Battle for Angola: The End of the Cold War in Africa 1975-89 - Al J Venter

This review has been submitted to the Canadian Army Journal.

Title: Battle for Angola: The End of the Cold War in Africa 1975-89

Author: Al J Venter

ISBN: 978-1-911096-41-2

Publisher: Helion

Year: 2017

Hardcover

Pages: 527

Maps/Photos: 5/100’s (colour, b/w) 

Al Venter is one of the most prolific writers of the myriad of African wars that has beset that continent in the years following independence. His works have an added level of authenticity due to the fact that he is anything but an armchair historian, he has actually participated in and been wounded in a number of them, including the Border Wars with Angola. Much of the history of the African Wars has been forgotten with the advent of ISIS, Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria but there is much to learn about symmetric response to both symmetric and asymmetric enemies.  

In his review of the wars, the author encompasses the conflicts technological, doctrinal and societal impacts and how these changed over the course of the war. He also draws upon first-hand accounts of operational commanders, weapons designers and soldiers to provide for a more nuanced and realistic sense of the success and challenges faced by the protagonists. Included in this are discussions of the asymmetric elements of the war; specifically UNITA and SWAPO as well as the Angolan Army (and their material and personnel supporters Cuba, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact). Much of the book is a discussion of the tactical and operational effectiveness of these organizations, their doctrine and how it was countered by both the Portuguese (before independence in 1974) as well as the South Africans. The role of mercenary groups such as Executive Outcome is also deeply intertwined within these conflicts. Venter discusses the influence of other regional conflicts and the role that they played in South African planning; the Rhodesians’ Fire Force concept, lessons learned from Biafra, the Portuguese Special Forces and tribal Bushmen all played a role and are analyzed in depth. 

The technological advances that resulted from the nature of the conflict as well as the self-sufficiency required of the South Africans (due to the international arms embargo) is very interesting. The requirement for vehicles that were specifically designed to provide effective protection against mines while still enabling a robust cross country capability resulted in the development of an entirely new class of vehicles: Ratels, Eland’s and Buffel’s all put South Africa at the very forefront of Infantry Fighting Vehicle technology.  

Venter’s work encompasses the complex nature of the war spanning the strategic Cold War period, the regional conflicts between the various tribal and national groups and the tactical nature of the traditional and asymmetric elements of the war. His analysis is deep and thoughtful and based upon first hand and expert knowledge. His discussion of the various paramilitary and Special Forces and some of their more notable successes and failures further enhances the scope of the work. This is a highly readable account of the struggle for South West Africa and the impact that it had both internationally and regionally. Helion has published a superb book replete with high quality photographs; the bibliography is extensive. There are many lessons to be learned from the engagements in Africa and without a doubt Venter and his work is an outstanding source.

The German Failure in Belgium, August 1914 - Dennis Showalter, Joseph P Robinson, Janet A Robinson

This review has been submitted to Strategy and Tactics magazine.

Title: The German Failure in Belgium, August 1914

Author: Dennis Showalter, Joseph P Robinson, Janet A Robinson

ISBN: 978-1-476-67462-9

Publisher: McFarland Books

Year: 2019

Softcover

Pages: 217

Photos/Maps: 22/9  

Germany entered the First World War confident that it would be able to deal a crushing blow to the Western Front Allies within a few weeks, thereby freeing its forces to turn East in order to deal with Russia in turn; events turned out quite differently. The authors have undertaken an in-depth analysis of what circumstances and practices contributed to this over-estimation. The book is a succinct and insightful review; not long but telling in its conclusions.  

The authors look at two distinct but critical shortfalls amongst the German execution of the invasion plans of the West. They are: critical failings within the planning itself, and most tellingly, a failure of reconnaissance. Each exacerbated the shortfalls of the others and resulted in crucial errors in decision making, ultimately leading to the failure of the German efforts in the West.  

Von Moltke committed a number of key errors in the development of the plan itself. These were related to both strategic and operational planning and reflected interesting elements of the German General Staff’s relationship with other government departments. Moltke made the decision to avoid crossing the Maastricht Corridor of Holland in order to provide for a potential neutral access point to the North Sea should Germany require it. This judgement was clearly a Foreign Affairs and Kaiser responsibility; however they were not part of the process. It is estimated that the resulting Liege bottleneck cost the Germans at least three days. He also decided to reshuffle the allocation of cavalry assets away from the Northern Wing of the German advance without any reduction in the task allocation. They were therefore unable to complete any of the activities effectively. Additionally, he created ad hoc Cavalry Corp’s with Headquarters that had not been exercised in peacetime, resulting in confusion and inefficiency. Finally, in the planning phase, the Germans assumed away elements that ran contrary to their vision of how the invasion would work; specifically, the fact that the Belgian Army would fight and not allow for free passage. 

