Case Red: The Collapse of France - Robert Forczyk

This review has been submitted to the British Military History Journal. 

Title: Case Red: The Collapse of France

Author: Robert Forczyk

ISBN: 978-1-4728-2442-4

Publisher: Osprey Publishing

Year: 2017

Hardcover

Pages: 464

Photos/Maps: 60/7

Studies relating to the Battle for France in 1940 tend to focus upon the initial weeks of the conflict running from the invasion of the Low Countries (Fall Gelb) and culminating in the evacuation of Allied troops at Dunkirk. Relatively little has been drafted relating to the follow-on Fall Rot (Case Red) which encompassed the drive south following Dunkirk and the capture of the remaining French territory. Forczyk’s book undertakes to address this shortfall and to draw attention to the Allied efforts, political and military, to contain the German drive. Included in his analysis are a series of studies highlighting challenges and successes by both sides and their background causes.

The author commences his work with a broad study of the Allied efforts in the years leading up to the invasion (1919-1939). This is critical for the reader to better appreciate the lack of coordination and internal dissention between the Western Countries. This was especially true of Belgium whose foreign policies served to both weaken and undermine French plans for countering the Germans.

His discussions draw attention to a number of areas that have generally not been addressed in past books on the battle of France. Following the evacuation at Dunkirk, there was an operational pause on the part of the Germans as they reformed their units and undertook the planning for the second phase of the attack on France: Fall Rot. Much of the planning and preparation has been glossed over in the major histories of this conflict. Hitler had given the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht – German High Command) only ten days between the end of Fall Gelb and the beginning of Fall Rot (25 May to 5 June). During that time in addition to planning the next stages of the advance, they also had to coordiante and deliver over 50,000 tons of supplies from Germany to their forward units (200 miles over destroyed and damaged transportation infrastructure). Support on this scale had  never been attempted before; Forczyk discusses in detail the logistical efforts of this period and the challenges overcome.

Additionally, it is important to note that the French remained a potent adversary even after their initial setbacks; one that the Germans viewed very seriously. The author looks at the methodology that the Germans undertook in order to retain their advantage after the element of surprise had been lost through superior planning and execution as well as joint operations between air and ground forces.

Forcyzk is balanced in his appraisals of the adversary’s capabilities but he is particularly scathing in this analysis of the French and British High Commands. He specifically focusses upon their divergence from both political oversight and control as well as the abrogation of their responsibility towards the soldiers under their command. This appears particularly true in the case of Weygand, the French Commander as he repeatedly dismissed direction from the French Government.    

Included in this work are a number of minor incidents that have been lost or overlooked. For example the French air force undertook 11 air raids on German cities during the Battle of France including the first air raid on Berlin when a single Farman bomber flew a round trip mission of over 3000 km, dropping 3 tonnes of bombs before returning back to base. The inclusion of these types of stories add both depth and breadth to Forcyzk’s narrative.

Osprey has published an excellent book that is well worth adding to one’s library. The author has drafted a book that adds much to the limited amount available on the German operations following Dunkirk. He sheds additional light on the deep challenges that the Western Allies faced in the early years of the war while also drawing attention to German areas of weakness. A very worthwhile read.

A War of Logistics – Parachutes and Porters in Indochina, 1945-1954 - Charles R Shrader

This review has been submitted to Army History Magazine.

Title: A War of Logistics – Parachutes and Porters in Indochina, 1945-1954

Author: Charles R Shrader

ISBN: 978-0-8131-6575-2

Publisher: University Press of Kentucky

Year: 2015

Hardcover

Pages: 488

Photos/Maps: 15/13

The War in Indochina is best remembered today for the decisive French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954; however, the conflict that led up to that was protracted, brutal and new. New in terms of the style of warfare being fought and the impact that the result would have well beyond the borders of Indochina. The author has approached the war from an unconventional perspective, one that has been heretofore a facet but not a central theme of works on the war; that of logistics and its role in the victory of the Viet Minh and the loss of the French. This was a war won and lost entirely on the strength and weakness of the respective logistics capabilities and doctrine of the adversaries.

