Panzer Tactics: Tank Operations in the East, 1941-42 - Oskar Munzel (translated by Linden Lyons)

Review submitted to Strategy and Tactics Magazine. 

Title: Panzer Tactics: Tank Operations in the East, 1941-42
Author: Oskar Munzel (translated by Linden Lyons)
ISBN: 978-1-61200-989-6
Publisher: Casemate
Year: 2021
Hardcover
Pages: 167
Photos/Maps: 0/21

Casemate Publishing is reissuing newly translated versions of the “Die Werhrmacht Im Kampf”:Battles and Problems of the Second World War series originally published in German during the 1950’s and 60’s. Written by former senior Commanders of the German Army, they capture the perspectives of those who were influential in how these campaigns and battles were planned and executed. The author, Munzel, was a member of the 6th Panzer Regiment from June, 1941 to December, 1943; he was its Commander from December, 1941. He also Commanded the 14th and 2nd Panzer Divisions and was the recipient of the Knight’s Cross. The 6th Pz Reg was directly involved in the operations described in this book and he thus brings a unique and eminently qualified operational perspective to his analysis.  

This work focuses first upon three major panzer operations leading up to the Battle for Moscow: the encirclement operations around Uman, the turn south to Kiev and the subsequent drive for Moscow. It then touches upon the reorientation south to the Caucasus and culminates in a series of conclusions based upon the experiences of the author. Drawing upon his personal perspectives, the recollections of other senior Panzer Commanders, as well as primary source material such as combat reports, war diaries and original orders, the author is able to both instruct and mentor the reader on elements of operations that only one who has experienced the cauldron and stress of battle can truly appreciate.  

Munzel’s refers to a number of themes that are prevalent throughout his discussion of the battles. Logistics and the ability to maintain a reliable source of supply for the operational forces was always a challenge even as early as the first few weeks of the Barbarossa Campaign. Shortages of ammunition and fuel are mentioned many times and the benefits of diesel engines that were used by the Russians. Overcoming these challenges are even more critical when one considers that the foundation of the German operational doctrine was deep interdiction by mobile forces. Additionally, was the critical need for aggressive, operationally focussed commanders at the Major, Lt-Col and Colonel ranks. These were the key individuals who set the tone for their units. Developing and mentoring leadership to match the nature of German operational doctrine ensured that senior NCO’s and Officers were able to assume command with assurance and an appreciation of the commanders intent. The author also discusses the impact of improvisation on German tactics as well as capabilities. The ability to improvise without higher direction is a skill set that was critical to the effective execution of German operations in the East. It ensured that opportunities that had not been foreseen were able to be exploited and it also enabled the Germans to overcome a more numerous enemy that was much more pedantic in their operational command and doctrine. Innovation on the part of German engineers enabled the incorporation and utilization of captured equipment, thereby offsetting some of the industrial shortfalls that they had begun to experience. The downside of this was the logistical nightmare that ensued as a result of the myriad of parts and ammunition types required to keep equipment operational; this had a detrimental effect upon an already strained logistics tail. Finally, the adverse effects of climate on the transportation infrastructure of the Soviet State, particularly rain degrading the road networks, combined with an inability of soft skinned vehicles to operate effectively off road further reduced the efficient logistical support to operations. 

The author’s writing style is clear and has a resonance to modern day. There are operational maps provided that facilitate the reader tracing the advances of the forces in question. They are copies of the original German operational maps from the time, are quite detailed, but at times difficult to follow; however, they do meet the need. Additionally, Munzel’s provides excerpts, at the end of the book,  from the War Diary of the 8th Company, 6 Pz Regt, that provide a snapshot of significant daily activities and the distances covered by the unit. This is useful as it gives the reader a sense of how fast the Germans were advancing and, by extension, how challenging was the effective maintenance of logistics, command and control as well as foot bound infantry support. 

This is an excellent book. Engaging in its narrative and educational in its conclusions. Casemate has published a high quality work worthy of the historian, the professional and the casual reader.

Moscow Tram Stop: A Doctor’s Experiences with the German Spearhead in Russia - Heinrich Haape (Edited by Craig W Luther)

 Submitted to Iron Cross Magazine 

Title: Moscow Tram Stop: A Doctor’s Experiences with the German Spearhead in Russia
Author: Heinrich Haape (Edited by Craig W Luther)
ISBN: 978-1-732-60741-5
Publisher: Stackpole Books
Year: 2020
Hardcover
Pages: 408
Photos/Maps: 76/5

Dr Haape’s Moscow Tram Stop is a unique and moving rendition of one man’s experiences as part of the German invasion of Russia. He was not a senior officer, nor in an HQ of a large formation. Indeed, his war was a tactical one; his horizon limited to the information and operational tasks given to his unit, 3^rd Battalion, Infantry Regiment 18. This work reflects that intimacy. There is no discussion of grand strategy, of conferences in Berlin nor of any interaction with an officer more senior that his Regimental Commander. The author was a very learned man: a staunch Christian, an artist, a medical doctor, a lover of the arts and a philosopher. He maintained a detailed diary of his experiences and observations and this forms the foundation of the book. His writing reflect a sensitive, yet grounded personality, dedicated to his duty, honest and nuanced in his assessments and acknowledging of the strengths and failings of himself and the soldiers that he served with. His Russian experience included some of the most brutal and vicious fighting experienced during Operation Barbarossa. His Battalion pushed forward to the very gates of Moscow and then retreated to the cauldron of the fighting around Rzhev. 