The authors then presents a detailed account of the first four weeks of the War; focussing on the challenges that arose as a result of the issues identified above. For an Army and General Staff that had an almost mystical reputation, fundamental errors in planning exacerbated challenges in execution. These were further compounded by a failure to fully appreciate the reconnaissance capabilities of the nascent air and cavalry elements. This failure in reconnaissance resulted in the Germans not having the visibility of the battlefield that was essential to the effective control of the complex operation that they were trying to execute. The conclusions postulated by the authors as to why this occurred are reasonable and applicable to modern command staffs.   

An comprehensive bibliography and notes section round out this excellent text. The author’s style is succinct and very readable. They have taken an interesting and unique perspective on the shortfalls which, as they point out, the Germans came very close to overcoming despite them. An outstanding addition to any library or reading list.

Rails of War: Supplying the Americans and Their Allies in China-Burma-India - Steven James Hantzis

This review was submitted to the Army History Journal

Title: Rails of War: Supplying the Americans and Their Allies in China-Burma-India

Author: Steven James Hantzis

ISBN: 978-1-612348-53-7

Publisher: Potomac Books

Year: 2017

Hardcover

Pages: 199

Photos/Maps: 25/6

The author Stephen James Hantzis, in his book Rails of War, has written a story relating the experiences of his father, Sergeant Hantzis, during his Second World War service in the Far East. The theatre in which he operated was in the eastern provincial region of India, specifically on the borders of what is today known as Myanmar. In 1944, while the Japanese were being pushed back across the Pacific theatre of operations, in this particular area they were still an offensive threat and seeking to break the British hold on India itself. What is less well known is the degree to which the Japanese were able to call upon Indian deserters in order to facilitate their offensive capabilities. The authors father was a sergeant in an American unit, the 721st Railway Operating Battalion, whose responsibility was to maintain the flow of supplies and material east to the 14th Army as well as to the regional American forces operating in support of the 14th Army.

This book is not an in-depth analysis of the strategic and operational events surrounding that particular area but more the story of the experiences of the authors father. The perspective of a sergeant working in conjunction with the other Americans who for the first time were exposed not only to a wartime environment but also the environmental and societal shock of working with the Indians (in India) and other nationalities associated with railway. For many of them, this was their first time outside of the continental United States. One of the strengths of this book is the fact that the author is able to provide the reader with a macro as well as micro synopsis of the events surrounding the period 1944 1945. For example, the author combines his discussion of not only the allied strategies associated with trying to defend the border of India but also the Japanese commander’s vision on how he hoped to bring India under the influence of the Japanese empire with a drive to Kolkata. The expectation was, from a Japanese perspective, that having broken through the allied lines and captured the regional capital Calcutta, they would be able to drive India out of the war thereby facilitating peace with the Chinese who would no longer be able to be supported by the flow of goods and supplies coming in from India over the hump. This would then free up over 2 million experienced Japanese soldiers who could then be utilized elsewhere in the field of combat. Another point of interest is the fact that the authors father was engaged in a key logistics function supporting Allied Ops in Burma. Japanese operational doctrine dictated that their soldiers travelled very light and were reliant upon capturing supplies from the Allies to augment their logistic shortfalls; thus they focussed much of their attention on the logistics hubs of the Allied armies.

What I particularly enjoyed about this book was the fact that he focusses his attention on the logistic requirements and support efforts made by the allies; In many cases historians focus exclusively on the operations and the front line soldiers either naval, air, or army and their engagement directly with the enemy. In this case the author has focussed upon a little known aspect of the Burma campaign which was the building and maintenance of the railway lifeline to the front. Air operations over ‘the hump’ have garnered a store of historical significance for the efforts made by the C - 47 pilots flying and dropping supplies to isolated operators. However, lesser known but of greater value were the efforts made by the railway troops who not only maintained the flow of supplies going to the front but also rebuilt the railway system itself, which was in very poor condition, but also serviced and refurbished the equipment which in the tropical environment deteriorated at a much faster rate then in the United States or Europe. The situations and conditions that faced Sgt Hantzis and his staff as related by the author also underscore the effect and challenge of the differences in culture, language and tradition. It is often forgotten in today’s world of extensive communications options just how limited was international exposure for many of the men from the small towns of the United States.

This book is an easy read and provides sufficient detail to enable to reader to appreciate the gravity of the environment in the Far East in 1944 as well as the challenges associated with trying to build, maintain and run a railway under the conditions of wartime India. The author provides a comprehensive bibliography that provides for further reading relating to both the logistics and operational environment. I enjoyed the book as it related a very personal as well as historical account of this theatre.

Warfare in the Woods and Forests - Anthony Clayton

Title: Warfare in the Woods and Forests 

Author: Anthony Clayton

ISBN: 978-0-253-35688-8

Publisher: Stackpole Books

Year: 2012

Hardcover

Pages: 145

Environmental considerations always play a key part of any military operational planning. Each represents a unique and challenging set of concerns that must be identified; training to meet these challenges is key. Forests and woods present a unique opportunity because, like mountains, jungles and swamp areas, they favour not only the defence but also asymmetric and lower technological enemies. They exacerbate the difficulties in extricating an enemy force and require significantly more resources to execute properly. There has not been a lot of thought and consideration given to the execution of operations (both offensive and defensive) in wooded environments so Clayton’s work specifically focussed on forests is a welcome addition.

