The Book of Five Rings - Miyamoto Musashi

Title: The Book of Five Rings

Author: Miyamoto Musashi
ISBN: 978-1-61180-640-3
Publisher: ShambalaYear: 1193
Softcover
Pages: 173

Miyamoto Musashi's "The Book of Five Rings" is a timeless classic in the world of martial arts and strategy. Written by one of Japan's most renowned swordsmen and warriors in the 17th century, this book transcends its origins to offer valuable insights into strategy, leadership, and life itself.

Musashi's treatise is divided into five books, each focusing on a specific aspect of strategy and combat. These books are Earth, Water, Fire, Wind, and Void, representing different elements and aspects of martial strategy. Each book delves into the philosophy and practicality of Musashi's approach to combat and, by extension, life.

One of the most striking aspects of "The Book of Five Rings" is its concise and direct style. Musashi's writing is clear and unambiguous, making it accessible to both martial artists and those interested in strategy and philosophy. He avoids unnecessary ornamentation and gets straight to the heart of his teachings. This clarity is one of the book's strengths, allowing readers to absorb the wisdom without unnecessary distractions.

At the core of Musashi's philosophy is the concept of the "Way of the Samurai" or "Bushido." He emphasizes the importance of self-discipline, commitment, and continuous improvement. Musashi's belief in relentless training and self-cultivation resonates not only with martial artists but with anyone striving for excellence in any field. His emphasis on adaptability and the ability to change strategies according to the circumstances is particularly relevant in today's fast-paced world.

"The Book of Five Rings" also provides valuable insights into the psychology of combat. Musashi discusses the importance of maintaining a calm and focused mind during battle, advocating for mental clarity as the key to victory. These insights can be applied beyond martial arts and into everyday life, helping individuals remain composed in high-pressure situations.

Another highlight of Musashi's work is his exploration of various combat stances and techniques. While the book primarily focuses on swordsmanship, the principles can be adapted to different forms of combat and even non-physical battles, such as business negotiations or personal conflicts. Musashi's emphasis on simplicity and economy of movement is particularly valuable, emphasizing the importance of efficiency in achieving one's goals.

However, "The Book of Five Rings" is not without its challenges. Some may find Musashi's philosophy overly rigid or too steeped in the context of medieval Japan. While the core principles remain relevant, adapting them to modern life may require some creativity and interpretation.

In conclusion, Miyamoto Musashi's "The Book of Five Rings" is a timeless classic that offers profound insights into strategy, discipline, and the art of living. Musashi's direct and clear writing style, combined with his deep wisdom, makes this book a must-read for martial artists, leaders, and anyone seeking personal and professional growth. While it may require some interpretation to apply its lessons to modern life, the essence of Musashi's teachings remains as relevant today as it was centuries ago. This book is a valuable addition to any library and a source of inspiration for those on a quest for self-improvement and mastery.

The Planning and Preparations for the Battle of Kursk Vol 1 - Valeriy Zamulin (translated by Stuart Britton)

This review has been submitted to the Canadian Army Journal 

Title: The Planning and Preparations for the Battle of Kursk Vol 1
Author: Valeriy Zamulin (translated by Stuart Britton)
ISBN: 978-1-914059-22-3
Publisher: Helion and Company
Year: 2021
Softcover
Pages: 565
Photographs/maps: 36/7

Valeriy Zamulin's "The Planning and Preparations for the Battle of Kursk Vol 1" is a remarkable addition to the extensive literature on World War II. This meticulously researched and expertly crafted volume offers a comprehensive exploration of the planning and preparations that led up to one of the most pivotal battles in history, the Battle of Kursk.

Zamulin, a renowned Russian military historian, brings a wealth of knowledge and expertise to this project. He draws from an impressive array of primary sources, including German and Soviet archival materials, personal diaries, and interviews with veterans who participated in the battle. This exhaustive research allows him to present a multifaceted and nuanced perspective on the events leading up to the Battle of Kursk.

The book is organized into a clear and logical structure, which aids readers in navigating the complex historical context. Zamulin begins by setting the stage, describing the strategic situation on the Eastern Front in 1943. He highlights the German defeat at Stalingrad and the subsequent Soviet offensive, which put the Red Army on the offensive for the first time in the war. The first half of the book is focussed upon the German preparations, while the second concentrates on the Russian efforts. Each covers the same time period leading up to the Battle itself.

One of the strengths of Zamulin's work is his attention to detail. He meticulously examines the decisions made by both the German High Command, led by Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, and the Soviet High Command, headed by Marshal Georgy Zhukov. He dissects the strategic and tactical considerations that influenced their planning, providing readers with a deep understanding of the thought processes behind these critical decisions. Another stellar element of the book is its comprehensive exploration of the how, (relating to the methodologies), the adversaries planned their offense/defence.

Zamulin's analysis of the German preparations for the battle is particularly illuminating. He delves into the logistical challenges faced by the Wehrmacht, including shortages of tanks, fuel, and experienced personnel. This detailed examination challenges the traditional narrative that the Germans were on the brink of victory and reveals the vulnerabilities and limitations of the German war machine.

Equally important is Zamulin's exploration of the Soviet side of the equation. He sheds light on the extensive preparations undertaken by the Red Army, including the construction of elaborate defensive fortifications and the assembly of a formidable armored force. Zamulin's research dispels the myth that the Soviets relied solely on numerical superiority, demonstrating the sophistication of their planning and the effectiveness of their defensive measures.

