Monday 22 February 2021

Military Strategy: A Global History - Jeremy Black

This review has been submitted to Proceedings Magazine. 


Title: Military Strategy: A Global History
Author: Jeremy Black
ISBN: 978-0-300-21718-6
Publisher: Yale UP
Hardcover
Pages: 306

Dr Jeremy Black is world renowned as one of the most prolific authors of history in the present day. With over 100 books to his credit and a litany of board appointments for a number of well respected journals and magazines, it was with great anticipation that his most recent work on Military Strategy was awaited. Dr Black notes in his introduction, that while strategy has become a byword in government, industry, military and academia in the modern day, in doing so, its core focus and intent has been lost and diluted. His intent in writing this work is to present the reader with a perspective on how strategy has been employed throughout history and to bring to the fore non-Eurocentric perspectives on the application of strategy. One is certainly struck by the audacity and breadth of the endeavour.

It should be noted at the outset that this is a work not for the faint of heart. There is an assumption of a fairly advanced baseline understanding of history and the key participants who are referenced in the book. Additionally, the work is quite dense and heavy, and does require a more advanced vocabulary than would be expected in a traditional contemporary work.

Appreciating that the thesis of the book was going to present significant challenges in execution, Black does introduce his subject well, laying the groundwork for the detailed analysis to follow. Unfortunately, evidence of over-reach rapidly makes itself known in the following chapters. While reference to Indian, Chinese, Ottoman and Japanese rulers and cultures are made, these are only skimmed without a depth of analysis that would enable them to act as a foil to Western dogma. Thus it is, for example, that the Chinese Kangxi Emperor, who the author compares to Julius Caesar or Napoleon, is not given any depth of comment or mention about how he enacted his strategy in an environment so different from the West. With each chapter, further emphasis is placed on the roles and approaches of traditional western powers such as the US, Great Britain, France and Germany. Additionally, while the role of non-operational influencers of strategy (such as logistics, technology and demographics) are mentioned they are not included within the more detailed exploration of strategy presented.

Nevertheless, an author of Black’s stature is not going to present a work that is without merit. He does present a series of excellent insights into how strategy should be considered and applied based upon his historical review. He postulates that theory is fine (in theory) however, all of the books and works related to the theoretical application of strategy need to be understood against the context of strategy as dynamic and changing. There is no “one size fits all’ model when it comes to appreciating how to apply a strategy to a given circumstance; strategic aims and goals of states change with the passage of time. He makes the observations, with examples, that constraints (what must be done) and restraints (what must not be done) serve to influence the strategic vision of a state. Moreover, such things as what constitutes a victory for a state (ie The Yom Kippur War of 1973), what is acceptable behaviour in the execution of war and what represents the element undertaking the execution of strategy (ie The War on Terror) are not fixed. All of these aspects differ with time, perspective and expectations of the actors involved.

The author sums up his work with a comprehensive bibliography and footnotes section. Overall, a valiant attempt at a comprehensive study of the practice of strategy throughout history which, while it contains some very valuable analysis and discussion was really doomed to fall short of the aggressive outcome that the author set for himself. 


No comments:

Post a Comment