MiG Alley: The US Air Force in Korea 1950-53 - Thomas McKelvey Cleaver

This review has been submitted to Strategy 

and Tactics Magazine.

Title: MiG Alley: The US Air Force in Korea 1950-53
Author: Thomas McKelvey Cleaver
ISBN: 978-1-4728-3608-3
Publisher: Osprey Publishing 
Year: 2019
 Hardcover
Pages: 326

Conventional wisdom relating to the Korean War has the UN Forces (read US Air Force) maintaining an incredible kill ratio vs the MiG 15’s of the Koreans and Chinese. Drawing upon primary source material, the author has shown conclusively that, rather than the 14:1 kill/loss rate normally quoted, in reality the air campaign was far closer with rates approaching 1:1 during the first half of the war and 1.3/1 in the latter years. 

Cleaver has undertaken an excellent review of the air war, citing from interviews, intelligence reports and mission assessments from both sides in a (successful) effort to overturn traditional perceptions. The flow of the narrative follows the timeline of the conflict and the reader is therefore able to trace the development of tactics, doctrine and aircraft and the impact that it had as the war progressed. 

Cleaver incorporates within the narrative, a clear and concise discussion of the capabilities of the primary combat aircraft of the adversaries: MiG-15 for the North and the F-86 Sabre for the UN. In the course of his assessments, he is able to prove that, from a technical perspective, the MIG-15 was an equal match for the F-86 and overall, a far superior aircraft to F-51D, F-80 and the navy F9F Panther. His suggestion that the discriminating factor for success became the expertise of the pilots at the controls and the development of doctrine that drew upon the advantages each airframe had over the other, is well supported by primary source analysis. For example, with its multiple cannon and advantage in rate of climb and dive speeds the MiG was best suited as a hit and run platform that could do devastating damage with only one or two strikes; whereas the Sabre, with its 6 x .50 guns and close in maneuverability, was ideal in a more traditional dog-fighting role. 

The author has focussed a great deal of the book on a balanced evaluation of flight documents and after action reports; his analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the pilots (Soviet, Chinese, Commonwealth and American) is fascinating as is his investigation of bias and hubris amongst them. Cleaver adroitly encapsulates the Air War in Korea within the broader spectrum of the international struggle developing between East and West. Thus it was that the nations involved went to great lengths to conceal/manipulate losses and victories as a means of propaganda.

His conclusions are of particular interest as they are not standard in nature. Rather than simply look at win/loss rates and the fact that the ‘North Korean’ air force was not able to operate south of the 38^th parallel, he draws far more nuanced deductions. He posits, for example, that the goal of the North was to prevent UN forces from being able to bomb Northern Korea with impunity. In this respect they were successful in that B-29 losses were such that daylight bombing was suspended and fighter bomber efforts were limited. In fact, as Cleaver points out, the air interdiction campaign of the UN was never able to isolate the North Koreans and Chinese on the battlefield.

A fascinating book and well worthy of a read for those who wish to achieve a deeper understanding of the strengths and limitations of air campaigns. Cleaver has undertaken a comprehensive analyses of his subject, well supported by primary source material, that he presents in a logical and easily understood manner. He has also added a very human dimension to his work with the inclusion of personal anecdotes from participants on both sides of the conflict. Strongly recommended.

East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950 - Roy E Appleman

Title: East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950

Author: Roy E Appleman

ISBN: 978-0890962831

Publisher: Texas A & M UP

Year: 1987

Hardcover

Pages: 361

Maps:  11

Photos: 41

The advance of UN forces into North Korea and the region of the Yalu River following the landing at Inchon in 1950 is well known and studied. The subsequent surprise attack by overwhelming Chinese infantry forces and the collapse of the UN drive followed by the desperate fighting retreat of the Marines of X Corps from around the Chosin Reservoir stands as one of the defining moments of the Korean Conflict. Lesser known but no less dramatic was the tragedy of the Army’s 31 Regimental Combat Team (RCT), destroyed while attempting to retreat after defending the 7^th Marines Eastern flank.

The author has drawn upon the first hand recollections of survivors as well as declassified documents from the Army and Marines to paint a comprehensive picture of a unit that circumstance, hubris and poor planning had destined for disaster. Additionally, he also relates a story of individual courage, tenacity and will on the part of individual soldiers and officers. Make no mistake however, Appleman pulls no punches in his rendition of selfishness and appalling leadership collapse.