The writing style of the author combined with the adept editing of Dr Craig provides the reader with a unique and very personal experience of the soldier of the period. Unlike many of the historical works of war, soldiers and officers have names and personalities. Experiences related include the humorous, ironic and frightening; boredom and routine broken by terror, violence and sudden injury or death blend together seamlessly. Anyone reading this book, who has served in the military, will appreciate, and recognize the shared and timeless stories. 

Dr Haape, the artist, also drew many of the people and things he describes in his memoirs. Thus he relates conversations that he had with Russian peasants and includes drawings of the individuals in the book. A peasant woodsman, his world-weary face craggy and his existence limited to his village and its immediate environs, observes on the coming winter and the war with the same sense of resignation and acceptance. Additionally, he relates providing medical assistance to local villagers and utilizing volunteer Russian prisoners to augment his medical staff. Vignette’s such as these reflect the closeness of the soldiers with their environment and the reality of the tactical ‘coal-face’ experienced on a day-to-day basis. 

What further enhances the uniqueness of this book, is the inclusion of a second narrative following the conclusion of Dr Haape’s diary. This second work, relates the 2016 cross-country journey undertaken by Dr Haape’s son Johannes, Dr Craig and Sergej Stasikov, a retired Russian logistics LCol. The three of them, using the original maps and war diaries of Infantry Regiment 18 as well as Dr Haape’s diary, retraced the exact route taken by the author and his comrades during Barbarossa. Throughout this expedition (covering over 4,492 kilometers), they confirmed the stories from his diary, participated in the 75^th anniversary of Op Barbarossa remembrance ceremonies, took part in the mass internment of the recovered remains of 1,200 unknown Russian soldiers recovered in the Rzhev region, tracked down the internment sites of Infantry Regiment 18 soldiers and met with local villagers and veterans identified in his diary. They were able to confirm the accuracy of both the route and the stories related. This story is an adventure in and of itself that is worth reading. 

This work is a true fusion of the historical and recent, blended in such a way as to uniquely reflect the true reality of the individual German soldier and the humanity of their day-to-day experiences during the first year of the Eastern Front War. Essentially two works in one, it both confirms the veracity of Dr Haape’s work, and also the ongoing reality of the effect of Barbarossa in the modern world. A quality publication from Stackpole that includes a detailed bibliography and extensive endnotes. This is highly recommended for any who wish to appreciate in a more intimate, yet unvarnished way, the soldier’s world on the Eastern Front in 1941/42.

COSSAC: Lt.Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan and the Genesis of Operation Overlord - Stephen C Kepher

This review has been submitted to the Journal of the Society for 

Army Historical Research

Title: COSSAC: Lt.Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan and the Genesis of Operation Overlord
Author: Stephen C Kepher
ISBN: 978-1-68247-508-9
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
Year: 2020
Hardcover
Pages: 300
Photos/Maps: 16/3

The development of the plan for the Allied invasion of the European mainland (Op Overlord) remains as one of the most complex military operations in history. Much has been written and studied relating to the actual invasion itself; however, the effort that went into the conceptualization and development of the plan itself has been generally overlooked in the discussion. Kepher’s book sheds light not only on the method by which the plan unfolded but also the myriad of other factors that had to be taken into account that were unique to this operation: the amphibious element, the multinational C2 issues, the integration of naval, air and land elements, the political facets and, central throughout, the role of LGen Morgan to the success of the project. 

This is the authors first book and he does an admirable job of recreating the environment within which Morgan was to operate. The author undertakes a noteworthy discussion and analysis of perhaps the greatest obstacle facing Morgan, in explaining to his readership, who have grown up in the era of multinational operations and NATO, what it was like for the Allies to create, from scratch and with little to no precedence, a planning team for the invasion. Exacerbating this challenge was that while Morgan as COSSAC (Chief of Staff Supreme Allied Commander) was expected to develop and plan the operation, there was no Supreme Allied Commander appointed. Thus he had no ‘top cover; for the decisions that he was making, nor guidance on the myriad of questions to be answered. Kepher’s liberal use of Morgan’s diaries of the period add additional depth and resonance to the narrative. 

This work serves as an excellent reference for anyone (military or civilian) undertaking a role in which they are working with a consortium of different nationalities, industries or political affiliations. Morgan’s experiences and those of his staff, highlight the benefits and pitfalls associated with these kinds of interactions. What serves as the best means of interaction, how does one undertake conflict resolution, what is the method to best address accusations of external favoritism by ones own government and military? All these examples, and more, are discussed at length through Morgan, and his staffs, own words and experiences. 

