Whispers Across The Atlantick - David Smith

This review has been submitted to the Canadian Army Journal. 

Title: Whispers Across The Atlantick

Author: David Smith

ISBN: 978-1-4728-2795-1

Publisher: Osprey

Year: 2017

Hardcover

Pages: 292

Maps:  5

Photos: 15

General William Howe was appointed the Commander of the Crown forces deployed to crush the rebellion that had broken out in the United States in 1776. The British Navy had unchallenged control of the seas and its land forces a heavy professional advantage over the American rebels. Things unfortunately did not go nearly as planned for the British; hampered by hubris, personal animosity between the commanders of the different British and German (the British Crown had hired German mercenaries) units, a failure to prioritize and focus on the primary task of destroying the rebel army and a marked failure to undertake operations with drive and urgency resulted in a growing dissatisfaction and a loss of confidence with Howe by the British Government. His resignation after the 1777 campaign season and the subsequent public enquiry in the House of Commons form the basis of the book.

I particularly enjoyed Smith’s approach to his narrative. Each chapter commences with the pertinent element of Howe’s speech to the House followed by an evaluation of the contents by the author (taking advantage of the benefit of hindsight). The chapter that follows expands upon the actions of the various antagonists during the period covered. This approach makes for a much clearer understanding of what the perceptions of Howe were at the time as compared to the reality of his actions on the ground.

The degree to which commanders relied upon the initiative of their subordinates during this period is clear. Limitations in communications and the challenges of operating along very limited axis’s of advance (in many cases consisting of rivers or game tracks) resulted in decisions being made based upon information that had been overtaken by events. More to the point though an explanation of the failure of the British to attain victory during these critical early years, lies in the authors analysis of Howe as a commander and his failure to grasp the operational and strategic options that would have destroyed the capacity of the Americans to continue the war. It is clear that Howe was not an incompetent General but that he was a man out of his depth in the combined symmetric and asymmetric styles of warfare that constituted the Revolution.

Additionally, Howe’s efforts were impeded by the inflexible position assumed by the British government in relation to the demands of the American colonists. His orders to destroy the various colony’s infrastructure as a means of undermining the will of the revolutionaries combined with a refusal to even acknowledge their grievances, ensured a steady and growing level of support for the insurrection. Smith discusses this challenge in some detail.   

Osprey has published a very good quality book. The main drawback to the content of the book itself is the quality of the maps. They are reproductions of the original maps produced at the time for the consumption of the British public and are, unfortunately, difficult to read and follow. Otherwise the narrative is excellent, the bibliography extensive and the font large enough to read easily. I very much enjoyed this book as it shed light upon the nature of 18^th century command as well as the challenge of conducting a war from a distance. Recommended.

A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff 1807-1945 - Col T.N. Dupuy

Title: A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff 1807-1945

Author: Col T.N. Dupuy

ISBN: 0-13-351114-6

Publisher: Prentice Hall

Year: 1977

Hardcover

Pages: 363

Maps:  19

Photos: 74

 Students of modern military history will agree that one of the most influential elements of the modern command system in most if not all countries has been the legacy of the German General Staff System, developed under the auspices of The Reformers (Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Clausewitz, Grolman and Boyen) following the collapse of the Prussian military at the Battles of Jena and Auerstadt in 1807. Dupuy’s work traces the development, institutionalization and influence of this system on the German military and, by extension, State up to the end of 1945.

This is a brilliant analysis of the staff system. Revolutionary in scope and visionary in implementation; it served to transform the Prussian and German States from a third rate power to the standard by which other militaries were measured. While the narrative is clear and logical, there are three elements which stand out as being key to the success and ultimate failure of the German military.

The first two and the foundation of the system (and that which gave it such resiliency and capacity) was the Founders success at “Institutionalizing Military Excellence”. This entailed ensuring the development and maintenance of a military as free as possible from the ‘vagaries of change’ resultant from human fallibility. In effect ensuring military excellence regardless of the influence of changing leadership. Dupuy provides an insightful and concise discourse on how the Germans developed a process of ensuring an Army of consistent and reliable ‘Organizational Genius’ while concurrently providing the structure within which leaders of ‘Operational Genius’ were developed. Additionally, the military leadership was to remain aloof and disconnected to the political machinations of the State.