Clayton divides his work into a series of period analysis commencing with the pre-firearm era and early modern warfare. Following this he looks at the advent of firearms and their impact and ends with the influence of modern technology (artillery, armour, aviation, automatic weapons etc) on the effective execution of operations within a wooded environment. Throughout the book, the author encompasses the psychological impact of forests on soldiers. The sense of closeness and lack of visibility augments the terror of close quarter combat; especially when combined with an enemy engaging in asymmetric methods of combat (such as natives or partisans).

Training to make use of camouflage and ground in order to limit an aggressors advantages is key to the effective use of forests. The author makes great use of practical examples to reinforce his narrative. The Soviet-Finnish Winter War is an excellent case in point. The odds in terms of men and equipment heavily favoured the Soviets but the Finnish mastery of the terrain more than overcame this until the Russians adapted their tactics. This, the training and skills required being key to the confidence of effective forest work, is a consistent theme throughout the book, regardless of the period in question.

A rather short treatise, it is nevertheless a worthwhile book to read and absorb the lessons therein. The author has provided an interesting bibliography that expands upon the examples introduced in the narrative. Effective training ensures that wooded terrain serves as another tool in the strategists toolbox both from an offensive and defensive perspective.

Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905 Vol 1, 2 - Julian S Corbett

This review was submitted to the Canadian Naval Review.

Title: Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905 Vol 1, 2

Author: Julian S Corbett

ISBN: 978-1-59114-197-6

Publisher: Naval Institute Press

Year: 2015

Softcover

Pages: 1134 (two volumes)

Photos/ Maps: 0

The Russo-Japanese War has continuing historical significance because it represents the coming of age of a Far Eastern power (Japan) who, for the first time, successfully challenged and destroyed a European superpower in both a land and, more significantly, naval conflict. Corbett’s work was drafted originally as a classified report for the British Committee on Imperial Defence shortly after the war. It received very limited release and was only made available to the general public seventy five years after his death.

Traditionally, historians have focussed their attention on the Battle of Tsushima Strait, where the Russian Baltic fleet was utterly destroyed by the Japanese High Seas fleet; however, this was a small, albeit significant, aspect of the overall war. Corbett’s analysis takes a much more holistic approach; undertaking to examine the conflict in its entirety and embedding Tsushima into a larger strategic engagement supporting Japanese land operations. Additionally, he traces the operational doctrine of each nation, their strengths and weaknesses and how this impacted operational decision making. There were in fact three Russian fleets engaged at various times during the course of this war; all were effectively destroyed by the Japanese. Corbett, in addition to discussing the battles themselves, puts this fact into context when he identifies that the Japanese only had one fleet available to them; if it had been lost, then the entire underpinning of its Imperial program would be removed. This was key to the Japanese war planning and operational execution.

The author, while generally viewed as one of the pre-eminent naval historians of his era, excels in this report at seamlessly weaving between the strategic, operational and tactical levels of the war; clearly explaining the role of the various arms and how they interacted. He also discusses the influence of the international situation on the decision making processes of the governments and the field commanders. As an example, one of the key factors that drove strategic decision making was the perspective that each of the nations had on the relative importance of the region. Corbett identifies that Japan saw the challenge of Russia as a direct threat to its strategic interests with direct and far-reaching implications for its future. Conversely, Russia viewed the same situation as, at best, having only regional implications and did not view the situation nearly as seriously. 

The publication would benefit from maps of the region and the naval combat as it unfolded. While he provides detailed descriptions of the combats, it is difficult for the naval layman to follow the maneuvers. Additionally, providing regional maps would greatly benefit the perspective and appreciation of expanse and distances.

Notwithstanding this point, Corbett has drafted an exceptional analysis of the Russo-Japanese war. His style and is very engaging and easily maintains the reader’s interest throughout. His analysis and ability to succinctly capture the broad canvas of this conflict makes this book mandatory reading for commanders at all levels (regardless of element) who wish to appreciate the complexities of combined operations. Very highly recommended.

Return of the Barbarians - Jakub J Grygiel

Title: Return of the Barbarians

Author: Jakub J Grygiel

ISBN: 978-1-107-15857-3

Publisher: Cambridge UP

Year: 2018

Hardcover

Pages: 222

The study of history in order to glean methods and hints at how to deal with modern day challenges is well appreciated by strategists and historians. Notwithstanding that, there are many who fail to appreciate the similarities between modern asymmetric warfare and the battles of the past. Grygiel has undertaken an effort to draw a direct line between much of what is happening today and instances where this has been experienced in the pre-modern era.

