Miracle at the Litza: Hitler’s First Defeat on the Eastern Front - Alf R Jacobsen

This review has been submitted to the Australian Naval Institute Journal

Title: Miracle at the Litza: Hitler’s First Defeat on the Eastern Front

Author: Alf R Jacobsen

ISBN: 978-1-612-00506-5

Publisher: Casemate

Year: 2017

Hardcover

Pages: 190

Photos/Maps: 71/8

Histories of the early stages of Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of Russia, traditionally focus upon the line of activities running from the Baltic to Romania and the incredible successes that the Germans enjoyed during the first six months of that campaign. Lesser known but of longer term significance was the savage and austere fighting that occurred in the high arctic on the approaches to Murmansk. Jacobsen has drawn upon primary source material from the archives of Russia, Germany, England, Norway and Finland in an effort to address this shortcoming.

The book outlines the planning and execution of the German attacks across two lines of advance, the challenges faced and why they ultimately failed. He also provides a detailed account of the Russian and English efforts at countering these attacks. Ultimately these efforts, unlike the rest of the Eastern Front, were successful and served as an excellent example of joint operational planning and execution across both service elements and between the British and Russians.

Jacobsen does a noteworthy job of analyzing why the German/Finnish forces failed and it centers upon a few key lessons:

1.    A failure of German Intelligence to accurately determine the forces both physical as well as climatic facing them across the northern approaches to Murmansk;

2.    Failure to engage with the Finns early enough to have them provide meaningful input into the planning process;

3.    Failure of relations between German strategic, operational and tactical levels of Command and a resultant loss of trust and focus;

4.    German failure to maintain the schwerepunkt of attack and the subsequent reinforcement of failure as opposed to success between the Northern and Salla approaches to Murmansk; and

5.    A dilution of limited forces across the North.

Conversely, the author’s discussion of the Allied efforts also highlights certain lessons:

1.    The critical importance of effective joint operations (in this case naval and naval air) on both morale and flexibility;

2.    Effective intelligence; both the timely interception and effective use of;

3.    Allied engagement and the challenge of the perception of help versus tangible assistance on trust and cooperation;

4.    Ensuring that the correct assets are available to provide flexible response options to local commanders (in this case naval gunfire, submarine and naval air options); and

5.    The under-rated but critical importance of dogged resilience in effective defensive operations.

Jacobsen’s analysis and presentation of this previously underrepresented aspect of Operation Barbarossa is a nuanced, balanced and thoroughly readable work. The maps provided are somewhat busy and hard to follow but provide an adequate appreciation of elevations and the challenging nature of the environment. The book closes with a synopsis/analysis of the campaign by a former head of the Norwegian Armed Forces who lends a professional soldiers perspective from one who intimately knows the ground being fought over. Highly recommended.