Panzer Operations - Hermann Hoth

Title: Panzer Operations

Author: Hermann Hoth

ISBN: 978-1-61200-269-9

Publisher: Casemate Books

Hardcover

Pages: 215

Photos/maps:14/16  

Hermann Hoth is considered by many to have been one of the greatest armoured commanders serving in the German Army during the Second World War. A veteran of the First World War, he commanded Panzer Group 3 during the initial drive into Russia, following which he was given responsibility for 17^th Army and subsequently 4^th Panzer Army. Despite being the recipient of the Swords to the Oak Leaves to the Knights Cross of the Iron Cross for exceptional bravery and leadership, he was blamed by Hitler for the loss of Kiev in Nov 1943 and relieved of command.

In 1956, Hoth drafted his memoires relating to the operations of 3 Panzer Group from the commencement of Barbarossa (June 1941 - the invasion of Russia) until October, 1941. This book is the first translation of said memoirs into english and represents an outstanding assessment of not only the operational command of armoured forces but also the interaction (both positive and negative) between Hitler, the strategic German Army command and the operational units. His observations on the delineation between ‘strategic’ and ‘operational’ lines of command as well as the overarching political considerations driving decision making are both relevant and insightful even today.  

Throughout, Hoth centres his assessments on the teachings of such giants of military thought as Scharnhorst, Clausewitz and Moltke and the necessity to learn from the lessons of the past. He also assesses the climate within which the German military planners operated at the strategic level – namely one in which Hitler continuously fluctuated in clearly identifying the main objective of the campaign: the destruction of the Red Army and the capture of Moscow or the economic crippling of the Soviet Union; the challenge therein being the fact that one is clearly military and the other socio-economic in nature. The vacillation between the two would hamper operations throughout the early days of the campaign. 

The meat of the book however, centres upon the effective command of armoured forces in the field and the best use that may be made of them. He draws extensively from the pre-invasion assessments made of the Soviet Union, its transportation infrastructure, military and anticipated response to invasion. He also discusses various invasion planning courses of action that were developed by the German High Command. These are fascinating as they are outstanding examples of high level planning and the process by which they were considered and rejected. Included was an option to combine all armoured and motorized infantry divisions into one massive mailed fist that would drive forward from a start point on the northern flank of Army Group Centre directly towards Leningrad thereby cutting off Russian Baltic forces and securing the Northern flank. Following this, the mobile forces would drive southwards cutting off Moscow and the Russian Army from its resupply and reinforcement options from the Urals and forcing it to fight on reversed fronts; all this while Army Group’s Centre and South would drive inexorably forward pinning Russian units in place. Such an example emphasizes the bold and risk accepting nature of effective armoured operations. 

The main body of the text traces the operations of Panzer Group 3 during the initial period of the Operation Barbarossa and the factors that affected his decision making. In his conclusion, Hoth encapsulates the essence and fundamental tenants of the operational command of mobile units and what are the key factors in the achievement of success (in relation to the campaign in Russia). Additionally, he reiterates the absolutely critical requirement to clearly establish and maintain the aim of operations regardless of the temptations that may present along the way. He includes in his work a series of annexes outlining key assessments and orders that he received and drafted during the course of the campaign. He also includes a discussion on the decision to undertake the final drive on Moscow in October, 1941 incorporating/emphasizing the responsibility of the commander in the decision making process.

 

Hoth’s writing style is direct and to the point; yet it remains very readable and thought-provoking. He is a commander who cares very deeply about his soldiers and their well-being but also for the mentorship and development of his leaders. Included in this book is an annex by the translator that assesses of Hoth’s political and social views. I found this to be somewhat jarring as it seemed out of place given that this was an operational treatise written by Hoth and not a biography; however, it is very much a sidebar issue. I would strongly recommend this book for any leader wanting to clearly understand what command (highlighted by bold, decisive action) entails in an operational context.

Lawrence in Arabia - Scott Anderson

Title: Lawrence in Arabia

Author: Scott Anderson

ISBN: 978-0-771-00768-2

Publisher: Signal Books

Softcover

Pages: 577

Photos/maps: 42/5 

Altruism is not a principle of war nor is it a principle of international relations and it is with this pretext that one must approach the machinations and deal-making that typified the Middle East during the years leading up to, during and immediately following the First World War. Anderson’s book presents the reader with a road map of the toing’s and froing’s between the key actors and nation states of the period and the impact that it has had on the long term social and political development of the region. Certainly, the decisions made then have reverberated down through the decades and continue to be felt in the challenges that we are dealing with today. 