The author has focused his attention primarily on the later period of the Roman Empire. During that period, the Empire was beset, especially from Germania on the opposite bank of the Danube, by persistent small scale strikes by groups of barbarians. These groups would strike randomly and quickly, pillage and burn before rapidly departing. Because they were operating out of an uncivilized region with no centralized Government, it was very difficult for Rome to draw upon its traditional, conventional means (diplomacy, deterrence or military) of dealing with adversaries such as the Parthians. Compounding the effects of these raids was the psychological fear that they produced; far in excess of their actual damage.

Grygiel succeeds in connecting this environment to the modern one of asymmetric terrorism. Through the advent of technology, these groups are able to strike at random from decentralized cells with little to no warning. These attacks, often very high profile in nature (such as the Madrid train bombing), result in deep disruption amongst the targeted nations far in excess of the damage done. Further, traditional conventional militaries are not equipped to effectively counter these attacks. Therefore despite the advent of technology many of these terrorist cells are still able to operate with a high degree of impunity.

 Much of the success of the barbarians centered upon their ability to undermine the confidence in the population in the State’s ability to provide protection. As Grygiel points out, this resulted in the local population taking on the responsibility for protection themselves. However, and again this is typical in much of today’s Western world, much of the Roman population had lived within the protection of the Empire for hundreds of years and therefore, did not have the knowledge or ability, to fight and respond effectively. This further exacerbated the challenge of response as regions began isolating themselves from Rome as they barricaded themselves within fortified towns and cities.

Grygiel asserts that much could be learned from the responses attempted by Rome to counter these threats from small, mobile barbarian cells. It is an interesting and compelling argument that he puts forward. Of course the tools available to the Nations of today are far more sophisticated than the ones of the Roman Empire, but the enemy is also far more sophisticated. The lessons of history remain for us to use should we look; Grygiels book suggests that very little happening today is new and that much remains a rehash of previous experiences. A fascinating read.

China's Vision of Victory - Jonathon DT Ward

Title: China's Vision of Victory
Author: Jonathon DT Ward
ISBN: 978-0-57-843810-8
Publisher: Atlas
Hardcover
Pages: 274

 In China’s Vision of Victory, the author has presented the reader with a comprehensive, insightful and thought provoking concept of what drives the Chinese and what goal they seek to attain. Western analysts have traditionally viewed China through the lens of a nation in gradual transition to one more in common with Western ideals. Initially, this perspective may have been understood given the experiences of the Soviet Union, Arab Spring and Tiananmen Square; however, this approach missed much of what were the underlying motivators of the Chinese leadership and by extension the Chinese people. Ward’s book approaches the question of Chinese aspirations from the perspective of one who has lived among the Chinese, has traveled extensively throughout China and its environs and is able to communicate fluently (both verbal and written) with the people in their own dialect. 

He has divided his book into five interconnected but distinct sections: rejuvenation and national destiny, ‘Blue National Soil’ - Military and Strategic Geography, Economic and Technological Ambitions, Global Reach and National Interest and Vision for New World Order. This is important because while each is unique, they are inextricably linked and help explain the common vision that the Chinese are pursuing. China is playing the long game and has the distinct advantage of having a government system that allows for the resources of the entire State: administrative, economic, military, diplomatic and societal, to be focused upon the task at hand. Ward clearly defines very early on exactly what that task is and, as he emphatically states, it is not the assumption of super power status in the world. Rather it is the return of China to what it sees as its natural position of pre-eminence amongst the international community. This distinction is critical to understanding the Chinese approach to domestic and international relations. To the Chinese, the ends justify whatever means need be used to achieve their return and every action they take is predicated upon how it will aid them in achieving their goal.

Ward presents a very compelling argument drawing a comparison between the external and internal Chinese messaging. The Domestic audience is constantly reminded of the “Century of Humiliation” starting from 1840 when a weak and corrupt China was pillaged by the forces of the West and how the newly revitalized China will return the world to its natural order. To the external audience, China presents a more conciliatory face, striving very hard to be seen as a benign power working in conjunction with world organizations to ensure peaceful coexistence. Emphasis is placed upon the efforts to raise its people from poverty and the use of Western PR firms to manage the message to foreign populations. 

This book is very well written and researched. It presents a comprehensive view of the Chinese goals and how they strive to achieve them. It also paints a rather bleak picture of the Western response to this threat. Ward pulls no punches nor does he present his arguments in such a way as to suggest that he has an underlying agenda. The threat that China presents to the world as it continues to awake from its slumber is real and tangible. That the West has been slow to respond is evidence of our complacency and hubris as well as the success at Chinese efforts at misinformation. Ward’s work needs to be read and discussed. It is a sobering call for action that Western powers ignore at their peril.

Five Days From Defeat - Walter Reid

This review submitted to British Army Review.