One of the book's standout features is its focus on the human aspect of warfare. Zamulin weaves personal stories and firsthand accounts into his narrative, allowing readers to connect with the individuals who lived through this tumultuous period. These personal insights humanize the conflict, making it more relatable and emotionally resonant.

Furthermore, Zamulin's writing style is engaging and accessible. He avoids unnecessary jargon and provides clear explanations of military terminology and concepts. This approach makes the book accessible to both military history enthusiasts and general readers with an interest in World War II.

While Zamulin's research is comprehensive, it is worth noting that "The Planning and Preparations for the Battle of Kursk Vol 1" is just the first volume in a series. As such, the book primarily covers the period leading up to the battle and the initial stages of the conflict. Readers seeking a detailed analysis of the battle itself may need to turn to subsequent volumes in the series.

In conclusion, Valeriy Zamulin's "The Planning and Preparations for the Battle of Kursk Vol 1" is a masterful work of military history that offers a deep and nuanced examination of the events leading up to the Battle of Kursk. Zamulin's meticulous research, engaging writing style, and focus on the human element of warfare make this book a valuable addition to the library of anyone interested in World War II history. It challenges existing narratives and provides a fresh perspective on a pivotal moment in the conflict. As we await subsequent volumes in the series, Zamulin's work stands as a testament to the importance of understanding the planning and preparations that shaped the course of history on the Eastern Front.

Crecy: Battle of the Five Kings - Michael Livingston

This review has been submitted to Military History Online 

Title: Crecy: Battle of the Five Kings
Author: Michael Livingston
ISBN: 978-1-4728-4705-8
Publisher: Osprey
Year: 2022
Hardcover
Pages: 303
Phots/Maps: 33/5

In "Crecy: Battle of the Five Kings," author Michael Livingston takes readers on a gripping journey through one of the most pivotal battles in medieval history. With meticulous research and a captivating writing style, Livingston masterfully reconstructs the Battle of Crecy, providing a vivid and detailed account of the clash between the English and French forces.

Livingston's narrative begins by setting the stage, delving into the political and military backdrop of 14th-century Europe. He skillfully navigates through the complex web of alliances, rivalries, and ambitions that shaped the events leading up to the battle. The author's ability to blend historical context with the personal stories of key figures creates a rich tapestry that engages readers from the start.

The book truly shines in its depiction of the battle itself. Livingston's descriptions are immersive and evocative, capturing the chaos and brutality of medieval warfare. From the thunderous clash of armored knights to the whistling flight of arrows, the author skillfully brings the battlefield to life, allowing readers to experience the tension and fear that gripped both sides.

One of the standout aspects of "Crecy: Battle of the Five Kings" is Livingston's attention to detail. The author's extensive research is evident in his comprehensive understanding of the weapons, tactics, and strategies employed by the opposing forces. He seamlessly blends historical accounts, primary sources, and archaeological evidence to paint a complete picture of the battle. This meticulous approach not only adds depth to the narrative but also enhances the book's credibility as a reliable historical resource.

Moreover, Livingston's exploration of the individuals involved in the conflict adds a human element to the story. By focusing on key figures such as King Edward III of England, King Philip VI of France, and the iconic English longbowmen, he provides insights into their motivations, personalities, and the impact they had on the outcome of the battle. These character-driven narratives offer a compelling contrast to the grand scale of the conflict, creating a well-rounded and engaging reading experience.

While the book excels in many areas, it occasionally becomes bogged down by excessive detail. Certain passages delve into minutiae that may overwhelm readers seeking a more streamlined narrative. Nevertheless, this level of detail will undoubtedly be appreciated by history enthusiasts who crave a more thorough examination of the battle.

In terms of structure, "Crecy: Battle of the Five Kings" is well-organized and easy to follow. The author guides readers through the chronology of events, providing clear explanations and helpful maps to aid comprehension. Additionally, the book is supplemented with stunning illustrations, photographs, and diagrams that further enhance the reading experience and aid in visualizing the battlefield.

In conclusion, Michael Livingston's "Crecy: Battle of the Five Kings" is a remarkable work that combines meticulous research, immersive storytelling, and compelling characterizations. The book provides a comprehensive and engrossing account of the Battle of Crecy, shedding light on one of the most significant conflicts of the Middle Ages. Whether you are a history aficionado or simply seeking an enthralling tale of warfare, this book is sure to captivate and educate. Livingston's expertise and passion for the subject shine through, making "Crecy" an essential addition to any history enthusiast's library.

Military Strategy: A Global History - Jeremy Black

This review has been submitted to Proceedings Magazine. 

Title: Military Strategy: A Global History
Author: Jeremy Black

ISBN: 978-0-300-21718-6

Publisher: Yale UP
Hardcover
Pages: 306

Dr Jeremy Black is world renowned as one of the most prolific authors of history in the present day. With over 100 books to his credit and a litany of board appointments for a number of well respected journals and magazines, it was with great anticipation that his most recent work on Military Strategy was awaited. Dr Black notes in his introduction, that while strategy has become a byword in government, industry, military and academia in the modern day, in doing so, its core focus and intent has been lost and diluted. His intent in writing this work is to present the reader with a perspective on how strategy has been employed throughout history and to bring to the fore non-Eurocentric perspectives on the application of strategy. One is certainly struck by the audacity and breadth of the endeavour.

It should be noted at the outset that this is a work not for the faint of heart. There is an assumption of a fairly advanced baseline understanding of history and the key participants who are referenced in the book. Additionally, the work is quite dense and heavy, and does require a more advanced vocabulary than would be expected in a traditional contemporary work.