The author has included significant additional data in the annexes, thus providing the reader with tangible references covering command structures and relationships, force structures, actual documentation from Morgan providing synopsis of his planning as well as selected abbreviations and acronyms. Kepher deliberately refrains from excessive use of military acronyms and slang in an effort to keep the narrative accessible to the average reader. Additionally, he provides comprehensive endnotes and bibliography that serve to suggest additional avenues of inquiry for the reader. 

The Naval Institute Press have published a high quality book that is both an outstanding rendition of the staff and planning work behind one of the most complex military operations in recent times as well as an excellent professional development tool. Highly recommended for the casual and professional historian alike. 

Paramilitarism – Mass Violence in the Shadow of the State - Ugur Umit Ungor

 This review has been submitted to Soldier Magazine. 

Title: Paramilitarism – Mass Violence in the Shadow of the State
Author: Ugur Umit Ungor
ISBN: 978-0-19-882524-1
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Year: 2020
Hardcover
Pages: 208 

In this short but enlightening treatise, the author addresses the issues surrounding why States utilize the services of paramilitary organizations, what are the common relationships that exists between them, and what is the effect upon societies within which these organizations operate (specifically as it relates to crime and the State). The analytical approach taken avoids idealised visions of these groups and focuses upon discussion and assessment based upon their observed actions. This work is an excellent study of para militaristic activity, within the context of the modern world, that encompasses the breadth of geographic environments within which they operate.

With Eagles to Glory: Napoleon and His German Allies in the 1809 Campaign - John H Gill

This review has been submitted to Strategy and Tactics Magazine. 

Title: With Eagles to Glory: Napoleon and His German Allies in the 1809 Campaign
Author: John H Gill
ISBN: 978-1-78438-309-1
Publisher: Pen and Sword Books
Year: 2018
Softcover
Pages: 542
Photos/Maps: 40/50

Napoleon and his Grande Armee have been written about in countless books and studies; however, attention on those Allies that contributed forces and the role that those forces played has been noticeably absent from the literature of the period. Forged out of the success of the 1805 French Campaigns, 36 small German States bound themselves through treaty to France under the Confederation of the Rhine (Rheinbund). Under the terms of the treaty, they would be obliged to provide a certain percentage of men and equipment when called upon by the French Emperor. Saxon Artillery, Hessian Fusiliers, Jagers and Dragoons from Baden and Infantry from Bavaria are representative of a portion of the myriad of forces made available to Napoleon by the Germans. In total, 123,081 soldiers representing all 36 German States participated in the 1809 Campaign against Austria. Gill’s work seeks to address the lack of recognition of the contribution that these member States made to Napoleon’s success. 

This is truly a comprehensive examination of the Germans, encompassing detailed descriptions and analysis of tactics, uniforms, weaponry, units, training and discussions of the regions from which the soldiers came. Additionally, Gill sheds light on how they were integrated into the French Armies and chain of command. Balancing the needs and sensitivities of this myriad of forces was no easy task and it is quite enlightening how it was undertaken. Appreciating that it is very easy for the historian to get caught up in the miasma of detail that always has the potential to severely degrade the reading experience, Gill adroitly balances the requirements of explanation with the realities of flow and engagement of the reader. He provides enough of the former to provide for the scope and story without getting bogged down. Additional detail is provided at the end of each chapter in the form of copious and comprehensive notes sections.   

Gill’s descriptions of the participation of the German contingents in the 1809 campaign takes the same approach as his analysis of the background: insightful, detailed enough while maintaining reader engagement and comprehensive. Not all contingents participated to the same degree but each is given its due by the author. The reader is left with a much better appreciation of the degree of complexity associated with how armies moved, deployed, fought and were supported during this period. 

The publication quality of the book is good although one of map synopsis pages is missing from the front of this edition. Additionally, the maps themselves leave something to be desired as they do not have the any indications of the movements of the units identified. Nevertheless, the information provided through various tables, unit organization charts, numerous appendices and a comprehensive bibliography is truly outstanding. 1809 is generally recognized as the beginning of the descent of Napoleon and the Grande Armee as both were beginning to exhibit the initial signs of a degradation of the quality previously ascribed to them. Thus it was that the participation and support of the Rheinbund Allies was all the more critical to its continued success. This is an excellent work for both the casual and serious historian and is a recommended addition to anyone’s library.  

The History of the Panzerwaffe Vol 1 1939-1942 - Thomas Anderson

 This review has been submitted to Iron Cross magazine.

Title: The History of the Panzerwaffe Vol 1 1939-1942
Author: Thomas Anderson
ISBN: 978-1-4728-0812-7
Publisher: Osprey Publishing
Year: 2015
Hardcover
Pages: 304
Photos/Maps: 100’s/0

Military historians interested in the development, from its very earliest stages, of the German Panzer forces, will be drawn to this work. Going back to the very first tanks utilized by the Germans (captured British Mark IV’s), Anderson traces the concurrent development of both the physical and doctrinal elements of the Panzer. Included in this analysis is the effect of defeat in the World War One on the mindset of the German military leadership. As Anderson discusses, defeat, while nationally tragic for the Germans, opened them to the revolutionary changes that the Panzer brought to the doctrinal table. 

