The Rzhev Slaughterhouse: The Red Army's Forgotten 15-Month Campaign Against Army Group Center, 1942-1943 - Svetlana Gerasimova

Title: The Rzhev Slaughterhouse: The Red Army's Forgotten 15-

Month Campaign Against Army Group Center, 1942-1943

Author: Svetlana Gerasimova

ISBN: 9-781-908-91651-8

Pages: 269

Publisher: Helion Publishing

Photos/Maps: 113/ 8 (colour)

Ms Gerasimova represents a relatively new wave of Russian historians that have taken advantage of the loosening of restrictions placed upon Russian military records and archives. Thus we are seeing the publishing of a series of books pertaining to Soviet operations during Operation Barbarossa that are primarily drafted from the Soviet perspective. Up until now, histories of the Russo-German War have predominately been from the German viewpoint with the associated perceptions that have resulted. Additionally, despite the fact that Russia has subsequently tightened up the regulations, Russian historians are now much more free to be critical in their analysis.

Gerasimova's work outlines the Soviet efforts to encircle and destroy the German Army Group Center following the German retreat after the Battle of Moscow (from October, 1941 to January, 1942). While the author provides an outstanding synopsis of the conflict as it raged across a relatively small geographic area, where the real strength of this narrative lies is in her evaluation of the effectiveness of the Soviet command staff. She is blunt and direct in her criticism of the failure of the Soviets to take advantage of opportunities and the glaring failures of the staff across both the spectrum of operations and support as well as planning and execution.

This ongoing battle has been overshadowed for the most part by the German Plan Blau and the Battle of Stalingrad. For that reason, and the reticence of the Soviet Union to release information on the conflict, the scope and violence of Rzhev has never been fully appreciated. As Gerasimova points out, even today German and Russian casualties are only able to be estimated (although the German figures are considered to be much more accurate). Conservatively, she states that approximately 330,000 German's and over 2 million Russian's were casualties in this campaign.

From a strategic perspective the Rzhev saliant presented both the Soviets and Germans with key opportunities that resulted in highly focused attention being given to the area by the respective National leaders. Rzhev was, for the Russians, a continuing threat to Moscow and for the Germans, not only a stepping stone to the Soviet capital (offensively) but also a potential line of advance on Berlin for Russian forces. For these reasons, massive resources were thrown into the fray by each side.

The quality of the translation from its original Russian is very high although there is the odd awkward sentence. This does not, however, take away from the overall flow of the narrative. The production value of the book itself is also extremely high. Gerasimova provides an outstanding bibliography of primary and secondary source material as well as extensive appendices of Stavka (Soviet Supreme HQ) orders and directives. Unfortunately, Russia has still not released key documents from the strategic level Stavka discussions that, as Gerasimova points out, further clarify and enhance any scholarly work on this subject.

Overall, this is an outstanding piece of historical research worthy of any library or collection. It provides valuable insight into the Soviet war leadership and operational execution. Her work is very balanced and insightful. The Rzhev campaign was a slaughter in every sense of the word. Survivors from both sides recalled the fighting years later as the worst they had experienced at any time throughout the war. The Germans may be considered the victors as they were not defeated and withdrew from the salient of their own accord in March, 1943 but the cost was very high. The Soviets, for their part, proved themselves determined and aggressive adversaries that would bode ill for the Germans in the coming years.

Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla - David Kilcullen

Title: Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban

Guerrilla

Author: David Kilcullen

ISBN: 978-1-849-04324-3

Pages: 342

Publisher: Hurst Publishing

Photos: 0

Rank: 5/5 

This is an outstanding book relating to the future of non-traditional (asymmetric) warfare. Kilcullen draws upon extensive firsthand experience as well as copious amounts of primary source discussion and material to map out his view on the changing nature of war. Focusing upon four main themes: population growth, urbanization, littoralization and connectedness, he concisely and clearly identifies the impact of demographic and technological change on how the future asymmetric threat will manifest itself. A must read for any who have a role in urban and military planning and development.

 

Operation Unthinkable: The Third World War British Plans to Attack the Soviet Empire - Jonathon Walker

Title: Operation Unthinkable: The Third World War British Plans to

Attack the Soviet Empire

Author: Jonathan Walker

ISBN: 9780752487182

Pages: 192

Photos/map: 28/4

Rating: 4/5 

Jonathan Walker has written a gem of a book with his work “Operation Unthinkable”. Drawing upon copious amounts of unpublished and primary source documents, he has traced the political and diplomatic shark tank that was the relationship between the three great powers in the final days of WW2. What is most surprising is the degree of naivety of the United States regarding the intentions of the Soviets. Churchill's efforts to raise awareness of the intentions of the Soviets are met with indifference and mistrust until the 11th hour. Walker has painted an engaging and sobering portrait of a struggle between ‘allies’ and the desperate plan drafted at the direction of Churchill. Very highly recommended.

