Eighth Army vs Rommel: Tactics, Training and Operations in North Africa 1940-1942 - James Colvin

 This review has been submitted to the Canadian Army Journal 

Title: Eighth Army vs Rommel: Tactics, Training and Operations in North Africa 1940-1942
Author: James Colvin
ISBN: 978-1-913336-64-6
Publisher: Helion and Company
Year: 2020
Softcover
Pages: 261
Photos/Maps: 30/11

The characteristics that define individuals as military warriors and leaders (integrity, bravery, self-sacrifice etc) are not the same as those that characterize members of the Profession of Arms. Like doctors, lawyers, architects or any other field that identifies itself by a professional standard, the Profession of Arms requires serious study, development, mentorship and expertise (in addition to the characteristics of the warrior). Colvin, in his work, approaches his analysis of the adversaries in the North African Campaign through their respective attitudes towards the development of their military leadership and how that attitude influenced the execution of operations. It is a unique and interesting study as it encompasses not only the pure military elements of the African conflict itself but also how the cultural/societal influences within which the respective antagonists developed; and how this affected their conduct and approach to military operations. Unique in its approach is the authors focus, not on the most senior levels of command, but the Corps and Divisional leaders. 

Colvin opens his book with an overarching review of the cultural environments that most heavily  influenced the development of the German and British leadership. The British approach, based predominantly within the Public School system emphasized fair play, team efforts and loyalty to ones peers. This style manifested itself into the primacy of and loyalty to the Regiment and their associated traditions. A directive and structured style of leadership and execution was often undermined by subordinate’s loyalty being primarily to a peer or commander from the same school (Eton etc) or Regiment as opposed to the appointed one. Conversely, a British Commander would often support a weak subordinate from a common background all the while refraining from being seen as too ‘directive’. 

The Germans, on the other hand, took a much more serious approach to the “art and science’ of military command. The German command schoolhouse had much higher standards and expectations than its British counterpart. Officers and senior NCOs were actively challenged to adapt to differing situations and to assume higher levels of command without hesitation. The Germans developed a common doctrine and ensured that it was clearly understood and adhered to across its forces. Colvin’s analysis of this critical area is both insightful and thought provoking. 

The author then segues this into a discussion of the doctrine and equipment development of the respective adversaries. Central to this was the use of ‘combined arms’ units by the Germans and the resistance to this by the British. The stove-piping of British combat elements enabled smaller German forces to overcome larger Allied forces by being able to call upon a variety of means to counter UK forces. Combined this with a well established doctrine that enabled the fluid and transparent transitions of command (requiring little to no formal ‘orders’) meant that the Germans were far more flexible in their approach and response. By contrast, British command was characterized by micro-management, misplaced loyalty, inconsistent doctrine and a more collegial and inclusive (as opposed to directive) leadership style. The author, to be clear, casts no aspersions on the bravery, loyalty and effort of British Commanders as individuals, but does draw attention to the cumulative impact of treating warfare as a ‘Great Game’ as opposed to a deadly serious profession.   

Additionally, Colvin includes within his discussions a detailed comparison of the weapons that each side utilized and how they adjusted their equipment and tactics to account for changes in their opposition. Thus it was that, while the Allies tended to have higher numbers of tanks, German tanks were of higher overall quality and were more survivable. When faced for example, with the British 2 pdr anti-tank gun, the Germans were able to counter with hardened frontal ‘spaced’ armour that enabled them to neutralize the penetrating power of the 2 pdr round. Additionally, the Germans adjusted their doctrine to utilize the famous 88 mm in an anti-tank role. Colvin’s discussion highlights the difference between the more ad hoc approach of the Allies compared with the more structured and deliberate approach of the Germans in their respective responses to the challenges of warfare in the desert. 

The author then follows with a series of chapters discussing and analyzing the performance of the adversaries in a series of key offensives and battles leading up to the Second Battle of El Alamein. Each highlights the respective competencies and shortcomings of the commanders and the methods by which they utilized their forces. While not all goes the Germans way, the Allies are seen to continue to struggle with effective command and control over their assets. Colvin sets the tone by looking at the effects of the ‘Crusader’ battles and the lessons that the respective combatants gleaned from them. He then goes on to look at how those lessons were correspondingly applied to the training and doctrine of the forces involved. Ultimately, it is the Allies which continue to struggle in the subsequent battles of Tobruk and Gazala; their commanders not having been able to discern their doctrinal shortcomings (shortcomings that were able to continue to be exploited by the Afrika Korps). 

Colvin closes his book with the arrival of Montgomery and the changes that he brings in terms of command, presence and leadership to the Allied side. His approach is much more in line with the Germans  and he breaks the mold of the traditional ‘fair play, public school chum’ view of his predecessors.  Commanders are not forgiven their shortfalls and a far tighter grip and focus is instilled. 

Colvin has written an excellent analysis of a level of command and control not often addressed but that is critical to the effective execution of the vision of the Theatre Commander: that of the Divisional and Corps commanders. His incorporation of the societal influences on the personality and professional development of the respective officer corps of the German and Allied forces is extremely instructive in comprehending the ‘foundation’ upon which these leaders developed. A comprehensive bibliography and footnote compendium as well as a superior quality publication from Helion round out this stellar work. This is a book that should be read more than once.