights into the complexities of command and the interplay between strategic planning and battlefield execution. 

The book also sheds light on the organizational dynamics and inter-service rivalries that shaped the Marine Corps' role in the Pacific theater. Taaffe delves into the relationship between Marine Corps generals and their counterparts in the Army and Navy, illuminating the struggles for resources, influence, and autonomy. The Marines did not have representation at the strategic table where targeting was decided and thus had little to no influence on the allocation of resources and personnel. By exploring these dynamics, the author enriches our understanding of the broader military and political landscape of World War II. His crisply written study provides for an effective introduction into the relationships between these commanders as they waged war under appalling conditions in an extremely complex international conflict. Additionally, the book sheds light on how the Marine Corps leadership maintained morale and motivation amongst forces spread across the vast expanse of the Pacific Theatre of operations; in many cases isolated from traditional western conveniences. These challenges proved to be, in many respects, just as tasking and perplexing. 

"Commanding the Pacific: Marine Corps Generals in World War II" by Stephen R. Taaffe is an outstanding contribution to the study of military history. Taaffe's meticulous research, engaging narrative, and balanced perspective provide a profound exploration of the strategic leadership and contributions of Marine Corps generals in the Pacific theater. This book is a must-read for anyone interested in World War II, military strategy, or the complexities of leadership in the face of daunting challenges.

Meat Grinder: The Battles for the Rzhev Salient 1942-43 - Prit Buttar

This review has been submitted to the British Army Review.

Title: Meat Grinder: The Battles for the Rzhev Salient 1942-43
Author: Prit Buttar
ISBN: 978-1-4728-5181-9
Publisher: Osprey
Year: 2022
Hardcover
Pages: 464
Photos/Maps: 38/17

"Meat Grinder" by Prit Buttar is a meticulously researched and compelling account of the Eastern Front during World War II. Spanning from November 1942 to March 1943, the book delves deep into the four campaigns waged by the Soviets in an effort to dislodge the Germans from their salient, highlighting the immense human cost and operational complexities of the conflict. With a comprehensive analysis of the military tactics, political maneuvers, and personal stories of soldiers on both sides, Buttar offers readers a gripping and harrowing portrayal of one of the most significant, but little known, campaigns of the Eastern Front war.

One of the notable strengths of "Meat Grinder" is Buttar's ability to provide a balanced narrative that gives equal attention to both the Soviet and German perspectives. By examining the decision-making processes of both sides, the author offers valuable insights into the motivations and challenges faced by the commanders and soldiers. Buttar's meticulous attention to detail and extensive use of primary sources, including diaries, letters, and official documents, adds a layer of authenticity to the narrative, allowing readers to gain a deeper understanding of the realities of war.

Moreover, Buttar's writing style is engaging and accessible, making complex military strategies and maneuvers understandable for readers with varying levels of knowledge on the subject. The author excels at breaking down grand strategy into individual battles and engagements, vividly describing the tactical decisions made by commanders and the impact they had on the overall campaign. This approach keeps the readers engaged throughout the book and enhances their understanding of the broader context within which these battles took place.

Buttar also excels in capturing the human side of the conflict. By weaving in personal anecdotes and experiences of soldiers from both sides, he humanizes the war, bringing to life the individuals who fought and sacrificed in these grueling campaigns. From the desperate struggles for survival to the acts of heroism and camaraderie amidst the chaos, these personal stories evoke a sense of empathy and make the reader emotionally invested in the outcome of the battles.

Another notable aspect of "Meat Grinder" is the author's exploration of the role that the personality of Marshal Zhukov (the senior Soviet commander) played in the continuing efforts of the Soviet Forces to dislodge the Germans, despite losses that eventually exceeded over two million dead, wounded and missing, for dubious returns. Buttar effectively demonstrates how the immense resources and manpower dedicated to the Rzhev Salient significantly affected Soviet operations elsewhere on the Eastern Front. Conversely, by diverting Soviet forces and drawing them into a series of protracted and costly conflicts, the Germans were able to stabilize the Central Front, despite significant losses of their own. This analysis offers a fresh understanding of the importance of the campaigns and challenges conventional Stalingrad centric narratives.

However, one slight challenge of the book is its dense and detailed nature. While the extensive research is commendable, at times, the sheer amount of information presented can be overwhelming. Some readers who are less familiar with the Eastern Front might find it challenging to keep track of the numerous battles, locations, and individuals discussed in the narrative. Nevertheless, the book provides a comprehensive glossary and maps that aid in navigation and understanding.

In conclusion, "Meat Grinder" by Prit Buttar is an exceptional work that sheds light on the oft overlooked Rzhev Salient battles that easily matched in intensity but dwarfed in scope the much better known Stalingrad offensive to the south. With its meticulous research, balanced perspective, and engaging narrative style, the book offers a comprehensive and insightful account of the brutal battles fought between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. By capturing the human experiences within the larger context of military strategy and political maneuvering, Buttar delivers a captivating and thought-provoking read that will appeal to both history enthusiasts and general readers alike.

COSSAC: Lt.Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan and the Genesis of Operation Overlord - Stephen C Kepher

This review has been submitted to the Journal of the Society for 

Army Historical Research

Title: COSSAC: Lt.Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan and the Genesis of Operation Overlord
Author: Stephen C Kepher
ISBN: 978-1-68247-508-9
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
Year: 2020
Hardcover
Pages: 300
Photos/Maps: 16/3

The development of the plan for the Allied invasion of the European mainland (Op Overlord) remains as one of the most complex military operations in history. Much has been written and studied relating to the actual invasion itself; however, the effort that went into the conceptualization and development of the plan itself has been generally overlooked in the discussion. Kepher’s book sheds light not only on the method by which the plan unfolded but also the myriad of other factors that had to be taken into account that were unique to this operation: the amphibious element, the multinational C2 issues, the integration of naval, air and land elements, the political facets and, central throughout, the role of LGen Morgan to the success of the project. 

