Return of the Barbarians - Jakub J Grygiel

Title: Return of the Barbarians

Author: Jakub J Grygiel

ISBN: 978-1-107-15857-3

Publisher: Cambridge UP

Year: 2018

Hardcover

Pages: 222

The study of history in order to glean methods and hints at how to deal with modern day challenges is well appreciated by strategists and historians. Notwithstanding that, there are many who fail to appreciate the similarities between modern asymmetric warfare and the battles of the past. Grygiel has undertaken an effort to draw a direct line between much of what is happening today and instances where this has been experienced in the pre-modern era.

The author has focused his attention primarily on the later period of the Roman Empire. During that period, the Empire was beset, especially from Germania on the opposite bank of the Danube, by persistent small scale strikes by groups of barbarians. These groups would strike randomly and quickly, pillage and burn before rapidly departing. Because they were operating out of an uncivilized region with no centralized Government, it was very difficult for Rome to draw upon its traditional, conventional means (diplomacy, deterrence or military) of dealing with adversaries such as the Parthians. Compounding the effects of these raids was the psychological fear that they produced; far in excess of their actual damage.

Grygiel succeeds in connecting this environment to the modern one of asymmetric terrorism. Through the advent of technology, these groups are able to strike at random from decentralized cells with little to no warning. These attacks, often very high profile in nature (such as the Madrid train bombing), result in deep disruption amongst the targeted nations far in excess of the damage done. Further, traditional conventional militaries are not equipped to effectively counter these attacks. Therefore despite the advent of technology many of these terrorist cells are still able to operate with a high degree of impunity.

 Much of the success of the barbarians centered upon their ability to undermine the confidence in the population in the State’s ability to provide protection. As Grygiel points out, this resulted in the local population taking on the responsibility for protection themselves. However, and again this is typical in much of today’s Western world, much of the Roman population had lived within the protection of the Empire for hundreds of years and therefore, did not have the knowledge or ability, to fight and respond effectively. This further exacerbated the challenge of response as regions began isolating themselves from Rome as they barricaded themselves within fortified towns and cities.

Grygiel asserts that much could be learned from the responses attempted by Rome to counter these threats from small, mobile barbarian cells. It is an interesting and compelling argument that he puts forward. Of course the tools available to the Nations of today are far more sophisticated than the ones of the Roman Empire, but the enemy is also far more sophisticated. The lessons of history remain for us to use should we look; Grygiels book suggests that very little happening today is new and that much remains a rehash of previous experiences. A fascinating read.

China's Vision of Victory - Jonathon DT Ward

Title: China's Vision of Victory
Author: Jonathon DT Ward
ISBN: 978-0-57-843810-8
Publisher: Atlas
Hardcover
Pages: 274

 In China’s Vision of Victory, the author has presented the reader with a comprehensive, insightful and thought provoking concept of what drives the Chinese and what goal they seek to attain. Western analysts have traditionally viewed China through the lens of a nation in gradual transition to one more in common with Western ideals. Initially, this perspective may have been understood given the experiences of the Soviet Union, Arab Spring and Tiananmen Square; however, this approach missed much of what were the underlying motivators of the Chinese leadership and by extension the Chinese people. Ward’s book approaches the question of Chinese aspirations from the perspective of one who has lived among the Chinese, has traveled extensively throughout China and its environs and is able to communicate fluently (both verbal and written) with the people in their own dialect. 

He has divided his book into five interconnected but distinct sections: rejuvenation and national destiny, ‘Blue National Soil’ - Military and Strategic Geography, Economic and Technological Ambitions, Global Reach and National Interest and Vision for New World Order. This is important because while each is unique, they are inextricably linked and help explain the common vision that the Chinese are pursuing. China is playing the long game and has the distinct advantage of having a government system that allows for the resources of the entire State: administrative, economic, military, diplomatic and societal, to be focused upon the task at hand. Ward clearly defines very early on exactly what that task is and, as he emphatically states, it is not the assumption of super power status in the world. Rather it is the return of China to what it sees as its natural position of pre-eminence amongst the international community. This distinction is critical to understanding the Chinese approach to domestic and international relations. To the Chinese, the ends justify whatever means need be used to achieve their return and every action they take is predicated upon how it will aid them in achieving their goal.

Ward presents a very compelling argument drawing a comparison between the external and internal Chinese messaging. The Domestic audience is constantly reminded of the “Century of Humiliation” starting from 1840 when a weak and corrupt China was pillaged by the forces of the West and how the newly revitalized China will return the world to its natural order. To the external audience, China presents a more conciliatory face, striving very hard to be seen as a benign power working in conjunction with world organizations to ensure peaceful coexistence. Emphasis is placed upon the efforts to raise its people from poverty and the use of Western PR firms to manage the message to foreign populations. 