Title: Five Days From Defeat

Author: Walter Reid

ISBN: 978-1-78027-490-4

Publisher: Birlinn Books

Year: 2017

Hardcover

Pages: 256

Photos/Maps: 19/2

Following the commencement of the massive German offensive in March, 1918, the Allies were rocked back on their heels as the front was ripped open and the British 5^th Army collapsed in disarray. Popular history suggests that Field Marshall Douglas Haig, commander of the British and Commonwealth forces, was instrumental in coordinating the Allied response; maintaining his composure while those around him lost theirs. In fact, to read his biographies and memoires, one could very easily believe that he was the driving force behind the concept and implementation of the Joint Command structure that the Allies ultimately adopted under French leadership.

Reid’s intent is to provide a counterpoint to much of the narrative pertaining to the British role in the last year of the war. To that extent, he has approached his study in a very structured manner; breaking the discussion into pre-1918, the period of the Spring Offensive, the Five Days and the last 100 Days. Why this is important is that enables the reader to understand both the military and political standings and motivations of the three major players (France, Great Britain and Germany) leading into the final push. Reid has done a commendable job at setting the stage for the drama of the Spring Offensive by shining a light onto the difficult relationship between Haig and George (the British PM). Haig comes across as a very egotistical Commander and was a key impediment to any form of change in the Command relationships between the Allies. Additionally, Reid clearly shows that, in the eyes of the British public, he was also seen as the lynchpin holding the West together.

He then goes on to break down the five critical days of the Spring Offensive and the reactions of the various national players. Extensive analysis of primary source documentation reveals significant disconnect between the accepted British (read Haig) inspired history and what the documents tell us. Haig, far from the decisive unflustered Commander that he wishes to be remembered as, was, in fact, very much prepared to retreat along the British lines of communications to the French ports in anticipation of evacuating the Army. In his defence, the Germans had shattered the 5^th Army and was collapsing the 3^rd and he did have orders to protect the last Army that Britain could effectively provide. Nevertheless as Reid has suggested very convincingly, much of what occurred as a result of the Spring Offensive happened around and in spite of Haig, not because of him.

Reid’s book is an interesting analysis of the relative state of the commanders of the three major powers. It sheds light on the role of the media in developing and maintaining both a perception of individuals as well as being a tool in the challenge of civil/military relations within the British hierarchy at this time. His discussion of the efforts of the civilian governments (especially amongst the British) to wrest back control of the war from the Generals is a telling example of the failure of clear delineations of responsibility. A very interesting read and a worthwhile addition to any library or collection.

Dak To and the Border Battles of Vietnam, 1967-1968 - Michael A. Eggleston

This review submitted to Canadian Army Today Magazine.

Title: Dak To and the Border Battles of Vietnam, 1967-1968

Author: Michael A. Eggleston

ISBN: 978-1-4766-6417-0

Publisher: Mcfarland Books (McFarlandBooks.com)

Year: 2017

Softcover

Pages: 224

Photos/Maps: 19/24

The battles in Vietnam were reaching a peak as the 1960’s moved into their final years. Generally, the sense has been that the United States was fighting the wrong war for the wrong reasons and that the advantages lay predominantly with the North Vietnamese. Included in these were the willingness to absorb causalities, the sense that this war was of national importance, the ineffective and corrupt nature of the Southern Vietnamese government, the ineffectiveness of the Southern Vietnamese Army and the control that the communist regime in Northern Vietnam exercised over its people and resources. While much of this was true, the United States and its Allies were not without deep capabilities and the North Vietnamese not without weakness and internal division.

Eggleston’s book sheds light upon some of the key events in the entire Vietnam War: the period leading up to the Tet Offensive. Much has been written about the actual Tet Offensive, while relatively little has looked at the American and North Vietnamese strategies leading up to this Offensive. Each side achieved its initial aims with the Border Battles: the Vietnamese to draw American forces out of the cities and into the countryside and the US to draw Vietnamese forces into more traditional set piece battles where they could be destroyed.

This is an excellent book to read in order to gain an appreciation of the nature of the conflict during this period. He expertly combines a sweeping synopsis of the history and nature of the war up to the Border Battle period and then delves in more detail regarding the scope of this engagement. Of particular poignancy, the author has drawn upon firsthand accounts of participants from both sides; by including them as written, he ensures that the reader has great difficulty putting the book down due to their realism and the raw emotion elicited. I have rarely come across such descriptive and emotive recollections.

This is a book focussed on the soldiers and their experiences at the front; in the thick of battle. Eggleston does not spare those who were not equal to the leadership task nor those who failed in their responsibilities to their soldiers. It is interesting to note the comments related to the American leadership practice of senior commanders trying to conduct operations from helicopters (the idea being that one would be able to maintain a much better grasp of the battlefield). Additionally, discussions about the terrain and the unique nature of fighting the regular North Vietnamese Army units vice Vietcong are also very enlightening. Finally, the failure of the North Vietnamese to appreciate the ability of the US command to reposition its forces undermined the ability of the North to achieve its desired end state with Tet.