This is the authors first book and he does an admirable job of recreating the environment within which Morgan was to operate. The author undertakes a noteworthy discussion and analysis of perhaps the greatest obstacle facing Morgan, in explaining to his readership, who have grown up in the era of multinational operations and NATO, what it was like for the Allies to create, from scratch and with little to no precedence, a planning team for the invasion. Exacerbating this challenge was that while Morgan as COSSAC (Chief of Staff Supreme Allied Commander) was expected to develop and plan the operation, there was no Supreme Allied Commander appointed. Thus he had no ‘top cover; for the decisions that he was making, nor guidance on the myriad of questions to be answered. Kepher’s liberal use of Morgan’s diaries of the period add additional depth and resonance to the narrative. 

This work serves as an excellent reference for anyone (military or civilian) undertaking a role in which they are working with a consortium of different nationalities, industries or political affiliations. Morgan’s experiences and those of his staff, highlight the benefits and pitfalls associated with these kinds of interactions. What serves as the best means of interaction, how does one undertake conflict resolution, what is the method to best address accusations of external favoritism by ones own government and military? All these examples, and more, are discussed at length through Morgan, and his staffs, own words and experiences. 

The author has included significant additional data in the annexes, thus providing the reader with tangible references covering command structures and relationships, force structures, actual documentation from Morgan providing synopsis of his planning as well as selected abbreviations and acronyms. Kepher deliberately refrains from excessive use of military acronyms and slang in an effort to keep the narrative accessible to the average reader. Additionally, he provides comprehensive endnotes and bibliography that serve to suggest additional avenues of inquiry for the reader. 

The Naval Institute Press have published a high quality book that is both an outstanding rendition of the staff and planning work behind one of the most complex military operations in recent times as well as an excellent professional development tool. Highly recommended for the casual and professional historian alike. 

Eighth Army vs Rommel: Tactics, Training and Operations in North Africa 1940-1942 - James Colvin

 This review has been submitted to the Canadian Army Journal 

Title: Eighth Army vs Rommel: Tactics, Training and Operations in North Africa 1940-1942
Author: James Colvin
ISBN: 978-1-913336-64-6
Publisher: Helion and Company
Year: 2020
Softcover
Pages: 261
Photos/Maps: 30/11

The characteristics that define individuals as military warriors and leaders (integrity, bravery, self-sacrifice etc) are not the same as those that characterize members of the Profession of Arms. Like doctors, lawyers, architects or any other field that identifies itself by a professional standard, the Profession of Arms requires serious study, development, mentorship and expertise (in addition to the characteristics of the warrior). Colvin, in his work, approaches his analysis of the adversaries in the North African Campaign through their respective attitudes towards the development of their military leadership and how that attitude influenced the execution of operations. It is a unique and interesting study as it encompasses not only the pure military elements of the African conflict itself but also how the cultural/societal influences within which the respective antagonists developed; and how this affected their conduct and approach to military operations. Unique in its approach is the authors focus, not on the most senior levels of command, but the Corps and Divisional leaders. 

Colvin opens his book with an overarching review of the cultural environments that most heavily  influenced the development of the German and British leadership. The British approach, based predominantly within the Public School system emphasized fair play, team efforts and loyalty to ones peers. This style manifested itself into the primacy of and loyalty to the Regiment and their associated traditions. A directive and structured style of leadership and execution was often undermined by subordinate’s loyalty being primarily to a peer or commander from the same school (Eton etc) or Regiment as opposed to the appointed one. Conversely, a British Commander would often support a weak subordinate from a common background all the while refraining from being seen as too ‘directive’. 

The Germans, on the other hand, took a much more serious approach to the “art and science’ of military command. The German command schoolhouse had much higher standards and expectations than its British counterpart. Officers and senior NCOs were actively challenged to adapt to differing situations and to assume higher levels of command without hesitation. The Germans developed a common doctrine and ensured that it was clearly understood and adhered to across its forces. Colvin’s analysis of this critical area is both insightful and thought provoking. 

The author then segues this into a discussion of the doctrine and equipment development of the respective adversaries. Central to this was the use of ‘combined arms’ units by the Germans and the resistance to this by the British. The stove-piping of British combat elements enabled smaller German forces to overcome larger Allied forces by being able to call upon a variety of means to counter UK forces. Combined this with a well established doctrine that enabled the fluid and transparent transitions of command (requiring little to no formal ‘orders’) meant that the Germans were far more flexible in their approach and response. By contrast, British command was characterized by micro-management, misplaced loyalty, inconsistent doctrine and a more collegial and inclusive (as opposed to directive) leadership style. The author, to be clear, casts no aspersions on the bravery, loyalty and effort of British Commanders as individuals, but does draw attention to the cumulative impact of treating warfare as a ‘Great Game’ as opposed to a deadly serious profession.   

Additionally, Colvin includes within his discussions a detailed comparison of the weapons that each side utilized and how they adjusted their equipment and tactics to account for changes in their opposition. Thus it was that, while the Allies tended to have higher numbers of tanks, German tanks were of higher overall quality and were more survivable. When faced for example, with the British 2 pdr anti-tank gun, the Germans were able to counter with hardened frontal ‘spaced’ armour that enabled them to neutralize the penetrating power of the 2 pdr round. Additionally, the Germans adjusted their doctrine to utilize the famous 88 mm in an anti-tank role. Colvin’s discussion highlights the difference between the more ad hoc approach of the Allies compared with the more structured and deliberate approach of the Germans in their respective responses to the challenges of warfare in the desert. 

The author then follows with a series of chapters discussing and analyzing the performance of the adversaries in a series of key offensives and battles leading up to the Second Battle of El Alamein. Each highlights the respective competencies and shortcomings of the commanders and the methods by which they utilized their forces. While not all goes the Germans way, the Allies are seen to continue to struggle with effective command and control over their assets. Colvin sets the tone by looking at the effects of the ‘Crusader’ battles and the lessons that the respective combatants gleaned from them. He then goes on to look at how those lessons were correspondingly applied to the training and doctrine of the forces involved. Ultimately, it is the Allies which continue to struggle in the subsequent battles of Tobruk and Gazala; their commanders not having been able to discern their doctrinal shortcomings (shortcomings that were able to continue to be exploited by the Afrika Korps). 