It is a maxim that one’s true nature is revealed during times of intense stress and hardship; the experience of 31 RCT highlights this fact in glaring detail. If nothing else, this tragedy serves as a teaching tool on leadership under adverse conditions. The collapse of the command structure and the subsequent deterioration of the 31 RCT from a military unit into a mob of individuals within a matter of hours is a harsh testament to the necessity of maintenance of unit cohesion and discipline and the critical roles of the NCO’s and Officers to that effect

There are many lessons to be gleaned from this work:

1.    The critical necessity of maintaining communications;

2.    The role of the Commander and where they need to be in order to ensure accessibility and the maintenance of operational control;

3.    Clear planning and ensuring that sub-units understand their roles and responsibilities;

4.    Anticipation of requirements. Commanders must not micromanage but focus on what is required next;

5.    Logistics: the need to identify critical requirements and the absolute necessity for the Command to deliver based upon those requirements

6.    The critical role of junior Officers and NCO’s in maintaining unit cohesion and discipline; and

7.    The need for inter-service cooperation and a common operating environment.

The experience of the 31^st RCT in Chosin should be studied by leadership academies and used a teaching tool for how not to undertake an operation. Individuals involved within the 7^th Marines and the RCT certainly rose to the challenge of the occasion and serve as examples for others to emulate; however, overall, the lessons of this tragedy are more akin to what not to do rather than the opposite.

Give Me Tomorrow: The Epic Stand of the Marines of George Company - Patrick K O’Donnell

Title: Give Me Tomorrow

Author: Patrick K O’Donnell

ISBN: 978-0-306-82044-1

Publisher: DaCapo

Year: 2010

Softvcover

Pages: 261

Photos/Maps: 28/4

O’Donnell’s book, while touching upon the grander strategies of the Korean War – mainly for context – is not about the larger picture. Rather it is a testament to the resilience and endurance of the soldiers at the coal face of battle. It is the story of the soldiers of the 1^st Marine Division and, more specifically, George Company (the 3/1^st – 3^rd Battalion/1^st Marines) and their epic, horrific retreat from the Chosin Resevoir in 1950. Indirectly, it is also the story of the Chinese and North Korean soldiers that they fought against and their tenacity in the face of horrible firepower and conditions.

Sound tactical and operational planning and effective logistics are the building blocks of military success; however, the absolute foundation is represented by esprit de corps, leadership and training. This is the message of this book. The author has gathered first-hand accounts of the individual soldiers, senior NCO’s and officers of the 1/3^rd and has produced a fine rendition of their experiences and motivations. Korea was unique in that, despite the lessons of the recently finished Second World War, America and the West had very few resources to draw upon to meet the North Korean threat and thus had to scramble to reactivate and train units. Therefore, many of the Marines of the 3/1^st had only the most basic of training and had to rely very heavily of a small cadre of officers and senior NCO’s to season them in the field (and very quickly). It was this common experience glue and the reliance each had upon the other that enabled these marines to overcome odds of greater than 10:1 and winter weather that was the coldest in living memory for the region.

O’Donnell’s narrative emphasizes the role of the professional NCO and officer cadre. They are there not only to ensure the baseline training and professionalism of the troops, but also that they stay focussed on the task at hand when everything about them is coming apart. The example and standards set and enforced by these individuals instilled the men with the capacity to endure the severe conditions that they were faced with. It becomes quite evident as the Chosin battle unfolded that it was not belief in the ‘cause’ but the desire to support one another and the pride at being a marine that carried the day.

Another aspect of leadership that was well conveyed in this book were the roles of the officers and NCO’s. The officer’s role was to plan and fight the Company; the First Sergeant and his NCO’s managed the men. These roles overlapped yet were distinct and it is this delineation that is most difficult for junior officers and NCO’s to learn and exercise comfortably. In the case of George Company, the example and experience of the First Sergeant Zullo was critical to the continued effectiveness of the Company.

Give Me Tomorrow is an excellent example of what can be achieved with proper training and leadership. It is also an excellent example of what can go wrong when intelligence and advice is ignored at the more senior levels. At the end of the day, it falls upon the lowest tactical level units to either carry the day or collapse. In the case of 3/1^st, they rose to the challenge and overcame the odds. The book is well researched and clearly expresses the sentiments of the men involved. The Korean War may be one that has been largely lost between World War 2 and Vietnam but the lessons are as relevant today as they were then. The men of George Company have been well served by O’Donnell’s work.