Shrader has effectively woven an insightful evaluation and analysis of the operational doctrine of both parties while maintaining his central theme of the key impact of logistics. Commencing with a strategic view of the conflict, he looks at the psychology and hubris of the post war French and their assumption of superiority over the Viet Minh. This, combined with an unstable national approach from France, precluded the resources from being assigned in terms of manpower as well as material that ultimately was needed for success.

He leads into the successful recognition by the Viet Minh of the necessity to not only outfight but also to outlast the French. The three stage operational approach combined with a successful utilization of the strengths of the Viet people – human capital – enabled for a flexible and dynamic asymmetric approach to conflict that the European approach of the French struggled to counter.

Shrader discusses at length how, from the French approach, heavy weapons and combined arms operations heavily based upon the lessons learned during the European conflict served as the central method of engagement. Artillery, armour, aircraft and naval contingents enabled the French to control set points but surrendered the countryside to the more mobile and agile Viet Minh and by extension, the initiative. The nature of the French approach to warfare resulted in a heavy logistics bill that had difficulty being met. Strategically, long lines of support stretching back to France or Japan due to a lack of an integral industrial capability in Indochina meant long delays in the meeting of demands. Operationally, the necessity of the French to establish isolated forward operating bases in order to counter the inflow of the Viet Minh forces and supplies required a reliance upon air or naval resupply methods that were costly, inefficient and resource intensive themselves.

Conversely, the Viet Minh acknowledged their inability to counter the French in set piece battles and, for the most part, did not allow themselves to be drawn into fights where they may be subjected to superior French armament. Shrader identifies how the Viet Minh leaders played a superior international hand by securing their lines of support from China. In addition, their requirements were far less extensive. The author has undertaken extensive in-depth research that backs up his conclusions. The typical Viet Minh soldier, for example only required approximately half of the daily weight of requirements compared with his French counterpart. The depth to which the author goes in his analysis of the typical demands of the respective forces is highly educational and telling for the reader; the French demands far outstripped their capability while the Viet Minh adjusted their tactics in line with their logistics capability and expertise.

The book also illustrates the flexibility of the Viet Minh logistics methodology compared to the French. Being far less technologically encumbered, they were significantly more agile in their mobility and much less rigid in their operational doctrine; thereby being able to manipulate their procedures far faster than the French. Unlike the French who were, for the most part, confined to pre-existing Indochinese transport infrastructure and vehicles, the Viet Minh developed a national level mobilization process whereby non-combatants were obliged to support operations through their use as porters. Regional command structures were created that facilitated the uninterrupted flow of supplies from one section to the next through its transfer between regionally assigned porters. They also developed the science of camouflage to previously unseen levels and maintained field craft discipline rigidly. The French were never able to develop a counter strategy to effectively undermine this tactic.

Shrader makes it clear that the French were not incompetent, merely hamstrung through a lack of logistics flexibility, non-responsive doctrine, a paradigm of their adversary based upon pre-existing hubris, a non-supportive National Government and a logistics dogma rooted in a European operational theatre. They were able to achieve some successes against the Viet Minh and their use of air and riverine resupply systems supported off road operations well. Unfortunately, the depth of capacity was heavily in favour of the Viet Minh as theirs was viewed as a national struggle and, consequently, given the support required through a more universally supported approach. The French certainly had the upper hand during periods of the conflict such as when they cut off Viet Minh access to critical rice growing regions (which served as a trade currency as well as supply for the Viet Minh). The logistics limitations suffered by the French were simply too great to enable them to follow up on their local successes.

Shrader’s book is an excellent study of the critical importance that logistics plays in the effective execution of tactical operations and strategic campaigns. For a vast majority of the conflict French technology heavily outweighed the Viet Minh; that they were unable to defeat them is testament to the ability of the Viet Minh to offset French advantage through non-traditional tactics and supply doctrine. The author has presented a balanced and in-depth study of this conflict and his conclusions are well supported through the use of primary source material from both sides. This is a book well worth reading for operators and supporters alike.  

Lost Opportunities: The Battle of the Ardennes 22 August 1914 - Simon J House

This review was submitted to Soldier Magazine.