I recommend this book. It is not an in-depth analysis of the politics of the war, more a treatise on the nature of tactical level combat in the Vietnam theatre and its effects upon soldiers at the squad and platoon level. Disturbing, enlightening and poignant in equal measure.

The First Day on the Eastern Front - Craig WH Luther

This review has been submitted to War History Online Magazine.

Title: The First Day on the Eastern Front

Author: Craig WH Luther

ISBN: 978-0-811-73780-7

Publisher: Stackpole Books

Year: 2019

Hardcover

Pages: 471

Photos/Maps: 60/18

Much has been written about the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Operation Barbarossa, initiated 22 June, 1941; thus it was with some resignation that I undertook to read yet another missive on this campaign. To my great surprise and pleasure I found the work to be engrossing and easily one of the best books that I have read in recent times.

Luther has undertaken to present the reader with a comprehensive picture and an in-depth analysis of the events surrounding the first day of the invasion. He has succeeded in this endeavour magnificently. Drawing upon a vast array of primary source materials (war diaries, letters, combat reports) from both the German and Russian archives, he has crafted a book of extraordinary scope and detail.

He commences his work with a look at the planning and logistics efforts required to make Barbarossa a reality. He convincingly dispels the argument that the German attack was in fact a spoiling engagement against a Soviet intent to invade. Having said that however, there appears little doubt that Russia was building towards an ultimate clash with Germany as indicated by their military upgrading. The efficiency and capacity of the German logistics planning and execution is neatly captured, as an example of the scope of Luther’s research, by the fact that over 10,000 trains were coordinated in the move East of the German armies; all while maintaining the elements of surprise.

He then moves on to a discussion of each of the three main fronts (North, Central and Southern) as well as the Air Campaign waged the first day. In every case he seamlessly transitions between the various levels of command and adds colour to his narrative through the use of first hand material relevant to the point in question. While a majority of the discussion is focussed upon the German perspective, there is ample Soviet reference to provide for a balanced appreciation. Much of what the author has quoted will resonate with the reader, especially if they have had any military service. What stands out is the breathtaking scope and violence of the attack; the author’s use of letters, diaries and unit war diary entries inject a much more personal scope to his descriptions.

The author continually introduces elements of sober reflection into the narrative which add poignancy to the story. The impact of the attack on the Russian civilians who were caught in the maelstrom of the German attack, the ferocity of the Russian defence (as an example, the Luftwaffe lost 78 aircraft the first day, 15 of those due to ramming by Soviet aircraft), the awe inspiring opening salvo’s by the German artillery and the descent by both sides, almost immediately, into a level of brutality not witnessed on any other front serve as but a few examples.

The comprehensive bibliography and copious endnotes provide for extensive additional research and reading opportunities. Luther has included numerous maps which he refers to throughout the text. For the most part these are adequate although some are difficult to follow. Overall however, this is a superb book, full of new information that is indicative of the years of research that went into this work. An excellent reference and addition to anyone’s library.  

Instrument of War: The German Army 1914-18 - Dennis Showalter

This review was submitted to Strategy and Tactics magazine. 

Title: Instrument of War: The German Army 1914-18

Editor: Dennis Showalter

ISBN: 978-1-4728-1300-8

Publisher: Osprey

Year: 2016

Hardcover

Pages: 304

Photos: 43

The German Army had a reputation leading up to the beginning of World War 1 that placed it squarely at the top of equivalent European Armies. Based mainly upon its performance during the Wars of German Unification (Denmark and Austria) and the Franco-Prussian War, it was perceived to be, in many respects, the standard to be emulated. Showalter approaches his topic with this in mind and investigates whether this reputation was still deserved just prior to World War 1. He further examines how the Army and its command structure morphed as the War continued and the impact that this had on its effectiveness and resiliency.

His analysis commences with a brief overview of the national character of the army and its various levels of personnel readiness. This sets the stage for his discussion of the army and the commencement of the war. Showalter is very balanced in his praise and criticism of the army and the reputation that it had. He postulates that the Army was the wrong tool for the Schlieffen Plan and that German Senior leadership failed to appreciate its limitations, specifically in the areas of mobility and communications, ultimately resulting in the plans failure. He further  convincingly postulates that, while the Army was superior in many ways to its contemporaries, the German Leadership was extremely limited in their strategic grasp and could not decide upon priorities of effort following the failure of the Schlieffen Plan.

Showalter effectively encapsulates the rise and fall of German fortunes as the war descends into one of stalemate and attrition in the West and supporting a weakened Austro-Hungary in the East against Russia and Italy. He shows that for a good part of the war, Germany was superior at the tactical and operational levels; engaging in the use of aircraft, gas, storm troop tactics and the command empowerment of NCO’s and Junior Officers. He is, however, merciless in his criticism of the senior German leadership; its infighting, hubris, political intrigue and ultimate failure to acknowledge the necessity of working in tandem with the diplomatic elements of the Government as well as not recognizing the self-destructiveness of the war.