Appreciating that the thesis of the book was going to present significant challenges in execution, Black does introduce his subject well, laying the groundwork for the detailed analysis to follow. Unfortunately, evidence of over-reach rapidly makes itself known in the following chapters. While reference to Indian, Chinese, Ottoman and Japanese rulers and cultures are made, these are only skimmed without a depth of analysis that would enable them to act as a foil to Western dogma. Thus it is, for example, that the Chinese Kangxi Emperor, who the author compares to Julius Caesar or Napoleon, is not given any depth of comment or mention about how he enacted his strategy in an environment so different from the West. With each chapter, further emphasis is placed on the roles and approaches of traditional western powers such as the US, Great Britain, France and Germany. Additionally, while the role of non-operational influencers of strategy (such as logistics, technology and demographics) are mentioned they are not included within the more detailed exploration of strategy presented.

Nevertheless, an author of Black’s stature is not going to present a work that is without merit. He does present a series of excellent insights into how strategy should be considered and applied based upon his historical review. He postulates that theory is fine (in theory) however, all of the books and works related to the theoretical application of strategy need to be understood against the context of strategy as dynamic and changing. There is no “one size fits all’ model when it comes to appreciating how to apply a strategy to a given circumstance; strategic aims and goals of states change with the passage of time. He makes the observations, with examples, that constraints (what must be done) and restraints (what must not be done) serve to influence the strategic vision of a state. Moreover, such things as what constitutes a victory for a state (ie The Yom Kippur War of 1973), what is acceptable behaviour in the execution of war and what represents the element undertaking the execution of strategy (ie The War on Terror) are not fixed. All of these aspects differ with time, perspective and expectations of the actors involved.

The author sums up his work with a comprehensive bibliography and footnotes section. Overall, a valiant attempt at a comprehensive study of the practice of strategy throughout history which, while it contains some very valuable analysis and discussion was really doomed to fall short of the aggressive outcome that the author set for himself. 

The Splintered Empires: The Eastern Front 1917-1921 - Prit Buttar

This review has been submitted to Strategy and Tactics Magazine.

Title: The Splintered Empires: The Eastern Front 1917-1921
Author: Prit Buttar
ISBN: 978-1-4728-1985-7
Publisher: Osprey Publishing
Year: 2017
Hardcover
Pages: 480
Photos/Maps: 34/14

With this book, the last in his WW1 Eastern Front series, Buttar closes the circle on a little appreciated, understood and studied facet of the First World War. Like his other works, the author draws upon his in-depth research and knowledge of the period to present a comprehensive picture of the convoluted paroxysms that wracked the Empires of Eastern Europe; resulting in the emergence of multiple nascent nations each struggling for survival and territory. For many Western readers, WW1 ended in November, 1918 with the cessation of hostilities on the Western Front. For those in the East; however, a further three years of conflict remained as nationalism, racism and political strife convulsed the region.

Buttar is the consummate historian, seamlessly transitioning from a strategic perspective, encompassing the broad spectrum of international players, to recollections from soldiers, citizens and statesmen that adds both depth and a personal element to the narrative. The author is adroit at selecting diary entries and letter passages that provide insight into the fear, confusion, despair, hope and rage that permeated throughout these societies as they collapsed into anarchy. This is particularly applicable to the Russian and Austro-Hungarian officers as discipline and professionalism collapsed in the face of societal turmoil.

This period is particularly confusing and complex; Buttar is able to tease apart the densely interwoven threads and present them in a cogent, logical fashion while not losing touch with the human element of the period. Traditionally, the smaller nations in the East received short shrift from historians focussed upon the collapse of the Great Powers; in this work, Buttar looks at each of the emerging nation states in turn and discusses their efforts to navigate the complex international waters around them. Thus Finland, each of the Baltic States, Poland and Ukraine are the subjects of chapters in their own right.

Additionally, Buttar addresses a number of elusive questions that have been left unclear in a number of previous accounts of the Eastern Front. Germany, for example had anticipated 45 essentially fresh divisions being freed up for transfer to the West for participation in the final German offensive. Ultimately, only 32 divisions were made available. The why of this centres upon the hubris and misguided national decisions of the Central Powers in their occupation policies and treatment of the Eastern regions. What of the forces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire? Why were they not available for transfer to the west; this also is addressed.

Overall, this is another outstanding book from this author. Encompassing not only the final years of the First World War but also the myriad of ‘successor wars’ that ravaged the region, Splintered Empires is a superb synopsis of the period. The bibliography and notes sections are comprehensive and add additional depth to the narrative. Osprey has published a high quality book that is a fabulous addition to anyone’s library.     

Haig’s Enemy: Crown Prince Rupprecht and Germany’s War on the Western Front - Jonathan Boff

This review has been submitted to Australian Army Journal

Title: Haig’s Enemy: Crown Prince Rupprecht and Germany’s War on the Western Front
Author: Jonathan Boff
ISBN: 978-0-19-967046-8
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Year: 2018
Hardcover
Pages: 373
Photos/Maps: 11/14 

Rupprecht, Crown Prince of Bavaria and one of the most senior Western Front Central Power commanders throughout WW1, has largely been forgotten with the passage of time; however, as Boff’s comprehensive study has shown, he was a key figure in the Central Power Alliance. Boff has undertaken to present an analysis of Rupprecht as commander, Crown Prince, husband and father. His conclusions, both balanced and nuanced, suggest that while he cannot be considered one of the ‘Great Captains” of history, he was, as a commander, insightful, competent and intelligent. He was also, as the Crown Prince of the second most powerful region of the German Federation (Bavaria), a product of his period and upbringing with all of the flaws and strengths that position entailed.  

