Haig’s Enemy: Crown Prince Rupprecht and Germany’s War on the Western Front - Jonathan Boff

This review has been submitted to Australian Army Journal

Title: Haig’s Enemy: Crown Prince Rupprecht and Germany’s War on the Western Front
Author: Jonathan Boff
ISBN: 978-0-19-967046-8
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Year: 2018
Hardcover
Pages: 373
Photos/Maps: 11/14 

Rupprecht, Crown Prince of Bavaria and one of the most senior Western Front Central Power commanders throughout WW1, has largely been forgotten with the passage of time; however, as Boff’s comprehensive study has shown, he was a key figure in the Central Power Alliance. Boff has undertaken to present an analysis of Rupprecht as commander, Crown Prince, husband and father. His conclusions, both balanced and nuanced, suggest that while he cannot be considered one of the ‘Great Captains” of history, he was, as a commander, insightful, competent and intelligent. He was also, as the Crown Prince of the second most powerful region of the German Federation (Bavaria), a product of his period and upbringing with all of the flaws and strengths that position entailed.  

The central theme of the book is obviously Rupprecht and his part during the War; however, Boff does an excellent job of continuously situating Rupprecht’s roles and actions within the broader spectrum of German Federation politics, the international environment and the flow of the War itself. The author is particularly adept at maintaining a clear and concise narrative that seamlessly weaves these disparate themes together in a easily comprehensible way. 

I particularly appreciated his analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the German Army and its command structure. Conventional opinion holds that the German Army of the time was a machine to be feared, emulated and respected; however, as Boff conclusively proves, while elements of this were in fact true, the actual reality of the effectiveness of the Army was far more nuanced. Command and control was riven with political appointees, regional cliques and swung broadly between meritocracy as a promotion foundation and favouritism. Decentralized execution of command, while periodically evident, became increasingly rare as operations turned against the Germans. Structures became rigid and honesty in self evaluation (as a military) became the exception and not the norm. 

Boff’s book was very enjoyable and educational to read. His writing style is engaging and his research thorough and balanced. A consummate historian, he has presented his work fairly and drawn conclusions that are well supported by primary source material. His narrative, while thoughtful and complete, avoids the pitfalls of excessive verbosity and leaves the reader with a number of insightful observations that resonate even today. The one conclusion that caused me to pause, however, was his position that, following the failure of the Battle of the Marne in 1914, Germany (and the Central Powers) were destined to lose the war as they were not able to accomplish the foundational goal of a quick and decisive victory in the West.

The book is a very high quality publication. Maps are centrally located at the front of the narrative making reference to them easy and photos, while not of the highest quality, distributed throughout. The work includes a copious number of endnotes and a comprehensive bibliography. I thoroughly enjoyed and appreciated this book and strongly recommend it.

MiG Alley: The US Air Force in Korea 1950-53 - Thomas McKelvey Cleaver

This review has been submitted to Strategy 

and Tactics Magazine.

Title: MiG Alley: The US Air Force in Korea 1950-53
Author: Thomas McKelvey Cleaver
ISBN: 978-1-4728-3608-3
Publisher: Osprey Publishing 
Year: 2019
 Hardcover
Pages: 326

Conventional wisdom relating to the Korean War has the UN Forces (read US Air Force) maintaining an incredible kill ratio vs the MiG 15’s of the Koreans and Chinese. Drawing upon primary source material, the author has shown conclusively that, rather than the 14:1 kill/loss rate normally quoted, in reality the air campaign was far closer with rates approaching 1:1 during the first half of the war and 1.3/1 in the latter years. 

Cleaver has undertaken an excellent review of the air war, citing from interviews, intelligence reports and mission assessments from both sides in a (successful) effort to overturn traditional perceptions. The flow of the narrative follows the timeline of the conflict and the reader is therefore able to trace the development of tactics, doctrine and aircraft and the impact that it had as the war progressed. 

Cleaver incorporates within the narrative, a clear and concise discussion of the capabilities of the primary combat aircraft of the adversaries: MiG-15 for the North and the F-86 Sabre for the UN. In the course of his assessments, he is able to prove that, from a technical perspective, the MIG-15 was an equal match for the F-86 and overall, a far superior aircraft to F-51D, F-80 and the navy F9F Panther. His suggestion that the discriminating factor for success became the expertise of the pilots at the controls and the development of doctrine that drew upon the advantages each airframe had over the other, is well supported by primary source analysis. For example, with its multiple cannon and advantage in rate of climb and dive speeds the MiG was best suited as a hit and run platform that could do devastating damage with only one or two strikes; whereas the Sabre, with its 6 x .50 guns and close in maneuverability, was ideal in a more traditional dog-fighting role. 

The author has focussed a great deal of the book on a balanced evaluation of flight documents and after action reports; his analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the pilots (Soviet, Chinese, Commonwealth and American) is fascinating as is his investigation of bias and hubris amongst them. Cleaver adroitly encapsulates the Air War in Korea within the broader spectrum of the international struggle developing between East and West. Thus it was that the nations involved went to great lengths to conceal/manipulate losses and victories as a means of propaganda.

His conclusions are of particular interest as they are not standard in nature. Rather than simply look at win/loss rates and the fact that the ‘North Korean’ air force was not able to operate south of the 38^th parallel, he draws far more nuanced deductions. He posits, for example, that the goal of the North was to prevent UN forces from being able to bomb Northern Korea with impunity. In this respect they were successful in that B-29 losses were such that daylight bombing was suspended and fighter bomber efforts were limited. In fact, as Cleaver points out, the air interdiction campaign of the UN was never able to isolate the North Koreans and Chinese on the battlefield.

A fascinating book and well worthy of a read for those who wish to achieve a deeper understanding of the strengths and limitations of air campaigns. Cleaver has undertaken a comprehensive analyses of his subject, well supported by primary source material, that he presents in a logical and easily understood manner. He has also added a very human dimension to his work with the inclusion of personal anecdotes from participants on both sides of the conflict. Strongly recommended.