Dingo Firestorm: The Greatest Battle of the Rhodesian Bush War - Ian Pringle

Title: Dingo Firestorm: The Greatest Battle of the Rhodesian Bush War

Author: Ian Pringle
Publisher: Helion, 2012
ISBN: 978-1-909384-12-5
Pages: 266
Photographs: 25 b/w, 33 colour
Maps: 5 b/w        

                Ian Pringle has written a fast-paced, engaging book about one of the most successful Rhodesian “fireforce” operations in history. Conceived out of a requirement to deal a major blow to the rebel ZANLA forces of Robert Mugabe (operating out of Mozambique), Op Dingo has come to represent the standard from which to measure special force joint operations. An unmitigated success, in Nov, 1977, 184 Rhodesian soldiers and 61 Rhodesian fixed and rotary wing aircraft struck two ZANLA camps deep within Mozambique. Two distinct operations undertaken concurrently within a period of 72 hrs resulted in a total of approximately 3000 ZANLA deaths, many thousands wounded and tons of equipment lost for a price of two Rhodesian dead, a handful wounded and one aircraft lost; a success that sent reverberations throughout the world.

                Pringle sets the stage for the reader by providing throughout the first half of the book a synopsis of the conditions that led up to Op Dingo. Relaying in a manner easily followed by the casual historian (but with more than sufficient detail for the armchair general), he succinctly traces the international situation that led to the Rhodesian isolation, its reluctant reliance upon South Africa and its (mainly successful) efforts to develop and maintain capabilities ensuring freedom of action. Additionally, Pringle sheds light upon the activities of the regional powers surrounding Rhodesia, their support for the rebel faction ZANLA and the impact that this had on the ultimate fate of the Rhodesians. All of this sets an outstanding base from which to segue into the unfolding of Operation Dingo.

                The second half of the book is a detailed rendition of the planning and execution at the tactical level of Op Dingo itself. Drawing upon first person as well as official documentation Pringle provides depth and breadth to his narrative; including not just recollections from the Rhodesian side, but also the ZANLA. His style is such that the reader feels intimately the tension, pressure and speed of the execution.

                Two observations that I would make is that while Pringle explains in detail a number of the Rhodesian technical innovations such as the flechette and golf bombs, he does not describe the alpha bomb. This is a significant oversight as this ordnance was a completely unique Rhodesian design and key to the success of the operation. Additionally, the maps provided could have been improved had the tracks of the different ingress and egress routes of the various airframes been provided. Pringle discusses these routes in detail in the narrative and I feel that the complexity (and, by extension) the professionalism of the operation would have been further enhanced by coloured maps tracing the routing. These are; however, minor comments that are not detrimental to Pringle’s success with this rendition.

                Overall, this is an excellent read and a thoroughly engaging book. I highly recommend it for those interested in a regional conflict that has largely been lost in the shadows of history.

Brown Waters of Africa: Portuguese Riverine Warfare 1961-1974 - John P Cann

The information presented was written by Chris Buckham; however, it was published in The Canadian Naval Review (Vol. 9, No. 3 (Fall 2013)). Therefore, the material is reproduced here by the author with the permission of the Review. If you would like to republish this information or refer to excerpts please contact the Editor CNR (Ann.Griffiths@Dal.Ca). Website for the Review is: http://www.navalreview.ca

Title: Brown Waters of Africa: Portuguese Riverine Warfare 1961-1974

Author: John P Cann
ISBN: 978-1-908916-56-3
Softcover
Pages: 274
Illustrations: 33 B/W
Publisher: Helion Publishing

                Histories relating to ‘colonial style’ insurrection often focus on the land and air aspects of those operations. What makes the Portuguese experience so interesting is that, due to geography and sparse population, riverine operations played a critical role for both the insurgents and the Portuguese trying to contain them. Riverine doctrine and ops were in their infancy when Portugal decided to go against world convention and undertake efforts to retain its three colonies in Africa (Angola, Mozambique and Guinea). Thus the Portuguese military developed and executed their concepts over the course of 13 years of ongoing operations resulting in a comprehensive and effective response to the insurgents. 