The central theme of the book is obviously Rupprecht and his part during the War; however, Boff does an excellent job of continuously situating Rupprecht’s roles and actions within the broader spectrum of German Federation politics, the international environment and the flow of the War itself. The author is particularly adept at maintaining a clear and concise narrative that seamlessly weaves these disparate themes together in a easily comprehensible way. 

I particularly appreciated his analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the German Army and its command structure. Conventional opinion holds that the German Army of the time was a machine to be feared, emulated and respected; however, as Boff conclusively proves, while elements of this were in fact true, the actual reality of the effectiveness of the Army was far more nuanced. Command and control was riven with political appointees, regional cliques and swung broadly between meritocracy as a promotion foundation and favouritism. Decentralized execution of command, while periodically evident, became increasingly rare as operations turned against the Germans. Structures became rigid and honesty in self evaluation (as a military) became the exception and not the norm. 

Boff’s book was very enjoyable and educational to read. His writing style is engaging and his research thorough and balanced. A consummate historian, he has presented his work fairly and drawn conclusions that are well supported by primary source material. His narrative, while thoughtful and complete, avoids the pitfalls of excessive verbosity and leaves the reader with a number of insightful observations that resonate even today. The one conclusion that caused me to pause, however, was his position that, following the failure of the Battle of the Marne in 1914, Germany (and the Central Powers) were destined to lose the war as they were not able to accomplish the foundational goal of a quick and decisive victory in the West.

The book is a very high quality publication. Maps are centrally located at the front of the narrative making reference to them easy and photos, while not of the highest quality, distributed throughout. The work includes a copious number of endnotes and a comprehensive bibliography. I thoroughly enjoyed and appreciated this book and strongly recommend it.

Case White: The Invasion of Poland 1939 - Robert Forczyk

This review has been submitted to Canadian Army Review

Title: Case White: The Invasion of Poland 1939

Author: Robert Forczyk

ISBN: 978-0-253-35688-8

Publisher: Osprey Books

Year: 2019

Softcover

Pages: 406

Photos/Maps: Advance Copy/8

Conventional historical wisdom suggests that the German invasion of Poland in 1939, triggering the beginning of WW2, was a foregone conclusion of victory for the Germans. Images of Polish cavalry charging German armoured forces and being destroyed have been used to portray the futility of the Polish resistance. Forczyk has addressed a number of these fallacies in his new, comprehensive analysis of Case White.

Commencing with an in-depth review of the events in the region of Northeastern Europe following the end of World War 1 and leading up to the 1930’s, Forczyk paints a broad canvass of the political, economic and social challenges that destabilized the region. This also clearly indicates the complexity of the interactions of the personalities and their influence on local relations. It is a little known fact that the German military had significant respect for the post war Polish commander Pilsudski (his memoirs were recommended reading for German Officers). However, his death in 1935 and the subsequent diminishment of trust between the German and Polish governments soured relations.

The account of the preparation and fighting is very balanced. It is easily forgotten that for both sides this was their first introduction to large scale, combined arms operations. Forczyk’s narrative easily encapsulates the challenges faced by the various combatant’s; their successes and failures. The Germans had developed the capability for close air support using Stuka dive bombers but found, for example, that their methodology for coordination was too slow in many cases to be effective. Additionally, in many cases, application of panzer doctrine was spotty and inconsistent, resulting in heavier losses than anticipated. The author is also commended for incorporating not just the operational elements into his study but also the impact of logistics. In many cases the German support elements were not able to keep up with the more mobile panzer forces.

 Conversely, the Polish forces proved themselves to be tenacious fighters but under poor strategic guidance. As Forczyk relates, the Poles were (and allowed themselves to be) mislead by the promises of assistance from the West. This reflected an inconsistent approach to modernization that was impacted by economic and personality based limitations. Additionally, a failure to realistically plan for mobilization and defensive operations (that emphasized non-critical regions of the country), combined to undermine Polish potential for effective defensive operations.

The third critical element of Case White was the Soviet invasion of Poland from the East. Typical of the Soviet leadership at the time, units were only provided with two days notice of the impending operation. Nor were there any formal plans developed for the integration of German and Soviet forces. Forczyk’s book describes in detail not only the ad hoc nature of the operational relationship between two ‘Allied’ nations but also the reprehensible response of the Polish allies, England and France, to the Soviet invasion. Tepid would be far too generous a word; as he states, Germany got war and the Soviets nothing for their actions.

Forczyk’s Case White is an outstanding book; deeply researched and eminently readable. His attention to detail, extensive annexes and copious endnotes provide a wealth of knowledge to the reader outside of the narrative itself. Case White is a highly recommended addition to anyone’s library and sheds light on what rapidly became a forgotten or secondary element of the Second World War.

China's Vision of Victory - Jonathon DT Ward

Title: China's Vision of Victory
Author: Jonathon DT Ward
ISBN: 978-0-57-843810-8
Publisher: Atlas
Hardcover
Pages: 274

 In China’s Vision of Victory, the author has presented the reader with a comprehensive, insightful and thought provoking concept of what drives the Chinese and what goal they seek to attain. Western analysts have traditionally viewed China through the lens of a nation in gradual transition to one more in common with Western ideals. Initially, this perspective may have been understood given the experiences of the Soviet Union, Arab Spring and Tiananmen Square; however, this approach missed much of what were the underlying motivators of the Chinese leadership and by extension the Chinese people. Ward’s book approaches the question of Chinese aspirations from the perspective of one who has lived among the Chinese, has traveled extensively throughout China and its environs and is able to communicate fluently (both verbal and written) with the people in their own dialect. 