Anderson has been able to effectively cut through the Gordian knot of Middle Eastern societies and politics and break down the story into a manageable and traceable narrative. It is truly awe inspiring the degree of naked ambition (both personal and national) that manifested itself at the expense of all else during this period. The example of France refusing to sanction an attack on Alexandretta in 1915 (resulting in the Gallipoli Campaign) because of its fear that it would lose its post war claim to Syria (this despite the fact that militarily it made eminent sense to strike there) boggles the mind with both its hubris and expectation. 

Turk vs Arab, House of Saud vs Hussein, British vs French, Entente vs Central Power, Lawrence vs Sykes, Tribe vs Tribe, Egypt vs India the list is endless of the competitive agendas that were undertaken as the dance of the Middle East carried on. A consistent theme throughout was Lawrence and his role as guide, intermediary, policy maker and manipulator between all of the various parties. The book is not about Lawrence specifically, but the central role that he plays in this drama is key to the long term results. The author does a very credible job of providing the reader a clear understanding of the personalities involved, what drives them, their bias’s, strengths and weaknesses; none more so than Lawrence. Lawrence holds himself aloof from those around him and forges his own path regardless of the intent or direction from his superiors; a true loose cannon. In doing so, he also contributes to the tragedy that unfolds in the region even while he plunges into cynicism and disillusionment with the Great Powers.

 

This book was a finalist for the National Book Critics Award and it is easy to understand why. Anderson has drafted an eminently readable and, more importantly, comprehendible synopsis of the years leading to the collapse of the Ottoman’s, the intricacies of the war years, the betrayal of promises made to the Arabs and the realignment of the Middle East in the vision of the victorious Western Powers. Additionally, Anderson provides an extensive bibliography and notes section for further study. For those seeking an in-depth yet engaging backgrounder for the modern challenges of the Middle East, this is a book to be read.

Gallipoli: The Ottoman Campaign - Edward J Erickson

Title: Gallipoli: The Ottoman Campaign

Author: Edward J Erickson

ISBN: 978-1-78346-166-0

Publisher: Pen and Sword Books

Softcover

Pages: 271

Photos/maps: 17/24 

Much of history is based upon perception and not necessarily upon reality; such is the case with the military forces of the Ottoman Empire. Viewed through the lens of “the sick man of Europe”, the march of Allenby into Jerusalem and the drama and romance of Lawrence of Arabia, it is easy to overlook or forget that the Army of the Ottoman’s was actually quite successful against the combined military’s of France and Great Britain. The successes of the Ottoman’s in the First Battle of the Dardanelle Strait (1915), Gallipoli (1915), Kut (1916) and the First and Second Battles of Giza (1916) are just as often credited to their German advisors as opposed to any integral capability. Erickson’s book, an operational review of the Gallipoli Campaign from the exclusive perspective of the Ottoman’s, does much to address this. 

The author begins his narrative with a detailed analysis of the years leading up to the 1915 campaign; the experience of some of the key commanders (both in terms of training and combat), the lessons resulting from the First Balkan War (1912-1913), the upgrades to the fortifications of the Dardanelle Straits, the doctrinal adjustments made to the Ottoman Regimental system and the training regime of the Ottoman’s for their army. The last two are of particular note as the Ottomans changed their regimental system from a square (four battalion) to a triangle (three battalion) system. This was found to be a much more manageable and responsive construct (and one in fact that the allies ultimately adopted in 1918). Additionally, the author discusses the fact that the Ottoman’s mobilized their forces in July, 1914 (a full three months before commencing hostilities) and this, given that they were not actively engaged in a land campaign until Gallipoli, provided them almost an entire year of work-up training for their forces. 

Erickson’s analysis of the Battle itself is insightful and detailed. Drawing upon primary source material from the Turkish archives, he is able to trace the actions and decision making of the Turkish commanders and the actual role that the German advisors (such as von Sanders) played. It is interesting to note that over the course of the campaign, there were series of individuals relieved of command by the Turkish General Staff including German officers. The reader comes away from this analysis with an appreciation of the complexity of the operational and tactical actions of the Ottoman forces. Advances to contact, transfers of authority, reliefs in place both night and day, combined support operations, multiple operational reorganizations of forces, a detailed reporting system, proactive command and decision making and dynamic leadership by the officer corps all speak to a modern and competent military structure and hierarchy. 

