Flesh and Steel During the Great War - Michel Goya

This review has been submitted to the Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research

Title: Flesh and Steel During the Great War
Author: Michel Goya
ISBN: 978-1-473-88696-4
Publisher: Pen-and -Sword
Year: 2018
Hardcover
Pages: 323
Photos/Maps: 17/5

Warfare, on the surface, personifies the best and worst of humankind: ultimate selfless sacrifice and unspeakable brutality. However, one of the benefits of large-scale conflict, is a laser focus by the governments of the warring nations upon developing any advantage that will enable them to prevail against their adversaries. This manifests itself as enormous advances in science, medicine, and technology, free of the financial and bureaucratic frictions that exist in peacetime. Michel Goya’s book undertakes a detailed analysis of the state of the French Army leading up to the commencement of hostilities in 1914, focusing upon the political and interpersonal challenges to modernization. He then traces the advances in the French military (to include the nascent Air Force and the three main combat arms elements) as the crucible of war and experience strip away the impediments that traditionally hamstrung its development. He incorporates into this discussion the changes in the mentality of the Chain of Command and the decision-making processes to highlight how new critical paths to change were generated. Finally, he closes his work with an overview of the state of the military at the close of the War and what transpired in the years following.

The experiences of the French front line soldier provide the context within which innovation is discussed. Drawing upon real life examples, Goya is able to provide tangible examples of the dynamic realignment in the decision making and doctrinal development process. Thus it was that the traditional top-down, centralized process of operational doctrine, invalidated by the shocking, near run failures of 1914 and the inability to break the stalemate of the following years, is supplanted by local, coal-face, innovation derived from real time engagement with the enemy. Goya explores in great detail how this transition occurred, what were the driving motivators that adjusted the French Command paradigm, and the impact that it had on operations.

 For the reader, understanding how the various elements adapted to the increasingly technological and complex face of the conflict is key towards appreciating just how dramatic and dynamic was the metamorphosis of the French military. Not only were these changes felt in the traditional fields of combat, but commanders and planners had to incorporate utterly new capabilities spanning the fields of communications, aviation and armour into effective joint operational and doctrinal use. The author presents the scope and pace of these complex changes in a lucid, insightful manner; laid out in a logical and easily understood style. Goya also expands upon the ongoing internal debates on how best to utilize these new capabilities; politics within the French military were never far from the surface and the authors discussion on how these manifested themselves makes for fascinating reading.

 Peacetime change within a military context is a slow, bureaucratic and pedantic process that may take years to realize change; wartime drives change through necessity and emphasis. The author has captured both sides of the French military experience in his book and, in the process, sheds light on the myriad of challenges that are unique to both circumstances. His extensive bibliography, notes sections and detailed appendices provide a breadth of context and additional sources for the reader to take advantage of. Of particular note is his comprehensive analysis of the experiences of the 13^th Infantry Division, a unit that was present from the first to the last day of the war. This analysis adds depth and an additional definitive example for the reader to grasp the authors intent of the book.

This is an excellent work of military history; touching upon a relatively little known or appreciated aspect of warfare: dynamic change. It is very strongly recommended for the professional and casual historian alike.

After Jutland: The Naval War in Northern European Waters June 1916 – November 1918 - James Goldrick

This review has been submitted to the Canadian Naval Review

Title: After Jutland: The Naval War in Northern European Waters June 1916 – November 1918
Author: James Goldrick
ISBN: 978-1-5267-4298-8
Publisher: Pen and Sword Publishing
Year: 2018
Hardcover
Pages: 332
Photos/Maps: 32/13 

The prevalent assumption amongst a significant portion of casual World War 1 enthusiasts is that, following the inconclusive Battle of Jutland, the German High Seas Fleet maintained a very limited presence on the high seas for the duration of the war, the Royal Navy continued, for the most part unchallenged, preserving the stranglehold on Germany and that the Baltic saw little if any activity whatsoever. Of course, this is far from the truth and Adm (ret'd) Goldrick’s work goes a long way in dismissing those misconceptions. His narrative iterates the experiences of the major Northern Theatre Battle Fleets (RN, German and Russian), as they undertake operations from the Gulf of Finland to the edge of the North Sea. While it is true that a second major fleet action along the lines of Jutland did not materialize, Goldrick makes it very clear that significant actions were very much the norm right up until the end of the war. 

The author is a professional Navy man, and that expertise comes through in his analysis and discussion of the engagements and operational challenges/successes of the different navies. Additionally, and just as significantly, he expands the scope of his narrative to include detailed reviews on the technological developments of the adversaries as the war progressed. These include but are not limited to mine warfare, naval air capabilities, gunnery, and submarine development. His observations and explanations on the impact of these areas on offensive and defensive operations are succinct and insightful. 

Navies operate in an international environment, free from the restraints of trench warfare etc. As such, they cannot help but interact with assets of non-combatant nations and these interactions can have far reaching effects well beyond their immediate boundaries. Goldrick incorporates his thoughts on the impact of these international engagements on the course of the war itself. The declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare by the Germans in 1917, for example, was directly responsible for facilitating the entrance of the United States into the war. 