Colvin closes his book with the arrival of Montgomery and the changes that he brings in terms of command, presence and leadership to the Allied side. His approach is much more in line with the Germans  and he breaks the mold of the traditional ‘fair play, public school chum’ view of his predecessors.  Commanders are not forgiven their shortfalls and a far tighter grip and focus is instilled. 

Colvin has written an excellent analysis of a level of command and control not often addressed but that is critical to the effective execution of the vision of the Theatre Commander: that of the Divisional and Corps commanders. His incorporation of the societal influences on the personality and professional development of the respective officer corps of the German and Allied forces is extremely instructive in comprehending the ‘foundation’ upon which these leaders developed. A comprehensive bibliography and footnote compendium as well as a superior quality publication from Helion round out this stellar work. This is a book that should be read more than once.

General Erich Hoepner: A Military Biography - W Chales de Beaulieu translated by Linden Lyons

This review has been submitted to Iron Cross Magazine. 

Title: General Erich Hoepner: A Military Biography
Author: W Chales de Beaulieu trans Linden Lyons
ISBN: 978-1-612-00976-6
Publisher: Casemate Publishing
Year: 2021
Hardcover
Pages: 252
Photos/Maps: 2/4 

De Beaulieu served as Hoepner’s first general staff officer during his campaign in Poland (1939) and then as his Chief of Staff during Hoepner’s campaigns in France and Russia. He therefore gained a deep insight and appreciation of both the personality and leadership style of this superb officer and panzer commander. Erich Hoepner’s career was characterized by his unwavering loyalty to the soldiers under his command, his duty to his country and the dictates of his conscience. Thus it was that he fulfilled the former with an aficionado’s skill in leading his panzers to Prague, Warsaw, Leningrad and the gates of Moscow and the latter by sacrificing his career for the welfare of his men before Moscow and his life in an effort to rid his country of Hitler. 

The author examens each of Hoepner’s campaigns individually by chapter. His focus is not simply upon the physical execution of the operations themselves but also the influence and affect of Hoepner’s personality on both the battlespace and the execution of his orders. De Beaulieu is a great admirer of Hoepners and this comes across in his evaluations; however, he is not an impartial sycophant. He is, for the most part, quite balanced in his assessment of Hoepner’s decisions; for example he discusses at some length the challenges that Hoepner faced during his drive into Belgium and makes note of errors made during the critical encounter with the Allies during the initial assault of the Dyle Line. Conversely, the author is too generous in his praise of German success against the French Cavalry Corps during the Battle of Hannut. While Hoepner prevailed in the battle, he did not succeed in destroying the French, enabling them to fight another day before Dunkirk. 

Along with Guderian, Hoepner was one of the very early proponents of an independent, self contained Panzer arm capable of deep, dramatic drives into the rear echelons of the enemy. He viewed this as the best way to unbalance and, more importantly, maintain the unbalance, of his adversaries. The author’s analysis of Hoepners drive towards Leningrad serve as perhaps the penultimate example of the effective operational use of the Panzer Arm in the hands of an expert at the peak of his prowess. 

The narrative of the book focuses upon Hoepner as leader and commander and the operational role that his forces undertook in the campaigns presented. The writing style and flow of the author makes for an easy grasp of the context. The work is lacking in sufficient maps that would have greatly facilitated the following of the operations as they unfolded. Although the narrative does give the reader a definite appreciation of the challenges of the terrain, distances, enemy forces and logistics that needed to be overcome, additional maps would have been very useful. The author undertakes, throughout the book, to present Hoepner as a real person, complete with flaws and errors. It is through this lens that the true strengths of Hoepner as both a military professional and quintessential leader are actually emphasized. That Hoepner is an exceptional commander and leader is beyond question; however, it is his willingness to assume responsibility for his decisions, despite the potential consequences, that serves to separate him from an already deep bench of competency. His actions before Moscow in January, 1942 and his willingness to support the July Plot against Hitler (for which he was tried and executed) are evidence of his moral strength and sound ethical grounding.  

The translation from the original German is excellent and there are ample footnotes that serve to expand upon more complicated portions of the operational narrative. Casemate has published a book of high quality. I would strongly recommend this work both as a reference for German operations from the period 1939-1941 and as an excellent study of a lesser known but equally impressive German Officer and Commander.

Montgomery: Friends Within Foes Without, Relationships in and Around 21st Army Group - Malcolm Pill

This review has been published in British Army Review. 

Title: Montgomery: Friends Within Foes Without, Relationships in and Around 21st Army Group
Author: Malcolm Pill
ISBN: 978-1-912690-53-4
Publisher: Unicorn Publishing
Year: 2019
Hardcover
Pages: 303
Photos: 30

Montgomery has proven to be, along with Patton for the Americans, perhaps the most controversial of the British senior commanders of the Second World War.  That he was a brilliant commander (with an ego to match) has been analyzed in multiple biographies and studies; Pill however, has approached his study of Montgomery strictly from the perspective of his personal and command relationships with his immediate staff and, externally, with those leaders of the British, Canadian and American forces germane to his command relationships. Pill’s is a story of personality, style and expectations as opposed to operational or tactical scrutiny. 

Pill’s multifaceted approach reveals a great deal about the inner thoughts of Montgomery: what he saw as important, how he viewed the execution of the war, what were the events and experiences that shaped both his and those with whom he interacted, perspectives and what influenced his decision making. While he has drawn upon a multitude of sources, it is the personal diaries and letters (he was a prodigious chronicler) of Montgomery and his confreres where Pill is able to shed light on the inner thoughts of the man. Unlike memoires which, written in the immediacy of the moment, are a much better source for glimpses into the honest thinking of the authors.

The author has divided his narrative into a series of sub-sections that fall broadly into Montgomery’s dealings with subordinates within 21st Army Gp, allies (and external commands) and operations within which he was involved. Pill’s engaging account casts a critical light not upon Montgomery’s capabilities as a tactician and operational planner, but upon his confidence and competence as a leader and commander. Much of the controversy, Pill conclusively proves, that Montgomery was involved with, was of his own making and not the result of external circumstance. Montgomery’s experience as commander of the 8th Army in North Africa and his subsequent endearment to the British nation as the ‘victor over Rommel’, ultimately led him to fall victim to that all too common occurrence of ‘believing his own press’. As Pill observes, this loss of humility resulted in an inflated sense of self that was toxic to relations with those not under his direct command. Montgomery’s inability to acknowledge the competencies and effectiveness of others outside of his immediate control was his Achilles heel and undermined much of the cooperation and support that he might otherwise have enjoyed.

