Title: Guerrillas
of Tsavo: The East African Campaign of the Great War in British East Africa
1914-1916
Author:
James G Willson
ISBN:
978-9966-7571-3-5
Publisher:
Self-published by James Wilson
Year:
2014
Softcover
Pages: 356
Photos/Maps:
511/28
The campaign
that was fought in Africa during WW1 has been largely overshadowed by every
other theatre but was extremely significant in the lessons that were (or were
not) learned, the operational doctrine developed and the new paradigm that it
left the Africans involved. Wilson, a local Kenyan businessman and historian,
has become an expert on the Tsavo region and the fighting that took place there
and his passion and deep knowledge of what transpired is patently evident in
this book.
It is
important to realize that for the major combatants, Britain and Germany, Africa
represented very different fields of effort. The one area of common ground was
that neither side envisioned Africa being anything more than a brief sideshow
to the major efforts on the Western Front: Germany seeing no way of
defending/supporting its colonies given the strength of the Royal Navy and
Britain simply assuming that the German colonies would capitulate given their
isolation. It is interesting that the civilian leadership in both locations
preferred to avoid any form of conflict altogether and it was the military
contingents that drove the recruitment, planning and execution of operations.
Notwithstanding
geography, Africa was unique in the fact that, in no other theatre was the
influence of a single commander more keenly felt. In this case, Gen Paul von
Lettow-Vorbeck, commanding the German forces throughout the campaign, developed
doctrine and an operational appreciation that effectively prevented the vastly
superior Allied forces from ever assuming the initiative. Lettow-Vorbeck
correctly determined that his Centre of Gravity/Effort was the tying down of as
many allied forces as possible, thereby preventing them from being utilized
elsewhere. In this approach, he was successful beyond anyone’s wildest
estimations. German forces at their peak numbered 3,007 European Officers and
12,100 Askari (locally trained soldiers) as well as several thousand
carriers/porters. Conversely, Allied forces (British, Portuguese and Belgian)
numbered in the region of 137 Generals, over 300,000 soldiers and many hundreds
of thousands of porters. The scope of success of the German effort in Africa
may be recognized by the fact that they did not surrender until a week
following the armistice in Europe and when they did, it was as an undefeated,
still operationally effective force.
Wilson
has authored a very interesting book. He provides an analysis of the social and
political situation in Africa at the time of the commencement of hostilities
and also provides the reader with detailed maps and geographic information. He
then follows the campaign in a daily format tracing the activities of both
contingents throughout the 1914, 15 and 16 campaigning season. As he does so,
he emphasizes different doctrines and methodologies used by each side and to
what degree they were effective. This is especially telling as the German
asymmetric approach, while unique at the time, will be seen as very familiar to
subsequent armies and campaigners. The lessons that Lettow-Vorbeck taught in
his approach to warfare were decades ahead of his time but they have not been
studied by modern military scholars and as a result, remain largely forgotten.
They form, however, the basis for most subsequent asymmetric conflicts.
This is
a well-researched and engaging book. I would strongly recommend that it be
reviewed and studied by any student of military history wishing to understand
how the correct application of limited force can have far-reaching
consequences.
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