A particular strength of this book is the section that the author refers to as the ‘Reflections’. In this area, he finalizes the work with a series of conclusions on the overall conduct of the naval war by each of the main protagonists. His observations are telling and prescient. He is critical of the method by which the German Navy was utilized, suggesting that its strengths were not fully recognized specifically in the areas of surface raiders, submarine warfare (not unrestricted however), and operational doctrine in the use of mixed-use flotilla’s and scouting groups. Nevertheless, the author also recognizes the limitations imposed on the fleet by external factors such as the expanse of the submarine service on personnel and the deterioration of the ships themselves as the war progressed due to (presumably) the impact of the blockade on engineering supplies. The British, for their part, missed significant opportunities regarding mine warfare and the advent of naval aviation. Additionally, its failure to pursue more aggressively a coordinated effort with the Russians that may well have squeezed the German ability to respond on two naval fronts concurrently. The author also makes note of the Russian reluctance to engage in the Western regions of the Baltic Sea. Surely here was a missed opportunity to interdict the flow of resources, particularly iron ore, from Sweden to Germany. 

This was a very enjoyable book to read; educational, relevant, and featuring a good balance of technical insight as well as flowing narrative. It is strongly recommended for the casual historian as well as the dedicated researcher. The publisher has produced a very high quality book to go with the excellent read.

The Splintered Empires: The Eastern Front 1917-1921 - Prit Buttar

This review has been submitted to Strategy and Tactics Magazine.

Title: The Splintered Empires: The Eastern Front 1917-1921
Author: Prit Buttar
ISBN: 978-1-4728-1985-7
Publisher: Osprey Publishing
Year: 2017
Hardcover
Pages: 480
Photos/Maps: 34/14

With this book, the last in his WW1 Eastern Front series, Buttar closes the circle on a little appreciated, understood and studied facet of the First World War. Like his other works, the author draws upon his in-depth research and knowledge of the period to present a comprehensive picture of the convoluted paroxysms that wracked the Empires of Eastern Europe; resulting in the emergence of multiple nascent nations each struggling for survival and territory. For many Western readers, WW1 ended in November, 1918 with the cessation of hostilities on the Western Front. For those in the East; however, a further three years of conflict remained as nationalism, racism and political strife convulsed the region.

Buttar is the consummate historian, seamlessly transitioning from a strategic perspective, encompassing the broad spectrum of international players, to recollections from soldiers, citizens and statesmen that adds both depth and a personal element to the narrative. The author is adroit at selecting diary entries and letter passages that provide insight into the fear, confusion, despair, hope and rage that permeated throughout these societies as they collapsed into anarchy. This is particularly applicable to the Russian and Austro-Hungarian officers as discipline and professionalism collapsed in the face of societal turmoil.

This period is particularly confusing and complex; Buttar is able to tease apart the densely interwoven threads and present them in a cogent, logical fashion while not losing touch with the human element of the period. Traditionally, the smaller nations in the East received short shrift from historians focussed upon the collapse of the Great Powers; in this work, Buttar looks at each of the emerging nation states in turn and discusses their efforts to navigate the complex international waters around them. Thus Finland, each of the Baltic States, Poland and Ukraine are the subjects of chapters in their own right.

Additionally, Buttar addresses a number of elusive questions that have been left unclear in a number of previous accounts of the Eastern Front. Germany, for example had anticipated 45 essentially fresh divisions being freed up for transfer to the West for participation in the final German offensive. Ultimately, only 32 divisions were made available. The why of this centres upon the hubris and misguided national decisions of the Central Powers in their occupation policies and treatment of the Eastern regions. What of the forces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire? Why were they not available for transfer to the west; this also is addressed.

Overall, this is another outstanding book from this author. Encompassing not only the final years of the First World War but also the myriad of ‘successor wars’ that ravaged the region, Splintered Empires is a superb synopsis of the period. The bibliography and notes sections are comprehensive and add additional depth to the narrative. Osprey has published a high quality book that is a fabulous addition to anyone’s library.     

Haig’s Enemy: Crown Prince Rupprecht and Germany’s War on the Western Front - Jonathan Boff

This review has been submitted to Australian Army Journal

Title: Haig’s Enemy: Crown Prince Rupprecht and Germany’s War on the Western Front
Author: Jonathan Boff
ISBN: 978-0-19-967046-8
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Year: 2018
Hardcover
Pages: 373
Photos/Maps: 11/14 

Rupprecht, Crown Prince of Bavaria and one of the most senior Western Front Central Power commanders throughout WW1, has largely been forgotten with the passage of time; however, as Boff’s comprehensive study has shown, he was a key figure in the Central Power Alliance. Boff has undertaken to present an analysis of Rupprecht as commander, Crown Prince, husband and father. His conclusions, both balanced and nuanced, suggest that while he cannot be considered one of the ‘Great Captains” of history, he was, as a commander, insightful, competent and intelligent. He was also, as the Crown Prince of the second most powerful region of the German Federation (Bavaria), a product of his period and upbringing with all of the flaws and strengths that position entailed.  

