This review has been published in the Journal of the RCAF.
Title: Crisis on the Mediterranean: Naval Competition and Great Power Politics, 1904-1914
Title: Crisis on the Mediterranean: Naval Competition and Great Power Politics, 1904-1914
Author:
Jon K Hendrickson
Publisher:
Naval Institute Press
ISBN:
978-1-61251-475-8
Year:
2014
Hardcover
Pages:
219
The
world of today is so radically different from that of pre-World War 1 that it
is difficult to even appreciate the challenges and concerns that nations of
that period faced as they struggled with international relations. Central to
this, the Mediterranean Sea, represented for many nations a key transport and
security concern as well as a common border between many of the (then) worlds
leading powers: Italy, France, the British Empire, the Ottoman Empire and the
Austro-Hungarian Empire. Each of these had its own agendas and visions of the
region and, in many cases, these were at odds with the desires of their
neighbours. Hendrickson's book traces the convoluted lines of international
naval diplomacy between the nations of the Mediterranean during the period
1904-1914. It reinforces the fact that the consistent underlying theme in
international relations is the fact that nations are never altruistic in their
dealings with each other and that these relationships are nothing if not
flexible.
The
author takes a chronological approach to the period, each chapter focussing
upon a specific component of the interactions. This follows an initial synopsis
of the environment and history of the region in order to set the tone for the
reader as well as providing a start point from which to move forwards. His
contention is that the natural state of affairs for the Med is anarchistic with
no clear player holding a dominant position for an extended period of time;
thus the British presence, controlling the Med for the last quarter of the 19th
century, was a deviation from and not the norm. The start point for the books
narrative is 1904 and the recognition by the British that they are no longer
able to retain their naval hegemony in the Mediterranean. This has a series of
knock-on effects for them including but not limited to: their ability to retain
influence over the Ottomon's, the requirement for additional ground forces in
order to retain control of their territories in Malta, Egypt and Gibraltar and
the necessity to proactively seek allies with whom to share the burden of
'presence'.
Hendrickson
then goes on to trace and analyze the key milestones that delineated the
relations between the international players as the Med came into play once
again. Thus chapters are assigned for the rise of the Italian and
Austro-Hungarian navies during their war scare between 1909 and 1911, their
ultimate raproachment and the impact that this had on their strength in the
Med. Following this, the decision by the Italians, bolstered by their
confidence in their relations with Austro-Hungary and desirous of a greater
influence in Med affairs, to invade Libya. The unanticipated impact of this was
profound for Italy's relationship with both the Alliance countries and France.
He then looks to the reaction of Britain and France to these unfolding events
and how the international situation with Germany forced Britain to adopt
agreements that were counter to her natural inclinations. The author goes on to
shed light on the deepening relationship between Italy and the Alliance as a
result of the reaction of the Entente nations to her expansionism. He then
closes the main narrative with a discussion on the strategic impact to Frances
war plans of the 19th Corps. Composed of the most most hardened and battle
experienced soldiers in the French arsenal, it was stationed in Algeria and
needed to be transported to France in order to fulfil its role in the Western
campaign plan. The importance of this unit to France and the Entente is
underscored by Hendrickson dedicating his final chapter to how France and
Britain grappled with this problem.
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