This book is very well written and researched. It presents a comprehensive view of the Chinese goals and how they strive to achieve them. It also paints a rather bleak picture of the Western response to this threat. Ward pulls no punches nor does he present his arguments in such a way as to suggest that he has an underlying agenda. The threat that China presents to the world as it continues to awake from its slumber is real and tangible. That the West has been slow to respond is evidence of our complacency and hubris as well as the success at Chinese efforts at misinformation. Ward’s work needs to be read and discussed. It is a sobering call for action that Western powers ignore at their peril.

Five Days From Defeat - Walter Reid

This review submitted to British Army Review.

Title: Five Days From Defeat

Author: Walter Reid

ISBN: 978-1-78027-490-4

Publisher: Birlinn Books

Year: 2017

Hardcover

Pages: 256

Photos/Maps: 19/2

Following the commencement of the massive German offensive in March, 1918, the Allies were rocked back on their heels as the front was ripped open and the British 5^th Army collapsed in disarray. Popular history suggests that Field Marshall Douglas Haig, commander of the British and Commonwealth forces, was instrumental in coordinating the Allied response; maintaining his composure while those around him lost theirs. In fact, to read his biographies and memoires, one could very easily believe that he was the driving force behind the concept and implementation of the Joint Command structure that the Allies ultimately adopted under French leadership.

Reid’s intent is to provide a counterpoint to much of the narrative pertaining to the British role in the last year of the war. To that extent, he has approached his study in a very structured manner; breaking the discussion into pre-1918, the period of the Spring Offensive, the Five Days and the last 100 Days. Why this is important is that enables the reader to understand both the military and political standings and motivations of the three major players (France, Great Britain and Germany) leading into the final push. Reid has done a commendable job at setting the stage for the drama of the Spring Offensive by shining a light onto the difficult relationship between Haig and George (the British PM). Haig comes across as a very egotistical Commander and was a key impediment to any form of change in the Command relationships between the Allies. Additionally, Reid clearly shows that, in the eyes of the British public, he was also seen as the lynchpin holding the West together.

He then goes on to break down the five critical days of the Spring Offensive and the reactions of the various national players. Extensive analysis of primary source documentation reveals significant disconnect between the accepted British (read Haig) inspired history and what the documents tell us. Haig, far from the decisive unflustered Commander that he wishes to be remembered as, was, in fact, very much prepared to retreat along the British lines of communications to the French ports in anticipation of evacuating the Army. In his defence, the Germans had shattered the 5^th Army and was collapsing the 3^rd and he did have orders to protect the last Army that Britain could effectively provide. Nevertheless as Reid has suggested very convincingly, much of what occurred as a result of the Spring Offensive happened around and in spite of Haig, not because of him.

Reid’s book is an interesting analysis of the relative state of the commanders of the three major powers. It sheds light on the role of the media in developing and maintaining both a perception of individuals as well as being a tool in the challenge of civil/military relations within the British hierarchy at this time. His discussion of the efforts of the civilian governments (especially amongst the British) to wrest back control of the war from the Generals is a telling example of the failure of clear delineations of responsibility. A very interesting read and a worthwhile addition to any library or collection.

Dak To and the Border Battles of Vietnam, 1967-1968 - Michael A. Eggleston

This review submitted to Canadian Army Today Magazine.

Title: Dak To and the Border Battles of Vietnam, 1967-1968

Author: Michael A. Eggleston

ISBN: 978-1-4766-6417-0

Publisher: Mcfarland Books (McFarlandBooks.com)

Year: 2017

Softcover

Pages: 224

Photos/Maps: 19/24

The battles in Vietnam were reaching a peak as the 1960’s moved into their final years. Generally, the sense has been that the United States was fighting the wrong war for the wrong reasons and that the advantages lay predominantly with the North Vietnamese. Included in these were the willingness to absorb causalities, the sense that this war was of national importance, the ineffective and corrupt nature of the Southern Vietnamese government, the ineffectiveness of the Southern Vietnamese Army and the control that the communist regime in Northern Vietnam exercised over its people and resources. While much of this was true, the United States and its Allies were not without deep capabilities and the North Vietnamese not without weakness and internal division.

Eggleston’s book sheds light upon some of the key events in the entire Vietnam War: the period leading up to the Tet Offensive. Much has been written about the actual Tet Offensive, while relatively little has looked at the American and North Vietnamese strategies leading up to this Offensive. Each side achieved its initial aims with the Border Battles: the Vietnamese to draw American forces out of the cities and into the countryside and the US to draw Vietnamese forces into more traditional set piece battles where they could be destroyed.