The central theme of the book is obviously Rupprecht and his part during the War; however, Boff does an excellent job of continuously situating Rupprecht’s roles and actions within the broader spectrum of German Federation politics, the international environment and the flow of the War itself. The author is particularly adept at maintaining a clear and concise narrative that seamlessly weaves these disparate themes together in a easily comprehensible way. 

I particularly appreciated his analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the German Army and its command structure. Conventional opinion holds that the German Army of the time was a machine to be feared, emulated and respected; however, as Boff conclusively proves, while elements of this were in fact true, the actual reality of the effectiveness of the Army was far more nuanced. Command and control was riven with political appointees, regional cliques and swung broadly between meritocracy as a promotion foundation and favouritism. Decentralized execution of command, while periodically evident, became increasingly rare as operations turned against the Germans. Structures became rigid and honesty in self evaluation (as a military) became the exception and not the norm. 

Boff’s book was very enjoyable and educational to read. His writing style is engaging and his research thorough and balanced. A consummate historian, he has presented his work fairly and drawn conclusions that are well supported by primary source material. His narrative, while thoughtful and complete, avoids the pitfalls of excessive verbosity and leaves the reader with a number of insightful observations that resonate even today. The one conclusion that caused me to pause, however, was his position that, following the failure of the Battle of the Marne in 1914, Germany (and the Central Powers) were destined to lose the war as they were not able to accomplish the foundational goal of a quick and decisive victory in the West.

The book is a very high quality publication. Maps are centrally located at the front of the narrative making reference to them easy and photos, while not of the highest quality, distributed throughout. The work includes a copious number of endnotes and a comprehensive bibliography. I thoroughly enjoyed and appreciated this book and strongly recommend it.

The German Failure in Belgium, August 1914 - Dennis Showalter, Joseph P Robinson, Janet A Robinson

This review has been submitted to Strategy and Tactics magazine.

Title: The German Failure in Belgium, August 1914

Author: Dennis Showalter, Joseph P Robinson, Janet A Robinson

ISBN: 978-1-476-67462-9

Publisher: McFarland Books

Year: 2019

Softcover

Pages: 217

Photos/Maps: 22/9  

Germany entered the First World War confident that it would be able to deal a crushing blow to the Western Front Allies within a few weeks, thereby freeing its forces to turn East in order to deal with Russia in turn; events turned out quite differently. The authors have undertaken an in-depth analysis of what circumstances and practices contributed to this over-estimation. The book is a succinct and insightful review; not long but telling in its conclusions.  

The authors look at two distinct but critical shortfalls amongst the German execution of the invasion plans of the West. They are: critical failings within the planning itself, and most tellingly, a failure of reconnaissance. Each exacerbated the shortfalls of the others and resulted in crucial errors in decision making, ultimately leading to the failure of the German efforts in the West.  

Von Moltke committed a number of key errors in the development of the plan itself. These were related to both strategic and operational planning and reflected interesting elements of the German General Staff’s relationship with other government departments. Moltke made the decision to avoid crossing the Maastricht Corridor of Holland in order to provide for a potential neutral access point to the North Sea should Germany require it. This judgement was clearly a Foreign Affairs and Kaiser responsibility; however they were not part of the process. It is estimated that the resulting Liege bottleneck cost the Germans at least three days. He also decided to reshuffle the allocation of cavalry assets away from the Northern Wing of the German advance without any reduction in the task allocation. They were therefore unable to complete any of the activities effectively. Additionally, he created ad hoc Cavalry Corp’s with Headquarters that had not been exercised in peacetime, resulting in confusion and inefficiency. Finally, in the planning phase, the Germans assumed away elements that ran contrary to their vision of how the invasion would work; specifically, the fact that the Belgian Army would fight and not allow for free passage. 

The authors then presents a detailed account of the first four weeks of the War; focussing on the challenges that arose as a result of the issues identified above. For an Army and General Staff that had an almost mystical reputation, fundamental errors in planning exacerbated challenges in execution. These were further compounded by a failure to fully appreciate the reconnaissance capabilities of the nascent air and cavalry elements. This failure in reconnaissance resulted in the Germans not having the visibility of the battlefield that was essential to the effective control of the complex operation that they were trying to execute. The conclusions postulated by the authors as to why this occurred are reasonable and applicable to modern command staffs.   

An comprehensive bibliography and notes section round out this excellent text. The author’s style is succinct and very readable. They have taken an interesting and unique perspective on the shortfalls which, as they point out, the Germans came very close to overcoming despite them. An outstanding addition to any library or reading list.

Five Days From Defeat - Walter Reid

This review submitted to British Army Review.