The author does not spare the rod in his analysis either and he is quick to point out the flaws and weaknesses of the Ottoman forces with equal clarity. This provides both balance and perspective in the overall analysis. He also provides discussion (although not to the detail or depth of the campaign itself) of the service support elements of the Ottoman forces operating on the Gallipoli Peninsula including medical, veterinary, supply and transport services. Finally, he also looks to the strategic level and the impact that operating within the most technologically advanced and infrastructure wise, the most developed part of the Ottoman Empire had upon the capability of the Ottoman forces within the region. 

Erickson provides numerous maps that are of benefit to the reader in following the actions of the Turkish forces as the Campaign unfolded; unfortunately, they are original maps from the Turkish archives and, as such, are very difficult to read and follow. Additionally, I would have enjoyed seeing more photographs of some of the key players in the Ottoman hierarchy such as Brig Esat Pasha and Enver Pasha. The bibliography is very extensive citing a series of memoires, primary (mainly from the Turkish military) and secondary sources that collectively provide the reader a plethora of options for further reading. The same may be said for the appendices citing command billets, ammo usage and orders of battle.

 

The author’s writing style is extremely engaging and easily maintains the reader’s interest. This is an operational study of this campaign and as such, does not contain many ‘personal experiences’ with some notable exceptions such as the valour of Cpl Seyit during the Battle of the Dardanelle Straits; this, however, is clearly identified by the author at the outset. This book would be an excellent addition to any library and serves as an outstanding counterpoint to the copious works on Gallipoli that speak only from the perspective of the Entente.

A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940-1945, Vol 2: North African Desert February 1942-March 1943 - Christopher Shores and Giovanni Massimello

Title: A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940-1945, Vol 2: North African Desert February 1942-March 1943

Author(s): Christopher Shores and Giovanni Massimello

ISBN: 978-1-909166-12-7

Publisher: Grub Street

Hardcover

Pages: 736

Photo’s/Maps: 100’s b/w//6 

Building on the success of their previous volume in this series, Shores and Massimello have compiled a massive amount of data and detail into a book outlining the experiences of the varying combatants as they head into their second year of desert fighting. Written as a calendar compilation, they provide both a synopsis of the day’s activities and highlights of the unique or noteworthy events of the period.

Photographs are incorporated throughout the narrative providing a stunning visual representation for the reader and, what’s more, they are not centrally printed but co-located within the storyline they are representative of. Each of the discussions are broken down into an outline of the day’s events followed by a detailed rendition of the casualties of the British, Germans and Italian adversaries (broken down into unit and a brief synopsis of the engagement, results and crew status) and claims (broken down into columns signifying unit, crew names, attacking aircraft type and designator, damaged or destroyed aircraft type, location and time). 

The extent and breadth of the research is truly remarkable while the presentation is such that the book does not read as a dry rendition of facts but leaves the reader with a true sense of the adrenalin, terror and courage of the aircrew involved. The authors also incorporate stories of those aspects of the conflict that have received, relatively speaking, very little attention. Take for example their discussion of the unique JU-86 pressurized reconnaissance aircraft (with an operational ceiling of over 48,000 ft)  that operated out of Kastelli, Crete. These aircraft undertook high altitude reconnaissance over the Nile Delta and all along the northern coast of Africa. Specialized Spitfires from 103 Maintenance Unit specifically stripped down were able to intercept and neutralize this Luftwaffe capability. Another excellent example of this is the story of Capt J.E. ‘Jack’ Parsonson and his first hand related experience of combat on the 10 November, 1942 when he was involved in a harrowing dogfight with, ultimately nine ME-109’s. He ends his recollection with a German Lieutenant pleasantly offering him a cigarette and food; telling him sardonically: “Well, for you the war is over. Here, would you like this egg?” This after he had just slammed his Kittyhawk into the desert floor and evacuated it as the 109’s circled above. 

Shores lead a team of researchers each with a specific national affiliation (German, Australian, Italian and American) who have each contributed a phenomenal amount of detail and anecdote towards the final publication. The book commences with a synopsis of the tactical and operational situation in the desert at the beginning of 1942; it sets the stage for the narrative that follows. Additionally, a number of noteworthy veterans (such as Ernst Dullberg, II Gruppe JG 27, John Waddy, 4 SAAF, James ‘Stocky’ Edwards, 260 Sqn and Neville Duke 112 and 92 Sqn and many others) provide lengthy and detailed recollections about Squadron life and combat operations in the desert. The reader is provided an intimate introspection by these men of their experiences and the respect that they shared not only for each other but also their adversaries and ground crew. One is definitely left with the sense that war in the desert was not personal but a deadly business. 