The theme throughout his book is that the main enemy of Germany was time. Every year weakened them and strengthened their adversaries, allowing the Allies to learn and close the gap between their respective armies. Compounding this was the diminishing pool of manpower available to Germany with which to make good its losses.

Showalter has proven himself to be an impartial judge of the German Army of this period; balanced in his praise and criticism. He draws attention to elements of German leadership and planning that are not necessarily readily apparent in many of the narratives of this war. There is no question that the Germans could have won the war given slightly different circumstances but, as Showalter points out, this would have been in spite of rather than because of the strategic level decision making. Despite its institutional weaknesses, the German Army proved itself to be an instrument of formidable depth and resilience; able to match the Allies right up until the last months of the War. Showalter gives the reader much to think about and ponder from his noteworthy analysis of this machine. A well-researched and very interesting book.

Illustrated History of the Sturmgeshutz-Abteilung 202 - Norbert Szamveber

This review has been submitted to Canadian Army Review.

Title: Illustrated History of the Sturmgeshutz-Abteilung 202

Editor: 

ISBN: 978-615-80072-6-9

Publisher: Peko

Year: 2016

Hardcover

Pages: 396

Photos/Maps: 118/40

This work, coming from Hungarian Publisher Peko, is an interesting analysis of the operational history of this assault gun unit. The author has drawn from the official operational reports and histories of the unit to provide a comprehensive exploration of the activities of the Unit from its creation in August, 1941 to its ultimate surrender with the rest of the German Heer (Army) on May 8, 1945. This is not a dry rendition of the daily activities unit life interspersed with moments of intense operational activity. Indeed, the author has undertaken to provide the reader with a narrative that not only flows but is also deeply descriptive and instructive of command methods, logistical challenges, organizational strengths as well as employment of the Stug III. Read with this approach in mind, the book provides a deep well of information to be gleaned by the attentive reader.

Included within the calendar breakdown are first hand recollections and battle reports that correspond to the given day. This is particularly striking as it provides a juxtaposition to the relatively two dimensional war diary style reporting. It is necessary to pay attention as one reads this book as skimming will guarantee that you miss salient points. As one reads through certain elements stand out:

1.      The creation of temporary kampfgruppes to counter Soviet attacks; usually built around the Stug batteries. Shows the adaptability of the German command structure;

2.      The speed with which the German command recognized and awarded exceptional conduct (one case relates 40 min for Adolf Hitler to confirm the awarding of three Knights crosses);

3.      The versatility of the assault artillery in supporting both offensive and defensive operations;

4.      The quality of the German crews, leadership and training compared to their Soviet adversaries under combat conditions and the incredible bravery of both sides;

5.      The incredible strain and pace of operations – one wonders at times when the crews slept;

6.      The superb support and turnaround time of the maintenance and logistics personnel in keeping the Stug batteries operational despite the huge challenges involved;

7.      The constant exchange and promulgation of lessons learned within the German command structure and the subsequent application of those lessons; and

8.      The degree to which joint operations were an inherent part of the German command ethos. 

Szamveber rounds out his book with a broad array of documents, maps and photographs that provided for a better visual appreciation of the weapon systems, developments in the Stug III technology, Orders of Battle and operational environments within which S-A 202 operated. A majority of the maps are copies of the original German maps which in some cases are somewhat hard to follow. Annexes of technical and operational data by the author also provide quick reference into the units’ workings and developments. This is a very high quality publication, presented in a way that enables the reader to really appreciate the complexities of operational command and utilization of a unique, critical Unit. 

Biafra’s War 1967-1970 - Al J Venter

This review has been submitted to Air Force magazine.

Title: Biafra’s War 1967-1970

Editor: Al J Venter

ISBN: 978-1-910294-69-7

Publisher: Helion

Year: 2015

Hardcover

Pages: 314

Photos/Maps: 149 (b/w) 26 (c)/5

Like many conflicts that ravaged the African continent in the years following the departure of the Colonial powers, the Biafran War has been largely forgotten by the West. It is indicative of how much society has changed that while the Rwandan genocide has become a watch word for deliberate slaughter, the million or so victims of the Biafran war, despite being mainly women and children subject to the cadaverous effects of starvation, did not elicit the international outrage typical of today’s responses. The author’s credibility in writing about this conflict is enhanced by his having been in situ for a significant part of it. Thus he has personally met many of the individuals that he writes about.

There are many facets of Biafra that came to typify African engagements during this period - the 1960’s and 70’s. In this case the engagement of third party nations indirectly or directly supporting one side or the other (or blocking aid) thereby influencing the outcome for national benefit. The British and Soviets each had an interest in helping Nigeria remain united and proactively protected their access to Nigerian oil; thereby finding themselves working together to ensure its continuity. The Portuguese and South Africans, by contrast, favoured Biafran sovereignty. The use of media to try and influence world opinion and the marked lack of response, despite the impact on women and children of the conflict, is indicative of the period in question. Venter’s insightful discussion of these issues provides an interesting counterpoint to similar situations today.