Title: Five Days From Defeat

Author: Walter Reid

ISBN: 978-1-78027-490-4

Publisher: Birlinn Books

Year: 2017

Hardcover

Pages: 256

Photos/Maps: 19/2

Following the commencement of the massive German offensive in March, 1918, the Allies were rocked back on their heels as the front was ripped open and the British 5^th Army collapsed in disarray. Popular history suggests that Field Marshall Douglas Haig, commander of the British and Commonwealth forces, was instrumental in coordinating the Allied response; maintaining his composure while those around him lost theirs. In fact, to read his biographies and memoires, one could very easily believe that he was the driving force behind the concept and implementation of the Joint Command structure that the Allies ultimately adopted under French leadership.

Reid’s intent is to provide a counterpoint to much of the narrative pertaining to the British role in the last year of the war. To that extent, he has approached his study in a very structured manner; breaking the discussion into pre-1918, the period of the Spring Offensive, the Five Days and the last 100 Days. Why this is important is that enables the reader to understand both the military and political standings and motivations of the three major players (France, Great Britain and Germany) leading into the final push. Reid has done a commendable job at setting the stage for the drama of the Spring Offensive by shining a light onto the difficult relationship between Haig and George (the British PM). Haig comes across as a very egotistical Commander and was a key impediment to any form of change in the Command relationships between the Allies. Additionally, Reid clearly shows that, in the eyes of the British public, he was also seen as the lynchpin holding the West together.

He then goes on to break down the five critical days of the Spring Offensive and the reactions of the various national players. Extensive analysis of primary source documentation reveals significant disconnect between the accepted British (read Haig) inspired history and what the documents tell us. Haig, far from the decisive unflustered Commander that he wishes to be remembered as, was, in fact, very much prepared to retreat along the British lines of communications to the French ports in anticipation of evacuating the Army. In his defence, the Germans had shattered the 5^th Army and was collapsing the 3^rd and he did have orders to protect the last Army that Britain could effectively provide. Nevertheless as Reid has suggested very convincingly, much of what occurred as a result of the Spring Offensive happened around and in spite of Haig, not because of him.

Reid’s book is an interesting analysis of the relative state of the commanders of the three major powers. It sheds light on the role of the media in developing and maintaining both a perception of individuals as well as being a tool in the challenge of civil/military relations within the British hierarchy at this time. His discussion of the efforts of the civilian governments (especially amongst the British) to wrest back control of the war from the Generals is a telling example of the failure of clear delineations of responsibility. A very interesting read and a worthwhile addition to any library or collection.

Instrument of War: The German Army 1914-18 - Dennis Showalter

This review was submitted to Strategy and Tactics magazine. 

Title: Instrument of War: The German Army 1914-18

Editor: Dennis Showalter

ISBN: 978-1-4728-1300-8

Publisher: Osprey

Year: 2016

Hardcover

Pages: 304

Photos: 43

The German Army had a reputation leading up to the beginning of World War 1 that placed it squarely at the top of equivalent European Armies. Based mainly upon its performance during the Wars of German Unification (Denmark and Austria) and the Franco-Prussian War, it was perceived to be, in many respects, the standard to be emulated. Showalter approaches his topic with this in mind and investigates whether this reputation was still deserved just prior to World War 1. He further examines how the Army and its command structure morphed as the War continued and the impact that this had on its effectiveness and resiliency.

His analysis commences with a brief overview of the national character of the army and its various levels of personnel readiness. This sets the stage for his discussion of the army and the commencement of the war. Showalter is very balanced in his praise and criticism of the army and the reputation that it had. He postulates that the Army was the wrong tool for the Schlieffen Plan and that German Senior leadership failed to appreciate its limitations, specifically in the areas of mobility and communications, ultimately resulting in the plans failure. He further  convincingly postulates that, while the Army was superior in many ways to its contemporaries, the German Leadership was extremely limited in their strategic grasp and could not decide upon priorities of effort following the failure of the Schlieffen Plan.

Showalter effectively encapsulates the rise and fall of German fortunes as the war descends into one of stalemate and attrition in the West and supporting a weakened Austro-Hungary in the East against Russia and Italy. He shows that for a good part of the war, Germany was superior at the tactical and operational levels; engaging in the use of aircraft, gas, storm troop tactics and the command empowerment of NCO’s and Junior Officers. He is, however, merciless in his criticism of the senior German leadership; its infighting, hubris, political intrigue and ultimate failure to acknowledge the necessity of working in tandem with the diplomatic elements of the Government as well as not recognizing the self-destructiveness of the war.

The theme throughout his book is that the main enemy of Germany was time. Every year weakened them and strengthened their adversaries, allowing the Allies to learn and close the gap between their respective armies. Compounding this was the diminishing pool of manpower available to Germany with which to make good its losses.

Showalter has proven himself to be an impartial judge of the German Army of this period; balanced in his praise and criticism. He draws attention to elements of German leadership and planning that are not necessarily readily apparent in many of the narratives of this war. There is no question that the Germans could have won the war given slightly different circumstances but, as Showalter points out, this would have been in spite of rather than because of the strategic level decision making. Despite its institutional weaknesses, the German Army proved itself to be an instrument of formidable depth and resilience; able to match the Allies right up until the last months of the War. Showalter gives the reader much to think about and ponder from his noteworthy analysis of this machine. A well-researched and very interesting book.