Anderson’s book may be broken down into roughly three sections: the introduction of the tank and the recognition of its impact on the battlefield of World War One, the interwar period where the doctrine of panzer operations advanced (even without actual tanks in the early postwar period) concurrent with technical innovation, and the transition from concept to reality in the first three years of World War Two. The author draws from and refers to a myriad of relevant primary source material (lessons learned, after-action reports and combat reports etc) in order to facilitate the readers understanding of how the Germans arrived at the revolutionary concept of the Panzer Division and its role in Blitzkrieg. It is noteworthy that the development of this doctrine and the tool to execute it was not a direct line but entailed a significant amount of testing and development. What is critical to appreciate however, is that the Germans were much more open to the potential of the Panzer than were their adversaries. 

Anderson also ensures that the reader is made aware of the variety of technical innovations that the Germans undertook in order to recognize the widest possible use of the panzer and its ancillary support elements. Thus it was that developers and engineers were given full support by the armed forces in improving the effectiveness of the tank. Additionally, captured Allied equipment was quickly analyzed and innovations incorporating or countering their design advantages were efficiently integrated into German designs and doctrine. 

The author looks at the effectiveness and role of the Panzerwaffe in the Polish, Norwegian, Western Desert and Eastern Campaigns. His analysis is concise, insightful and relevant as the Panzer Division takes it final form prior to Operation Barbarossa. The nature of the authors discussion is not steeped in technical verbiage but in a manner that the layman may appreciate. In addition to the formal documentation reviewed by the author, inclusion of first person recollections of combat as well as life in the tanks, adds depth and a ‘personal’ edge to the book. 

Overall, this is an excellent visual as well as narrative work. Replete with photographs and technical charts on the tanks themselves, it contains a trove of useful information. Osprey has published a book of the highest quality. Unfortunately, no bibliography has been provided; however, this does not negate the utility of this work as an excellent study of the early development and use of the armoured forces of Germany.

Eighth Army vs Rommel: Tactics, Training and Operations in North Africa 1940-1942 - James Colvin

 This review has been submitted to the Canadian Army Journal 

Title: Eighth Army vs Rommel: Tactics, Training and Operations in North Africa 1940-1942
Author: James Colvin
ISBN: 978-1-913336-64-6
Publisher: Helion and Company
Year: 2020
Softcover
Pages: 261
Photos/Maps: 30/11

The characteristics that define individuals as military warriors and leaders (integrity, bravery, self-sacrifice etc) are not the same as those that characterize members of the Profession of Arms. Like doctors, lawyers, architects or any other field that identifies itself by a professional standard, the Profession of Arms requires serious study, development, mentorship and expertise (in addition to the characteristics of the warrior). Colvin, in his work, approaches his analysis of the adversaries in the North African Campaign through their respective attitudes towards the development of their military leadership and how that attitude influenced the execution of operations. It is a unique and interesting study as it encompasses not only the pure military elements of the African conflict itself but also how the cultural/societal influences within which the respective antagonists developed; and how this affected their conduct and approach to military operations. Unique in its approach is the authors focus, not on the most senior levels of command, but the Corps and Divisional leaders. 

Colvin opens his book with an overarching review of the cultural environments that most heavily  influenced the development of the German and British leadership. The British approach, based predominantly within the Public School system emphasized fair play, team efforts and loyalty to ones peers. This style manifested itself into the primacy of and loyalty to the Regiment and their associated traditions. A directive and structured style of leadership and execution was often undermined by subordinate’s loyalty being primarily to a peer or commander from the same school (Eton etc) or Regiment as opposed to the appointed one. Conversely, a British Commander would often support a weak subordinate from a common background all the while refraining from being seen as too ‘directive’. 

The Germans, on the other hand, took a much more serious approach to the “art and science’ of military command. The German command schoolhouse had much higher standards and expectations than its British counterpart. Officers and senior NCOs were actively challenged to adapt to differing situations and to assume higher levels of command without hesitation. The Germans developed a common doctrine and ensured that it was clearly understood and adhered to across its forces. Colvin’s analysis of this critical area is both insightful and thought provoking. 

The author then segues this into a discussion of the doctrine and equipment development of the respective adversaries. Central to this was the use of ‘combined arms’ units by the Germans and the resistance to this by the British. The stove-piping of British combat elements enabled smaller German forces to overcome larger Allied forces by being able to call upon a variety of means to counter UK forces. Combined this with a well established doctrine that enabled the fluid and transparent transitions of command (requiring little to no formal ‘orders’) meant that the Germans were far more flexible in their approach and response. By contrast, British command was characterized by micro-management, misplaced loyalty, inconsistent doctrine and a more collegial and inclusive (as opposed to directive) leadership style. The author, to be clear, casts no aspersions on the bravery, loyalty and effort of British Commanders as individuals, but does draw attention to the cumulative impact of treating warfare as a ‘Great Game’ as opposed to a deadly serious profession.   