He has divided his book into five interconnected but distinct sections: rejuvenation and national destiny, ‘Blue National Soil’ - Military and Strategic Geography, Economic and Technological Ambitions, Global Reach and National Interest and Vision for New World Order. This is important because while each is unique, they are inextricably linked and help explain the common vision that the Chinese are pursuing. China is playing the long game and has the distinct advantage of having a government system that allows for the resources of the entire State: administrative, economic, military, diplomatic and societal, to be focused upon the task at hand. Ward clearly defines very early on exactly what that task is and, as he emphatically states, it is not the assumption of super power status in the world. Rather it is the return of China to what it sees as its natural position of pre-eminence amongst the international community. This distinction is critical to understanding the Chinese approach to domestic and international relations. To the Chinese, the ends justify whatever means need be used to achieve their return and every action they take is predicated upon how it will aid them in achieving their goal.

Ward presents a very compelling argument drawing a comparison between the external and internal Chinese messaging. The Domestic audience is constantly reminded of the “Century of Humiliation” starting from 1840 when a weak and corrupt China was pillaged by the forces of the West and how the newly revitalized China will return the world to its natural order. To the external audience, China presents a more conciliatory face, striving very hard to be seen as a benign power working in conjunction with world organizations to ensure peaceful coexistence. Emphasis is placed upon the efforts to raise its people from poverty and the use of Western PR firms to manage the message to foreign populations. 

This book is very well written and researched. It presents a comprehensive view of the Chinese goals and how they strive to achieve them. It also paints a rather bleak picture of the Western response to this threat. Ward pulls no punches nor does he present his arguments in such a way as to suggest that he has an underlying agenda. The threat that China presents to the world as it continues to awake from its slumber is real and tangible. That the West has been slow to respond is evidence of our complacency and hubris as well as the success at Chinese efforts at misinformation. Ward’s work needs to be read and discussed. It is a sobering call for action that Western powers ignore at their peril.

Instrument of War: The German Army 1914-18 - Dennis Showalter

This review was submitted to Strategy and Tactics magazine. 

Title: Instrument of War: The German Army 1914-18

Editor: Dennis Showalter

ISBN: 978-1-4728-1300-8

Publisher: Osprey

Year: 2016

Hardcover

Pages: 304

Photos: 43

The German Army had a reputation leading up to the beginning of World War 1 that placed it squarely at the top of equivalent European Armies. Based mainly upon its performance during the Wars of German Unification (Denmark and Austria) and the Franco-Prussian War, it was perceived to be, in many respects, the standard to be emulated. Showalter approaches his topic with this in mind and investigates whether this reputation was still deserved just prior to World War 1. He further examines how the Army and its command structure morphed as the War continued and the impact that this had on its effectiveness and resiliency.

His analysis commences with a brief overview of the national character of the army and its various levels of personnel readiness. This sets the stage for his discussion of the army and the commencement of the war. Showalter is very balanced in his praise and criticism of the army and the reputation that it had. He postulates that the Army was the wrong tool for the Schlieffen Plan and that German Senior leadership failed to appreciate its limitations, specifically in the areas of mobility and communications, ultimately resulting in the plans failure. He further  convincingly postulates that, while the Army was superior in many ways to its contemporaries, the German Leadership was extremely limited in their strategic grasp and could not decide upon priorities of effort following the failure of the Schlieffen Plan.

Showalter effectively encapsulates the rise and fall of German fortunes as the war descends into one of stalemate and attrition in the West and supporting a weakened Austro-Hungary in the East against Russia and Italy. He shows that for a good part of the war, Germany was superior at the tactical and operational levels; engaging in the use of aircraft, gas, storm troop tactics and the command empowerment of NCO’s and Junior Officers. He is, however, merciless in his criticism of the senior German leadership; its infighting, hubris, political intrigue and ultimate failure to acknowledge the necessity of working in tandem with the diplomatic elements of the Government as well as not recognizing the self-destructiveness of the war.

The theme throughout his book is that the main enemy of Germany was time. Every year weakened them and strengthened their adversaries, allowing the Allies to learn and close the gap between their respective armies. Compounding this was the diminishing pool of manpower available to Germany with which to make good its losses.

Showalter has proven himself to be an impartial judge of the German Army of this period; balanced in his praise and criticism. He draws attention to elements of German leadership and planning that are not necessarily readily apparent in many of the narratives of this war. There is no question that the Germans could have won the war given slightly different circumstances but, as Showalter points out, this would have been in spite of rather than because of the strategic level decision making. Despite its institutional weaknesses, the German Army proved itself to be an instrument of formidable depth and resilience; able to match the Allies right up until the last months of the War. Showalter gives the reader much to think about and ponder from his noteworthy analysis of this machine. A well-researched and very interesting book.

Strategy: Context and Adaption from Archidamus to Airpower - Richard J Bailey, James Forsyth, Mark Yeisley

This review has been submitted to Strategy and Tactics Magazine

Title: Strategy: Context and Adaption from Archidamus to Airpower

Editor: Richard J Bailey, James Forsyth, Mark Yeisley

ISBN: 978-1-682-47003-9

Publisher: Naval Institute Press

Year: 2016

Hardcover

Pages: 279

Strategy is a dynamic, living thing; intimately influenced by technology, geography, society and science. The editors have collaborated in bringing together a series of essays, each dealing with different aspects of strategy and its application and influence on the modern battlefield. The authors of the essays are academics, experts in their fields and all PhD instructors associated with the US School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. The intent of this work is to both promote and facilitate change in the way that strategy is perceived and applied.