The third aspect that they endeavoured to implement, but were ultimately unsuccessful, was ensuring that the military and its leadership were seen and understood to be tools of and accountable to the people of Prussia and ultimately, Germany. Where this failed was in the relationship between the Kaiser and the Reichstag (or Parliament). The Kaiser insisted upon an Army that was loyal to and controlled by Him. Thus it was that the leadership and the Army swore fealty to the Kaiser and not to Germany (as represented by the people).

The book goes a long way towards providing an explanation as to why the German Army remained an effective, focussed fighting force right up until the last days of the Second World War. It also, by extension, explains why the military did not intervene with the rise of Hitler and also swore an oath to him. Dupuy’s analysis shows the strength of the system that the Germans had created and how it translated into such an effective military force. Additionally, the dangers of providing such an effective tool to an individual as opposed to an accountable entity is also made abundantly clear.

This is a great book, logically laid out and comprehensive in its scope. It serves as an outstanding review of the strengths and weaknesses of the German Staff system.

1918: Winning the War, Losing the War - Matthias Strohn

This review has been submitted to the British Army Review.

Title: 1918: Winning the War, Losing the War

Author: Matthias Strohn

ISBN: 978-1-4728-2933-7

Publisher: Osprey

Year: 2018

Hardcover

Pages: 304

Maps:  8

Photos: 19

Those who have studied the First World War in any way will agree that the key front between victory or defeat was the Western Front. They will also agree that for the duration of the war, the Western Front, unlike the East and Southern Fronts, was static except for two brief periods: 1914 leading up to the Battle of the Marne and 1918 with the final offensives of the Germans and the subsequent Last 100 Days of the Allies. 1918, as its title implies, focuses upon the final year of the war, but not as an analysis of the movements and activities of the different protagonists; but as a discussion of the relative capabilities, the strengths, weaknesses and the influencing factors that reflected the different armies as they faced each other after 4 years of warfare.

This book draws upon the knowledge of a number of respected military historians, each well published and hailing from a variety of teaching institutions in Austria, Germany, the UK, the United States and Ireland. Each of the 10 contributors has been given a nation or subject to discuss (ie the Air Campaign, Naval Warfare, the British Army, the German Army etc) covering off all of the major facets of the war as it was in 1918. Each is a stand-alone analysis and may be read independent of the others. Austro-Hungary, Russia, the Ottomans and Italy are not covered as chapters but are lumped together in the sections: The Forgotten Fronts of Europe and the War Outside of Europe. This is unfortunate as certainly the three nations of Italy, Austro-Hungary and Turkey were still very active participants in their own right.

The chapters are drafted in a format similar in nature to a university lecture; not surprising given the backgrounds of the contributors. This also ensures that the content flows logically, is lucid and engaging. This improves both the quality of the reading experience as well as facilitating the knowledge that wishes to be passed.

The narrative of the book is bookended by an initial introductory chapter that places the impact of the final year of the War into a modern day context as well as a final installment that captures a number of the lessons to be gleaned from the results of the year’s events on the Western Front. On the German side, the campaigns of 1918 revealed a completely revamped operational and tactical engagement methodology based upon the ‘Stormtrooper’ infiltration tactics and vastly improved artillery utilization. It proved to be extremely effective at breaking the deadlock of trench warfare but could not be sustained due primarily to logistical limitations. On the Allied side, it was the lesson of interdependence between Allies. Up to that point in the war, nations had worked together but retained their operational independence. The crisis of the German offensives set the conditions on the Allied side for the appointment of a senior commander for all Allied armies, something that was never achieved amongst the Central Powers; this in turn significantly improved the Entente’s operational effectiveness and focus.

Overall, 1918 is an excellent analysis of the final year of the war, drawing upon the expertise of a number of different subject matter experts. The analysis is clear, concise and in-depth; it is unfortunate that Austro-Hungary and Turkey do not have their own chapters but they are not ignored. The conclusion is comprehensive and draws attention to a series of lessons that still resonate a century later. It is clear, from the discussion, that the war was still very much undecided as the protagonists entered the summer of 1918 and could easily have had very different results given just a few changes. A book well worth reading and discussing.