Five Days From Defeat - Walter Reid

This review submitted to British Army Review.

Title: Five Days From Defeat

Author: Walter Reid

ISBN: 978-1-78027-490-4

Publisher: Birlinn Books

Year: 2017

Hardcover

Pages: 256

Photos/Maps: 19/2

Following the commencement of the massive German offensive in March, 1918, the Allies were rocked back on their heels as the front was ripped open and the British 5^th Army collapsed in disarray. Popular history suggests that Field Marshall Douglas Haig, commander of the British and Commonwealth forces, was instrumental in coordinating the Allied response; maintaining his composure while those around him lost theirs. In fact, to read his biographies and memoires, one could very easily believe that he was the driving force behind the concept and implementation of the Joint Command structure that the Allies ultimately adopted under French leadership.

Reid’s intent is to provide a counterpoint to much of the narrative pertaining to the British role in the last year of the war. To that extent, he has approached his study in a very structured manner; breaking the discussion into pre-1918, the period of the Spring Offensive, the Five Days and the last 100 Days. Why this is important is that enables the reader to understand both the military and political standings and motivations of the three major players (France, Great Britain and Germany) leading into the final push. Reid has done a commendable job at setting the stage for the drama of the Spring Offensive by shining a light onto the difficult relationship between Haig and George (the British PM). Haig comes across as a very egotistical Commander and was a key impediment to any form of change in the Command relationships between the Allies. Additionally, Reid clearly shows that, in the eyes of the British public, he was also seen as the lynchpin holding the West together.

He then goes on to break down the five critical days of the Spring Offensive and the reactions of the various national players. Extensive analysis of primary source documentation reveals significant disconnect between the accepted British (read Haig) inspired history and what the documents tell us. Haig, far from the decisive unflustered Commander that he wishes to be remembered as, was, in fact, very much prepared to retreat along the British lines of communications to the French ports in anticipation of evacuating the Army. In his defence, the Germans had shattered the 5^th Army and was collapsing the 3^rd and he did have orders to protect the last Army that Britain could effectively provide. Nevertheless as Reid has suggested very convincingly, much of what occurred as a result of the Spring Offensive happened around and in spite of Haig, not because of him.

Reid’s book is an interesting analysis of the relative state of the commanders of the three major powers. It sheds light on the role of the media in developing and maintaining both a perception of individuals as well as being a tool in the challenge of civil/military relations within the British hierarchy at this time. His discussion of the efforts of the civilian governments (especially amongst the British) to wrest back control of the war from the Generals is a telling example of the failure of clear delineations of responsibility. A very interesting read and a worthwhile addition to any library or collection.

Dak To and the Border Battles of Vietnam, 1967-1968 - Michael A. Eggleston

This review submitted to Canadian Army Today Magazine.

Title: Dak To and the Border Battles of Vietnam, 1967-1968

Author: Michael A. Eggleston

ISBN: 978-1-4766-6417-0

Publisher: Mcfarland Books (McFarlandBooks.com)

Year: 2017

Softcover

Pages: 224

Photos/Maps: 19/24

The battles in Vietnam were reaching a peak as the 1960’s moved into their final years. Generally, the sense has been that the United States was fighting the wrong war for the wrong reasons and that the advantages lay predominantly with the North Vietnamese. Included in these were the willingness to absorb causalities, the sense that this war was of national importance, the ineffective and corrupt nature of the Southern Vietnamese government, the ineffectiveness of the Southern Vietnamese Army and the control that the communist regime in Northern Vietnam exercised over its people and resources. While much of this was true, the United States and its Allies were not without deep capabilities and the North Vietnamese not without weakness and internal division.

Eggleston’s book sheds light upon some of the key events in the entire Vietnam War: the period leading up to the Tet Offensive. Much has been written about the actual Tet Offensive, while relatively little has looked at the American and North Vietnamese strategies leading up to this Offensive. Each side achieved its initial aims with the Border Battles: the Vietnamese to draw American forces out of the cities and into the countryside and the US to draw Vietnamese forces into more traditional set piece battles where they could be destroyed.

This is an excellent book to read in order to gain an appreciation of the nature of the conflict during this period. He expertly combines a sweeping synopsis of the history and nature of the war up to the Border Battle period and then delves in more detail regarding the scope of this engagement. Of particular poignancy, the author has drawn upon firsthand accounts of participants from both sides; by including them as written, he ensures that the reader has great difficulty putting the book down due to their realism and the raw emotion elicited. I have rarely come across such descriptive and emotive recollections.

This is a book focussed on the soldiers and their experiences at the front; in the thick of battle. Eggleston does not spare those who were not equal to the leadership task nor those who failed in their responsibilities to their soldiers. It is interesting to note the comments related to the American leadership practice of senior commanders trying to conduct operations from helicopters (the idea being that one would be able to maintain a much better grasp of the battlefield). Additionally, discussions about the terrain and the unique nature of fighting the regular North Vietnamese Army units vice Vietcong are also very enlightening. Finally, the failure of the North Vietnamese to appreciate the ability of the US command to reposition its forces undermined the ability of the North to achieve its desired end state with Tet.

I recommend this book. It is not an in-depth analysis of the politics of the war, more a treatise on the nature of tactical level combat in the Vietnam theatre and its effects upon soldiers at the squad and platoon level. Disturbing, enlightening and poignant in equal measure.