Not surprisingly, it was logistics that ultimately spelled the end for the Biafran cause. Venter goes into a great deal of detail discussing the lengths that the Biafran government undertook trying to ensure a steady flow of supplies into their enclave. Of particular note was the airbridge that served as the lifeline for medicine, ammunition and food for the population. Using primarily Super Constellations and Stratocruisers, these aircraft flew multiple missions per night into an adhoc airfield under the constant threat of air interdiction or bombing. An outstanding example and study in air logistics support.

Mercenaries also played key roles for both the Biafrans and the Nigerians. Undertaking responsibility as combat/transport pilots, trainers, communications and other specialist tasks, they filled the void that the native soldiers could not. Their experiences and treatment are extensively studied by the author and add to the Wild West environment that reflected this region. Names that became synonymous with mercenary operations throughout the African region added Biafra to their battle honours: Count Gustav von Rosen, Mike Gibson, Jan Zumbach, Jay Breytenbach, “Taffy” Williams, Rolf Steiner and Ares Klootwyk. Additionally, groups such as Medecins Sans Frontieres also had their origins in Biafra and are discussed at length by the author.

A further aspect of note covered by the narrative was the extensive improvisation used by the Biafrans to offset the lack of consistent logistics support. Thousands of cottage industries coordinated by the Biafran government made uniforms, distilled fuel, modified weapon systems, made tanks and developed unique weapons (such as the Ojukwu Bucket that acted as a deadly yet primitive claymore style mine). The creative ability of the Biafran people was extremely noteworthy and flies in the face of many preconceived notions of African peoples.

The author rounds out his narrative with a look ahead and behind for this region of Africa. His discussion of the causes of the fracture within the Nigerian confederation are enlightening and insightful and his observations on the effects of Boko Haram and the erosion of cohesion along religious as well as ethnic lines, cause for concern.

Helion has once again published a book of the highest quality, replete with excellent photographs (colour and b/w) as well as very useful maps. Venter has provided the reader with a work that, while on balance favouring the Biafran perspective, nevertheless gives due credit to the efforts of the Nigerian Federal leader’s success at reconciliation following the cessation of hostilities. His work captures the complexity and the nuance of the conflict and presents a tantalizing glimpse of what an African society is capable of when free from the shackles of endemic corruption. A book well worth reading.

The Franco-Prussian War 1870-71 Vol 1 and 2 - Quintin Barry

This review was submitted to Military History Online.

Title: The Franco-Prussian War 1870-71 Vol 1 and 2

Author: Quintin Barry

ISBN: 978-1-906033-45-3//978-1-906033-46-0

Publisher: Helion and Company

Year: 2009

Softcover

Pages: 342/530

Photos/Maps: 171/40

Mr Barry has penned a tour de force rendition of the (relatively) short yet dramatic engagement between the French Empire and the German Confederacy. The outcome changed the face of Europe and set the stage for the cataclysm’s to follow in the 20^th century. Barry’s approach is detailed and comprehensive; as such he has divided his volumes around the Battle of Sedan which serves as a natural division between French Imperial and French Republican operations. His analysis and discussion are very detailed and he adds further nuance to his narrative by drawing upon anecdotes from participants. This is primarily a book detailing the role of Helmuth von Moltke as Chief of the German General Staff in building, training and ultimately directing the German Army in war; as well as his challenges in dealing with the sometimes divergent demands of the military and German Chancellor Bismark.

Given the broad spectrum of the war, Barry has done an excellent job at presenting the myriad of military engagements in a logical and straightforward manner. His descriptions focus upon the operational and strategic levels of command and he expends a great deal of effort in presenting multi-dimensional portrayals of the key German and French Commanders. This greatly facilitates a deep appreciation of the myriad of personalities that impact the execution of operations and their influence on events. It also goes far in reinforcing the key German leadership technique of decentralized execution of the Commanders Intent. Time and again, Barry quotes orders and diary inserts that relate the advantages gleaned by the German forces when senior officers did not micro manage their subordinates.

Of course not everything was in the Germans favour and Barry provides plenty of examples of the friction that existed within both the German and French command elements. The reader is also given deep insight into the extremely complicated political turmoil resulting from the collapse of the French Emperor’s government in the midst of the conflict and the profound resiliency of the French military and people in replenishing their losses in short order. Quantity may not replace quality but it certainly gave the German Commanders pause.

The maps are a great disappointment with this publication unfortunately. They are very hard to follow and therefore of very limited value. This is quite a drawback given the complexity of the operations. However, overall Barry has written an outstanding history of this war, in such a way that it retains the reader’s interest despite the complex maneuvering of the vast forces involved. I strongly recommend this work for those who wish to gain insight into the real time effects of the application of Commanders Intent as a tool of command.