This review has been submitted to Canadian Army Review
Title: Case White: The
Invasion of Poland 1939
Author: Robert Forczyk
ISBN: 978-0-253-35688-8
Publisher: Osprey
Books
Year: 2019
Softcover
Pages: 406
Photos/Maps: Advance
Copy/8
Conventional
historical wisdom suggests that the German invasion of Poland in 1939,
triggering the beginning of WW2, was a foregone conclusion of victory for the
Germans. Images of Polish cavalry charging German armoured forces and being
destroyed have been used to portray the futility of the Polish resistance.
Forczyk has addressed a number of these fallacies in his new, comprehensive
analysis of Case White.
Commencing with an
in-depth review of the events in the region of Northeastern Europe following the
end of World War 1 and leading up to the 1930’s, Forczyk paints a broad canvass
of the political, economic and social challenges that destabilized the region.
This also clearly indicates the complexity of the interactions of the
personalities and their influence on local relations. It is a little known fact
that the German military had significant respect for the post war Polish
commander Pilsudski (his memoirs were recommended reading for German Officers).
However, his death in 1935 and the subsequent diminishment of trust between the
German and Polish governments soured relations.
The account of the
preparation and fighting is very balanced. It is easily forgotten that for both
sides this was their first introduction to large scale, combined arms operations.
Forczyk’s narrative easily encapsulates the challenges faced by the various
combatant’s; their successes and failures. The Germans had developed the
capability for close air support using Stuka dive bombers but found, for
example, that their methodology for coordination was too slow in many cases to
be effective. Additionally, in many cases, application of panzer doctrine was
spotty and inconsistent, resulting in heavier losses than anticipated. The
author is also commended for incorporating not just the operational elements
into his study but also the impact of logistics. In many cases the German
support elements were not able to keep up with the more mobile panzer forces.
Conversely, the Polish forces proved
themselves to be tenacious fighters but under poor strategic guidance. As
Forczyk relates, the Poles were (and allowed themselves to be) mislead by the
promises of assistance from the West. This reflected an inconsistent approach
to modernization that was impacted by economic and personality based
limitations. Additionally, a failure to realistically plan for mobilization and
defensive operations (that emphasized non-critical regions of the country),
combined to undermine Polish potential for effective defensive operations.
The third critical
element of Case White was the Soviet invasion of Poland from the East. Typical
of the Soviet leadership at the time, units were only provided with two days
notice of the impending operation. Nor were there any formal plans developed for
the integration of German and Soviet forces. Forczyk’s book describes in detail
not only the ad hoc nature of the operational relationship between two ‘Allied’
nations but also the reprehensible response of the Polish allies, England and
France, to the Soviet invasion. Tepid would be far too generous a word; as he
states, Germany got war and the Soviets nothing for their actions.
Forczyk’s Case White
is an outstanding book; deeply researched and eminently readable. His attention
to detail, extensive annexes and copious endnotes provide a wealth of knowledge
to the reader outside of the narrative itself. Case White is a highly
recommended addition to anyone’s library and sheds light on what rapidly became
a forgotten or secondary element of the Second World War.
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