To Defeat the Few: The Luftwaffe’s Campaign to Destroy RAF Fighter Command Aug-Sept 1940 - Douglas C Dildy and Paul F Crickmore

This review has been submitted to the Journal of the RCAF. 

Title: To Defeat the Few: The Luftwaffe’s Campaign to Destroy RAF Fighter Command Aug-Sept 1940
Author: Douglas C Dildy and Paul F Crickmore
ISBN: 978-1-4728-3918-3
Publisher: Osprey Publishing
Year: 2020
Hardcover
Pages: 384
Photos/Maps: 303/9

A majority of the histories of the Battle of Britain have been drafted from the perspective of the RAF; viewed generally as a small understrength fighter force poised against a blooded, supremely confident and experienced Luftwaffe. Rising to the challenge, David defeated Goliath in a classic tale of prevailing against great odds. Indeed, in some respects this is a very accurate narrative; however, as Dildy and Crickmore have set out to show, that is only a small part of the story.

The authors have approached their analysis of the Battle of Britain from the perspective of the Germans. Why this is important is that it provides the reader with a better understanding of the German challenges, the means at their disposal to overcome them and how decisions were reached that ultimately decided the course of the battle. What sets this book apart from other studies is that the authors have situated their study within the context of an independent counter air campaign (the Luftwaffe’s efforts to defeat the RAF) engaging an adversary with a multilayered and integrated air defence system.

A vast majority of the histories of the Battle of Britain, emphasize the numerous errors that the Luftwaffe made in the execution of its campaign; it is easy to view these as mistakes if one lacks the context of why the Germans made these decisions. This work addresses those shortfalls. Appreciating what the operational and tactical aims of the Luftwaffe were in this engagement is critical to the better comprehension of what drove those decisions. The authors add additional depth to this by clearly analyzing what lay within the technical capabilities and knowledge of the Luftwaffe. Keeping in mind that they had not been faced with an adversary with the command and control infrastructure available to the RAF before.

This work is replete with tables, graphs, rare or previously unpublished photographs and colour maps that add a great deal of scope to the study. The quality of the book is outstanding and it is eminently readable for the casual and serious historian. Too often, histories lower the quality of their work to the lowest common denominator; sacrificing nuance for ‘black and white’ statements. This book does not fall into that category. That errors were made by the Luftwaffe in the execution of its campaign is without doubt (such as changing the focus of the campaign to London); nevertheless, as this work clearly illustrates, the majority were made using the best tools available within the context of their greater strategic goal. This is definitely recommended for the operational thinker, it is not a book for those seeking first hand accounts of victory and defeat. An excellent addition to any library.