This is a unique and fascinating account of the man and the commander that was Montgomery. The reader is left with the impression that, once the war ended, he struggled to find his place. Certainly his relations with a majority of his subordinate commanders remained good in the years following the war but the fact that he had burned so many bridges within the British command community and on the international stage precluded his being considered for many positions that he would otherwise have been eminently qualified for. Pill has done his research and his book serves as an excellent example and warning for those leaders who come after.

At War’s Summit: The Red Army and the Struggle for the Caucasus Mountains in World War II - Alexander Statiev

This review has been submitted to the RCAF Journal

Title: At War’s Summit: The Red Army and the Struggle for the Caucasus Mountains in World War II
Author: Alexander Statiev
ISBN: 978-1-108-42462-2
Publisher: Cambridge UP
Year: 2018
Hardcover
Pages: 440
Photos/Maps: 22/19

In June, 1942 the Axis powers launched Fall Blau, the southern drive to capture the Caucasus region of the Soviet Union, thereby securing the oil fields for Germany and depriving the Soviets of the southern resupply link with the West. Dividing the southern forces into Army Group’s A and B, the Axis powers initially enjoyed great success with Gp B driving towards Stalingrad and Gp A thrusting into the Transcaucasus region towards Baku. Ultimately however, the Axis overextended themselves and the Soviets were able to break the German advance at Stalingrad. Overshadowed by the disaster in Stalingrad, the efforts of Army Gp A and, more specifically, the fighting amongst the unforgiving peaks on the Transcaucus Mountain range, have been generally relegated to the back pages of history. Statiev’s book is an effort to not only rectify that shortfall but to also shed light on the numerous lessons to be gleaned from combat in the brutal high altitude mountain environment. 

While Statiev does discuss, by way of comparison, the development of mountain troops in both Russia and Germany, his focus is primarily upon the Russian perspective throughout the book. He ensures that the reader has a sound appreciation of the history of mountain operations in Russia by drawing attention to a series of past conflicts in which Russian forces were fighting in mountainous regions. He is able to convincingly prove that a plethora of information was available to the Russians regarding the unique challenges posed by altitude operations and the means to overcome them. His discussion of the popularity of the climbing during the interwar period in both Germany and Russia reinforces the fact that both countries had ample expertise to draw upon. 

Statiev comprehensive discussion/analysis of the German 49^th Mountain Corps thrust into the Caucasus Mountains in an effort to cut off the coastal region, and the Russian efforts to resist them, is remarkably engaging and educating, reflecting a writing style that captures the imagination while retaining a scholarly quality. The Russians retained all of the advantages of numbers, short lines of communication and unchallenged control of the skies. The systemic failure of the Russian leadership to properly lead, equip and train its soldiers to meet the challenges of both the Germans and the environment is all the more appalling as a result. Their approach of ‘quantity over quality’ reflects an absolute arrogance and desperation with respect to the lives of their soldiers. 

The Germans, for their part, once again gambled on the quality of their elite mountain forces to overcome their massive shortfall in numbers. The fact that they came as close as they did is indicative of the specialist nature of mountain warfare and the superiority of their leadership and training. The author’s discussion of these battles, and the unique challenges for support forces, provides the reader with a clear appreciation the successes and failures of the respective adversaries. 

Another element of the combat in this region that Statiev draws attention to is the fact that the peoples living here were not supporters of the Russian/Soviet regime. Support for the Germans was much more forthcoming then for the Russians. Efforts on behalf of both the Germans and Russians to build relationships with these groups are interesting as both sides appreciated the benefits of local knowledge and support. However, from Statiev’s research, it is evident that the Russians had ignored their opportunities until it was almost too late and that this resulted in them having a far greater challenge than the Germans in this respect. 

Statiev closes his work with a discussion of the attitude with which the Russian leadership viewed the nature of the military as a profession. Looking across the spectrum of military operations and drawing liberally from available primary sources, he reveals that, throughout the war, the Russians continuously fell back on their numbers at the expense of training. This was, to a certain extent, a result of necessity, and the gap definitely closed as the war progressed. Nevertheless, the Germans consistently were able to inflict significantly more casualties on the Russians then they took. 

The standard of this publication by the Cambridge UP is of the highest quality. Detailed maps are provided throughout that illustrate the battlefields discussed. The author provides generous endnotes and a comprehensive bibliography for further research. For those seeking fresh information about the Eastern Front, this work, highlighting a regional conflict that has heretofore received scant attention, this is an excellent source.

Haig’s Enemy: Crown Prince Rupprecht and Germany’s War on the Western Front - Jonathan Boff

This review has been submitted to Australian Army Journal

Title: Haig’s Enemy: Crown Prince Rupprecht and Germany’s War on the Western Front
Author: Jonathan Boff
ISBN: 978-0-19-967046-8
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Year: 2018
Hardcover
Pages: 373
Photos/Maps: 11/14 

Rupprecht, Crown Prince of Bavaria and one of the most senior Western Front Central Power commanders throughout WW1, has largely been forgotten with the passage of time; however, as Boff’s comprehensive study has shown, he was a key figure in the Central Power Alliance. Boff has undertaken to present an analysis of Rupprecht as commander, Crown Prince, husband and father. His conclusions, both balanced and nuanced, suggest that while he cannot be considered one of the ‘Great Captains” of history, he was, as a commander, insightful, competent and intelligent. He was also, as the Crown Prince of the second most powerful region of the German Federation (Bavaria), a product of his period and upbringing with all of the flaws and strengths that position entailed.  

The central theme of the book is obviously Rupprecht and his part during the War; however, Boff does an excellent job of continuously situating Rupprecht’s roles and actions within the broader spectrum of German Federation politics, the international environment and the flow of the War itself. The author is particularly adept at maintaining a clear and concise narrative that seamlessly weaves these disparate themes together in a easily comprehensible way. 