Additionally, Colvin includes within his discussions a detailed comparison of the weapons that each side utilized and how they adjusted their equipment and tactics to account for changes in their opposition. Thus it was that, while the Allies tended to have higher numbers of tanks, German tanks were of higher overall quality and were more survivable. When faced for example, with the British 2 pdr anti-tank gun, the Germans were able to counter with hardened frontal ‘spaced’ armour that enabled them to neutralize the penetrating power of the 2 pdr round. Additionally, the Germans adjusted their doctrine to utilize the famous 88 mm in an anti-tank role. Colvin’s discussion highlights the difference between the more ad hoc approach of the Allies compared with the more structured and deliberate approach of the Germans in their respective responses to the challenges of warfare in the desert. 

The author then follows with a series of chapters discussing and analyzing the performance of the adversaries in a series of key offensives and battles leading up to the Second Battle of El Alamein. Each highlights the respective competencies and shortcomings of the commanders and the methods by which they utilized their forces. While not all goes the Germans way, the Allies are seen to continue to struggle with effective command and control over their assets. Colvin sets the tone by looking at the effects of the ‘Crusader’ battles and the lessons that the respective combatants gleaned from them. He then goes on to look at how those lessons were correspondingly applied to the training and doctrine of the forces involved. Ultimately, it is the Allies which continue to struggle in the subsequent battles of Tobruk and Gazala; their commanders not having been able to discern their doctrinal shortcomings (shortcomings that were able to continue to be exploited by the Afrika Korps). 

Colvin closes his book with the arrival of Montgomery and the changes that he brings in terms of command, presence and leadership to the Allied side. His approach is much more in line with the Germans  and he breaks the mold of the traditional ‘fair play, public school chum’ view of his predecessors.  Commanders are not forgiven their shortfalls and a far tighter grip and focus is instilled. 

Colvin has written an excellent analysis of a level of command and control not often addressed but that is critical to the effective execution of the vision of the Theatre Commander: that of the Divisional and Corps commanders. His incorporation of the societal influences on the personality and professional development of the respective officer corps of the German and Allied forces is extremely instructive in comprehending the ‘foundation’ upon which these leaders developed. A comprehensive bibliography and footnote compendium as well as a superior quality publication from Helion round out this stellar work. This is a book that should be read more than once.

The Canal Line: France and Flanders Campaign 1940 - Jerry Murland

This review has been submitted to Soldier Magazine.

Title: The Canal Line: France and Flanders Campaign 1940
Author: Jerry Murland
ISBN: 978-1-473-85219-8
Publisher: Pen and Sword
Year: 2018
Softcover
Pages: 205
Photos/Maps: 100’s/12

This combination battlefield history and guided tour book provides an excellent synopsis of the events surrounding the fighting in the low countries leading up to Dunkirk. The included driving and walking tours are very well laid out with photographs and detailed directions. The maps provided, as support to the narrative, are average. The publication is of high quality and an appropriate size for ‘pocket travel’. Overall, a recommended purchase for those wishing to follow the course of the battles with additional, in-depth, information that adds colour and personality to the experience.

General Erich Hoepner: A Military Biography - W Chales de Beaulieu translated by Linden Lyons

This review has been submitted to Iron Cross Magazine. 

Title: General Erich Hoepner: A Military Biography
Author: W Chales de Beaulieu trans Linden Lyons
ISBN: 978-1-612-00976-6
Publisher: Casemate Publishing
Year: 2021
Hardcover
Pages: 252
Photos/Maps: 2/4 

De Beaulieu served as Hoepner’s first general staff officer during his campaign in Poland (1939) and then as his Chief of Staff during Hoepner’s campaigns in France and Russia. He therefore gained a deep insight and appreciation of both the personality and leadership style of this superb officer and panzer commander. Erich Hoepner’s career was characterized by his unwavering loyalty to the soldiers under his command, his duty to his country and the dictates of his conscience. Thus it was that he fulfilled the former with an aficionado’s skill in leading his panzers to Prague, Warsaw, Leningrad and the gates of Moscow and the latter by sacrificing his career for the welfare of his men before Moscow and his life in an effort to rid his country of Hitler. 

The author examens each of Hoepner’s campaigns individually by chapter. His focus is not simply upon the physical execution of the operations themselves but also the influence and affect of Hoepner’s personality on both the battlespace and the execution of his orders. De Beaulieu is a great admirer of Hoepners and this comes across in his evaluations; however, he is not an impartial sycophant. He is, for the most part, quite balanced in his assessment of Hoepner’s decisions; for example he discusses at some length the challenges that Hoepner faced during his drive into Belgium and makes note of errors made during the critical encounter with the Allies during the initial assault of the Dyle Line. Conversely, the author is too generous in his praise of German success against the French Cavalry Corps during the Battle of Hannut. While Hoepner prevailed in the battle, he did not succeed in destroying the French, enabling them to fight another day before Dunkirk. 

Along with Guderian, Hoepner was one of the very early proponents of an independent, self contained Panzer arm capable of deep, dramatic drives into the rear echelons of the enemy. He viewed this as the best way to unbalance and, more importantly, maintain the unbalance, of his adversaries. The author’s analysis of Hoepners drive towards Leningrad serve as perhaps the penultimate example of the effective operational use of the Panzer Arm in the hands of an expert at the peak of his prowess. 

