Thursday, 10 August 2017

Konev’s Golgotha - Mikhail Filippenkov

This review has been submitted to the Canadian Army Journal.

Title: Konev’s Golgotha
Author: Mikhail Filippenkov
ISBN: 978-1-910777-37-4
Publisher: Helion
Year: 2016
Pages: 168
Photos/ Maps: 18/8

In the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the archives of the former Soviet military were made available for historians to access when researching books relating to the Second World War. Unfortunately that window has now been significantly restricted again, limiting the ability of authors to provide a balanced accounting of events on the Eastern Front; this challenge was exacerbated by the systematic destruction of Soviet Unit records relating to operations where the Soviet Union suffered significant reversals. Operation Typhoon, the German drive for Moscow in October, 1941, falls into this category.

This work, which focusses upon the operational and tactical events running from 25 September to 12 October during which the pocket at Viaz’ma was closed, primarily deals with the Northern arm of this drive led by the Panzergruppe 3. The author traces the events leading to the capture of the town of Sychevka, a point north of Viaz’ma and critical to opening the road to Moscow. The author, a Russian national, does his best to provide a balance in the narrative between the Soviet forces of Konev’s Western Front and the German forces; unfortunately he is precluded from doing so due to the fact that all archives relating to Stavka (Soviet high command) and Front documents are still sealed. Thus, while he is able to draw some information from other sources, the book is mainly told from the German perspective.

Nevertheless, the approach taken by the author of a daily recitation of events does highlight some very interesting points on both sides: the quality of German command and control is evident in their ability to maintain decision making momentum over the Russian leadership; the dramatic changes in temperature and its effect upon the operational capabilities of both sides (the author refers to weather and temperature at the beginning of each day – the first wet snow fell on 7 October and the temperature fell to -40 at night by 10 October); the inability of the Germans to logistically maintain their forces and the incredible burden that this shortfall placed upon the rear services and the luftwaffe. Throughout the book the author refers to German units running short of fuel and the conscious decision by the German high command to not issue winter kit at the beginning of Typhoon due to the delay it would cause to the start date. The author also draws attention to the more effective combined arms operations of the Germans and the Russian lack of effective air reconnaissance. Finally, he acknowledges the overall superiority of German leadership and equipment while concurrently recognizing the strengths of the Russian forces in defensive operations.

Helion has maintained its high standard of quality with the production value of this work. This book is a quick and interesting read but should be read in conjunction with other authors such as David Glantz, Lev Lopukhovsky “The Viaz'ma Catastrophe, 1941: The Red Army's Disastrous Stand Against Operation Typhoon” or Svetlana Gerasimova’s “The Rzhev Slaughterhouse”. I also found that the maps provided with the text did not provide much detail on the area’s in the narrative; a shortcoming when the book is broken into daily analysis. Nevertheless, an interesting and engaging read.

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