Grub Street has published a book of outstanding quality. For those looking for a book outlining the experiences of the air war in the desert, it would be difficult to find a better source. This is volume two and volume three will focus on operations around Tunisia. While the book may be read in isolation from volume one, I would strongly recommend reading in order to get a real sense of the ebb and flow of the desert air war.

‘Neath Verdun - Maurice Genevoix

Title: ‘Neath Verdun

Author: Maurice Genevoix

ISBN: 978-0-85706-208-6

Publisher: Leonaur

Hardcopy

Pages: 171

Photos/Maps: 0

This book is a reproduction of the author’s diary running for the first few weeks of World War 1    (25 August – 4 October, 1914). It is not a book about the Battle of Verdun, but more the experiences, observations and thoughts of Lt Genevoix as he and his fellow soldiers grapple with the stresses and challenges of war for the first time in the region of the Meuse Valley. 

What makes this book quite unique is the degree of detail which the author recalls and remarks upon. Written in the immediacy of the moment, he is able to convey a sense of the frustration, fear, confusion, doubt, hope and comradeship that pervade these early days. One is struck by his horror at seeing soldiers with horrific wounds desperately seeking medical aid, the crushing exhaustion of endless marches in rain and mud, the joy at the prospect of a warm meal, the struggles with preventing melancholy at not receiving mail and the sad empathy at the suffering of wounded horses that he comes across. 

He and his soldiers are not hardened to war as of yet; they are still learning and struggling with the new reality of their existence and what it entails. The author is able to convey his concerns and fears of his own leadership and the terror of the prospect of combat and death (or even worse wounding). In battle, especially on the front line, ones focus is drawn into a very narrow field, bracketed by the soldiers within one’s immediate responsibility. This isolation and the necessity to make decisions under the stress of being exposed to maiming, death, exhaustion and fear is eloquently conveyed in Genevoix’s comments.

 

He is a sensitive, observant and thoughtful man, capable of seeing and capturing the essence of his surroundings and experiences through the written word in a way that many diarists fail to achieve. His work is short, but it leaves one feeling profoundly introspective and humbled at the massive undertaking that Genevoix and his soldiers were embarking upon. This is made all the more poignant with the reader’s benefit of hindsight and the knowledge of what the war would degenerate into. This book is well worth reading for junior and mid-grade officers as well as historians or those curious to get a bit of an appreciation of early field life of a combat command soldier.

Do No Harm - Henry Marsh

Title: Do No Harm
Author: Henry Marsh
ISBN: 978-1-250-06581-0
Publisher: Raincoast
Softcover
Pages: 277

Henry Marsh is a renowned neurosurgeon out of the UK. He has drafted a book outlining some of his more memorable experiences over a forty year career in medicine with the intent of passing on to future generations of clinicians and surgeons some of his hard earned observations and lessons. What caught my eye, and why I have included it within my blog, was the similarity in terms of leadership lessons within his writings that may also be applied within both the military and medical contexts.

Marsh divides his book into a series of chapters that relate to a specific type of spinal or brain injury. Each serves as an introduction to a success or failure and an evaluation by Marsh on how he addressed the situation. This is not a medical text, it is a compilation of reminiscences using his medical field as a guide. He does not pull any punches and undertakes a critical analysis of himself and others as he relates the events for the reader.

Why is this relevant for a leader? A number of reasons:

1. Mentorship: Marsh instituted a process whereby junior doctors presented case files and recommended courses of action during a daily morning briefing attended by all regardless of experience. This promoted group learning and a forum within which diagnosis and treatments could be discussed. Marsh continuously challenged his doctors ensuring greater consideration and thought;
2. Empathy: He placed particular stress on the importance of not forgetting that patients and subordinates are universally human first and that this must not be forgotten when interacting with them; from both a treatment and an institutional perspective. Throughout his works he is extremely critical of the bureaucracy that treats patients as commodities as opposed to human beings;
3. Micromanagement: Marsh acknowledges that he had particular difficulty allowing junior doctors to learn by doing and being empowered to undertake procedures without his direct intervention. It is critical that subordinates be encouraged and trusted (within their capabilities) and overseen only as required;
4. Ethics: As part of his instruction regime, Marsh was a strong proponent of "because you can does not mean you should' in terms of treatment. That is to say, will the resulting quality of life merit the discomfort and risk of surgery? This oblique approach to medical intervention is very much in keeping with the mindset that leaders must maintain;
5. Error: Throughout his narrative, Marsh is quick to acknowledge his own fallibility. This is important for all as hubris is the precursor to catastrophic failure. To be an effective leader or professional, it is critical that we recognize our own shortcomings; and
6. Knowing When to Challenge: The author acknowledges that, with maturity, came a realization that he could not win every fight and that indeed, he was foolish to try. The recognition of what was truly important served to focus his attention and improved his time management;