I particularly appreciated his analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the German Army and its command structure. Conventional opinion holds that the German Army of the time was a machine to be feared, emulated and respected; however, as Boff conclusively proves, while elements of this were in fact true, the actual reality of the effectiveness of the Army was far more nuanced. Command and control was riven with political appointees, regional cliques and swung broadly between meritocracy as a promotion foundation and favouritism. Decentralized execution of command, while periodically evident, became increasingly rare as operations turned against the Germans. Structures became rigid and honesty in self evaluation (as a military) became the exception and not the norm. 

Boff’s book was very enjoyable and educational to read. His writing style is engaging and his research thorough and balanced. A consummate historian, he has presented his work fairly and drawn conclusions that are well supported by primary source material. His narrative, while thoughtful and complete, avoids the pitfalls of excessive verbosity and leaves the reader with a number of insightful observations that resonate even today. The one conclusion that caused me to pause, however, was his position that, following the failure of the Battle of the Marne in 1914, Germany (and the Central Powers) were destined to lose the war as they were not able to accomplish the foundational goal of a quick and decisive victory in the West.

The book is a very high quality publication. Maps are centrally located at the front of the narrative making reference to them easy and photos, while not of the highest quality, distributed throughout. The work includes a copious number of endnotes and a comprehensive bibliography. I thoroughly enjoyed and appreciated this book and strongly recommend it.

Destination Dunkirk: The Story of Gort’s Army - Gregory Blaxland

This review has been submitted to Reveille Magazine.

Title: Destination Dunkirk: The Story of Gort’s Army

Author: Gregory Blaxland

ISBN: 978-1-52673-523-2

Publisher: Pen and Sword Books

Year: 2018

Hardcover

Pages: 436

Photos/Maps: 53/24

The Battle of France and the Low Countries commenced 10 May, 1940, and was an unmitigated success for the German military. In six weeks they had accomplished what their forefathers could not in four years of fighting, the collapse and occupation of France. Much has been written about this campaign with ad-nauseam analysis of what the Germans did right and the Allies (especially the French) did wrong. What has received relatively little in the way of attention was the role played by the British Expedition Force (BEF) who fought alongside the French in country well known to many of the World War 1 veterans now returning as senior Officers and NCO’s. While the British contribution to this campaign (in terms of land forces) was relatively small compared to the French and German armies, they nevertheless occupied key territory linking the French and Belgian armies along the River Dyle in Eastern Belgium. Their war was a short but sharp one; first contact on May 12, leading to evacuation from Dunkirk end May, and the last troops departing on June 17 from Nantes and St Nazarine.

The author was a member of the BEF and was evacuated on May 31^st from Dunkirk. His narrative is based therefore, not only on the official war diaries of the French, British and German units involved but also upon his and his peers’ personal records and recollections. His unique experience, having actually lived what he was writing about, has enabled him to pass on to the reader a perspective replete with anecdotal and documented information couched with a historian’s eye.

This version is a reprint of the original from 1973. The quality of the writing is excellent, conveying a real sense of the shock as the German juggernaut crashed into the unblooded British; driving them irrevocably back. It is noteworthy that the British forces did not collapse as did many of the Belgian and French, but were able to maintain cohesion and discipline as they retreated along roads choked with refugees and allies. Blaxland’s writing further underscores the absolute confusion amongst the Allied Headquarters as they struggled to deal with crisis followed by crisis. This work represents an excellent study in crisis planning and initiative amongst the British leadership while highlighting the utter failures of nerve and coordination amongst the Allies.

Included in the work are many maps outlining the unfolding struggle; while helpful, they are of average quality and would have benefitted from a rework. The author has also included a series of appendices that lay out in detail the formations included in the BEF, an outline of the main weapons systems and their capabilities in a comparison of German, French and British forces and finally a detailed rendition of source material broken out by chapter. Thoughtful, balanced and deeply informative, this is truly a worthwhile rendition of the BEF experience in France and a noble testament to its officers and soldiers.

Biafra’s War 1967-1970 - Al J Venter

This review has been submitted to Air Force magazine.

Title: Biafra’s War 1967-1970

Editor: Al J Venter

ISBN: 978-1-910294-69-7

Publisher: Helion

Year: 2015

Hardcover

Pages: 314

Photos/Maps: 149 (b/w) 26 (c)/5

Like many conflicts that ravaged the African continent in the years following the departure of the Colonial powers, the Biafran War has been largely forgotten by the West. It is indicative of how much society has changed that while the Rwandan genocide has become a watch word for deliberate slaughter, the million or so victims of the Biafran war, despite being mainly women and children subject to the cadaverous effects of starvation, did not elicit the international outrage typical of today’s responses. The author’s credibility in writing about this conflict is enhanced by his having been in situ for a significant part of it. Thus he has personally met many of the individuals that he writes about.

There are many facets of Biafra that came to typify African engagements during this period - the 1960’s and 70’s. In this case the engagement of third party nations indirectly or directly supporting one side or the other (or blocking aid) thereby influencing the outcome for national benefit. The British and Soviets each had an interest in helping Nigeria remain united and proactively protected their access to Nigerian oil; thereby finding themselves working together to ensure its continuity. The Portuguese and South Africans, by contrast, favoured Biafran sovereignty. The use of media to try and influence world opinion and the marked lack of response, despite the impact on women and children of the conflict, is indicative of the period in question. Venter’s insightful discussion of these issues provides an interesting counterpoint to similar situations today.

Not surprisingly, it was logistics that ultimately spelled the end for the Biafran cause. Venter goes into a great deal of detail discussing the lengths that the Biafran government undertook trying to ensure a steady flow of supplies into their enclave. Of particular note was the airbridge that served as the lifeline for medicine, ammunition and food for the population. Using primarily Super Constellations and Stratocruisers, these aircraft flew multiple missions per night into an adhoc airfield under the constant threat of air interdiction or bombing. An outstanding example and study in air logistics support.

Mercenaries also played key roles for both the Biafrans and the Nigerians. Undertaking responsibility as combat/transport pilots, trainers, communications and other specialist tasks, they filled the void that the native soldiers could not. Their experiences and treatment are extensively studied by the author and add to the Wild West environment that reflected this region. Names that became synonymous with mercenary operations throughout the African region added Biafra to their battle honours: Count Gustav von Rosen, Mike Gibson, Jan Zumbach, Jay Breytenbach, “Taffy” Williams, Rolf Steiner and Ares Klootwyk. Additionally, groups such as Medecins Sans Frontieres also had their origins in Biafra and are discussed at length by the author.