Red Devils Over the Yalu - Igor Seidov, Translated by Stuart Britton

Title: Red Devils Over the Yalu

Author: Igor Seidov, Translated by Stuart Britton

ISBN: 978-1-909384-41-5

Publisher: Helion

Softcover

Pages: 598

Photos: 64 b/w 

The Korean War by October, 1950, was all but won by the UN and American forces; the North Koreans were pushed into pockets deep in the north of the country and the Allies ruled the skies and oceans. Everything changed however with the entrance of Chinese forces into the war on October 17th, 1950. What occurred immediately afterwards is very well known and chronicled in the histories of the Korean War, what has not been well remembered however, was the key role that the Soviet Union played not only in training and equipping the North Korean and Chinese Air Forces, but also in the direct provision of air force personnel into the fighting.  

For the first time, Seidov has chronicled in detail the exploits of Soviet aerial operations throughout the Korean War. Fighting wearing Chinese uniforms, utilizing Chinese phraseology while flying and operating in aircraft of Soviet make but bearing Chinese markings, these forces directly engaged Allied air forces and wrested control of the skies over the northern part of the Korean peninsula away from the West.  

Limited in their operational range due to restrictions imposed by the Soviet Government, these forces nevertheless had an immediate and dramatic effect upon the allied air campaign once they commenced operations on November 1st, 1950. The Mig 15 dominated the skies over the F-51's, F-80's, F9F's and F-84 of the West and heralded the demise of operational bombing with the heavy losses they inflicted upon the B-29 formations of the Far East Air Force. It was not, in fact, until the introduction of the F-86 Sabre of the 4th Fighter-Interceptor Group on the 15th of December, 1950, that the Allies were able to engage the Russians again on a level playing field. 

Seidov draws upon the declassified archives of both Russian and American combat records to verify or repudiate many of the long standing claims and beliefs associated with the Korean air war. For example, conventional wisdom has the American's destroying Migs at a rate of 8:1 and, while in absolute terms this is true, it is based primarily on the fact that the US attributed a majority of their losses to non-air combat related causes. Seidov goes on to show that many of the losses were in fact shoot-downs as opposed to mechanical or ground fire reasons. I found his evaluations to be very balanced and equally critical of both sides.  

Additionally, Seidov looks into the strategic engagement plan of the Soviets and analyzes it for strengths and weaknesses. He is very critical of the Russian practice to rotate units in their entirety due to the loss of operational experience and the necessity to relearn lessons and goes into great detail regarding the training and practices that US fighter pilot replacements went through before they were considered capable for full frontline duties. One area that would have been beneficial for Seidov to have investigated more was the reason why the Soviet High Command followed the rotation practice that they did. They were aware of the losses and the changes in the dynamic of the air war but Seidov only skirts the surface. 

The author has obviously interviewed numerous Russian, Chinese and North Korean veterans as he has incorporated hundreds of first hand accounts into the books narrative. These were fascinating as they discussed challenges, tactics and experiences of the other side that have heretofore never been related. 

The book is very detailed in its accounts of the engagements of the different Russian units throughout the period of the war. The degree of detail is a two edged sword in my opinion as it provides the reader a deep appreciation of the nature of Korean War air combat, while, concurrently, blending the individual stories thereby tending to blunt the tight narrative. 

Helion has published an excellent quality book and Stuart Britton's translation is outstanding. The book would have benefited from maps detailing the area of operations of the Russians and a regional map to facilitate an appreciation of the distances flown by the US and Russian aircraft. Overall, a very meaty book full of incredible detail that provides deep insight into the nature of air combat in Korea from the Russian perspective. For those fans and historians of the Korean War looking for new material, I would strongly recommend this book.

Concrete Hell - Louis A DiMarco

The information presented was written by Chris Buckham; however, it was published in The Canadian Army Journal. Therefore, the material is reproduced here by the author with the permission of the journal. If you would like to republish this information or refer to excerpts please contact the Editor Canadian Army Journal (ANDREW.GODEFROY@forces.gc.ca). Website for the Journal is: http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/default-eng.asp?view=more

Title: Concrete Hell: Urban Warfare From Stalingrad to Iraq

Author: Louis A DiMarco
ISBN: 978-1-84908-792-6
Hardcover
Pages: 232
Illustrations: 47 B/W, 19 Colour
Publisher: Osprey Publishing

                An element of warfare that rarely receives the degree of attention warranted is fighting in built up areas. Historians tracing the unfolding of a campaign will talk about fighting in Caen, Krakov or Warsaw but don’t delve into the details. Louis DiMarco’s book looks to address this oversight through an analysis of city fighting over the last century. His stated intention with this book is threefold: provide the reader with an overall understanding of the urban battlespace, analyse doctrinal insights – based on case studies – into factors affecting the execution of urban operations, and trace the evolution of urban warfare from the 20^th and early 21^st century. He undertakes this effort through a series of case studies of urban conflicts commencing with World War 2 and running through to Iraq.