This is an excellent book to read in order to gain an appreciation of the nature of the conflict during this period. He expertly combines a sweeping synopsis of the history and nature of the war up to the Border Battle period and then delves in more detail regarding the scope of this engagement. Of particular poignancy, the author has drawn upon firsthand accounts of participants from both sides; by including them as written, he ensures that the reader has great difficulty putting the book down due to their realism and the raw emotion elicited. I have rarely come across such descriptive and emotive recollections.

This is a book focussed on the soldiers and their experiences at the front; in the thick of battle. Eggleston does not spare those who were not equal to the leadership task nor those who failed in their responsibilities to their soldiers. It is interesting to note the comments related to the American leadership practice of senior commanders trying to conduct operations from helicopters (the idea being that one would be able to maintain a much better grasp of the battlefield). Additionally, discussions about the terrain and the unique nature of fighting the regular North Vietnamese Army units vice Vietcong are also very enlightening. Finally, the failure of the North Vietnamese to appreciate the ability of the US command to reposition its forces undermined the ability of the North to achieve its desired end state with Tet.

I recommend this book. It is not an in-depth analysis of the politics of the war, more a treatise on the nature of tactical level combat in the Vietnam theatre and its effects upon soldiers at the squad and platoon level. Disturbing, enlightening and poignant in equal measure.

The First Day on the Eastern Front - Craig WH Luther

This review has been submitted to War History Online Magazine.

Title: The First Day on the Eastern Front

Author: Craig WH Luther

ISBN: 978-0-811-73780-7

Publisher: Stackpole Books

Year: 2019

Hardcover

Pages: 471

Photos/Maps: 60/18

Much has been written about the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Operation Barbarossa, initiated 22 June, 1941; thus it was with some resignation that I undertook to read yet another missive on this campaign. To my great surprise and pleasure I found the work to be engrossing and easily one of the best books that I have read in recent times.

Luther has undertaken to present the reader with a comprehensive picture and an in-depth analysis of the events surrounding the first day of the invasion. He has succeeded in this endeavour magnificently. Drawing upon a vast array of primary source materials (war diaries, letters, combat reports) from both the German and Russian archives, he has crafted a book of extraordinary scope and detail.

He commences his work with a look at the planning and logistics efforts required to make Barbarossa a reality. He convincingly dispels the argument that the German attack was in fact a spoiling engagement against a Soviet intent to invade. Having said that however, there appears little doubt that Russia was building towards an ultimate clash with Germany as indicated by their military upgrading. The efficiency and capacity of the German logistics planning and execution is neatly captured, as an example of the scope of Luther’s research, by the fact that over 10,000 trains were coordinated in the move East of the German armies; all while maintaining the elements of surprise.

He then moves on to a discussion of each of the three main fronts (North, Central and Southern) as well as the Air Campaign waged the first day. In every case he seamlessly transitions between the various levels of command and adds colour to his narrative through the use of first hand material relevant to the point in question. While a majority of the discussion is focussed upon the German perspective, there is ample Soviet reference to provide for a balanced appreciation. Much of what the author has quoted will resonate with the reader, especially if they have had any military service. What stands out is the breathtaking scope and violence of the attack; the author’s use of letters, diaries and unit war diary entries inject a much more personal scope to his descriptions.

The author continually introduces elements of sober reflection into the narrative which add poignancy to the story. The impact of the attack on the Russian civilians who were caught in the maelstrom of the German attack, the ferocity of the Russian defence (as an example, the Luftwaffe lost 78 aircraft the first day, 15 of those due to ramming by Soviet aircraft), the awe inspiring opening salvo’s by the German artillery and the descent by both sides, almost immediately, into a level of brutality not witnessed on any other front serve as but a few examples.

The comprehensive bibliography and copious endnotes provide for extensive additional research and reading opportunities. Luther has included numerous maps which he refers to throughout the text. For the most part these are adequate although some are difficult to follow. Overall however, this is a superb book, full of new information that is indicative of the years of research that went into this work. An excellent reference and addition to anyone’s library.  

Instrument of War: The German Army 1914-18 - Dennis Showalter

This review was submitted to Strategy and Tactics magazine. 

Title: Instrument of War: The German Army 1914-18

Editor: Dennis Showalter

ISBN: 978-1-4728-1300-8

Publisher: Osprey

Year: 2016

Hardcover

Pages: 304

Photos: 43

The German Army had a reputation leading up to the beginning of World War 1 that placed it squarely at the top of equivalent European Armies. Based mainly upon its performance during the Wars of German Unification (Denmark and Austria) and the Franco-Prussian War, it was perceived to be, in many respects, the standard to be emulated. Showalter approaches his topic with this in mind and investigates whether this reputation was still deserved just prior to World War 1. He further examines how the Army and its command structure morphed as the War continued and the impact that this had on its effectiveness and resiliency.