A further aspect of note covered by the narrative was the extensive improvisation used by the Biafrans to offset the lack of consistent logistics support. Thousands of cottage industries coordinated by the Biafran government made uniforms, distilled fuel, modified weapon systems, made tanks and developed unique weapons (such as the Ojukwu Bucket that acted as a deadly yet primitive claymore style mine). The creative ability of the Biafran people was extremely noteworthy and flies in the face of many preconceived notions of African peoples.

The author rounds out his narrative with a look ahead and behind for this region of Africa. His discussion of the causes of the fracture within the Nigerian confederation are enlightening and insightful and his observations on the effects of Boko Haram and the erosion of cohesion along religious as well as ethnic lines, cause for concern.

Helion has once again published a book of the highest quality, replete with excellent photographs (colour and b/w) as well as very useful maps. Venter has provided the reader with a work that, while on balance favouring the Biafran perspective, nevertheless gives due credit to the efforts of the Nigerian Federal leader’s success at reconciliation following the cessation of hostilities. His work captures the complexity and the nuance of the conflict and presents a tantalizing glimpse of what an African society is capable of when free from the shackles of endemic corruption. A book well worth reading.

Otto Skorzeny: The Devil’s Disciple - Stuart Smith

This review submitted to Soldier Magazine.

Title: Otto Skorzeny: The Devil’s Disciple

Author: Stuart Smith

Publisher: Osprey

Year: 2018

Hardcover

Pages: 384

Maps:  5

Photos: 44

Otto Skorzeny has been not been remembered kindly by historians. A hard line Nazi and self-promoter, he has been accused of taking the credit duly owed to others. Smith has produced a work that balances that assumption. Eminently readable and well researched, his book presents Skorzeny as both a courageous and dedicated soldier of Hitler as well as a vain and venal man; both facets are correct. The  Operations that he led are presented and analyzed in order to shed light on his strengths and weaknesses as a commander. Smith also provides a detailed background of Skorzeny before and after the war, providing the context needed to understand the man himself and his drives. Well worth a look.

Morning Star, Midnight Sun - Jeffrey R Cox

This review submitted to Sabretache Magazine.

Title: Morning Star, Midnight Sun

Author: Jeffrey R Cox

ISBN: 978-1-4728-2638-1

Publisher: Osprey

Year: 2018

Softcover

Pages: 448

Maps:  4

There remains a common misperception that, following their defeat at Midway, that the tide of war had turned definitively against the Japanese and that their ultimate defeat was now inevitable. Jeffrey Cox’s work proves this to be categorically false. That they had suffered a major setback was indeed the case and recognized but the Japanese still viewed the war as winnable.

This was a particularly enjoyable book to read; not only for its detailed content and analysis, but also for the humour and style of the author. Interspersed with his discussion of the events of the period covered by the book, are ‘sidebar’ interpretations of reactions of commanders and participants. These cynical interjections add levity and, indeed, a more human element to the narrative. The traditional stoic demeanour of the Japanese are given a more realistic feel. The Allies, a more truthful reflection of the strains of multinational as well as inter-service operations. 

Cox balances his narrative extremely well between the protagonists. The reader is provided with fascinating insights into the effects of fog of war, opinions and expectations of individual Commanders and a deep understanding of the pressures of command and the cumulative effects of decisions. During this period, both the Allies and the Japanese commanders were under great pressure to achieve clear victories. While the Americans had defeated the Japanese at Midway, they had lost a carrier in the process resulting in an operational draw. The American public demanded greater success. Conversely, the Japanese commanders felt compelled to avenge the stain of their Midway losses. Compounding this pressure was the fact that neither side, at this time, had the depth of resources to compensate for any additional losses of capital ships.

The author effectively captures the complex interplay between the adversaries as they struggled to control the seas and skies over the centre of gravity during this period: Guadacanal Island. The Japanese proved conclusively that they remained more than a match for the American forces facing them. In fact, they held a majority of the cards in terms of surface vessels, command quality, operational options and control of the seas. Having trained exhaustively for night operations, the Japanese continued to rule the night with the Americans maintaining an advantage during the daylight. Two things had changed however that are not widely appreciated but are glaringly obvious in Cox’s analysis: the Americans had finally found an Admiral in Halsey that had the aggressiveness and presence to take the fight to the Japanese and the vaunted “Sea Eagles”, the Japanese carrier aviators that had ruled the skies up to now, had been decimated and were a fraction of their former numbers. The replacement pool was unable to replace the losses with similar quality aviators.

Cox has drafted an outstanding book of exceptional quality and content. His narrative style is engaging and keeps the reader hooked. His comprehensive knowledge of this period is reflected in his deep analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the American and Japanese forces. Regardless of whether one is interested in naval operations in the Pacific Theatre, this book remains not only and excellent reference but also read.

From Victory to Stalemate: The Western Front, Summer 1944 - C J Dick

This review has been submitted to the British Army Review.

Title: From Victory to Stalemate: The Western Front, Summer 1944

Author: C J Dick

ISBN: 978-0-7006-2293-1

Publisher: Kansas UP

Year: 2016

Hardcover

Pages: 465

Maps: 14

Photos: 0

In this, the first of a two volume set, the author has undertaken to ascertain the causes behind the Western Allied forces failure in their efforts to knock Germany out of the war in 1944. Certainly, there was every reason for confidence that this was attainable once Allies had overcome the German defences at Normandy and broken out into the French interior. The re-establishment of maneuver warfare against a greatly degraded German military should have sounded the death knell for Axis defensive efforts in the West.

While the author does discuss in detail the elements of the Western Campaign, starting with the invasion of Normandy, he is clear that the focus of the book is not another rendition of that series of battles. Rather, he uses the campaign as a means of facilitating his analysis of where, how and why the Allies diverged from a focussed drive at the destruction the Wehrmacht and its combat capability into a series of costly (in terms of time, effort and logistics) secondary and tertiary efforts that ultimately diluted their operational effectiveness. Thereby enabling the Germans to retain a defensive capability and thus prolong the war.