The chapters of the book represent facets of strategy and strategic thought that are not necessarily appreciated by those inculcated into the more traditional strategic trifecta: politics, plans and execution within a military context. The broadening of the strategic scope enables the planner to better appreciate the environment within which they are obligated to work and execute their task. This holistic approach recognizes the need to approach strategy in a dynamic and non-linear fashion backstopped against a comprehensive education of strategic thought.

Concurrent to the task of strategic expansion is the need to blend this thought practice with the application of airpower theory; or how to undertake achieving the strategic goal within the boundaries and limitations of modern airpower principles. This is a challenging task, readily acknowledged by the authors, but one that is of critical importance if one is to be effective. Nevertheless, the work underscores the need to think of strategic aims and goals beyond the simple application of force; and to do so in a concurrent fashion. This further assists in meeting the constraints of the applied force of airpower.

In addition to its variety of thought-provoking essays, this work contains an extensive array of foot and endnotes that further clarify the discussion points of the authors. This proved very helpful as, with any essay, there are aspects that require expansion in order to facilitate understanding. The book is rounded out with a comprehensive bibliography of supplemental and relevant readings. The academic intent of this work, which is to help identify for the reader/student, what strategy is in its most basic form. However, the authors readily acknowledge that this question is an elusive target and that the book really aims at providing guidance on numerous methods by which strategy may be sought. In this respect the book is very successful.

The authors have created a work that covers a broad range of strategic analysis and method. In the case of this book, the emphasis focuses upon the use of strategy in relation to the effective application of airpower; however, it should be noted that the methods discussed in this work have a relevance far outside of the military application of strategy. The process of understanding the underlying methods of deriving strategy and its application is as important as the determination of strategic executions. This work helps guide the reader in this direction. 

Morning Star, Midnight Sun - Jeffrey R Cox

This review submitted to Sabretache Magazine.

Title: Morning Star, Midnight Sun

Author: Jeffrey R Cox

ISBN: 978-1-4728-2638-1

Publisher: Osprey

Year: 2018

Softcover

Pages: 448

Maps:  4

There remains a common misperception that, following their defeat at Midway, that the tide of war had turned definitively against the Japanese and that their ultimate defeat was now inevitable. Jeffrey Cox’s work proves this to be categorically false. That they had suffered a major setback was indeed the case and recognized but the Japanese still viewed the war as winnable.

This was a particularly enjoyable book to read; not only for its detailed content and analysis, but also for the humour and style of the author. Interspersed with his discussion of the events of the period covered by the book, are ‘sidebar’ interpretations of reactions of commanders and participants. These cynical interjections add levity and, indeed, a more human element to the narrative. The traditional stoic demeanour of the Japanese are given a more realistic feel. The Allies, a more truthful reflection of the strains of multinational as well as inter-service operations. 

Cox balances his narrative extremely well between the protagonists. The reader is provided with fascinating insights into the effects of fog of war, opinions and expectations of individual Commanders and a deep understanding of the pressures of command and the cumulative effects of decisions. During this period, both the Allies and the Japanese commanders were under great pressure to achieve clear victories. While the Americans had defeated the Japanese at Midway, they had lost a carrier in the process resulting in an operational draw. The American public demanded greater success. Conversely, the Japanese commanders felt compelled to avenge the stain of their Midway losses. Compounding this pressure was the fact that neither side, at this time, had the depth of resources to compensate for any additional losses of capital ships.

The author effectively captures the complex interplay between the adversaries as they struggled to control the seas and skies over the centre of gravity during this period: Guadacanal Island. The Japanese proved conclusively that they remained more than a match for the American forces facing them. In fact, they held a majority of the cards in terms of surface vessels, command quality, operational options and control of the seas. Having trained exhaustively for night operations, the Japanese continued to rule the night with the Americans maintaining an advantage during the daylight. Two things had changed however that are not widely appreciated but are glaringly obvious in Cox’s analysis: the Americans had finally found an Admiral in Halsey that had the aggressiveness and presence to take the fight to the Japanese and the vaunted “Sea Eagles”, the Japanese carrier aviators that had ruled the skies up to now, had been decimated and were a fraction of their former numbers. The replacement pool was unable to replace the losses with similar quality aviators.

Cox has drafted an outstanding book of exceptional quality and content. His narrative style is engaging and keeps the reader hooked. His comprehensive knowledge of this period is reflected in his deep analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the American and Japanese forces. Regardless of whether one is interested in naval operations in the Pacific Theatre, this book remains not only and excellent reference but also read.

Case Red: The Collapse of France - Robert Forczyk

This review has been submitted to the British Military History Journal. 

Title: Case Red: The Collapse of France

Author: Robert Forczyk

ISBN: 978-1-4728-2442-4

Publisher: Osprey Publishing

Year: 2017

Hardcover

Pages: 464

Photos/Maps: 60/7

Studies relating to the Battle for France in 1940 tend to focus upon the initial weeks of the conflict running from the invasion of the Low Countries (Fall Gelb) and culminating in the evacuation of Allied troops at Dunkirk. Relatively little has been drafted relating to the follow-on Fall Rot (Case Red) which encompassed the drive south following Dunkirk and the capture of the remaining French territory. Forczyk’s book undertakes to address this shortfall and to draw attention to the Allied efforts, political and military, to contain the German drive. Included in his analysis are a series of studies highlighting challenges and successes by both sides and their background causes.