                Cann’s book commences with a comprehensive overview of the development of the insurgency movement within Africa and the concurrent responses to it from the West and Soviets. He then addresses the challenges to the Portuguese government and senior military staff as it was pulled between opportunities and responsibilities to NATO (and its blue-water naval requirements) and the ‘ultramar’ (or colonies) and their brown-water focus. The Portuguese senior naval staff’s success, commencing in the mid-1950’s, in meeting both of these necessities, was remarkable both in terms of naval equipment purchase and design and doctrinal development (especially relating to operations within river, lake and littoral regions). While creating their own unique brown-water doctrine, the Portuguese drew heavily on the successes and failures of three main allies: the US, French and Great Britain.

                He then delves into the creation of specialized marine infantry, the Fuzileiros, to augment the engagement power of the riverine fleet. Having been disbanded as a force in 1890, these marines were reactivated with new operating procedures and tactics in 1959. Operating with new ‘Zodiac’ style small boats, these soldiers augmented the already versatile and formidable fleet of landing craft, patrol boats and frigates that were specifically created to meet the unique requirements of brown-water engagements.

                Once he had established the background and history of the Portuguese involvement and reaction to the colonial insurgencies, Cann focused his attention on operations and activities within each of the colonies themselves. Drawing upon extensive after-action reports and interviews, he sheds light upon the similarities and differences between the Portuguese navy’s responses to the unique requirements of each region. Faced with insurgents of varying capability and competence, the navy, through an ongoing and dynamic process of trial and error, developed extremely effective and responsive methods to interdict and disrupt insurgent logistical support by denying them freedom of movement within the regional waterways. Due to the challenging geography of the region joint operations with the army became the norm and while this was, from an overall perspective, effective, there were significant growing pains as the two traditionally independent elements struggled with command and control as well as operational primacy issues. Nevertheless, the navy’s ability to adapt both its equipment and tactics to meet the challenges of the insurgencies was indeed laudable.

                Cann’s book is excellent and sheds light upon a campaign that was largely overshadowed by the US experiences in Vietnam. That the Portuguese were able, by 1974, to realize military success in all three of their insurgent regions is in and of itself indicative of the critical success of their equipment and tactics. Cann provides an outstanding bibliography and footnote system thereby providing the reader with reams of material to follow up with. His extensive use of maps also ensures clear geographic context for the different theatres of operations. The font is a bit small but this is a minor inconvenience.

 
                Overall an excellent book and one that should be studied for those interested in expanding their knowledge of non-traditional uses of naval assets in an asymmetric environment. Highly recommended.

Concrete Hell - Louis A DiMarco

The information presented was written by Chris Buckham; however, it was published in The Canadian Army Journal. Therefore, the material is reproduced here by the author with the permission of the journal. If you would like to republish this information or refer to excerpts please contact the Editor Canadian Army Journal (ANDREW.GODEFROY@forces.gc.ca). Website for the Journal is: http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/default-eng.asp?view=more

Title: Concrete Hell: Urban Warfare From Stalingrad to Iraq

Author: Louis A DiMarco
ISBN: 978-1-84908-792-6
Hardcover
Pages: 232
Illustrations: 47 B/W, 19 Colour
Publisher: Osprey Publishing

                An element of warfare that rarely receives the degree of attention warranted is fighting in built up areas. Historians tracing the unfolding of a campaign will talk about fighting in Caen, Krakov or Warsaw but don’t delve into the details. Louis DiMarco’s book looks to address this oversight through an analysis of city fighting over the last century. His stated intention with this book is threefold: provide the reader with an overall understanding of the urban battlespace, analyse doctrinal insights – based on case studies – into factors affecting the execution of urban operations, and trace the evolution of urban warfare from the 20^th and early 21^st century. He undertakes this effort through a series of case studies of urban conflicts commencing with World War 2 and running through to Iraq.

                DiMarco’s work is interesting and useful in that it spends a great deal of effort providing a strategic and operational level (‘big hand/small map’) overview of the conflict and the events leading up to it. The challenge with this is that the degree of analysis of the evolution of urban warfare is somewhat limited. I would have anticipated a greater attention and focus on the actual development and execution of urban doctrine. Additionally, DiMarco’s premise (identified in Chapter 1) that ‘warfare’s historically traditional locale’ is the urban battle space is, in my opinion, not accurate. One does not have to look very hard to find innumerable historical examples of field combat, siege warfare and, least of all, fighting in urban settings that underscore the multi-facetted nature of war.
  