Dick looks at the foundations of the operational level of war and how these building blocks were applied in the development of and the execution of doctrine in the different Allied nations (in this case American, British and Canadian). Given the lack of experience amongst senior Allied commanders under combat conditions, he further discusses the strengths and weaknesses of each of the army’s as they undertook the buildup and follow-on operations in Normandy and beyond. He follows this with a detailed discussion and analysis of national logistics capabilities and their performance under operational conditions. His book winds up with a comprehensive review of each of the senior (Army and Army Group) commanders performance through the lens of the relative doctrine each was operating under.

This is a particularly strong book in that explains in clear, concise terms the reasons behind the Allies failure to effectively overcome a drastically weakening Wehrmacht for 11 months, despite their unchallenged command of the air and logistic dominance. His balanced examination is uncompromising in its conclusions. It provides the reader with an outstanding assessment of the influences that coloured the Allies decision making. Focussing on elements such as divergent doctrine, media critique, political interference, hubris (an assumption that the collapse of German resistance was imminent), an application of doctrine as dogma vice guidance, failure of effective command, inter-service rivalry and a failure to oversee and plan for the efficient execution of logistics support, Dick’s work underscores challenges that transcend World War 2 and are as applicable today as they were in 1944. Very strongly recommended for the senior commander regardless of element.

East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950 - Roy E Appleman

Title: East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950

Author: Roy E Appleman

ISBN: 978-0890962831

Publisher: Texas A & M UP

Year: 1987

Hardcover

Pages: 361

Maps:  11

Photos: 41

The advance of UN forces into North Korea and the region of the Yalu River following the landing at Inchon in 1950 is well known and studied. The subsequent surprise attack by overwhelming Chinese infantry forces and the collapse of the UN drive followed by the desperate fighting retreat of the Marines of X Corps from around the Chosin Reservoir stands as one of the defining moments of the Korean Conflict. Lesser known but no less dramatic was the tragedy of the Army’s 31 Regimental Combat Team (RCT), destroyed while attempting to retreat after defending the 7^th Marines Eastern flank.

The author has drawn upon the first hand recollections of survivors as well as declassified documents from the Army and Marines to paint a comprehensive picture of a unit that circumstance, hubris and poor planning had destined for disaster. Additionally, he also relates a story of individual courage, tenacity and will on the part of individual soldiers and officers. Make no mistake however, Appleman pulls no punches in his rendition of selfishness and appalling leadership collapse.

It is a maxim that one’s true nature is revealed during times of intense stress and hardship; the experience of 31 RCT highlights this fact in glaring detail. If nothing else, this tragedy serves as a teaching tool on leadership under adverse conditions. The collapse of the command structure and the subsequent deterioration of the 31 RCT from a military unit into a mob of individuals within a matter of hours is a harsh testament to the necessity of maintenance of unit cohesion and discipline and the critical roles of the NCO’s and Officers to that effect

There are many lessons to be gleaned from this work:

1.    The critical necessity of maintaining communications;

2.    The role of the Commander and where they need to be in order to ensure accessibility and the maintenance of operational control;

3.    Clear planning and ensuring that sub-units understand their roles and responsibilities;

4.    Anticipation of requirements. Commanders must not micromanage but focus on what is required next;

5.    Logistics: the need to identify critical requirements and the absolute necessity for the Command to deliver based upon those requirements

6.    The critical role of junior Officers and NCO’s in maintaining unit cohesion and discipline; and

7.    The need for inter-service cooperation and a common operating environment.

The experience of the 31^st RCT in Chosin should be studied by leadership academies and used a teaching tool for how not to undertake an operation. Individuals involved within the 7^th Marines and the RCT certainly rose to the challenge of the occasion and serve as examples for others to emulate; however, overall, the lessons of this tragedy are more akin to what not to do rather than the opposite.

Whispers Across The Atlantick - David Smith

This review has been submitted to the Canadian Army Journal. 

Title: Whispers Across The Atlantick

Author: David Smith

ISBN: 978-1-4728-2795-1

Publisher: Osprey

Year: 2017

Hardcover

Pages: 292

Maps:  5

Photos: 15

General William Howe was appointed the Commander of the Crown forces deployed to crush the rebellion that had broken out in the United States in 1776. The British Navy had unchallenged control of the seas and its land forces a heavy professional advantage over the American rebels. Things unfortunately did not go nearly as planned for the British; hampered by hubris, personal animosity between the commanders of the different British and German (the British Crown had hired German mercenaries) units, a failure to prioritize and focus on the primary task of destroying the rebel army and a marked failure to undertake operations with drive and urgency resulted in a growing dissatisfaction and a loss of confidence with Howe by the British Government. His resignation after the 1777 campaign season and the subsequent public enquiry in the House of Commons form the basis of the book.

I particularly enjoyed Smith’s approach to his narrative. Each chapter commences with the pertinent element of Howe’s speech to the House followed by an evaluation of the contents by the author (taking advantage of the benefit of hindsight). The chapter that follows expands upon the actions of the various antagonists during the period covered. This approach makes for a much clearer understanding of what the perceptions of Howe were at the time as compared to the reality of his actions on the ground.

The degree to which commanders relied upon the initiative of their subordinates during this period is clear. Limitations in communications and the challenges of operating along very limited axis’s of advance (in many cases consisting of rivers or game tracks) resulted in decisions being made based upon information that had been overtaken by events. More to the point though an explanation of the failure of the British to attain victory during these critical early years, lies in the authors analysis of Howe as a commander and his failure to grasp the operational and strategic options that would have destroyed the capacity of the Americans to continue the war. It is clear that Howe was not an incompetent General but that he was a man out of his depth in the combined symmetric and asymmetric styles of warfare that constituted the Revolution.

Additionally, Howe’s efforts were impeded by the inflexible position assumed by the British government in relation to the demands of the American colonists. His orders to destroy the various colony’s infrastructure as a means of undermining the will of the revolutionaries combined with a refusal to even acknowledge their grievances, ensured a steady and growing level of support for the insurrection. Smith discusses this challenge in some detail.   

