Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan 1945-47 - DM Giangreco

This review has been submitted to the Australian Army Journal. 

Title: Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan 1945-47
Author: DM Giangreco
ISBN: 978-1-682-47165-4
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
Year: 2017
Hardcover
Pages: 552
Photos/Maps: 26/13

The last months of the Second World War were characterized by some of the most vicious fighting experienced in the Pacific Theatre. Tenacious resistance by Japanese forces on Iwo Jima and Okinawa resulting in the highest casualty rates thus far experienced by US forces in the Pacific, presaging a struggle for the Japanese home islands that would dwarf all previous battles. Fear of the massive casualties that were anticipated to be sustained by the US from an invasion of the Japanese home islands, war fatigue amongst the population and an acknowledgement by US leadership of the continued resistance anticipated by Japanese forces (both civilian and military) led to a decision by President Truman to utilize nuclear weapons in an effort to shock the Japanese into surrender. Ultimately, the two nuclear strikes did prompt the Japanese into accepting unconditional surrender (save for the protection of the Emperor from prosecution as a war criminal); however, it also led to future widespread condemnation by some historians and anti-nuclear factions that felt nothing justified the use of these weapons.

 Giangreco’s work looks at the myriad of complex and ethical challenges faced by the US decision makers as they grappled with how to bring the war with Japan to a close as rapidly as possible with a minimum loss of American, Japanese and Allied lives.

 The author’s book is characterized by a deep and comprehensive analysis and understanding of the planning challenges and political atmosphere within which the senior planning staff operated. He has drawn extensively upon the original operational plans of both the US and Japanese for attack and defence as well as primary source intelligence analysis undertaken by both adversaries. Of particular note is his research into and use of what was actually briefed to the decision makers. This is critical as it speaks to what was the information that they were basing their decisions upon.

The narrative in Hell to Pay follows a series of concurrent and mutually supportive tracks:

1.     An accessible and broad analysis of the international political situation following the close of hostilities with Germany. The US, Soviet Union, Japan, China, UK and the Commonwealth all feature prominently in this as the significant remaining players. The author looks at the domestic stressors, perceived and real political goals, and what capabilities each has to participate in the final engagement with Japan;

2.      An in-depth review of the situation within Japan itself: what was the domestic political environment like, what were the actual resources that Japan could still draw upon in terms of military forces and their capabilities, what did the Japanese perceive as the possible options for invasion and how were they preparing to respond, what were the Japanese goals in continuing to resist, what were the Japanese operational plans for defence and resistance, what did they anticipate to be the casualties and were they prepared to accept these and how well prepared were the Japanese for the invasion; and

3.      A similar but broader and deeper examination of the debate within senior US circles  regarding what was the best way to deal with Japan rounds out this interwoven text. Combined with the Japanese perspective, this thread is easily the most engrossing. Again drawn from predominantly primary source material, it sheds light on the massive undertaking that faced the US both from a manpower as well as materiel perspective. Taking into consideration that the invasion would be far more complex than anything in history (compared with Normandy which was a “shore to shore” invasion with only a short channel crossing, the invasion of Japan would have be executed and supported exclusively from the sea); the invasion fleet alone was estimated to be over 4000 ships. The author identifies and discusses the three main options (and the accompanying factors for and against each) available to the Truman Administration: 1. A series of nuclear strikes on designated cities in an effort to shock the Japanese Government into surrender, 2. Siege of Japanese home islands, cutting off all food and resources, thereby driving them into capitulation, and 3. Invasion.

The level of detail and accompanying examination of what information each side had to go on as they struggled with what decisions to take are hallmarks of Giangreco’s work. He has approached the subject with the third person analysis of the consummate historian while adding a degree of humanity and engagement within the text itself. The reader is left with a profound appreciation of the magnitude and complexity of the problem facing the Allies, the degree to which the Japanese were prepared to continue resisting (and their far greater capability to undertake resistance than was previously understood) and the political and societal pressures on Truman that can only be fully appreciated by a society that was suffering between 65,000 and 100,000 casualties per month since June of 1944.

The book concludes with a series of appendices that present the reader with elements of the actual planning documents for Op Downfall (invasion of Japan), Op Blacklist (occupation of Japan) and the actual G-2 (Intelligence) analysis prepared by both US and Japanese Forces during the lead up to Op Downfall (included in the Japanese portion are postwar interrogation records with key Japanese military commanders and Intelligence analysts). Additionally, there is a very detailed notes section and bibliography.

Anyone who wishes to better appreciate the decision making environment facing the Japanese and Allied leaders going into 1945 and the struggle to come to the correct conclusion on whether or not to use the nuclear option must read this book. Whether one is a critic or supportive of the decision, this work will provide context and information to better help inform the debate positions of each side. Hell to Pay is also an outstanding source book for military logistics professionals, as well as Naval and Airforce operators who wish to improve their understanding of the complexity of an operation of this magnitude. An excellent work and very strongly endorsed.