Selling Schweinfurt: Targeting, Assessment, and Marketing in the Air Campaign Against German Industry - Brian D Vlaun

This review has been submitted to the RCAF Journal.

Title: Selling Schweinfurt: Targeting, Assessment, and Marketing in the Air Campaign Against German Industry
Author: Brian D Vlaun
ISBN: 978-1-682-47536-2
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
Year: 2020
Hardcover
Pages: 303
Photos/Maps: 15/0

In his book "Selling Schweinfurt: Targeting, Assessment, and Marketing in the Air Campaign against German Industry," author Brian D. Vlaun examines the complex process of target selection and assessment in the Allied air campaign against German industry during World War II. Vlaun draws on a wide range of sources, including official government records, personal papers, and contemporary media reports, to provide a detailed account of how the Allied air forces identified and prioritized targets for bombing.

The book is divided into three main parts. In the first part, Vlaun provides an overview of the Allied air campaign against German industry, emphasizing the strategic importance of targeting key industrial centers. He discusses the challenges faced by the Allies in terms of target selection, including the difficulty of accurately assessing the effectiveness of bombing raids and the need to balance strategic objectives with operational realities.

In the second part of the book, Vlaun delves into the system of target selection and assessment. He describes the various methods used by the Allies to identify potential targets, including aerial reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, and analysis of German industry's organizational structure. He also examines the complex process of prioritizing targets based on their strategic value and vulnerability.

One of the most interesting aspects of Vlaun's analysis is his discussion of the role of marketing in the Allied air campaign. He argues that the Allies relied heavily on propaganda and psychological operations to sell their bombing campaign to the public, both at home and abroad. For example, the famous "bomber boys" of the US Eighth Air Force were promoted as heroes and symbols of American determination to defeat the Nazi regime. Vlaun suggests that this kind of marketing played an important role in sustaining public support for the bombing campaign, even in the face of mounting casualties and criticism.

In the final part of the book, Vlaun assesses the effectiveness of the Allied air campaign against German industry. He argues that while the bombing campaign did have a significant impact on the German war economy, its overall strategic value has been overstated. Vlaun notes that the Allied air forces failed to achieve their primary objective of crippling German industry, due in part to the resilience and adaptability of the German war machine. Additionally, he makes the argument that the “behind the scenes” political machinations surrounding the relevance and effectiveness of the air campaign and, by extension, the maintenance of a separate Air Force, was a driving factor in ensuring that the 8^th Air Force conclusively demonstrate that it was able to decisively impact the Germans ability to continue prosecuting the war. Vlaun also undertakes an insightful analysis of a US intelligence community that was created only as the air war intensified in 1942-43 and thus has little to no operational experience from which to develop its processes and doctrine.

The results of a very junior service striving to justify itself while concurrently validating an air campaign replete with political undercurrents, was that the Air Force intelligence community was highly motivated to produce assessments that justified the operational effort and supported the strategic focus on ball-bearing and oil production facilities as a means of hamstringing the German military industrial complex. This, despite the fact, that there was little to practically show in the way of a tangible negative impact upon the German industrial sector.

Overall, "Selling Schweinfurt" is a well-written and thoroughly researched book that provides a fascinating insight into the complexities of target selection and assessment in the context of the Allied air campaign against German industry. Vlaun's analysis is nuanced and insightful, and he does an excellent job of balancing the strategic and operational aspects of the bombing campaign with the human and ethical implications of aerial warfare.

"Selling Schweinfurt" is an superb addition to the growing body of literature on the Allied air campaign against Germany during World War II. It is an important reminder of the complexity and human cost of aerial warfare, and a valuable resource for anyone interested in the history of military strategy and tactics. It also serves as an outstanding case study of the impact of outside influences and internal assumptions on the quality of product that an organization might produce.

Hitler’s Fremde Heere Ost: German Military Intelligence on the Eastern Front 1942-1945 - Magnus Pahl (translated by Derik Hammond)

This review has been submitted to the British Army Review.

Title: Hitler’s Fremde Heere Ost: German Military Intelligence on the Eastern Front 1942-1945

Author: Magnus Pahl (translated by Derik Hammond)

ISBN: 978-1-910777-08-4

Publisher: Helion

Year: 2016

Hardcover

Pages: 410

Photos/ Maps: 28/4

Many questions remain about the decision of Germany to attack the Soviet Union in 1941; one of the most compelling was how did the Germans underestimate so significantly the size and depth of the Soviet industrial as well as military capability? Accusatory fingers have traditionally been leveled at a failure on the part of the military intelligence organization to accurately predict this. Pahl’s book addresses this and many other questions by analyzing the German military intelligence organization from the ground up; its strengths, weaknesses, operating environment (political and operational), leadership and mandate.

There are two concurrent tracks that the author follows in his analysis. The first focuses upon the establishment and development of the intelligence service within the German military and the State and its relationship with the RHSA (Reichssicherheitshauptamt – Senior Bureau of Reich Security) and the Abwher. Compartmentalisation was one of the means by which Hitler maintained control over the Nazi state/war machine and intelligence was no exception. Thus it was that although given a mandate to undertake all forms of intelligence gathering including strategic, the FHO was never given the resources nor access to undertake the strategic level effectively; nor did the various elements of the intelligence services (state and Nazi party) cooperate willingly.

The second element that the author traces is the role of MGen Reinhard Gehlen in professionalizing and developing the effectiveness of the FHO. He commanded the organization from 1942 onwards and was instrumental in transitioning it from an ad hoc to a structured and far more proactive and engaged organization. Pahl clearly shows the role that Gehlan played in this as well as his vision of the future. Such was his impact that, as the author relates, he was able to not only maintain the integrity of his organization as the war effort collapsed, but was also able to ensure that the most effective members, gathered information and networks developed against the Soviets were able to be made available to the Americans and the German state following the surrender. That this was accomplished within weeks of the end of the war is testament to his vision, preparation and organizational skills.

This is a comprehensively researched book that paints a picture for the reader of the deep competence as well as structural and ideological weakness of the wartime German state. It contains many lessons for modern intelligence organizations relating to development, interoperability and doctrinal requirements to meet mandate. Pahl’s work delves into both the complex structure but also the doctrine related to the German intelligence services and the challenges that it faced. Within the German military there was a professional bias against the kind of clandestine work associated with spying and it was only with great difficulty was Gehlen able to recruit and establish a formal training regime to meet the needs of the military. However, as Pahl clearly shows, while Gehlen was able to very effectively provide for the operational and tactical needs of the military, he was never able to overcome the bureaucratic friction inherent in the structure of the State.

Pahl’s work provides an outstanding bibliography and notes section offering a plethora of additional reading material and sources. There is an error in the publication of the book where a map is reproduced in place of the FHO structure; however, this is minor when taken as a whole. It is also somewhat of a technical read more geared toward the ardent historian or those with an interest in the intelligence services during the war. Nevertheless, Pahl’s work definitively answers the questions of how and why the Germans had such difficulty building an in-depth appreciation of the Soviets and is well worth the time to read.