Author:
Marc Bloch
ISBN:
978-8-087-83083-3
Publisher:
Important Books
Year:
2013
Softcover
Pages:
133
Photographs/maps:
0
Between
July and August 1940, Captain Marc Bloch, a fuel services officer in the French
Army, drafted his testament of the cause of the French defeat at the hands of
the German Wehrmacht. Bloch had seen active service in the trenches during the
First World War and was a historian/professor during the interwar years. His
service in the Second World War was undertaken at both operational and Army
level HQ's where he was privy to the workings of the highest level of French
Army command. With ample military experience and the eye of a professional
historian, he was able to to discern much in the confusion that he witnessed
around him.
His
book is a poignant and insightful analysis of why the French Army and, by
extension, the French Government and people were so thoroughly and soundly
beaten when all of the potential existed for French victory. He addresses
multiple aspects of the French armed forces and French society for, as he
points out, there was no one issue but a combination thereof, that brought the
house of cards down. He readily acknowledges that he did not have ready access
to the 'behind the scenes' machinations of decision making but he did have a
keen eye and a myriad of experience that gives his analysis validity and
credibility.
He is
both relentless and balanced in his exposure of the flaws that plagued the
French leadership and HQ; he spares no level of command, but it is evident that
his purpose is not to discredit on a personal level but to reveal on a
professional level. His observations cross the spectrum of what today would be
called the 'J-Staff'; some of his more telling observations follow:
1.
Communication: A lack of common operating picture within the HQ's and a failure
to pass information to the levels where it was needed in a timely manner. Also
a tendency to hoard information;
2.
Administration vs Operations: Administration trumped operational decision
making. An emphasis on process as opposed to results.
3.
Hubris: An assumption of superiority and a failure to emphasize continuous
learning. A failure to appreciate the changes that technology had brought to
the battlefield and a reliance upon the "way it has always been done'.
4.
Education: A failure to adapt and to take advantage of the opportunities to
adjust and develop doctrine before the conflict started (the Germans used
blitzkrieg techniques in Poland but the French ignored the lessons to be
learned despite an 8 month gap between Poland and France).
5.
Command: An inability of the commanders to adjust to the dynamic environment of
modern operations as a result of experience, training and paradigm shortfalls.
Bloch quotes a corps commander to Gen Blanchard (commander of the 1st Army):
"Do what you want Mon General but do something!"; stated in Bloch's
presence.
6.
National Expectations/institutions: A rise amongst the population of a level of
expectation for self (as opposed to national) service exacerbated by both
government and media playing off political and economic fault lines resulting
in stagnation and a psychological 'softening' of the population. A diminishment
of critical thinking within scientific and centres of higher education.
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