1918: Winning the War, Losing the War - Matthias Strohn

This review has been submitted to the British Army Review.

Title: 1918: Winning the War, Losing the War

Author: Matthias Strohn

ISBN: 978-1-4728-2933-7

Publisher: Osprey

Year: 2018

Hardcover

Pages: 304

Maps:  8

Photos: 19

Those who have studied the First World War in any way will agree that the key front between victory or defeat was the Western Front. They will also agree that for the duration of the war, the Western Front, unlike the East and Southern Fronts, was static except for two brief periods: 1914 leading up to the Battle of the Marne and 1918 with the final offensives of the Germans and the subsequent Last 100 Days of the Allies. 1918, as its title implies, focuses upon the final year of the war, but not as an analysis of the movements and activities of the different protagonists; but as a discussion of the relative capabilities, the strengths, weaknesses and the influencing factors that reflected the different armies as they faced each other after 4 years of warfare.

This book draws upon the knowledge of a number of respected military historians, each well published and hailing from a variety of teaching institutions in Austria, Germany, the UK, the United States and Ireland. Each of the 10 contributors has been given a nation or subject to discuss (ie the Air Campaign, Naval Warfare, the British Army, the German Army etc) covering off all of the major facets of the war as it was in 1918. Each is a stand-alone analysis and may be read independent of the others. Austro-Hungary, Russia, the Ottomans and Italy are not covered as chapters but are lumped together in the sections: The Forgotten Fronts of Europe and the War Outside of Europe. This is unfortunate as certainly the three nations of Italy, Austro-Hungary and Turkey were still very active participants in their own right.

The chapters are drafted in a format similar in nature to a university lecture; not surprising given the backgrounds of the contributors. This also ensures that the content flows logically, is lucid and engaging. This improves both the quality of the reading experience as well as facilitating the knowledge that wishes to be passed.

The narrative of the book is bookended by an initial introductory chapter that places the impact of the final year of the War into a modern day context as well as a final installment that captures a number of the lessons to be gleaned from the results of the year’s events on the Western Front. On the German side, the campaigns of 1918 revealed a completely revamped operational and tactical engagement methodology based upon the ‘Stormtrooper’ infiltration tactics and vastly improved artillery utilization. It proved to be extremely effective at breaking the deadlock of trench warfare but could not be sustained due primarily to logistical limitations. On the Allied side, it was the lesson of interdependence between Allies. Up to that point in the war, nations had worked together but retained their operational independence. The crisis of the German offensives set the conditions on the Allied side for the appointment of a senior commander for all Allied armies, something that was never achieved amongst the Central Powers; this in turn significantly improved the Entente’s operational effectiveness and focus.

Overall, 1918 is an excellent analysis of the final year of the war, drawing upon the expertise of a number of different subject matter experts. The analysis is clear, concise and in-depth; it is unfortunate that Austro-Hungary and Turkey do not have their own chapters but they are not ignored. The conclusion is comprehensive and draws attention to a series of lessons that still resonate a century later. It is clear, from the discussion, that the war was still very much undecided as the protagonists entered the summer of 1918 and could easily have had very different results given just a few changes. A book well worth reading and discussing.

The Great Influenza: The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in History - John M Barry

Title: The Great Influenza: The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in History

Author: John M Barry

ISBN: 978-0-143036-49-4

Publisher: Penguin

Year: 2004

Softcover

Pages: 546

The Great Influenza of the immediate post WW1 years claimed the lives of between 20-40 million people worldwide before it had run its course. The author has drafted a comprehensive study encompassing not only the spread and morbidity of the Great Influenza of 1918-1920 but also the means by which scientists and medical staff endeavoured to combat it. Most interestingly, he also looks at the role government played in failing to both recognize, despite copious amounts of evidence, and assist in combatting the disease through education and leadership. Barry has focussed upon the impact that the disease had on the United States while referring obliquely to its impact internationally.

His discussion and analysis of the disease itself is concise and clear; he provides the reader with a detailed understanding of what constitutes the influenza as well as its characteristics. This is key to understanding nature of illness and how it mutates and spreads. He also discusses the means and individuals who were on the front line trying to understand and isolate the virus. The aggressive nature of the influenza virus was unlike anything that had been experienced before and the scientific and medical knowledge needed to effectively counter it was in its infancy.

What is noteworthy in the book is the author’s analysis of the US Federal Government’s response, or lack thereof, to the crisis. President Wilson’s administration was focussed on the war and the US’s role in it. As such, he would not allow for any discussion, publication or central coordination of a response to the pandemic as being a negative influence on the war effort. Thus it was that while people were literally dying in the streets, the Government offices of Public Health were issuing statements indicating that there was no cause for alarm. Barry discusses in detail the impact of denial on the population and the panic that it caused.