Title: Lost Opportunities: The Battle of the Ardennes 22 August 1914

Author: Simon J House

ISBN: 978-1- 911096-42-9

Publisher: Helion

Year: 2017

Hardcover

Pages: 252

Photos/ Maps: 36/59 (in separate included book)

The author has undertaken an outstanding analysis of the French efforts to disrupt the German Schlieffen Plan by striking at the hinge of the German advance in the Ardennes. Despite achieving both tactical and operational surprise and having heavy numerical superiority, the French failed utterly in their endeavours. His book reviews the battles themselves, the qualities and competencies of the four key commanders involved (two German and two French) at the operational level as well as the doctrinal and training policies of Germany and France in the years leading up to the war. A superb study and a publication of the highest quality.

Sedan 1870: The Eclipse of France - Douglas Fermer

This review has been submitted to The British Military History Journal.

Title: Sedan 1870: The Eclipse of France

Author: Douglas Fermer

ISBN: 978-1-473-82889-6

Publisher: Pen and Sword

Year: 2015

Softcover

Pages: 244

Photos/ Maps: 30/10

The Franco-Prussian War marked a historic shift in the dynamics of the European political and national stage; the decline of France and the rise of the German confederation. This was made all the more significant given the assumption by many of the predominance of French martial prowess and the relatively junior position of Germany. The results of the war left the French in political and military disarray and the Germans as the new masters of the profession of arms. Fermer’s book covers the events leading up to the commencement of the war and the proceedings up to the conclusion of the Battle of Sedan and the surrender of Napoleon III, Emperor of the French.

While the book ultimately focusses upon the Battle of Sedan, the author has undertaken to provide the reader with a comprehensive understanding of not only the events but also the capabilities and political/military realities of the protagonists leading up to the conflict. This is critical as it speaks to the conditions that resulted in the unforeseen military cataclysm for France. The analysis undertaken by Fermer looks at not only the size and capabilities of the respective armies, but more importantly their respective doctrines and leadership.

France’s doctrine relating to combat was only part of the equation and, as Fermer so aptly discusses, it was the doctrine surrounding the processes relating to mobilization and logistics that proved to be the true Achilles Heel of the French. Their plans were unrealistic, unproven and based on capabilities that existed only on paper. Further exacerbating this shortcoming, the French political and military leadership chose to ignore the realities of French weakness and undertake their roles and responsibilities more as partisan political adversaries living in a delusional  world of past glories rather than the real politique of 1870 Europe.

Fermer also casts a strong light on the nascent German Empire and its efforts to establish itself as a leading member within the European host of nations. While Fermer equitably identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the German approach, it is clear that the political and military leadership of Prussia (read Germany) was much better prepared and in tune than the French. They also had the benefit of much more recent combat experience with the Danish and Austrian wars where they were able undertake critical analysis of their plans and doctrine.

Having prepared the groundwork through this macro, pan-European approach, Fermer is able to focus on the immediate events leading up the outbreak of hostilities and the initial stages of the war. His eye is critical and unrelenting as he relates the activities of the individual armies and commanders. As he discusses, the French were not without opportunity and courage but they were immediately caught behind the ‘power curve’ and surrendered the initiative to the Germans. The Germans, for their part, maintained a clear operational focus that allowed their armies to operate independently but in concert with one another. The French command and support structure rapidly collapsed under the rapidly changing operational and tactical environment and they found themselves operating reactively instead of proactively with little or no central control.

The narrative reaches its apogee with its examination of the Battle of Sedan itself. The study is such that the reader instinctively feels for the French soldiers as they fight with futile desperation under a command that has abrogated its responsibilities to the vagaries of fate. The unfolding of the battle is easily followed and related with a critical eye to the impact of local encounters on the overall battle. Both the German and French leadership is studied in some detail as to their conduct and competence with lessons to be learned for the modern day practitioner.

Fermer is an eminently readable author and his books well worth the investment. Sedan 1870, is an excellent study in hubris and hunger, doctrine and professionalism and the underlying motivation that drives troops, regardless of the quality of their leadership, to astonishing levels of self-sacrifice.       

