This review has been submitted to Army History Magazine.
Title: A
War of Logistics – Parachutes and Porters in Indochina, 1945-1954
Author:
Charles R Shrader
ISBN:
978-0-8131-6575-2
Publisher:
University Press of Kentucky
Year:
2015
Hardcover
Pages:
488
Photos/Maps:
15/13
The War
in Indochina is best remembered today for the decisive French defeat at Dien
Bien Phu in 1954; however, the conflict that led up to that was protracted,
brutal and new. New in terms of the style of warfare being fought and the
impact that the result would have well beyond the borders of Indochina. The
author has approached the war from an unconventional perspective, one that has
been heretofore a facet but not a central theme of works on the war; that of
logistics and its role in the victory of the Viet Minh and the loss of the
French. This was a war won and lost entirely on the strength and weakness of
the respective logistics capabilities and doctrine of the adversaries.
Shrader
has effectively woven an insightful evaluation and analysis of the operational
doctrine of both parties while maintaining his central theme of the key impact
of logistics. Commencing with a strategic view of the conflict, he looks at the
psychology and hubris of the post war French and their assumption of
superiority over the Viet Minh. This, combined with an unstable national
approach from France, precluded the resources from being assigned in terms of
manpower as well as material that ultimately was needed for success.
He
leads into the successful recognition by the Viet Minh of the necessity to not
only outfight but also to outlast the French. The three stage operational
approach combined with a successful utilization of the strengths of the Viet
people – human capital – enabled for a flexible and dynamic asymmetric approach
to conflict that the European approach of the French struggled to counter.
Shrader
discusses at length how, from the French approach, heavy weapons and combined
arms operations heavily based upon the lessons learned during the European conflict
served as the central method of engagement. Artillery, armour, aircraft and
naval contingents enabled the French to control set points but surrendered the
countryside to the more mobile and agile Viet Minh and by extension, the
initiative. The nature of the French approach to warfare resulted in a heavy
logistics bill that had difficulty being met. Strategically, long lines of
support stretching back to France or Japan due to a lack of an integral
industrial capability in Indochina meant long delays in the meeting of demands.
Operationally, the necessity of the French to establish isolated forward
operating bases in order to counter the inflow of the Viet Minh forces and
supplies required a reliance upon air or naval resupply methods that were
costly, inefficient and resource intensive themselves.
Conversely,
the Viet Minh acknowledged their inability to counter the French in set piece
battles and, for the most part, did not allow themselves to be drawn into
fights where they may be subjected to superior French armament. Shrader
identifies how the Viet Minh leaders played a superior international hand by
securing their lines of support from China. In addition, their requirements
were far less extensive. The author has undertaken extensive in-depth research
that backs up his conclusions. The typical Viet Minh soldier, for example only
required approximately half of the daily weight of requirements compared with
his French counterpart. The depth to which the author goes in his analysis of
the typical demands of the respective forces is highly educational and telling
for the reader; the French demands far outstripped their capability while the
Viet Minh adjusted their tactics in line with their logistics capability and expertise.
The
book also illustrates the flexibility of the Viet Minh logistics methodology
compared to the French. Being far less technologically encumbered, they were significantly
more agile in their mobility and much less rigid in their operational doctrine;
thereby being able to manipulate their procedures far faster than the French.
Unlike the French who were, for the most part, confined to pre-existing
Indochinese transport infrastructure and vehicles, the Viet Minh developed a
national level mobilization process whereby non-combatants were obliged to
support operations through their use as porters. Regional command structures
were created that facilitated the uninterrupted flow of supplies from one
section to the next through its transfer between regionally assigned porters.
They also developed the science of camouflage to previously unseen levels and
maintained field craft discipline rigidly. The French were never able to
develop a counter strategy to effectively undermine this tactic.
Shrader
makes it clear that the French were not incompetent, merely hamstrung through a
lack of logistics flexibility, non-responsive doctrine, a paradigm of their
adversary based upon pre-existing hubris, a non-supportive National Government
and a logistics dogma rooted in a European operational theatre. They were able
to achieve some successes against the Viet Minh and their use of air and
riverine resupply systems supported off road operations well. Unfortunately,
the depth of capacity was heavily in favour of the Viet Minh as theirs was viewed
as a national struggle and, consequently, given the support required through a
more universally supported approach. The French certainly had the upper hand
during periods of the conflict such as when they cut off Viet Minh access to
critical rice growing regions (which served as a trade currency as well as
supply for the Viet Minh). The logistics limitations suffered by the French
were simply too great to enable them to follow up on their local successes.
Shrader’s
book is an excellent study of the critical importance that logistics plays in
the effective execution of tactical operations and strategic campaigns. For a
vast majority of the conflict French technology heavily outweighed the Viet
Minh; that they were unable to defeat them is testament to the ability of the
Viet Minh to offset French advantage through non-traditional tactics and supply
doctrine. The author has presented a balanced and in-depth study of this
conflict and his conclusions are well supported through the use of primary
source material from both sides. This is a book well worth reading for
operators and supporters alike.
Title: The
Hill
