This review has been submitted to War History Online magazine.
Author:
Henrik O Lunde
ISBN:
978-1-61200-161-6
Publisher:
Casemate
Year:
2013
Hardcover
Pages:
278
Photos/Maps:
16/6
The
gradual changing of the fortunes of war for the Germans, starting in late 1942,
witnessed the transition from offensive to defensive operations for the
Wehrmacht. As the forces allied against them grew in size and capability and
the operational space diminished, the Germans were forced into ever more
dynamic and reactive defensive measures, demanding decision making at the
lowest possible level of command. Fronts had opened in Italy, Normandy,
throughout the East, the North and in the air and the capacity for OKW
(Oberkoammndo der Wehrmacht) and OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres) to provide
timely guidance and evaluation steadily diminished. This book evaluates and
analyses one region, the Baltic, and how Hitlers command strategy for this
vital region developed, influenced in no small part by his strategic
perceptions and bias'. The author incorporates into his study, an operational
analysis of the impact of Hitlers command approach on the ability of the German
Baltic forces to react to their dynamic environment.
The
author maintains a three pronged approah in his evaluation; each was critical
to the results for the German Army. First he undertakes a study of Adolf Hitler
the man and tactician. Specifically, he looks at Hitlers history as a
soldier,his perception of his own capabilities and his relationship with senior
Nazi officials and Wehrmacht officers. HIs perceptions resulted in a flawed
operational policy that squandered hundreds of thousands of his best soldiers
in an effort to sustain a failing strategic policy. Following this he evaluates
the political dynamic of the Scandinavian region focussung primarily upon the
two main players - Finland and Sweden- and their ongoing relationship with
Germany as the war progressed. Lunde incorporates into this the economic,
geopolitical and military aspects of these relationships and how they impacted
HItler's thinking. Finally, he looks at the relationship between Hitler and his
commanders and, more importantly, their ability to influence operational
decision-making. It is telling the degree to which, even at the eleventh hour,
they acquiesced to his flawed operational logic irrespective of their
professional assessment of the situation within their regions.
Lunde's
arguments are both logical and easily
followed. He has addressed a series of very complex facets of German leadership
dynamics and international relations and presented them in such a way that,
while the evident complexity is not lost upon the reader, it is not only
comprehendible but also thought provoking. For example, the relationship
between Germany and Finland is extremely challenging and nuanced. With a
battle-hardened army of over 600,000 soldiers, Finland was a key linch-pin in
the potential success of German force of arms in Russia but was also reliant
upon German arms to ensure its safety from Russia. This inter-dependence
increased as the war continued with Germany doing all it could to retain
Finland as an active or at least passive ally in the conflict. The
international dance between the two is fascinating to follow and expertly
dissected by Lunde.
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