Three German Invasions of France – The Summer Campaigns of 1870, 1914 and 1940 - Douglas Fermer

This review has been submitted to the British Military History Journal

Title: Three German Invasions of France – The Summer Campaigns of 1870, 1914 and 1940

Author: Douglas Fermer

ISBN: 978-1-781593-54-7

Publisher: Pen and Sword

Year: 2013

Hardcover

Pages: 273

Photos/ Maps: 30/11

Germany and France have maintained a difficult relationship stemming back to the pre-German unification period of Prussia and Napoleonic France. Three wars were fought between the two nations during the 70 years from 1970 until 1940; each reflecting a period of political, doctrinal and societal change within each nation state. Fermer’s book looks at the root causes and the execution of these wars with a view towards highlighting the impact on these conflicts upon the French army and society primarily and upon Germany secondarily.

Fermer’s analysis is balanced and insightful. Despite the breadth of the topics that he has undertaken to review, he does so in a very succinct manner; the renditions of his observations easy to follow and well developed. His approach is to look at each of the individual engagements as a part of a greater whole. This facilitates a linear examination that clearly identifies the connections and causation's between the wars.

He has divided his book into four distinct parts, each addressing the individual conflicts as well as the precursor period in France leading up to 1870. Each section establishes the environment of the period and the main changes that had occurred as well as the main lessons to be learned from each encounter. Central throughout is the political atmosphere which remains the main cause of the military escalation between the nations. The use of the military as a tool of political gain must be balanced and extremely carefully applied; Fermer shows that, leading to 1870, the Germans were extremely adept at this but that limitations in political acumen by both participants made themselves felt to a greater degree as time went forward. Hubris on the part of both French and German leadership was legion.

Fermer also undertakes a detailed evaluation of the impact of success upon both the victor and vanquished both doctrinally and psychologically. His investigation reveals that the German use of lessons learned following their actions were far more in depth (and taken far more seriously) than their French counterparts. The French were further handicapped by their political instability and ongoing intra-national divergence. This manifested itself in inconsistent recruitment and armament policies as well as challenges in foreign policy.

Also, included in the book is a comprehensive listing of the references that he has utilized; of particular note is the number of primary source documents. Overall this is an outstanding rendition of the turbulent period encompassing these three conflicts. The author has drafted a narrative that recounts the characteristics of the conflicts themselves, the underlying causes (primary, secondary and beyond) and the results politically, militarily and socially thus providing the reader with a complete understanding of this period. Fermer’s book is an excellent account and source. 

D Day Through German Eyes Vol 1 and 2 - Holger Eckhertz

Title: D Day Through German Eyes Vol 1 and 2

Author: Holger Eckhertz

ASIN: B00VX372UE

Publisher: DTZ History Publications

Year: 2015

E Book

Pages: 141/168

Photos/Maps: 0

I have made the decision to review Herr Eckhertz’s two books together as they are of the same theme and presentation. During WW2, the author’s grandfather, Dieter Eckhertz, was a military journalist for the German military publications ‘Die Wehrmacht’ and ‘Signal’.  In 1944, he was tasked with writing a series of articles on the Atlantic Wall in the West and, in the process of preparing, visited many of the units stationed in that region. Following the war, in 1954, while no longer a reporter, he decided to follow up with individuals from those units he had visited in order to capture their recollections and experiences of D-Day now that the passage of time had provided some distance between the events. The results are testimonials that are still raw, disturbing, enlightening, brutally honest and at the same time deeply thought provoking. The interviews were never published until they came into the hands of Dieter’s grandson who has done an excellent job of presenting them to the modern audience.

Each interview is presented as a series of questions relating to the interviewees experience primarily on the day of 6 June; thus the narrative is more of a discussion vice a story. Additionally, a majority of the men interviewed are private soldiers, not senior officers or Non-commissioned ranks and therefore the reader begins to appreciate these ‘lower level’ responses and perspectives.

There are a number of themes which I found very interesting that came out of these interviews as the men looked back on their experiences. These included a sense that they were defending a ‘United Europe’, frustration that the Allies were distracting them from the real threat which was communism, an initial confidence in their ability to hold the line, shock at the capability of the Allies to bring armour in such large numbers across the channel and disbelief at the violence of the air and sea assault.

Additionally, the testimonies bring up a number of other extremely interesting subjects such as the Allies use of phosphorous weapons and its impact upon the defenders, the Allied ‘flame tank’, the German use of the ‘Goliath’, the use of foreign workers in the building the Western Wall, the extensive appearance of Russian and Polish soldiers fighting for the Germans and what happened to them following capture and the interaction between the German soldiers and the French population.