The author commences his work with a broad study of the Allied efforts in the years leading up to the invasion (1919-1939). This is critical for the reader to better appreciate the lack of coordination and internal dissention between the Western Countries. This was especially true of Belgium whose foreign policies served to both weaken and undermine French plans for countering the Germans.

His discussions draw attention to a number of areas that have generally not been addressed in past books on the battle of France. Following the evacuation at Dunkirk, there was an operational pause on the part of the Germans as they reformed their units and undertook the planning for the second phase of the attack on France: Fall Rot. Much of the planning and preparation has been glossed over in the major histories of this conflict. Hitler had given the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht – German High Command) only ten days between the end of Fall Gelb and the beginning of Fall Rot (25 May to 5 June). During that time in addition to planning the next stages of the advance, they also had to coordiante and deliver over 50,000 tons of supplies from Germany to their forward units (200 miles over destroyed and damaged transportation infrastructure). Support on this scale had  never been attempted before; Forczyk discusses in detail the logistical efforts of this period and the challenges overcome.

Additionally, it is important to note that the French remained a potent adversary even after their initial setbacks; one that the Germans viewed very seriously. The author looks at the methodology that the Germans undertook in order to retain their advantage after the element of surprise had been lost through superior planning and execution as well as joint operations between air and ground forces.

Forcyzk is balanced in his appraisals of the adversary’s capabilities but he is particularly scathing in this analysis of the French and British High Commands. He specifically focusses upon their divergence from both political oversight and control as well as the abrogation of their responsibility towards the soldiers under their command. This appears particularly true in the case of Weygand, the French Commander as he repeatedly dismissed direction from the French Government.    

Included in this work are a number of minor incidents that have been lost or overlooked. For example the French air force undertook 11 air raids on German cities during the Battle of France including the first air raid on Berlin when a single Farman bomber flew a round trip mission of over 3000 km, dropping 3 tonnes of bombs before returning back to base. The inclusion of these types of stories add both depth and breadth to Forcyzk’s narrative.

Osprey has published an excellent book that is well worth adding to one’s library. The author has drafted a book that adds much to the limited amount available on the German operations following Dunkirk. He sheds additional light on the deep challenges that the Western Allies faced in the early years of the war while also drawing attention to German areas of weakness. A very worthwhile read.

War in the East: A Military History of the Russo-Turkish War 1877-78 - Quintin Barry

This review has been submitted to Strategy and Tactics Magazine.

Title: War in the East: A Military History of the Russo-Turkish War 1877-78

Author: Quintin Barry

ISBN: 978-1-911096-69-6

Publisher: Helion

Year: 2016

Softcover

Pages: 534

Photos/ Maps: 100’s/17

Barry has once again focussed his attention on a war of less prominence internationally but one that had very significant implications for the region in which it took place. The Ottoman Empire at the time of the conflict encompassed the European regions of Bulgaria, portions of modern day Romania and areas of Bosnia. The Russians were very much interested in extending their access and influence to encompass not only the Black Sea but also were seeking passage to the Mediterranean via the Dardanelles. The Ottomans were, even at this time, seen as the weak man of Europe, heavily corrupt and vulnerable to collapse; the Russians, following the brutal suppression of a Bulgarian uprising by the Turks, saw an opportunity to break their neighbour to the south and extend their influence regionally.

What looked to be a simple operation that would result in Russian victory and accompanying international prestige turned into a difficult, costly and grinding campaign that was far more challenging than anyone had originally anticipated. While the Russians achieved complete victory in the end, it was as much a result of Turkish incompetence as Russian capability. It also came very close to resulting in war between Russia and Great Britain due to the concerns about Russian interest in the Dardanelles. Barry presents a very accurate and telling view of the international pressure brought to bear upon both protagonists as the European community sought to protect their own interests and limit the reach of Russia.

Barry has done a noteworthy analysis of this war. He succinctly encompasses the international as well as the operational components of the war; he also clearly highlights where opportunities were lost to both sides. For example his discussion of the Turkish Black Sea fleet and the Danube gunboat squadrons are indicative of the lack of operational appreciation shown by the Turkish commanders. The book represents a strategic/operational analysis of the conflict in that he only periodically dips into the tactical stories of the soldiers themselves. It is enough however, to gain a good appreciation of the conditions and environment under which the conflict was fought. Of particular note was Barry’s discussion of the extensive use of fortifications and the power of the defensive war compared to the offensive. The use of trenches and hard points by the Turks gave a hint of the nature of war to come, lessons that were not readily grasped by the observers.

I was very disappointed with the maps provided as I found the actions in the narrative difficult to follow on them. Beyond that the book is very well written and the photo’s/drawings provide very good context to the narrative. Barry closes his book with an excellent synopsis of the forces involved as well as a comprehensive bibliography. An engaging read and study of the last major conflict of the 1800’s.

Blockade: Cruiser Warfare and the Starvation of Germany in World War One - Steve R Dunn

This review has been submitted to War History Online Magazine.

