General Erich Hoepner: A Military Biography - W Chales de Beaulieu translated by Linden Lyons

This review has been submitted to Iron Cross Magazine. 

Title: General Erich Hoepner: A Military Biography
Author: W Chales de Beaulieu trans Linden Lyons
ISBN: 978-1-612-00976-6
Publisher: Casemate Publishing
Year: 2021
Hardcover
Pages: 252
Photos/Maps: 2/4 

De Beaulieu served as Hoepner’s first general staff officer during his campaign in Poland (1939) and then as his Chief of Staff during Hoepner’s campaigns in France and Russia. He therefore gained a deep insight and appreciation of both the personality and leadership style of this superb officer and panzer commander. Erich Hoepner’s career was characterized by his unwavering loyalty to the soldiers under his command, his duty to his country and the dictates of his conscience. Thus it was that he fulfilled the former with an aficionado’s skill in leading his panzers to Prague, Warsaw, Leningrad and the gates of Moscow and the latter by sacrificing his career for the welfare of his men before Moscow and his life in an effort to rid his country of Hitler. 

The author examens each of Hoepner’s campaigns individually by chapter. His focus is not simply upon the physical execution of the operations themselves but also the influence and affect of Hoepner’s personality on both the battlespace and the execution of his orders. De Beaulieu is a great admirer of Hoepners and this comes across in his evaluations; however, he is not an impartial sycophant. He is, for the most part, quite balanced in his assessment of Hoepner’s decisions; for example he discusses at some length the challenges that Hoepner faced during his drive into Belgium and makes note of errors made during the critical encounter with the Allies during the initial assault of the Dyle Line. Conversely, the author is too generous in his praise of German success against the French Cavalry Corps during the Battle of Hannut. While Hoepner prevailed in the battle, he did not succeed in destroying the French, enabling them to fight another day before Dunkirk. 

Along with Guderian, Hoepner was one of the very early proponents of an independent, self contained Panzer arm capable of deep, dramatic drives into the rear echelons of the enemy. He viewed this as the best way to unbalance and, more importantly, maintain the unbalance, of his adversaries. The author’s analysis of Hoepners drive towards Leningrad serve as perhaps the penultimate example of the effective operational use of the Panzer Arm in the hands of an expert at the peak of his prowess. 

The narrative of the book focuses upon Hoepner as leader and commander and the operational role that his forces undertook in the campaigns presented. The writing style and flow of the author makes for an easy grasp of the context. The work is lacking in sufficient maps that would have greatly facilitated the following of the operations as they unfolded. Although the narrative does give the reader a definite appreciation of the challenges of the terrain, distances, enemy forces and logistics that needed to be overcome, additional maps would have been very useful. The author undertakes, throughout the book, to present Hoepner as a real person, complete with flaws and errors. It is through this lens that the true strengths of Hoepner as both a military professional and quintessential leader are actually emphasized. That Hoepner is an exceptional commander and leader is beyond question; however, it is his willingness to assume responsibility for his decisions, despite the potential consequences, that serves to separate him from an already deep bench of competency. His actions before Moscow in January, 1942 and his willingness to support the July Plot against Hitler (for which he was tried and executed) are evidence of his moral strength and sound ethical grounding.  

The translation from the original German is excellent and there are ample footnotes that serve to expand upon more complicated portions of the operational narrative. Casemate has published a book of high quality. I would strongly recommend this work both as a reference for German operations from the period 1939-1941 and as an excellent study of a lesser known but equally impressive German Officer and Commander.

Narvik: The Struggle of Battle Group Dietl in the Spring of 1940 - Alex Buchner (Translated by Janice Ancker)

This review has been submitted to Air Force

Magazine. 

Title: Narvik: The Struggle of Battle Group Dietl in the Spring of 1940
Author: Alex Buchner (Translated by Janice Ancker)
ISBN: 978-1-61200-917-9
Publisher: Casemate Publishing
Year: 2020
Hardcover
Pages: 218
Photos/Maps: 0/9 

The German invasion of Norway, in April/May 1940, is viewed by many as another example of German military prowess and the Allied response one of incompetence and vacillation. In many respects that is true, however, the battle that took place over the Northern port of Narvik stands out as a particularly vivid example of missed opportunity by the Allies and a mixture of tenacity and great luck on the part of the Germans. 

