This review was submitted to Army History Magazine.
Author: Nuto Revelli
ISBN: 978-0-7006-1908-5
Hardcover
Pages: 540
Illustrations: 2 maps
Publisher: University of Kansas Press
When
one considers the war on the Eastern Front, it is very easy to fall into the
trap of assuming that the war was exclusively between the Germans and Soviets
(with a smattering of other nations). This is far from the truth; other nations
provided significant forces operating under their own command and control, to
the struggles in the East. The Italians provided an expeditionary army known as
ARMIR (Italian Army in Russia and later the Italian 8th Army) consisting
of a total of approximately 230,000 men. A vast majority of them (150,000)
operated along the Don River and were thus overwhelmed by the Russian Operation
Uranus (the code name for the overall operation in Stalingrad) in Dec 1942; of
this total the Italians suffered 85,000 dead or missing and 27,000 wounded or
frostbitten. An additional tragedy for the Italian servicemen was that,
following the end of the war 10,000 prisoners were returned in either 1945 or
1946 by the Soviets (even though Italy had surrendered in 1943).
Following
the cessation of hostilities, Italy succumbed to a significant amount of
internal upheaval as it struggled to emerge from the shadow of fascism and the
extensive amount of destruction wrought by the war. Central to this were the
struggles between the supporters of communism and capitalism. Veterans were
therefore treated with varying degrees of disdain depending upon who they were
dealing with in government.
Nuto Revelli
was a veteran of the Eastern front; a veteran who escaped capture by the
Russians and became a partisan following Italy’s surrender. A resident of the
Cuneo region of Northwestern Italy, he was a member of the elite Alpini;
divisions trained for conflict in the rugged mountains of Italy’s northern
border. He became a professional historian after the war and decided that the
story of Italy’s efforts, as related by the soldiers that fought, was lacking.
He therefore interviewed 43 veterans of his region, all having experienced
combat on the Eastern front and transcribed their stories verbatim. Originally
collected and printed in Italian in 1966, the text has been translated by John
Penuel for a reissue in English for the first time.
There
are a number of lessons which may be gleaned from the writings provided and it
must be emphasized that the texts are all from the perspective of, for the most
part, private and junior NCO soldiers (there are two officers, a lieutenant and
a captain also included). They therefore did not have access to high level
planning, strategy or visibility. Thus their views are quite narrow in keeping
with what they were exposed to; but very telling in what they recall and what
was of significance to them:
1. Logistics at most levels of engagement were disastrous. Soldiers did
not receive proper food or clothing to the point where, even within the Italian
peninsula, there were still multiple cases of having to ‘live off of the land’.
Uniforms and footwear were inadequate for conditions and were of poor quality.
Mail delivery was inadequate and unreliable. The entire logistics system of the
Italian military appears (from the perspective of the soldiers involved) to
have been extremely tenuous and quickly failed under the pressure of the
Russian campaign.
2. Utilization of the forces in question was inappropriate. The
divisions of the Alpini were trained and equipped to operate in mountainous
conditions, not as general infantry. Thus their equipment (ie mountain
artillery), training and expertise was not only misapplied but inadequate to
deal with the equipment and numbers of the Soviet forces facing them.
3. Leadership was found wanting within the Italian military as was
training. As a general rule, officers did not mix with the soldiers and
information regarding locations, destinations and conditions were withheld from
the troops. Thus they lacked not only situational awareness but trust in their
chains of command.
4. There was significant animosity and mistrust between the Germans and
the Italians even during the period that they were allies. This perception of
being the weaker of the allies and the condescension with which the Germans
treated them did not promote harmony or develop common goals and visions. The
Italian perception as they deployed for Russia was that Germany will have taken
care of a vast majority of the fighting.
5. Transport was very poor for the Italians. The Germans had requested
“truck transported” units. The Italians provided “truck transportable” units
meaning that they were trained to move by vehicle but had no integral transport
equipment. This resulted in long marches, frostbite and soldiers that were both
exhausted and suffering from terrible morale.
6. Post war Italy was more interested in moving forward then caring for
their injured, repatriating soldiers. The soldiers were eligible for multiple
war pensions but the process and timeline set up by the government to have them
actioned was so convoluted and inefficient that many were still not receiving
money ten years following their return.
This is not
an easy book to read. Notwithstanding the impact of the raw testimony from the
survivors that, in itself, strains one’s ability to comprehend, the reader
certainly feels the extent of the resignation to their individual fates. They
have lost the passions of youth and have been crushed by fate and circumstance.
This book is
also very difficult to read because of the style of the presentation. Because
the testimony of the veterans is presented verbatim with very little editing,
it is at times hard to follow and understand. This style is a two edged sword
as it presents with deep legitimacy but also, lacking in context, it can be
somewhat confusing.
Overall, this
is a very moving work to the sacrifices of the Italian soldier on the Eastern
front. It does not look at strategy or operational success and failure; it
serves merely as a medium by which the soldier can tell his story. It provides
very interesting insight into the experiences of these men in captivity and
their reception upon repatriation and, additionally, what they anticipated
going into Russia. The production value of the book is high and the translation
from Italian very good. It is a work that should be read in conjunction with an
operational history of the Italian Expeditionary Army in order to assist with
context.
No comments:
Post a Comment