This review has been submitted to the British Army Review.
Title: Hitler’s
Fremde Heere Ost: German Military Intelligence on the Eastern Front 1942-1945
Author:
Magnus Pahl (translated by Derik Hammond)
ISBN:
978-1-910777-08-4
Publisher:
Helion
Year:
2016
Hardcover
Pages: 410
Photos/
Maps: 28/4
Many
questions remain about the decision of Germany to attack the Soviet Union in
1941; one of the most compelling was how did the Germans underestimate so
significantly the size and depth of the Soviet industrial as well as military
capability? Accusatory fingers have traditionally been leveled at a failure on
the part of the military intelligence organization to accurately predict this.
Pahl’s book addresses this and many other questions by analyzing the German
military intelligence organization from the ground up; its strengths,
weaknesses, operating environment (political and operational), leadership and
mandate.
There
are two concurrent tracks that the author follows in his analysis. The first
focuses upon the establishment and development of the intelligence service
within the German military and the State and its relationship with the RHSA (Reichssicherheitshauptamt
– Senior Bureau of Reich Security) and the Abwher. Compartmentalisation was one
of the means by which Hitler maintained control over the Nazi state/war machine
and intelligence was no exception. Thus it was that although given a mandate to
undertake all forms of intelligence gathering including strategic, the FHO was
never given the resources nor access to undertake the strategic level
effectively; nor did the various elements of the intelligence services (state
and Nazi party) cooperate willingly.
The
second element that the author traces is the role of MGen Reinhard Gehlen in
professionalizing and developing the effectiveness of the FHO. He commanded the
organization from 1942 onwards and was instrumental in transitioning it from an
ad hoc to a structured and far more proactive and engaged organization. Pahl
clearly shows the role that Gehlan played in this as well as his vision of the
future. Such was his impact that, as the author relates, he was able to not
only maintain the integrity of his organization as the war effort collapsed,
but was also able to ensure that the most effective members, gathered
information and networks developed against the Soviets were able to be made
available to the Americans and the German state following the surrender. That
this was accomplished within weeks of the end of the war is testament to his vision,
preparation and organizational skills.
This is
a comprehensively researched book that paints a picture for the reader of the
deep competence as well as structural and ideological weakness of the wartime
German state. It contains many lessons for modern intelligence organizations
relating to development, interoperability and doctrinal requirements to meet
mandate. Pahl’s work delves into both the complex structure but also the
doctrine related to the German intelligence services and the challenges that it
faced. Within the German military there was a professional bias against the
kind of clandestine work associated with spying and it was only with great
difficulty was Gehlen able to recruit and establish a formal training regime to
meet the needs of the military. However, as Pahl clearly shows, while Gehlen
was able to very effectively provide for the operational and tactical needs of
the military, he was never able to overcome the bureaucratic friction inherent
in the structure of the State.
Pahl’s
work provides an outstanding bibliography and notes section offering a plethora
of additional reading material and sources. There is an error in the
publication of the book where a map is reproduced in place of the FHO
structure; however, this is minor when taken as a whole. It is also somewhat of
a technical read more geared toward the ardent historian or those with an
interest in the intelligence services during the war. Nevertheless, Pahl’s work
definitively answers the questions of how and why the Germans had such
difficulty building an in-depth appreciation of the Soviets and is well worth
the time to read.