Perhaps the most remarkable interview was with a specialist weapons officer who discussed in detail the development of a weapon by the Germans that would be categorized today as a FAE (fuel air explosive). This weapon has enormous destructive power mainly centered upon the massive shock wave that it generates when detonated. The German system, code named Taifun (Typhoon) B, was deployed to Normandy and was to be utilized against the Allied armour concentration at St Lo but was fortunately destroyed by a random artillery barrage just before it was launched. 

There are some questions that would be worthwhile following up for clarification and accuracy. One centres upon the interviewees use of the term 'Tobruk' bunker to describe their 2 man prefabricated machine gun posts; the use of this term was not a German but an Allied one. Additionally, while I have found reference to German development and practice of coal-dust and fuel mixtures on the Eastern front, this book was the only reference that I have found that refers to a FAE style weapon deployed at D-Day. These two books are only available as e-books but I would recommend them both for their content and presentation. I found them to be not only highly informative but also forthright depictions of these soldier’s experiences. Certainly, a guide for further discussion.

Strange Defeat - Marc Bloch

Title: Strange Defeat

Author: Marc Bloch

ISBN: 978-8-087-83083-3

Publisher: Important Books

Year: 2013

Softcover

Pages: 133

Photographs/maps: 0

Between July and August 1940, Captain Marc Bloch, a fuel services officer in the French Army, drafted his testament of the cause of the French defeat at the hands of the German Wehrmacht. Bloch had seen active service in the trenches during the First World War and was a historian/professor during the interwar years. His service in the Second World War was undertaken at both operational and Army level HQ's where he was privy to the workings of the highest level of French Army command. With ample military experience and the eye of a professional historian, he was able to to discern much in the confusion that he witnessed around him.

His book is a poignant and insightful analysis of why the French Army and, by extension, the French Government and people were so thoroughly and soundly beaten when all of the potential existed for French victory. He addresses multiple aspects of the French armed forces and French society for, as he points out, there was no one issue but a combination thereof, that brought the house of cards down. He readily acknowledges that he did not have ready access to the 'behind the scenes' machinations of decision making but he did have a keen eye and a myriad of experience that gives his analysis validity and credibility.

He is both relentless and balanced in his exposure of the flaws that plagued the French leadership and HQ; he spares no level of command, but it is evident that his purpose is not to discredit on a personal level but to reveal on a professional level. His observations cross the spectrum of what today would be called the 'J-Staff'; some of his more telling observations follow:

1. Communication: A lack of common operating picture within the HQ's and a failure to pass information to the levels where it was needed in a timely manner. Also a tendency to hoard information;

2. Administration vs Operations: Administration trumped operational decision making. An emphasis on process as opposed to results. 

3. Hubris: An assumption of superiority and a failure to emphasize continuous learning. A failure to appreciate the changes that technology had brought to the battlefield and a reliance upon the "way it has always been done'.

4. Education: A failure to adapt and to take advantage of the opportunities to adjust and develop doctrine before the conflict started (the Germans used blitzkrieg techniques in Poland but the French ignored the lessons to be learned despite an 8 month gap between Poland and France).

5. Command: An inability of the commanders to adjust to the dynamic environment of modern operations as a result of experience, training and paradigm shortfalls. Bloch quotes a corps commander to Gen Blanchard (commander of the 1st Army): "Do what you want Mon General but do something!"; stated in Bloch's presence.

6. National Expectations/institutions: A rise amongst the population of a level of expectation for self (as opposed to national) service exacerbated by both government and media playing off political and economic fault lines resulting in stagnation and a psychological 'softening' of the population. A diminishment of critical thinking within scientific and centres of higher education.

These represent a few of the myriad of observations raised by Bloch. Unlike historians writing on the collapse of France in the past tense, Bloch's work is based on experience and having lived the drama. His comments are based upon his personal experiences and views. Bloch's work is a challenge to France to take a hard, unvarnished look at its performance in the war. Unfortunately, many of his views are prevalent in the military's and societies of today including a tendency to emphasize a success without recognizing where significant weaknesses existed. His narrative lacks perhaps some of the 'finishing' of a modern author's work but his points are clear and devastating; our modern institutions and commands ignore his lessons at their peril.