This review has been submitted to the British Military History Journal.
Title: Case
Red: The Collapse of France
Author:
Robert Forczyk
ISBN:
978-1-4728-2442-4
Publisher:
Osprey Publishing
Year:
2017
Hardcover
Pages: 464
Photos/Maps:
60/7
Studies
relating to the Battle for France in 1940 tend to focus upon the initial weeks
of the conflict running from the invasion of the Low Countries (Fall Gelb) and culminating
in the evacuation of Allied troops at Dunkirk. Relatively little has been
drafted relating to the follow-on Fall Rot (Case Red) which encompassed the
drive south following Dunkirk and the capture of the remaining French
territory. Forczyk’s book undertakes to address this shortfall and to draw
attention to the Allied efforts, political and military, to contain the German
drive. Included in his analysis are a series of studies highlighting challenges
and successes by both sides and their background causes.
The
author commences his work with a broad study of the Allied efforts in the years
leading up to the invasion (1919-1939). This is critical for the reader to better
appreciate the lack of coordination and internal dissention between the Western
Countries. This was especially true of Belgium whose foreign policies served to
both weaken and undermine French plans for countering the Germans.
His
discussions draw attention to a number of areas that have generally not been
addressed in past books on the battle of France. Following the evacuation at
Dunkirk, there was an operational pause on the part of the Germans as they
reformed their units and undertook the planning for the second phase of the
attack on France: Fall Rot. Much of the planning and preparation has been
glossed over in the major histories of this conflict. Hitler had given the OKW
(Oberkommando der Wehrmacht – German High Command) only ten days between the
end of Fall Gelb and the beginning of Fall Rot (25 May to 5 June). During that
time in addition to planning the next stages of the advance, they also had to coordiante
and deliver over 50,000 tons of supplies from Germany to their forward units
(200 miles over destroyed and damaged transportation infrastructure). Support
on this scale had never been attempted
before; Forczyk discusses in detail the logistical efforts of this period and
the challenges overcome.
Additionally,
it is important to note that the French remained a potent adversary even after
their initial setbacks; one that the Germans viewed very seriously. The author
looks at the methodology that the Germans undertook in order to retain their
advantage after the element of surprise had been lost through superior planning
and execution as well as joint operations between air and ground forces.
Forcyzk
is balanced in his appraisals of the adversary’s capabilities but he is
particularly scathing in this analysis of the French and British High Commands.
He specifically focusses upon their divergence from both political oversight
and control as well as the abrogation of their responsibility towards the
soldiers under their command. This appears particularly true in the case of
Weygand, the French Commander as he repeatedly dismissed direction from the
French Government.
Included
in this work are a number of minor incidents that have been lost or overlooked.
For example the French air force undertook 11 air raids on German cities during
the Battle of France including the first air raid on Berlin when a single
Farman bomber flew a round trip mission of over 3000 km, dropping 3 tonnes of
bombs before returning back to base. The inclusion of these types of stories
add both depth and breadth to Forcyzk’s narrative.
Osprey
has published an excellent book that is well worth adding to one’s library. The
author has drafted a book that adds much to the limited amount available on the
German operations following Dunkirk. He sheds additional light on the deep
challenges that the Western Allies faced in the early years of the war while
also drawing attention to German areas of weakness. A very worthwhile read.