The narrative of the book focuses upon Hoepner as leader and commander and the operational role that his forces undertook in the campaigns presented. The writing style and flow of the author makes for an easy grasp of the context. The work is lacking in sufficient maps that would have greatly facilitated the following of the operations as they unfolded. Although the narrative does give the reader a definite appreciation of the challenges of the terrain, distances, enemy forces and logistics that needed to be overcome, additional maps would have been very useful. The author undertakes, throughout the book, to present Hoepner as a real person, complete with flaws and errors. It is through this lens that the true strengths of Hoepner as both a military professional and quintessential leader are actually emphasized. That Hoepner is an exceptional commander and leader is beyond question; however, it is his willingness to assume responsibility for his decisions, despite the potential consequences, that serves to separate him from an already deep bench of competency. His actions before Moscow in January, 1942 and his willingness to support the July Plot against Hitler (for which he was tried and executed) are evidence of his moral strength and sound ethical grounding.  

The translation from the original German is excellent and there are ample footnotes that serve to expand upon more complicated portions of the operational narrative. Casemate has published a book of high quality. I would strongly recommend this work both as a reference for German operations from the period 1939-1941 and as an excellent study of a lesser known but equally impressive German Officer and Commander.

Narvik: The Struggle of Battle Group Dietl in the Spring of 1940 - Alex Buchner (Translated by Janice Ancker)

This review has been submitted to Air Force

Magazine. 

Title: Narvik: The Struggle of Battle Group Dietl in the Spring of 1940
Author: Alex Buchner (Translated by Janice Ancker)
ISBN: 978-1-61200-917-9
Publisher: Casemate Publishing
Year: 2020
Hardcover
Pages: 218
Photos/Maps: 0/9 

The German invasion of Norway, in April/May 1940, is viewed by many as another example of German military prowess and the Allied response one of incompetence and vacillation. In many respects that is true, however, the battle that took place over the Northern port of Narvik stands out as a particularly vivid example of missed opportunity by the Allies and a mixture of tenacity and great luck on the part of the Germans. 

This work, part of “Die Wehrmacht im Kampf” series from Casemate, was originally published in the late 1950’s by Buchner who was present at the battle as part of the German Mountain Troops. He was thus able to draw upon not only the recollections of his compatriots but also his own experiences during the fighting. Written solely from the perspective of the German forces present, it is the first time in English that a narrative of the fighting has been available exclusively from that viewpoint. 

Originally deployed as the most northern element of the invasion forces, a convoy made up of ten destroyers ferried at high speed, 2,700 German Mountain troops with only their personal kit and a minimum of additional supplies to Narvik in order to seize this key port for the export of Swedish ore. All of their follow-on supplies, specialized winter warfare kit and heavy weapons were to follow in a second echelon of support ships expected within 48 hours of their arrival. Unfortunately for the Germans, while their seizure of Narvik and its surrounding area went generally as planned, the Royal Navy succeeded in surprising and sinking all 10 of the German destroyers as well as all save one of the follow-on support ships. Thereby isolated and cut off from support, the Germans, numbering 2,700 Mountain Troops and 2,600 Naval personnel, were faced with holding off at least five times as many Allied soldiers, readily supplied by the Royal Navy who controlled the sea access. However, under the inspired leadership of Generalleutnant Dietl, the Germans, utilizing audacity, initiative, skill and daring (and enjoying more than a fair degree of luck) managed to hold off the more pedestrian efforts on the part of the Allies to oust them from their tenuous hold on Narvik. 

What stands out in this narrative are the critical roles that leadership and morale played in the German success. Buchner relates, in very telling prose, the incredibly debilitating environment within which the Germans had to operate. Northern Norway in April and May is a very hostile winter climate which would have challenged the finest of troops let alone a force that was comprised half of Naval personnel now being used in a Mountain Infantry role. The author describes the methods the German leadership took to both integrate these men into infantry roles and also to fully utilize the specialist skills that they possessed (communications, support and small watercraft control). The Germans showed great skill at taking full advantage of the resources that were available to them.

The writing style of the author is surprisingly engaging. The reader is able to fully appreciate not only the challenges of the environment but of the formidable skill of the German soldiers and officers in adjusting to a fluid and dynamic combat environment. One is left with a distinct appreciation of the benefits of hard training, audacious leadership throughout the chain of command and a deep-rooted belief by the Germans in competency of their Commanders. 

The book is a good quality publication although pictures would have added to the general presentation. The maps provided at the front were in German from the original publication but are able to be used to follow the unfolding events. A series of appendices outline orders of battle at various points for the opposing forces, orders and directives and timelines for the reinforcement of the German forces. The author has also included a comprehensive bibliography (utilizing German primary source material) as well as thorough notes section. Overall, a well written and very interesting book that would serve as an excellent counter point to publications of Allied efforts in Norway.

Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan 1945-47 - DM Giangreco

This review has been submitted to the Australian Army Journal. 