This is an excellent account of this event and a timely reminder of the precarious relationship that we maintain with nature. It is also a notice to the importance of effective planning and preparation for future events. Hubris will lead to our downfall and the Great Influenza serves as a reminder of what can occur if we allow our guard to slip.

Lost Opportunities: The Battle of the Ardennes 22 August 1914 - Simon J House

This review was submitted to Soldier Magazine.

Title: Lost Opportunities: The Battle of the Ardennes 22 August 1914

Author: Simon J House

ISBN: 978-1- 911096-42-9

Publisher: Helion

Year: 2017

Hardcover

Pages: 252

Photos/ Maps: 36/59 (in separate included book)

The author has undertaken an outstanding analysis of the French efforts to disrupt the German Schlieffen Plan by striking at the hinge of the German advance in the Ardennes. Despite achieving both tactical and operational surprise and having heavy numerical superiority, the French failed utterly in their endeavours. His book reviews the battles themselves, the qualities and competencies of the four key commanders involved (two German and two French) at the operational level as well as the doctrinal and training policies of Germany and France in the years leading up to the war. A superb study and a publication of the highest quality.

Wind in the Wires - Duncan Grinnell-Milne

This review has been submitted to Airforce Magazine.

Title: Wind in the Wires

Author: Duncan Grinnell-Milne

ISBN: 978-1-90980-801-0

Publisher: Pen and Sword

Year: 2014

Hardcover

Pages: 238

Photos/ Maps: 4/0

Autobiographies of the early days of the Royal Flying Corps (later to be known as the Royal Air Force) never cease to impress. Perhaps it is the sense of wonder and élan with which these early pilots and observers recount their adventures; and that was what it was for many of these young gentlemen, an adventure. Wind in the Wire is the author’s story of his time in the RFC and his experiences as one of the early, and late, pilots of the First World War.

The first thing that strikes the reader is the prose with which the author writes. Despite not being a professional writer, he is able to turn a phrase in such a way as to convey to the reader a clear sense of the image and the humanity behind the description. His humility, joy, fears, frustrations and doubts are expressed simply and honestly, without pretense or embellishment. He is as forthright about his insecurities at learning to fly and joining an operational squadron as he is about his growing confidence and aggression in the air.

This is a book solely about his flying period; from when he reports for pilot training from his Regiment in July, 1915 to his last flight of the war in 1919. The narrative may be divided into three distinct parts: his training, his first operational squadron and being captured and finally his escape and rejoining 56 Squadron for the last months of the war. Each section alone stands as a fascinating tale of growth and adventure; taken together they represent a life’s worth of experiences compacted into three and a half short years.

The first section relates the author’s experiences in learning to fly as well as his first Squadron in France. What stands out is the quality of leadership and, during this time of the war, the lack of knowledge relating to even basic flying. Skills such as spinning, formation, bombing and gunnery were all being learned ‘on the fly’ and even the more senior pilots did not know much more than the most junior. 

The author does not dwell on the details of his incarceration period in any detail save that made numerous attempts at escape and that he turned down multiple offers by the Germans to have him transferred to neutral Holland where he would be precluded from further participation in the war but would not be held to the same degree of restriction as he was in Germany. It is very interesting to learn of the different approaches that many of the internee’s adopted as a result of their newfound circumstances and the options available such as transfer to a neutral country.

The period transitioning his escape and return to flying duty is of particular interest because it represents in fact a time capsule. During the two and a half years of his time as a POW, the entire spectrum of air combat had utterly changed. The doctrine, airframes, weapons and organizational structure of the RFC (and the Germans) was nothing like it was when he was captured. His description of endeavouring to get back into operational flying on the Western Front, his retraining and the “Rip van Winkle” effect of coming to grips with his new surroundings is gripping and absorbing. His treatment at 56 Squadron as somewhat of a carnival freak due to the fact that he was returning aircrew from a bygone era (escapees were never returned to combat roles at this time so he was doubly unique) is very interesting to follow. Even his description of the advent of bureaucracy within the RFC when compared to his first arrival in France in 1915 is both insightful, telling and humorous.

Perhaps the most poignant aspect of the book however, is the concluding pages as the war comes to an unexpected end. The author, being only 23 at this time, relates the deep sense of loss and dislocation as the Squadron and the War, representing familiarity, structure as well as profound comradeship, is systematically, and without fanfare, stripped down and disbanded. Although it is impossible to fully render the sense of isolation felt by the author and his peers (indeed if one has not experienced the intensity of war and its effect upon its combatants, mere words have difficulty translating it), G-M’s writing does convey to the reader the emotional turmoil as few books have.

Although this book relates the experiences of a war that was fought one hundred years ago, its significance reverberates even today. This book is a classic of airmanship and courage and should be read in conjunction with the likes of Cecil Lewis’ Sagittarius Rising, Arthur Gould Lee’s Open Cockpit and No Parachute as well as VM Yate’s Winged Victory. An outstanding work of literature and a must for any historian of the military arts.   

