This review was submitted to Military History Online.
Title: The
Franco-Prussian War 1870-71 Vol 1 and 2
Author: Quintin Barry
ISBN: 978-1-906033-45-3//978-1-906033-46-0
Publisher: Helion and
Company
Year: 2009
Softcover
Pages: 342/530
Photos/Maps: 171/40
Mr Barry has penned a
tour de force rendition of the (relatively) short yet dramatic engagement
between the French Empire and the German Confederacy. The outcome changed the
face of Europe and set the stage for the cataclysm’s to follow in the 20th
century. Barry’s approach is detailed and comprehensive; as such he has divided
his volumes around the Battle of Sedan which serves as a natural division
between French Imperial and French Republican operations. His analysis and
discussion are very detailed and he adds further nuance to his narrative by
drawing upon anecdotes from participants. This is primarily a book detailing
the role of Helmuth von Moltke as Chief of the German General Staff in
building, training and ultimately directing the German Army in war; as well as
his challenges in dealing with the sometimes divergent demands of the military
and German Chancellor Bismark.
Given the broad
spectrum of the war, Barry has done an excellent job at presenting the myriad
of military engagements in a logical and straightforward manner. His
descriptions focus upon the operational and strategic levels of command and he
expends a great deal of effort in presenting multi-dimensional portrayals of
the key German and French Commanders. This greatly facilitates a deep appreciation
of the myriad of personalities that impact the execution of operations and
their influence on events. It also goes far in reinforcing the key German
leadership technique of decentralized execution of the Commanders Intent. Time
and again, Barry quotes orders and diary inserts that relate the advantages
gleaned by the German forces when senior officers did not micro manage their
subordinates.
Of course not
everything was in the Germans favour and Barry provides plenty of examples of
the friction that existed within both the German and French command elements. The
reader is also given deep insight into the extremely complicated political
turmoil resulting from the collapse of the French Emperor’s government in the
midst of the conflict and the profound resiliency of the French military and
people in replenishing their losses in short order. Quantity may not replace
quality but it certainly gave the German Commanders pause.