This work, part of “Die Wehrmacht im Kampf” series from Casemate, was originally published in the late 1950’s by Buchner who was present at the battle as part of the German Mountain Troops. He was thus able to draw upon not only the recollections of his compatriots but also his own experiences during the fighting. Written solely from the perspective of the German forces present, it is the first time in English that a narrative of the fighting has been available exclusively from that viewpoint. 

Originally deployed as the most northern element of the invasion forces, a convoy made up of ten destroyers ferried at high speed, 2,700 German Mountain troops with only their personal kit and a minimum of additional supplies to Narvik in order to seize this key port for the export of Swedish ore. All of their follow-on supplies, specialized winter warfare kit and heavy weapons were to follow in a second echelon of support ships expected within 48 hours of their arrival. Unfortunately for the Germans, while their seizure of Narvik and its surrounding area went generally as planned, the Royal Navy succeeded in surprising and sinking all 10 of the German destroyers as well as all save one of the follow-on support ships. Thereby isolated and cut off from support, the Germans, numbering 2,700 Mountain Troops and 2,600 Naval personnel, were faced with holding off at least five times as many Allied soldiers, readily supplied by the Royal Navy who controlled the sea access. However, under the inspired leadership of Generalleutnant Dietl, the Germans, utilizing audacity, initiative, skill and daring (and enjoying more than a fair degree of luck) managed to hold off the more pedestrian efforts on the part of the Allies to oust them from their tenuous hold on Narvik. 

What stands out in this narrative are the critical roles that leadership and morale played in the German success. Buchner relates, in very telling prose, the incredibly debilitating environment within which the Germans had to operate. Northern Norway in April and May is a very hostile winter climate which would have challenged the finest of troops let alone a force that was comprised half of Naval personnel now being used in a Mountain Infantry role. The author describes the methods the German leadership took to both integrate these men into infantry roles and also to fully utilize the specialist skills that they possessed (communications, support and small watercraft control). The Germans showed great skill at taking full advantage of the resources that were available to them.

The writing style of the author is surprisingly engaging. The reader is able to fully appreciate not only the challenges of the environment but of the formidable skill of the German soldiers and officers in adjusting to a fluid and dynamic combat environment. One is left with a distinct appreciation of the benefits of hard training, audacious leadership throughout the chain of command and a deep-rooted belief by the Germans in competency of their Commanders. 

The book is a good quality publication although pictures would have added to the general presentation. The maps provided at the front were in German from the original publication but are able to be used to follow the unfolding events. A series of appendices outline orders of battle at various points for the opposing forces, orders and directives and timelines for the reinforcement of the German forces. The author has also included a comprehensive bibliography (utilizing German primary source material) as well as thorough notes section. Overall, a well written and very interesting book that would serve as an excellent counter point to publications of Allied efforts in Norway.

Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan 1945-47 - DM Giangreco

This review has been submitted to the Australian Army Journal. 

Title: Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan 1945-47
Author: DM Giangreco
ISBN: 978-1-682-47165-4
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
Year: 2017
Hardcover
Pages: 552
Photos/Maps: 26/13

The last months of the Second World War were characterized by some of the most vicious fighting experienced in the Pacific Theatre. Tenacious resistance by Japanese forces on Iwo Jima and Okinawa resulting in the highest casualty rates thus far experienced by US forces in the Pacific, presaging a struggle for the Japanese home islands that would dwarf all previous battles. Fear of the massive casualties that were anticipated to be sustained by the US from an invasion of the Japanese home islands, war fatigue amongst the population and an acknowledgement by US leadership of the continued resistance anticipated by Japanese forces (both civilian and military) led to a decision by President Truman to utilize nuclear weapons in an effort to shock the Japanese into surrender. Ultimately, the two nuclear strikes did prompt the Japanese into accepting unconditional surrender (save for the protection of the Emperor from prosecution as a war criminal); however, it also led to future widespread condemnation by some historians and anti-nuclear factions that felt nothing justified the use of these weapons.