Title: Blockade: Cruiser Warfare and the Starvation of Germany in World War One

Author: Steve R Dunn

ISBN: 978-1-84832-340-7

Publisher: Pena and Sword//Seaforth

Year: 2016

Hardcover

Pages: 208

Photos/Maps: 15/1

One of the least appreciated battlegrounds of the First World War was the ocean. The Battle of Jutland has been well documented as has been the fact that Germany was subject to a very effective naval blockade; however, the details of that blockade and its actual effect are at best superficially known to the reading public. Blockade seeks to redress that delta with its discussion of the methodology of the blockade, focusing upon the actions of the 10^th Cruiser Squadron covering the ‘Northern Approaches” and renditions of noteworthy individual ship actions. Further, he touches upon little known German efforts to both break the blockade and effect a similar style of blockade on the British Islands.

Dunn begins his work with a look at the impact of the German surface raider’s and the u-boat campaign. He additionally looks at the challenges of the Law of the Sea as it pertains to submarine warfare (so-called ‘unrestricted warfare’). His analysis is succinct and easily grasped and enables the reader to comprehend the difficulty and potential of this new form of warfare both doctrinally and practically. Additionally, his narrative clearly shows the effect that individual commerce raiders had when released upon merchant fleets unprotected on the vast oceans.

He also discusses the legality (and superficially, the morality) of a universal blockade not specifically aimed at military resources but Germany writ large and the doctrinal transition from close to distant blockade. The legality of the blockade as a method of warfare is interesting in that it highlights the hypocrisy of the international and historical discussion of this period. Much was made (especially amongst neutrals) of the illegality of unrestricted seaborne warfare to the point where calls were made by the British to declare submarine warfare a war crime. Yet, the dubious legality of the general blockade of Germany was never questioned despite the fact that over 750,000 German civilian deaths may be directly attributable to a lack of food during the war.

The 10th Cruiser Squadron, comprising obsolete cruisers and armed merchant vessels (AMC’s), was responsible for an inverted triangle running from Iceland to Norway with its southern point on the Orkney’s. The deeply hostile environment and hardships that these sailors suffered and their unacknowledged triumph at denying the Germans merchant access is recounted by Dunn in a gripping narrative of courage and endurance. He focusses on the human face of this campaign as opposed to a stark rendition of dates and numbers. The statistics serve to reinforce the significance of the accomplishments of the officers and sailors themselves. Dunn’s account of the unsung heroes and combatants of this region is not limited to the Allies but also encompasses the German officers and sailors who constantly strove to break the 10^th Cruiser Sqn’s stranglehold on this region.

This book serves as an excellent introduction into the details of the blockade; its history, evolution and effect. It touches upon themes that should be discussed in more detail such as the morality and legality of the blockade and the stigma of German attempts at unrestricted warfare; however, these are not pursued in any real analytical depth. Dunn’s work is solid and very readable and is recommended for those seeking to gain insight into the nature of this kind of warfare and its impact upon the Allied war effort in 1914-1918.

Enemy in the East - Rolf-Dieter Muller

This review has been submitted to Strategy and Tactics Magazine

Title: Enemy in the East

Author: Rolf-Dieter Muller

ISBN: 978-1-78076-829-8

Publisher: IB Taurus/Raincoast Books

Year: 2015

Hardcover

Pages: 316

Photos/Maps: 22/7

There has been much speculation on the degree of proactive involvement the military leadership of the German Armed Forces had in the conception and planning of the attack on Russia. During the trials following the war, it was consistently suggested that the conception for the idea of the attack was Hitler’s alone and that the military’s role in this was that of following the orders of a legitimate government. Muller seeks to undermine that theory by proving that the military was both a proactive and willing partner in the conception and development of the attack on Russia contrary to long held belief.

This was a very interesting and enjoyable book to read. The author has done a noteworthy job at shedding light upon a period of intense international lobbying and exchange. Perhaps the most fascinating part of this was his discussion and analysis of the close relationship that existed between the Germans and Poles right up until the last few months before war broke out. Poland and Germany held a common view of the threat posed by Russia and were very active partners in planning and executing the breakup of Czechslovakia as well as planning for the further redistribution of Ukrainian land and the resettlement of any Jews in their territory. Muller has painted a very clear picture of two nations with very common interests; further reinforced by the extent to which Germany tried to accommodate Poland’s wishes.

He also clearly relates the rapidly changing international situation that necessitated continuous and re-prioritization of planning by the German military. Additionally, the rapid pace of operations precluded addressing many of the shortfalls recognized by the German military commanders in their equipment and doctrine. It is not clear; however, that the German military proactively worked at pushing political policy East. It is true and is proven by the author that the military was not at all happy with the prospect of striking at the West but, while more confident of their chances with Russia, they were still seeking time and delay in order to build up their experience and capabilities.

The author has also been successful with his analysis of Stalin’s adept handling of the international uncertainty leading up to the outbreak of hostilities. He played Germany for incredible accommodations in spheres of interest and positioning that significantly diminished Germany’s advantages when war came two years later. Not the least of these involved pushing the German start line for an attack into Russian hundreds of kilometers to the west. It is very clear from Muller’s study that the German military and leadership chaffed under this imposed cooperation.

A very well researched and insightful study of the international twists and turns leading up to war in the East. What is patently obvious is that Hitler maintained a clear but consistently frustrated focus on attacking Russia at the earliest opportunity and that the Polish leadership, while tragically misreading German intent and Western capability, inadvertently prevented a German victory in Russia while concurrently sacrificing its territory and populations to the ravages of both German and Russia forces. An interesting book that does much to dispel the myth of a Germany bent on crushing a helpless Poland but does not succeed in proving the case that the German military was any more complicit in pushing for an attack on Russia.