Osprey has published a very good quality book. The main drawback to the content of the book itself is the quality of the maps. They are reproductions of the original maps produced at the time for the consumption of the British public and are, unfortunately, difficult to read and follow. Otherwise the narrative is excellent, the bibliography extensive and the font large enough to read easily. I very much enjoyed this book as it shed light upon the nature of 18^th century command as well as the challenge of conducting a war from a distance. Recommended.

Logistics in the Falklands War: A Case Study in Expeditionary Warfare - Kenneth L Privratsky

This review has been submitted to The Journal of the RCAF

Title: Logistics in the Falklands War: A Case Study in Expeditionary Warfare

Author: Kenneth L Privratsky

ISBN: 978-1-47382-312-9

Publisher: Pen and Sword Books

Year: 2016

Hardcover

Pages: 271

Photos/Maps: 54/6

The Falkland’s War was a conflict that no-one anticipated or effectively planned for. A conventional war fought between two individual nations, one NATO the other South American, had simply not been in the paradigm of western planners for literally decades as focus had remained exclusively on the NATO-Warsaw Pact standoff. That the British prevailed was as much a testament to professionalism and their ability to improvise as it was to a heavy dose of luck. Logistics was the key to success in this conflict; the author, drawing upon interviews and primary source material, paints a vivid picture of the challenges facing the support elements of this force. The lessons that he gleans from his research are many and I have identified some of the more significant ones below, covering a broad spectrum of support doctrine.

Effective control of logistics relies heavily upon a clear delineation of command and responsibility. Give the distances involved and the resultant paucity of resources, it was strange that the overall commander of the British Task Force (Commander South Atlantic Task Force) Admiral Fieldhouse, did not sail with the fleet. This left task force logisticians trying to support four sub-group commanders (Rear Admiral Woodward – Commander Carrier Battle Group, Brig Thompson – Commander Landing Force, Commodore Clapp – Commander Amphibious Task Force and Captain Young – Commander Op Paraquet) who each had equal standing under Fieldhouse. Poor strategic and operational communication ability meant that inevitably conflicts arose relating to priority of support.

Additional challenges identified by the author included the breakdown of logistics discipline during the deployment phase to Ascension Island. Unfortunately, this is not an unusual case and has been repeated many times since the Falklands War. Clear marking, tracking information and prioritization is critical if items are not to be mishandled or misplaced. As soon as tracking control is lost over items, especially during a period of intense throughput, it is like randomly placing a book on a library shelf, the item will be most likely lost for the duration of the operation. The same holds true for inaccurate prioritization. Items are handled and given space on aircraft etc based upon their identified priority. Unfortunately, the old adage holds true: if everything is identified as priority, then nothing is priority. The need to maintain logistics discipline, regardless of the pressure to get things out of the door, is absolutely critical to the effective support of an operation.

Another area that the author discusses in detail is the atrophying of skill sets such as amphibious assaults into austere environments fully supported by logistics. Cost cutting and a paradigm of first world support available through NATO nations sapped the British of experience and knowledge. This reluctance to expend defence dollars on realistic training was not limited to the UK but their experience serves as a warning to other nations that it is “too late to buy insurance once the house is on fire”. Many Western members of the NATO alliance find themselves severely limited in their ability to undertake operations of any significant magnitude unilaterally due to a degradation or atrophying of skills and resources due to a reliance upon others to make up any shortfalls.

British victory in the Falkland’s war was not a foregone conclusion. One of the points that the author makes is that, while the British did lose a significant number of assets during the war, predominantly they were picket ships or combat vessels as opposed to support ships. Argentine orders to their pilots were to target the logistics elements of the fleet thereby crippling the British before they could get a foothold on the ground. The pilots, generally, went after the fighting elements and either consciously or otherwise, disregarded their orders. That they did was exceptionally fortunate for the British.

Privratsky’s book is the first to look at the Falkland’s war purely from the perspective of logistics. His work is thoughtful and insightful and conveys messages that continue to be relevant and timely. Many will argue that technology is making the world smaller and more accessible; however, as the Falkland’s war demonstrated, advances in technology raise both the level of expectation of the operators towards their support elements but also increases the degree of complexity that logisticians must overcome in maintaining and supporting far flung ops worldwide. This book contains a significant number of lessons for militaries of all stripes and capabilities and should be reviewed in detail.

The Great Influenza: The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in History - John M Barry

Title: The Great Influenza: The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in History

Author: John M Barry

ISBN: 978-0-143036-49-4

Publisher: Penguin

Year: 2004

Softcover

Pages: 546

The Great Influenza of the immediate post WW1 years claimed the lives of between 20-40 million people worldwide before it had run its course. The author has drafted a comprehensive study encompassing not only the spread and morbidity of the Great Influenza of 1918-1920 but also the means by which scientists and medical staff endeavoured to combat it. Most interestingly, he also looks at the role government played in failing to both recognize, despite copious amounts of evidence, and assist in combatting the disease through education and leadership. Barry has focussed upon the impact that the disease had on the United States while referring obliquely to its impact internationally.

His discussion and analysis of the disease itself is concise and clear; he provides the reader with a detailed understanding of what constitutes the influenza as well as its characteristics. This is key to understanding nature of illness and how it mutates and spreads. He also discusses the means and individuals who were on the front line trying to understand and isolate the virus. The aggressive nature of the influenza virus was unlike anything that had been experienced before and the scientific and medical knowledge needed to effectively counter it was in its infancy.

What is noteworthy in the book is the author’s analysis of the US Federal Government’s response, or lack thereof, to the crisis. President Wilson’s administration was focussed on the war and the US’s role in it. As such, he would not allow for any discussion, publication or central coordination of a response to the pandemic as being a negative influence on the war effort. Thus it was that while people were literally dying in the streets, the Government offices of Public Health were issuing statements indicating that there was no cause for alarm. Barry discusses in detail the impact of denial on the population and the panic that it caused.

This is an excellent account of this event and a timely reminder of the precarious relationship that we maintain with nature. It is also a notice to the importance of effective planning and preparation for future events. Hubris will lead to our downfall and the Great Influenza serves as a reminder of what can occur if we allow our guard to slip.