 Giangreco’s work looks at the myriad of complex and ethical challenges faced by the US decision makers as they grappled with how to bring the war with Japan to a close as rapidly as possible with a minimum loss of American, Japanese and Allied lives.

 The author’s book is characterized by a deep and comprehensive analysis and understanding of the planning challenges and political atmosphere within which the senior planning staff operated. He has drawn extensively upon the original operational plans of both the US and Japanese for attack and defence as well as primary source intelligence analysis undertaken by both adversaries. Of particular note is his research into and use of what was actually briefed to the decision makers. This is critical as it speaks to what was the information that they were basing their decisions upon.

The narrative in Hell to Pay follows a series of concurrent and mutually supportive tracks:

1.     An accessible and broad analysis of the international political situation following the close of hostilities with Germany. The US, Soviet Union, Japan, China, UK and the Commonwealth all feature prominently in this as the significant remaining players. The author looks at the domestic stressors, perceived and real political goals, and what capabilities each has to participate in the final engagement with Japan;

2.      An in-depth review of the situation within Japan itself: what was the domestic political environment like, what were the actual resources that Japan could still draw upon in terms of military forces and their capabilities, what did the Japanese perceive as the possible options for invasion and how were they preparing to respond, what were the Japanese goals in continuing to resist, what were the Japanese operational plans for defence and resistance, what did they anticipate to be the casualties and were they prepared to accept these and how well prepared were the Japanese for the invasion; and

3.      A similar but broader and deeper examination of the debate within senior US circles  regarding what was the best way to deal with Japan rounds out this interwoven text. Combined with the Japanese perspective, this thread is easily the most engrossing. Again drawn from predominantly primary source material, it sheds light on the massive undertaking that faced the US both from a manpower as well as materiel perspective. Taking into consideration that the invasion would be far more complex than anything in history (compared with Normandy which was a “shore to shore” invasion with only a short channel crossing, the invasion of Japan would have be executed and supported exclusively from the sea); the invasion fleet alone was estimated to be over 4000 ships. The author identifies and discusses the three main options (and the accompanying factors for and against each) available to the Truman Administration: 1. A series of nuclear strikes on designated cities in an effort to shock the Japanese Government into surrender, 2. Siege of Japanese home islands, cutting off all food and resources, thereby driving them into capitulation, and 3. Invasion.

The level of detail and accompanying examination of what information each side had to go on as they struggled with what decisions to take are hallmarks of Giangreco’s work. He has approached the subject with the third person analysis of the consummate historian while adding a degree of humanity and engagement within the text itself. The reader is left with a profound appreciation of the magnitude and complexity of the problem facing the Allies, the degree to which the Japanese were prepared to continue resisting (and their far greater capability to undertake resistance than was previously understood) and the political and societal pressures on Truman that can only be fully appreciated by a society that was suffering between 65,000 and 100,000 casualties per month since June of 1944.

The book concludes with a series of appendices that present the reader with elements of the actual planning documents for Op Downfall (invasion of Japan), Op Blacklist (occupation of Japan) and the actual G-2 (Intelligence) analysis prepared by both US and Japanese Forces during the lead up to Op Downfall (included in the Japanese portion are postwar interrogation records with key Japanese military commanders and Intelligence analysts). Additionally, there is a very detailed notes section and bibliography.

Anyone who wishes to better appreciate the decision making environment facing the Japanese and Allied leaders going into 1945 and the struggle to come to the correct conclusion on whether or not to use the nuclear option must read this book. Whether one is a critic or supportive of the decision, this work will provide context and information to better help inform the debate positions of each side. Hell to Pay is also an outstanding source book for military logistics professionals, as well as Naval and Airforce operators who wish to improve their understanding of the complexity of an operation of this magnitude. An excellent work and very strongly endorsed.