His analysis commences with a brief overview of the national character of the army and its various levels of personnel readiness. This sets the stage for his discussion of the army and the commencement of the war. Showalter is very balanced in his praise and criticism of the army and the reputation that it had. He postulates that the Army was the wrong tool for the Schlieffen Plan and that German Senior leadership failed to appreciate its limitations, specifically in the areas of mobility and communications, ultimately resulting in the plans failure. He further  convincingly postulates that, while the Army was superior in many ways to its contemporaries, the German Leadership was extremely limited in their strategic grasp and could not decide upon priorities of effort following the failure of the Schlieffen Plan.

Showalter effectively encapsulates the rise and fall of German fortunes as the war descends into one of stalemate and attrition in the West and supporting a weakened Austro-Hungary in the East against Russia and Italy. He shows that for a good part of the war, Germany was superior at the tactical and operational levels; engaging in the use of aircraft, gas, storm troop tactics and the command empowerment of NCO’s and Junior Officers. He is, however, merciless in his criticism of the senior German leadership; its infighting, hubris, political intrigue and ultimate failure to acknowledge the necessity of working in tandem with the diplomatic elements of the Government as well as not recognizing the self-destructiveness of the war.

The theme throughout his book is that the main enemy of Germany was time. Every year weakened them and strengthened their adversaries, allowing the Allies to learn and close the gap between their respective armies. Compounding this was the diminishing pool of manpower available to Germany with which to make good its losses.

Showalter has proven himself to be an impartial judge of the German Army of this period; balanced in his praise and criticism. He draws attention to elements of German leadership and planning that are not necessarily readily apparent in many of the narratives of this war. There is no question that the Germans could have won the war given slightly different circumstances but, as Showalter points out, this would have been in spite of rather than because of the strategic level decision making. Despite its institutional weaknesses, the German Army proved itself to be an instrument of formidable depth and resilience; able to match the Allies right up until the last months of the War. Showalter gives the reader much to think about and ponder from his noteworthy analysis of this machine. A well-researched and very interesting book.

Illustrated History of the Sturmgeshutz-Abteilung 202 - Norbert Szamveber

This review has been submitted to Canadian Army Review.

Title: Illustrated History of the Sturmgeshutz-Abteilung 202

Editor: 

ISBN: 978-615-80072-6-9

Publisher: Peko

Year: 2016

Hardcover

Pages: 396

Photos/Maps: 118/40

This work, coming from Hungarian Publisher Peko, is an interesting analysis of the operational history of this assault gun unit. The author has drawn from the official operational reports and histories of the unit to provide a comprehensive exploration of the activities of the Unit from its creation in August, 1941 to its ultimate surrender with the rest of the German Heer (Army) on May 8, 1945. This is not a dry rendition of the daily activities unit life interspersed with moments of intense operational activity. Indeed, the author has undertaken to provide the reader with a narrative that not only flows but is also deeply descriptive and instructive of command methods, logistical challenges, organizational strengths as well as employment of the Stug III. Read with this approach in mind, the book provides a deep well of information to be gleaned by the attentive reader.

Included within the calendar breakdown are first hand recollections and battle reports that correspond to the given day. This is particularly striking as it provides a juxtaposition to the relatively two dimensional war diary style reporting. It is necessary to pay attention as one reads this book as skimming will guarantee that you miss salient points. As one reads through certain elements stand out:

1.      The creation of temporary kampfgruppes to counter Soviet attacks; usually built around the Stug batteries. Shows the adaptability of the German command structure;

2.      The speed with which the German command recognized and awarded exceptional conduct (one case relates 40 min for Adolf Hitler to confirm the awarding of three Knights crosses);

3.      The versatility of the assault artillery in supporting both offensive and defensive operations;

4.      The quality of the German crews, leadership and training compared to their Soviet adversaries under combat conditions and the incredible bravery of both sides;

5.      The incredible strain and pace of operations – one wonders at times when the crews slept;

6.      The superb support and turnaround time of the maintenance and logistics personnel in keeping the Stug batteries operational despite the huge challenges involved;

7.      The constant exchange and promulgation of lessons learned within the German command structure and the subsequent application of those lessons; and

8.      The degree to which joint operations were an inherent part of the German command ethos. 

Szamveber rounds out his book with a broad array of documents, maps and photographs that provided for a better visual appreciation of the weapon systems, developments in the Stug III technology, Orders of Battle and operational environments within which S-A 202 operated. A majority of the maps are copies of the original German maps which in some cases are somewhat hard to follow. Annexes of technical and operational data by the author also provide quick reference into the units’ workings and developments. This is a very high quality publication, presented in a way that enables the reader to really appreciate the complexities of operational command and utilization of a unique, critical Unit.