                DiMarco’s work is interesting and useful in that it spends a great deal of effort providing a strategic and operational level (‘big hand/small map’) overview of the conflict and the events leading up to it. The challenge with this is that the degree of analysis of the evolution of urban warfare is somewhat limited. I would have anticipated a greater attention and focus on the actual development and execution of urban doctrine. Additionally, DiMarco’s premise (identified in Chapter 1) that ‘warfare’s historically traditional locale’ is the urban battle space is, in my opinion, not accurate. One does not have to look very hard to find innumerable historical examples of field combat, siege warfare and, least of all, fighting in urban settings that underscore the multi-facetted nature of war.
  
              Nevertheless, DiMarco’s work does have some very valuable analysis associated with it. He does identify a number of consistent themes associated with success in urban combat. Intelligence, isolating the environment from reinforcement, specialized weapon systems and joint operating teams as well as working to separate the combatants (both conventional and asymmetric) from their civilian population support base all retain resonance. Additionally, the failure of many nations to remember and learn the lessons from the past (therefore failing to apply them) proved to be both costly and time-consuming.   

                DiMarco has produced a worthy product but it attempts to address too many issues that are secondary to, and have little bearing on, his stated primary focus. A good example of this was his discussion of the use of Republic of South Korean forces in the retaking of Seoul during the Korean War. The author’s outline of their involvement, while interesting, adds nothing to the discussion of how urban warfare was undertaken and developed.

                I enjoyed his work as a general analysis of the battlefields that he reviews but the book left me somewhat underwhelmed. I had anticipated, given his introduction, much more effort to be given to the how’s and why’s of urban conflict itself. Also I think that a number of his premises, while not completely incorrect, are somewhat skewed. The book is worth a read but with a critical eye.

This Kind of War - T.R. Fehrenbach

Title: This Kind of War

Author: T.R. Fehrenbach

ISBN: 9781574882599

Hardcover

Pages: 483

Illustrations: 20 b/w with maps

Publisher: Brassey’s

Col (Ret’d) Fehrenbach’s book traces the scope of the Korean war; commencing with an outline of the history of the initial partition to the final armistice.  He not only provides an in depth explanation of the war itself but also incorporates the international situation and its effects upon the ongoing conflict and its outcomes.

This edition of the book provides detailed maps and timelines associated with the significant events of the war. This is very helpful as the first half of the conflict was characterized by a massive war of operational movement up and down the peninsula while the second half was one of relative stagnation.

His writing style is not technical in nature and is very accessible to the average reader. His focus is primarily on the US and ROK (Republic of Korea) and their experiences during the war. The other allied forces involved in the conflict receive little to no mention. He easily transitions from the tactical to the strategic view of operations thereby providing the reader with a clear understanding of the complexity and uniqueness of the fight. An excellent example being the uprising associated with the North Korean and Chinese POW’s held on the island of Koje off of the southern tip of South Korea. The degree of naiveté shown by the Allied (predominately US) forces charged with managing and administering these prisoners was staggering; especially in light of the fact that the experiences of WW2 were so recent. Fehrenbach not only adroitly outlines the situation but delves into the root causes that enabled the uprising and its outcome.

Fehrenbach makes a concerted effort to highlight the challenges of the individual soldiers (from senior officers to privates) engaged in the fighting. He does not hold back criticism (backed by fact) where warranted and his narrative displays the US army as a reflection of the post World War 2 society; warts and all. His writing does wander into a bit of ‘pulpit thumping’ from time to time however, while a little distracting, this does not adversely affect the overall narrative flow.

This was not a hard book to read and is an excellent starting point for anyone interested in a overall exposure to the Korean War. This war, coming on the heels of the Second World War, has often been dismissed (even being called a police action) as a minor engagement; far from it.  This was a massive conflict that in terms of geography was much smaller than other major conflicts but was nevertheless, as intense and devastating as any that had been fought in the 20^th century. It also heralded a new age of conflict within the auspices of the UN, a dawning of Asian pride and the superpower power struggles. I learned a great deal and came away with a much better understanding of some of the unique complexities associated with operations during this period and in this environment. I recommend it and would suggest that it be used a spring board to other more focused books on the Korean War.