Allies Are a Tiresome Lot: The British Army in Italy in the First World War - John Dillon

This review has been submitted to War History Online.

Title: Allies Are a Tiresome Lot: The British Army in Italy in the First World War

Author: John Dillon

ISBN: 978-1-910777-32-9

Publisher: Helion

Year: 2015

Hardcover

Pages: 224

Photos/ Maps: 15/4

As part of their Wolverhampton Military Studies program, Helion has published this interesting study of the experiences and undertakings of the British Army deployed to Italy in support of the Italian Front. Dillon has provided a comprehensive overview of the unique challenges, social environs and environmental differences facing the British and how they adapted their doctrine and regulations accordingly.

The Italians were a late comer to the war and were not held in high regard by the British command; however, a number of setbacks had, by 1917 driven the Italian government to the brink of surrender. The Allies, specifically the British, under significant pressure on the Western front due to the war weariness of the French (having recently mutinied), the recent loss of Romania and the deteriorating situation in the East with Russia, could not afford to lose the Italians without incurring a substantial threat to the entire war effort. They therefore reluctantly agreed to pull badly needed troops from the Western Front to bolster the Italians.

The Italian Front for soldiers recently engaged in the horrors of the Western Front was, in many respects, a paradise. Combat was infrequent, distances to the enemy trenches were as far as over a kilometre in many cases, the weather was mild, the ground dry and the daily routine easy; boredom became as much a challenge as the enemy. These unique challenges form the basis of Dillon’s work. He divides his narrative into distinctive sections, each stand-alone and covering such areas as medical, crime and punishment, morale and working with the Italians. He also provides, at the outset, a synopsis of the Italian war effort both in terms of the fighting as well as the relations of the Italian Government with its Allies. He closes his book with the British/Italian engagement with the Austro-Hungarians during the final months of the war and the challenges associated with the tense post war regional relations and the need to bring the soldiers home.

As this is a relatively unknown aspect of the First World War Dillon’s work is significant in the light it sheds on the unique facets of this campaign. He writes with clarity and humour, relating conditions and situations not seen on other fronts. This is a serious work however, well researched and presented. He draws on a plethora of primary source material to provide not only the strategic perspective but also the soldier’s narrative, weaving in many firsthand accounts into his writing.

Helion has maintained its high standard of quality with the production value of this work. Dillon’s book is a fascinating account of the strange world that the British soldiers, fresh from the Western Front, found themselves; the challenges that they faced and the methods that they used to adapt to this new environment.

The Grand Scuttle - Dan van der Vat

Title: The Grand Scuttle

Author: Dan van der Vat

ISBN: 978-1-873-37629-4

Publisher: Spellmount

Year: 1982

Hardcover

Pages: 240

Photos/ Maps: 9/1

Following the signing of the Armistice in November 1918, many assumed that the First World War was concluded; however, in reality, the war was only on hold pending German ratification of the final peace treaty. As a condition of the Armistice, the Allied powers demanded that the German High Seas Fleet be interned in either an Allied or neutral port. The legal challenges of maintaining such a huge concentration of ships in one location precluded most neutral powers from agreeing resulting in the fleet being ordered to Scapa Flow until the cessation of negotiations. Seventy-four capital ships, stripped of their armaments, made their way to the English port to await the results of the Paris negotiations, the crews knowing that they and their ships were at the centre of intense debate and dissention between not only Germany and the Allied countries, but also between the Allies themselves.

Adding to the complexity of this situation was the fact that, because the ships were only interned but not surrendered, the Allies were not allowed under international law to place troops on board. Thus the ships continued to be crewed by German officers and men who were not allowed ashore during the period of internment. Additionally, the German Navy was beset by internal unrest and the massive spread of communism amongst the crews resulting in widespread insubordination and the abuse of officers (especially on the larger ships). These were the conditions under which the German Admiral Reuter (the German internment Commander) and his officers had to manage the fleet and prevent the British from having an excuse to board and seize the ships.

Van der Vat’s book is a study of the international environment leading up to the internment, the conditions under which the German fleet was held and, most importantly, how Reuter used his superior leadership skills to not only re-establish a degree of control over the sailors but also to guide the fleet to an honourable and noteworthy end despite the best efforts of the British. Concurrent to his description of the environment, van der Vat undertakes a detailed evaluation of the complexity of Reuter as a Commander and his sense of honour and duty. Given the paucity of information available to him and the limitations on external contact imposed by the British, it was he alone that made the decisions surrounding the conduct and ultimate fate of the fleet. Very few commanders have been given a more daunting task under more stressful conditions than Reuter.

While this book is older it nevertheless contains some extremely valuable lessons and insights applicable to the commanders of today. Issues of morale, acceptance of risk, decision making, maintenance of aim, duty and honour are displayed in bas relief as being central to retaining a degree of effectiveness under conditions of extreme adversity. A fascinating and engaging read.   

The Horns of the Beast - James Stejskal

This review has been submitted to Military History Monthly Magazine.