Title: Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan 1945-47
Author: DM Giangreco
ISBN: 978-1-682-47165-4
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
Year: 2017
Hardcover
Pages: 552
Photos/Maps: 26/13

The last months of the Second World War were characterized by some of the most vicious fighting experienced in the Pacific Theatre. Tenacious resistance by Japanese forces on Iwo Jima and Okinawa resulting in the highest casualty rates thus far experienced by US forces in the Pacific, presaging a struggle for the Japanese home islands that would dwarf all previous battles. Fear of the massive casualties that were anticipated to be sustained by the US from an invasion of the Japanese home islands, war fatigue amongst the population and an acknowledgement by US leadership of the continued resistance anticipated by Japanese forces (both civilian and military) led to a decision by President Truman to utilize nuclear weapons in an effort to shock the Japanese into surrender. Ultimately, the two nuclear strikes did prompt the Japanese into accepting unconditional surrender (save for the protection of the Emperor from prosecution as a war criminal); however, it also led to future widespread condemnation by some historians and anti-nuclear factions that felt nothing justified the use of these weapons.

 Giangreco’s work looks at the myriad of complex and ethical challenges faced by the US decision makers as they grappled with how to bring the war with Japan to a close as rapidly as possible with a minimum loss of American, Japanese and Allied lives.

 The author’s book is characterized by a deep and comprehensive analysis and understanding of the planning challenges and political atmosphere within which the senior planning staff operated. He has drawn extensively upon the original operational plans of both the US and Japanese for attack and defence as well as primary source intelligence analysis undertaken by both adversaries. Of particular note is his research into and use of what was actually briefed to the decision makers. This is critical as it speaks to what was the information that they were basing their decisions upon.

The narrative in Hell to Pay follows a series of concurrent and mutually supportive tracks:

1.     An accessible and broad analysis of the international political situation following the close of hostilities with Germany. The US, Soviet Union, Japan, China, UK and the Commonwealth all feature prominently in this as the significant remaining players. The author looks at the domestic stressors, perceived and real political goals, and what capabilities each has to participate in the final engagement with Japan;

2.      An in-depth review of the situation within Japan itself: what was the domestic political environment like, what were the actual resources that Japan could still draw upon in terms of military forces and their capabilities, what did the Japanese perceive as the possible options for invasion and how were they preparing to respond, what were the Japanese goals in continuing to resist, what were the Japanese operational plans for defence and resistance, what did they anticipate to be the casualties and were they prepared to accept these and how well prepared were the Japanese for the invasion; and

3.      A similar but broader and deeper examination of the debate within senior US circles  regarding what was the best way to deal with Japan rounds out this interwoven text. Combined with the Japanese perspective, this thread is easily the most engrossing. Again drawn from predominantly primary source material, it sheds light on the massive undertaking that faced the US both from a manpower as well as materiel perspective. Taking into consideration that the invasion would be far more complex than anything in history (compared with Normandy which was a “shore to shore” invasion with only a short channel crossing, the invasion of Japan would have be executed and supported exclusively from the sea); the invasion fleet alone was estimated to be over 4000 ships. The author identifies and discusses the three main options (and the accompanying factors for and against each) available to the Truman Administration: 1. A series of nuclear strikes on designated cities in an effort to shock the Japanese Government into surrender, 2. Siege of Japanese home islands, cutting off all food and resources, thereby driving them into capitulation, and 3. Invasion.

The level of detail and accompanying examination of what information each side had to go on as they struggled with what decisions to take are hallmarks of Giangreco’s work. He has approached the subject with the third person analysis of the consummate historian while adding a degree of humanity and engagement within the text itself. The reader is left with a profound appreciation of the magnitude and complexity of the problem facing the Allies, the degree to which the Japanese were prepared to continue resisting (and their far greater capability to undertake resistance than was previously understood) and the political and societal pressures on Truman that can only be fully appreciated by a society that was suffering between 65,000 and 100,000 casualties per month since June of 1944.

The book concludes with a series of appendices that present the reader with elements of the actual planning documents for Op Downfall (invasion of Japan), Op Blacklist (occupation of Japan) and the actual G-2 (Intelligence) analysis prepared by both US and Japanese Forces during the lead up to Op Downfall (included in the Japanese portion are postwar interrogation records with key Japanese military commanders and Intelligence analysts). Additionally, there is a very detailed notes section and bibliography.

Anyone who wishes to better appreciate the decision making environment facing the Japanese and Allied leaders going into 1945 and the struggle to come to the correct conclusion on whether or not to use the nuclear option must read this book. Whether one is a critic or supportive of the decision, this work will provide context and information to better help inform the debate positions of each side. Hell to Pay is also an outstanding source book for military logistics professionals, as well as Naval and Airforce operators who wish to improve their understanding of the complexity of an operation of this magnitude. An excellent work and very strongly endorsed.

Military Strategy: A Global History - Jeremy Black

This review has been submitted to Proceedings Magazine. 

Title: Military Strategy: A Global History
Author: Jeremy Black

ISBN: 978-0-300-21718-6

Publisher: Yale UP
Hardcover
Pages: 306

Dr Jeremy Black is world renowned as one of the most prolific authors of history in the present day. With over 100 books to his credit and a litany of board appointments for a number of well respected journals and magazines, it was with great anticipation that his most recent work on Military Strategy was awaited. Dr Black notes in his introduction, that while strategy has become a byword in government, industry, military and academia in the modern day, in doing so, its core focus and intent has been lost and diluted. His intent in writing this work is to present the reader with a perspective on how strategy has been employed throughout history and to bring to the fore non-Eurocentric perspectives on the application of strategy. One is certainly struck by the audacity and breadth of the endeavour.

