This review has been submitted to The British Military History Journal.
Author:
Douglas Fermer
ISBN:
978-1-473-82889-6
Publisher:
Pen and Sword
Year:
2015
Softcover
Pages: 244
Photos/
Maps: 30/10
The
Franco-Prussian War marked a historic shift in the dynamics of the European
political and national stage; the decline of France and the rise of the German
confederation. This was made all the more significant given the assumption by
many of the predominance of French martial prowess and the relatively junior
position of Germany. The results of the war left the French in political and
military disarray and the Germans as the new masters of the profession of arms.
Fermer’s book covers the events leading up to the commencement of the war and
the proceedings up to the conclusion of the Battle of Sedan and the surrender
of Napoleon III, Emperor of the French.
While
the book ultimately focusses upon the Battle of Sedan, the author has
undertaken to provide the reader with a comprehensive understanding of not only
the events but also the capabilities and political/military realities of the
protagonists leading up to the conflict. This is critical as it speaks to the
conditions that resulted in the unforeseen military cataclysm for France. The
analysis undertaken by Fermer looks at not only the size and capabilities of
the respective armies, but more importantly their respective doctrines and
leadership.
France’s
doctrine relating to combat was only part of the equation and, as Fermer so
aptly discusses, it was the doctrine surrounding the processes relating to
mobilization and logistics that proved to be the true Achilles Heel of the
French. Their plans were unrealistic, unproven and based on capabilities that
existed only on paper. Further exacerbating this shortcoming, the French
political and military leadership chose to ignore the realities of French
weakness and undertake their roles and responsibilities more as partisan political
adversaries living in a delusional world
of past glories rather than the real politique of 1870 Europe.
Fermer
also casts a strong light on the nascent German Empire and its efforts to
establish itself as a leading member within the European host of nations. While
Fermer equitably identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the German
approach, it is clear that the political and military leadership of Prussia
(read Germany) was much better prepared and in tune than the French. They also
had the benefit of much more recent combat experience with the Danish and
Austrian wars where they were able undertake critical analysis of their plans
and doctrine.
Having
prepared the groundwork through this macro, pan-European approach, Fermer is
able to focus on the immediate events leading up the outbreak of hostilities
and the initial stages of the war. His eye is critical and unrelenting as he
relates the activities of the individual armies and commanders. As he
discusses, the French were not without opportunity and courage but they were
immediately caught behind the ‘power curve’ and surrendered the initiative to
the Germans. The Germans, for their part, maintained a clear operational focus
that allowed their armies to operate independently but in concert with one
another. The French command and support structure rapidly collapsed under the
rapidly changing operational and tactical environment and they found themselves
operating reactively instead of proactively with little or no central control.
The
narrative reaches its apogee with its examination of the Battle of Sedan
itself. The study is such that the reader instinctively feels for the French
soldiers as they fight with futile desperation under a command that has
abrogated its responsibilities to the vagaries of fate. The unfolding of the
battle is easily followed and related with a critical eye to the impact of
local encounters on the overall battle. Both the German and French leadership
is studied in some detail as to their conduct and competence with lessons to be
learned for the modern day practitioner.
Fermer
is an eminently readable author and his books well worth the investment. Sedan
1870, is an excellent study in hubris and hunger, doctrine and professionalism
and the underlying motivation that drives troops, regardless of the quality of
their leadership, to astonishing levels of self-sacrifice.
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