Title: The Horns of the Beast

Author: James Stejskal

ISBN: 978-1-909982-78-9

Publisher: Helion

Year: 2014

Softcover

Pages: 140

Photos/ Maps: 64/9

Very few have heard of the Swakop River Campaign in South-West Africa (SWA). Undertaken by South African troops against the forces within the German colony, it was concluded by the Allies in July, 1915. Relatively speaking it was a minor campaign when compared to the European and Turkish conflicts or even, for that matter, the East African campaign in what is today Kenya and Tanzania. Nevertheless, it was important for a number of reasons: it resulted in South Africa being responsible for SWA, it isolated the German surface raiders operating in the Far East and it reduced the German presence overseas.

For the Allies, victory was a forgone conclusion as the German forces were heavily outnumbered and they could not rely upon indigenous forces due to heavy handed policies which had both subdued as well as alienated their relationships. Additionally, German tactics were flawed and poorly executed by their commanders. Psychologically, the German officers were defeated almost immediately and this negativity transferred itself to their responsible forces. Finally, the physical environment in the region was not conducive to guerrilla style warfare being dry and, for the most part, open.

The author has done a good job at analyzing the challenges faced by both adversaries. The South African’s, while heavily outnumbering the Germans, were hampered by poor logistical planning as well as a revolt amongst those Boers who felt that they should not be fighting on behalf of the British Empire. It would have been interesting to have had more information on the nature and extent of this revolt as it was very significant to the timely execution of their mission. The Germans also allowed themselves to be distracted by a confrontation with the Portuguese colony of Angola (with whom they were not even at war). While successful, it removed a significant number of badly needed forces for the period of the three months that these troops were engaged.

Overall, a short but interesting read. The author finishes with photos and notes on the present day conditions of the different battlefields. Recommended for those interested in some of the more peripheral battlefields of WW1. 

Blockade: Cruiser Warfare and the Starvation of Germany in World War One - Steve R Dunn

This review has been submitted to War History Online Magazine.

Title: Blockade: Cruiser Warfare and the Starvation of Germany in World War One

Author: Steve R Dunn

ISBN: 978-1-84832-340-7

Publisher: Pena and Sword//Seaforth

Year: 2016

Hardcover

Pages: 208

Photos/Maps: 15/1

One of the least appreciated battlegrounds of the First World War was the ocean. The Battle of Jutland has been well documented as has been the fact that Germany was subject to a very effective naval blockade; however, the details of that blockade and its actual effect are at best superficially known to the reading public. Blockade seeks to redress that delta with its discussion of the methodology of the blockade, focusing upon the actions of the 10^th Cruiser Squadron covering the ‘Northern Approaches” and renditions of noteworthy individual ship actions. Further, he touches upon little known German efforts to both break the blockade and effect a similar style of blockade on the British Islands.

Dunn begins his work with a look at the impact of the German surface raider’s and the u-boat campaign. He additionally looks at the challenges of the Law of the Sea as it pertains to submarine warfare (so-called ‘unrestricted warfare’). His analysis is succinct and easily grasped and enables the reader to comprehend the difficulty and potential of this new form of warfare both doctrinally and practically. Additionally, his narrative clearly shows the effect that individual commerce raiders had when released upon merchant fleets unprotected on the vast oceans.

He also discusses the legality (and superficially, the morality) of a universal blockade not specifically aimed at military resources but Germany writ large and the doctrinal transition from close to distant blockade. The legality of the blockade as a method of warfare is interesting in that it highlights the hypocrisy of the international and historical discussion of this period. Much was made (especially amongst neutrals) of the illegality of unrestricted seaborne warfare to the point where calls were made by the British to declare submarine warfare a war crime. Yet, the dubious legality of the general blockade of Germany was never questioned despite the fact that over 750,000 German civilian deaths may be directly attributable to a lack of food during the war.

The 10th Cruiser Squadron, comprising obsolete cruisers and armed merchant vessels (AMC’s), was responsible for an inverted triangle running from Iceland to Norway with its southern point on the Orkney’s. The deeply hostile environment and hardships that these sailors suffered and their unacknowledged triumph at denying the Germans merchant access is recounted by Dunn in a gripping narrative of courage and endurance. He focusses on the human face of this campaign as opposed to a stark rendition of dates and numbers. The statistics serve to reinforce the significance of the accomplishments of the officers and sailors themselves. Dunn’s account of the unsung heroes and combatants of this region is not limited to the Allies but also encompasses the German officers and sailors who constantly strove to break the 10^th Cruiser Sqn’s stranglehold on this region.

This book serves as an excellent introduction into the details of the blockade; its history, evolution and effect. It touches upon themes that should be discussed in more detail such as the morality and legality of the blockade and the stigma of German attempts at unrestricted warfare; however, these are not pursued in any real analytical depth. Dunn’s work is solid and very readable and is recommended for those seeking to gain insight into the nature of this kind of warfare and its impact upon the Allied war effort in 1914-1918.