This review has been submitted to the Journal of the RCAF
Author:
Craig W H Luther
ISBN:
978-0-7643-4376-6
Publisher:
Schiffer
Year:
2013
Hardcover
Pages:
712
Photographs/maps:
185/23 handout
The
number of books written about the German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22
June, 1941 is legion. Thus it is that in order to stand out, a book must have
some aspect of it that makes it unique
from the others; Luther's book has two. The first focuses upon the
build-up to Barbarossa; not just the political and operational planning - that
has been well covered - but the logistical detail and execution. Secondly, he
limits (and I use the term loosely given the detail of the book) his narrative
to the operations of Army Group Centre and its drive on Moscow. This narrowing
of the scope of Luther's book highlights for the reader the immense challenges
associated with Barbarossa and, most importantly from a learning perspective,
what was done well by both the Soviet's and Germans and what was not.
Logistics
is not an exciting field of military operations and planning and many of the
histories of Barbarossa, while acknowledging it, pay only a cursory nod to the
critical role that it played as well as the amount of work it took to execute
as well as plan effectively. Luther does not do this; dedicating a full quarter
of his work to the German planning, pre-deployment and deployment phases of the
operation. The sheer numbers and complexity of the buildup and movement of the
forces involved (for Army Group Centre alone) is staggering: well over 127,000
tons of ammunition, 52,000 tons of fuel, 45,800 tons of rations (these values
equated to 20 days of supply only), millions of men and horses, vehicles and
equipment from across Europe, in secret, to staging areas along the
Soviet/German border. The movement tables for the railway system show hundreds
of trains flowing the resources east; a five phased operation over a period
February to June and entailing over 220 trains per day at its peak. Luther has
done an excellent job highlighting this phenomenal success and providing an
appreciation of the scope, distance and complexity of this undertaking.
He also
goes beyond simply the reiteration of fact and provides the reader with an
analysis of why the Germans arrived at the planning assumptions that they did
and how that ultimately affected the outcome of the operation. He draws clear
and concise lines of evaluation between a decision at the planning stage and
its trickle down effect through the operational and tactical levels of
execution. He also emphasizes the flexibility of the German support system with
his discussion of the last minute decision to move 8 Air Corps across the lines
of deployment. This decision to change the operational area of this massive
organization (over 8000 vehicles alone) had the potential to derail the entire
eastern deployment; that it did not was testament to the capability of the
German logistics system.
Luther
has drawn upon an extensive series of sources from both the Soviet and German
archives as well as a massive amount of secondary sources. Each chapter is
provided with its own end-notes thereby facilitating quick and timely review by
the reader. As he transitions from the build-up to the execution phase of the
campaign it is interesting that he maintains the balance between the frontline
operations, the growing logistical challenges and the impact of the continued
dysfunction between the strategic priorities of Hitler and those of OKW. His
writing style seamlessly flows between these aspects and he brings a critical
eye to his evaluation of the impacts of
these challenges.
His
focus is upon the German onslaught to the gates of Moscow but he does
incorporate into his study an analysis of the strengths and weakness of the
Soviet military and its operational capacities. In doing so he provides a clear
control line for the reader in terms of an evaluation of the capabilities of
the adversaries.
The
book itself is a very healthy tome. Included with it are a series of
operational maps (in German) of the various periods leading up to the December
battles outside of Moscow. The production value of the book is high and the
text easily readable.
Luther
has written a comprehensive and deeply analytical study of the lead up, launch
and task execution of Army Group Centre in the monumental Barbarossa operation.
This could be a very dry and dusty recitation of statistics and movements;
however, he avoids this through a dynamic and engaging style that incorporates
both an operational canvas and personal facets for the soldiers involved. His
review of the logistics challenges married with the flawed intelligence and
planning assumptions and evaluations go far in explaining how and why the
Germans reached the zenith of their offensive capability literally at the gates
of Moscow. Highly recommended as a an addition to any library on the Second
World War.
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