At War’s Summit: The Red Army and the Struggle for the Caucasus Mountains in World War II - Alexander Statiev

This review has been submitted to the RCAF Journal

Title: At War’s Summit: The Red Army and the Struggle for the Caucasus Mountains in World War II
Author: Alexander Statiev
ISBN: 978-1-108-42462-2
Publisher: Cambridge UP
Year: 2018
Hardcover
Pages: 440
Photos/Maps: 22/19

In June, 1942 the Axis powers launched Fall Blau, the southern drive to capture the Caucasus region of the Soviet Union, thereby securing the oil fields for Germany and depriving the Soviets of the southern resupply link with the West. Dividing the southern forces into Army Group’s A and B, the Axis powers initially enjoyed great success with Gp B driving towards Stalingrad and Gp A thrusting into the Transcaucasus region towards Baku. Ultimately however, the Axis overextended themselves and the Soviets were able to break the German advance at Stalingrad. Overshadowed by the disaster in Stalingrad, the efforts of Army Gp A and, more specifically, the fighting amongst the unforgiving peaks on the Transcaucus Mountain range, have been generally relegated to the back pages of history. Statiev’s book is an effort to not only rectify that shortfall but to also shed light on the numerous lessons to be gleaned from combat in the brutal high altitude mountain environment. 

While Statiev does discuss, by way of comparison, the development of mountain troops in both Russia and Germany, his focus is primarily upon the Russian perspective throughout the book. He ensures that the reader has a sound appreciation of the history of mountain operations in Russia by drawing attention to a series of past conflicts in which Russian forces were fighting in mountainous regions. He is able to convincingly prove that a plethora of information was available to the Russians regarding the unique challenges posed by altitude operations and the means to overcome them. His discussion of the popularity of the climbing during the interwar period in both Germany and Russia reinforces the fact that both countries had ample expertise to draw upon. 

Statiev comprehensive discussion/analysis of the German 49^th Mountain Corps thrust into the Caucasus Mountains in an effort to cut off the coastal region, and the Russian efforts to resist them, is remarkably engaging and educating, reflecting a writing style that captures the imagination while retaining a scholarly quality. The Russians retained all of the advantages of numbers, short lines of communication and unchallenged control of the skies. The systemic failure of the Russian leadership to properly lead, equip and train its soldiers to meet the challenges of both the Germans and the environment is all the more appalling as a result. Their approach of ‘quantity over quality’ reflects an absolute arrogance and desperation with respect to the lives of their soldiers. 

The Germans, for their part, once again gambled on the quality of their elite mountain forces to overcome their massive shortfall in numbers. The fact that they came as close as they did is indicative of the specialist nature of mountain warfare and the superiority of their leadership and training. The author’s discussion of these battles, and the unique challenges for support forces, provides the reader with a clear appreciation the successes and failures of the respective adversaries. 

Another element of the combat in this region that Statiev draws attention to is the fact that the peoples living here were not supporters of the Russian/Soviet regime. Support for the Germans was much more forthcoming then for the Russians. Efforts on behalf of both the Germans and Russians to build relationships with these groups are interesting as both sides appreciated the benefits of local knowledge and support. However, from Statiev’s research, it is evident that the Russians had ignored their opportunities until it was almost too late and that this resulted in them having a far greater challenge than the Germans in this respect. 

Statiev closes his work with a discussion of the attitude with which the Russian leadership viewed the nature of the military as a profession. Looking across the spectrum of military operations and drawing liberally from available primary sources, he reveals that, throughout the war, the Russians continuously fell back on their numbers at the expense of training. This was, to a certain extent, a result of necessity, and the gap definitely closed as the war progressed. Nevertheless, the Germans consistently were able to inflict significantly more casualties on the Russians then they took. 

The standard of this publication by the Cambridge UP is of the highest quality. Detailed maps are provided throughout that illustrate the battlefields discussed. The author provides generous endnotes and a comprehensive bibliography for further research. For those seeking fresh information about the Eastern Front, this work, highlighting a regional conflict that has heretofore received scant attention, this is an excellent source.