It should be noted at the outset that this is a work not for the faint of heart. There is an assumption of a fairly advanced baseline understanding of history and the key participants who are referenced in the book. Additionally, the work is quite dense and heavy, and does require a more advanced vocabulary than would be expected in a traditional contemporary work.

Appreciating that the thesis of the book was going to present significant challenges in execution, Black does introduce his subject well, laying the groundwork for the detailed analysis to follow. Unfortunately, evidence of over-reach rapidly makes itself known in the following chapters. While reference to Indian, Chinese, Ottoman and Japanese rulers and cultures are made, these are only skimmed without a depth of analysis that would enable them to act as a foil to Western dogma. Thus it is, for example, that the Chinese Kangxi Emperor, who the author compares to Julius Caesar or Napoleon, is not given any depth of comment or mention about how he enacted his strategy in an environment so different from the West. With each chapter, further emphasis is placed on the roles and approaches of traditional western powers such as the US, Great Britain, France and Germany. Additionally, while the role of non-operational influencers of strategy (such as logistics, technology and demographics) are mentioned they are not included within the more detailed exploration of strategy presented.

Nevertheless, an author of Black’s stature is not going to present a work that is without merit. He does present a series of excellent insights into how strategy should be considered and applied based upon his historical review. He postulates that theory is fine (in theory) however, all of the books and works related to the theoretical application of strategy need to be understood against the context of strategy as dynamic and changing. There is no “one size fits all’ model when it comes to appreciating how to apply a strategy to a given circumstance; strategic aims and goals of states change with the passage of time. He makes the observations, with examples, that constraints (what must be done) and restraints (what must not be done) serve to influence the strategic vision of a state. Moreover, such things as what constitutes a victory for a state (ie The Yom Kippur War of 1973), what is acceptable behaviour in the execution of war and what represents the element undertaking the execution of strategy (ie The War on Terror) are not fixed. All of these aspects differ with time, perspective and expectations of the actors involved.

The author sums up his work with a comprehensive bibliography and footnotes section. Overall, a valiant attempt at a comprehensive study of the practice of strategy throughout history which, while it contains some very valuable analysis and discussion was really doomed to fall short of the aggressive outcome that the author set for himself. 

To Defeat the Few: The Luftwaffe’s Campaign to Destroy RAF Fighter Command Aug-Sept 1940 - Douglas C Dildy and Paul F Crickmore

This review has been submitted to the Journal of the RCAF. 

Title: To Defeat the Few: The Luftwaffe’s Campaign to Destroy RAF Fighter Command Aug-Sept 1940
Author: Douglas C Dildy and Paul F Crickmore
ISBN: 978-1-4728-3918-3
Publisher: Osprey Publishing
Year: 2020
Hardcover
Pages: 384
Photos/Maps: 303/9

A majority of the histories of the Battle of Britain have been drafted from the perspective of the RAF; viewed generally as a small understrength fighter force poised against a blooded, supremely confident and experienced Luftwaffe. Rising to the challenge, David defeated Goliath in a classic tale of prevailing against great odds. Indeed, in some respects this is a very accurate narrative; however, as Dildy and Crickmore have set out to show, that is only a small part of the story.

The authors have approached their analysis of the Battle of Britain from the perspective of the Germans. Why this is important is that it provides the reader with a better understanding of the German challenges, the means at their disposal to overcome them and how decisions were reached that ultimately decided the course of the battle. What sets this book apart from other studies is that the authors have situated their study within the context of an independent counter air campaign (the Luftwaffe’s efforts to defeat the RAF) engaging an adversary with a multilayered and integrated air defence system.

A vast majority of the histories of the Battle of Britain, emphasize the numerous errors that the Luftwaffe made in the execution of its campaign; it is easy to view these as mistakes if one lacks the context of why the Germans made these decisions. This work addresses those shortfalls. Appreciating what the operational and tactical aims of the Luftwaffe were in this engagement is critical to the better comprehension of what drove those decisions. The authors add additional depth to this by clearly analyzing what lay within the technical capabilities and knowledge of the Luftwaffe. Keeping in mind that they had not been faced with an adversary with the command and control infrastructure available to the RAF before.

This work is replete with tables, graphs, rare or previously unpublished photographs and colour maps that add a great deal of scope to the study. The quality of the book is outstanding and it is eminently readable for the casual and serious historian. Too often, histories lower the quality of their work to the lowest common denominator; sacrificing nuance for ‘black and white’ statements. This book does not fall into that category. That errors were made by the Luftwaffe in the execution of its campaign is without doubt (such as changing the focus of the campaign to London); nevertheless, as this work clearly illustrates, the majority were made using the best tools available within the context of their greater strategic goal. This is definitely recommended for the operational thinker, it is not a book for those seeking first hand accounts of victory and defeat. An excellent addition to any library.