              Nevertheless, DiMarco’s work does have some very valuable analysis associated with it. He does identify a number of consistent themes associated with success in urban combat. Intelligence, isolating the environment from reinforcement, specialized weapon systems and joint operating teams as well as working to separate the combatants (both conventional and asymmetric) from their civilian population support base all retain resonance. Additionally, the failure of many nations to remember and learn the lessons from the past (therefore failing to apply them) proved to be both costly and time-consuming.   

                DiMarco has produced a worthy product but it attempts to address too many issues that are secondary to, and have little bearing on, his stated primary focus. A good example of this was his discussion of the use of Republic of South Korean forces in the retaking of Seoul during the Korean War. The author’s outline of their involvement, while interesting, adds nothing to the discussion of how urban warfare was undertaken and developed.

                I enjoyed his work as a general analysis of the battlefields that he reviews but the book left me somewhat underwhelmed. I had anticipated, given his introduction, much more effort to be given to the how’s and why’s of urban conflict itself. Also I think that a number of his premises, while not completely incorrect, are somewhat skewed. The book is worth a read but with a critical eye.

The Daring Dozen - Gavin Mortimer

The information presented was written by Chris Buckham; however, it was published in Sabretache Journal. Therefore, the material is reproduced here by the author with the permission of the Journal. If you would like to republish this information or refer to excerpts please contact: Paul.Skrebels@unisa.edu.au  Website for the Journal is: http://www.mhsa.org.au/journal.html

Title: The Daring Dozen

Author: Gavin Mortimer
ISBN: 978-1-84908-842-8
Pages: 303
Hardcover
Photographs: 14 b/w

It has been commonly said that necessity is the mother of invention, certainly in the case of warfare many obstacles are removed as the operational need outweighs tradition and convention. Mortimer's book The Daring Dozen, tells the story about twelve unconventional warriors and the impact that they made on the outcome of the Second World War. His approach is to provide an overall introduction to the nature of and what contitutes special operations followed by twelve chapters each dedicated to an individual and their exploits. He focuses upon the UK, Italy, US and Germany and it is interesting (and somewhat telling) that the USSR and Japan do not have any additions.

What is fascinating about the book is the similarity of challenges faced by Special Forces' advocates in each of the countries and also the common personality threads that each of the national advocates shared. In almost every case, the individuals behind the creation of these organizations were considered to be poor traditional soldiers (not in terms of ability but in terms of acceptance of status quo) and faced significant resistance to their “out of the box thinking”. They also tended to have a short fuse when it came to dealing with conventional chains of command.

Mortimer has not provided a conclusion with his work. This is not a significant issue in my opinion as his focus is upon the individual leaders not the concept of special forces themselves. What is noteworthy to be gleaned from the studies is insight into why some countries were more successful than others regarding the development of special operations. For example, the question relating to why the Germans never developed an equivalent force to the UK’s Long Range Desert Patrol is interesting. After all, they both operated in the same environment and the Germans had shown a marked ability to think non-traditionally (note the airborne glider attack on Eben Emael). It would appear that the appetite for the development of operations outside of the conventional envelope was much more limited within Germany than in the UK.

The author approaches his subjects as unique chapters. Therefore the book may be read in individual chunks without losing any of the flow or content. This is beneficial if you have an interest in the subject but little time to read. The approach and layout is similar for each; topics are traced from their pre-spec ops period and followed as they developed into the driving force behind their nations’ operational development. Through this, challenges, operations and successes are identified and discussed. Additionally, the difficulty many had in the post war period is also discussed in some detail. One can imagine the shock of trying to transition from a semi-autonomous fighting commander involved in high risk, high adrenaline activities to suddenly finding oneself once again under the scrutiny of conventional forces in a peace time environment; many, understandably, had significant difficulty transitioning. Also of interest was the change in attitude of the Governments towards the post war maintenance of special ops forces. In many cases units were summarily disbanded (such as the SAS) as Governments and conventional militaries could not appreciate a continued requirement for their skill sets.

Overall, this was an informative and well researched book. It was not a difficult read and serves as a good introduction to the major players of the early special operations communities. What we take for granted today regarding the use of special forces in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan owes its conception to those pioneers reviewed in this book. Naturally, the degree of detail for each individual is limited due to the amount of space allotted to them; nevertheless, I would recommend this book as a solid general history of the inception of Special Forces.