This review was published in the Canadian Naval Review
Title:
South Pacific Cauldron
Author:
Alan Rems
ISBN:
978-1-61251-470-3
Publisher:
Naval Institute Press
Hardcover
Pages:
284
Photos/Maps:
42/16
The
public's knowledge of the Pacific Campaign during World War 2 is very limited
and focussed. Battles such as Pearl Harbour, Bataan, Singapore, Midway and Iwo
Jima come quickly to mind when challenged, but in actual fact, these represent
but a few of the myriad of battles fought in the shadows of the European
conflict and the Battle of the Atlantic. Rems' intent with this book has been
to shed light, in one comprehensive work,
upon those battles fought with no less violence, intensity and anguish
in some of the most difficult environments on earth, that have faded from the
collective conscience of the world writ large.
Further
marginalizing the history of this conflict was he fact that the South Pacific
Campaign served as both a prelude and to secure the southern flank of the much
higher profile Central Pacific Offensive launched in late 1943. Maintaining a
perspective that incorporates all of the major combatants (US, Japanese,
Australian and New Zealand) he has ensured a balanced and studied approach to
the successes and failures of the parties
involved and thus an excellent study of lessons for the present.
Commencing
with the Battle of Guadalcanal, the author focuses his attention on the
operations in the South Pacific chain of island (Primarily the Solomon Islands,
New Britain and New Guinea). It is very enlightening and surprising how
effective and aggressive the Japanese remained despite an inexorable turning of
the tide both in terms of resources and technology. For example, of the twelve
naval battles of the Solomon Island
campaign, the Japanese won or drew even in ten of them. Noteworthy technological
advantages remained with the Japanese in terms of torpedo and torpedo bomber
well into 1944; additionally, superior tactical control of surface assets in
combat also remained with the Japanese commanders until the beginning of 1944.
The
author undertakes a detailed analysis of the various combatant forces and it is
striking the patterns that emerge. For example, it is clear that on the
Japanese side, intelligence was woefully inaccurate, repeatedly underestimating
Allied forces and intentions. Also, the Japanese were superb jungle fighters
able to take advantage of terrain to develop formidable defensive works. As
soldiers and aircrew, they were extremely resilient, tough fighters
consistently taking horrible casualties compared to the Allies. Additionally,
they were often operating under conditions of extreme malnutrition bordering on
starvation as well as rampant illness. Logistically, it was evident that the
Japanese were operating under extremely adverse conditions and yet, somehow,
were able to maintain operational capability despite the incredible shortages.
Unfortunately, the author does not provide a great deal of insight into this
aspect of the operations limiting his Japanese analysis to the actions of
senior officers; this would have been very enlightening and helpful as a
counterpoint to the Allied
undertakings.
On the
Allied side, his discussions are fascinating. One is struck very early on by
the interservice and international rivalries within and between the Allied
forces. Resistance to joint operational command was very ingrained and was the
cause of a series of losses that could have been avoided. Additionally, the
Allies had broken the Japanese codes and were therefore in a much better
position to proactively engage. Allied soldiers were equally as tough as
their counterparts and a healthy respect for both the climate and between the
adversaries was a hallmark of journals and recollections. What was also very
interesting, was, especially within the Australian forces, was the employment
of Divisions in diametrically opposite environments. Thus the Australian 7th
Division, famous for its stand at Tobruk in North Africa was transferred to New
Guinea and had to learn from scratch how to become effective jungle fighters.
Again, the logistics of the offensives are given scant attention by the author
despite the fact that many of the operations were undertaken with the sole
purpose of providing operating bases.
Also,
in terms of straight numbers, it is easy to understand why these campaigns did
not challenge for the limelight in domestic attention. The operations generally
involved small numbers of troops when compared with European or even Central
Pacific operations) and were long drawn out affairs. Geography and
infrastructure ensured that these actions were not quick nor dramatic. The
environment was as dangerous and unforgiving as the enemy and was under
appreciated at the combatants extreme peril.
Rems provides excellent maps and photographs that serve to reinforce his
narrative. Despite the areas of his work that could have been given greater
appreciation (the Japanese operational and tactical demands and the logistics
of the Allied effort) his writing is strong, his analysis balanced and his
style engaging. It is easy to understand, although, unless actually experienced
not fully appreciate, the horrible conditions under which these operations took
place: determined, unforgiving adversaries, geography that was easily some of
the most difficult in the world to operate within and generally ignored in the
domestic and world press. A solid bibliography rounds out Rems' work. It serves
as a fitting testament to those fighting in a horrific sideline and the
challenges that they faced.
Title: Training and Development of German General Staff Officers