The most important aspect of this book from a leadership perspective; however, was his ability to make decisions and function effectively as a doctor despite the fact that he had not been able to save all of his patients; indeed some that he had successfully operated upon were paralyzed, left with significant disabilities or were not cured but only provided a brief reprieve. Neurosurgery can easily lead to catastrophic failure and requires a deep conviction and mental strength to undertake for both surgeon and patient. Many in leadership positions become incapacitated by PTSD (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder) and are thus unable to continue with their responsibilities. Marsh writes very personally about his struggles to reconcile his role as a healer with the shortcomings that he has inevitably experienced. He assumes an empathetic 'real politique' perspective that maintains his touch with patients while concurrently strengthening his mental capacity to deal with those times when the cure 'was worse than the illness'. This is a critical lesson for leaders to learn and emulate.

A fascinating and engaging read for all regardless of ones experience level. Marsh has provided outstanding lessons and mentorship beyond the surgical ward.

The Sky Their Battlefield II - Trevor Henshaw

Original written by Chris Buckham. Published in the Journal of the RCAF.

Title: The Sky Their Battlefield II

Author: Trevor Henshaw

ISBN: 978-0-9929771-1-5

Publisher: Fetubi Books

Softcover

Pages: 406

Photos: 289

Historians undertake two main roles in the course of their studies, one is to gather first hand recollections, information and statistics and secondly, to take that information and interpret and recount it for future audiences. Henshaw has produced a reference work of enormous breadth and depth, cataloguing the losses, on all fronts, of the British Commonwealth airforces from 1912 until 1919, as well as United States casualties from 1916 onwards. 

The book is structured in a very logical way with an easy to follow layout, ensuring the reader can access whatever aspect of information that they are seeking quickly and efficiently. Commencing with a guide on how to follow the nomenclature of the book, he has incorporated in excess of 16,800 casualty (wounded, missing and killed) write-ups into the body of the book broken out by year, region and accident or combat. He has also referenced thousands of German records in order to confirm Allied losses.

Interspaced within the text is an ongoing narrative of significant events that add dimension to his work. It is very easy to view these losses in a very two dimensional way, especially given the common structure of presentation; however, Hernshaw has provided hundreds of photographs that clearly present the grim results of many an airman's dream. His interjections highlight interesting events within the chronological layout of the text; thus he identifies, as examples, new aircraft introductions , air lessons learned during the Ypres battles, Hindenburg line preparations, and a myriad of other information relating to the development, execution and challenges of aircraft design and combat. The central theme however, of recognition and identification of the fate of aircrews, remains the central focus throughout.

Added to this publication is an Accident Addendum that outlines the fates of the 4,530 aircrew that were injured or killed in circumstances not directly related to enemy action. This is both very appropriate and informative as history tends to forget about those whose sacrifices resulted from old airframes, limited experience, poor air doctrine and a host of other 'behind the lines' reasons. Henshaw also incorporates those 'other rank' members who were lost but there is no known cause; their sacrifice is no less telling or significant. 

Another aspect of this work that lends weight and credence to it as an outstanding source for future historians is the analysis undertaken by the author of the information that he has gleaned from the official records. This represents the second phase of historical relevance: statistics are only as worthwhile as the interpretation of what they tell you. His evaluation and presentation in table form of the operational cause factors (ie bombing, strafing, reconnaissance etc) of loss is a goldmine of information in and of itself. His appendices include such components as: Western Front Losses 1914-1918 by Aircraft Type, Nature of Operations, Cost of Aircraft and Engines, AIR1 Casualties from Kew, RFC and RAF Roles of Honour and Analyses of Losses throughout the war from 1912-1919. Each of these is presented as useable raw data with emphasis placed upon key aspects and markers such as casualty rates by aircraft type. 

The amount of time and effort associated with researching and cataloguing the information within this book is staggering. The scope and depth of the analysis and the discussion of what the statistics amount to is second to none. Henshaw has provided for the reading public and the future historian, a treasure trove of information and a testament to the sacrifice of the personnel of the Royal Flying Corps, the Royal Air Force, Royal Naval Air Service, the Commonwealth air services and the nascent United States Airforce. One only begins to appreciate the vastness of the operations and the geographic scope of the undertaking when it is laid out for you in a format such as this. Henshaw is to be commended for producing a book of such richness and gravity.