The Splintered Empires: The Eastern Front 1917-1921 - Prit Buttar

This review has been submitted to Strategy and Tactics Magazine.

Title: The Splintered Empires: The Eastern Front 1917-1921
Author: Prit Buttar
ISBN: 978-1-4728-1985-7
Publisher: Osprey Publishing
Year: 2017
Hardcover
Pages: 480
Photos/Maps: 34/14

With this book, the last in his WW1 Eastern Front series, Buttar closes the circle on a little appreciated, understood and studied facet of the First World War. Like his other works, the author draws upon his in-depth research and knowledge of the period to present a comprehensive picture of the convoluted paroxysms that wracked the Empires of Eastern Europe; resulting in the emergence of multiple nascent nations each struggling for survival and territory. For many Western readers, WW1 ended in November, 1918 with the cessation of hostilities on the Western Front. For those in the East; however, a further three years of conflict remained as nationalism, racism and political strife convulsed the region.

Buttar is the consummate historian, seamlessly transitioning from a strategic perspective, encompassing the broad spectrum of international players, to recollections from soldiers, citizens and statesmen that adds both depth and a personal element to the narrative. The author is adroit at selecting diary entries and letter passages that provide insight into the fear, confusion, despair, hope and rage that permeated throughout these societies as they collapsed into anarchy. This is particularly applicable to the Russian and Austro-Hungarian officers as discipline and professionalism collapsed in the face of societal turmoil.

This period is particularly confusing and complex; Buttar is able to tease apart the densely interwoven threads and present them in a cogent, logical fashion while not losing touch with the human element of the period. Traditionally, the smaller nations in the East received short shrift from historians focussed upon the collapse of the Great Powers; in this work, Buttar looks at each of the emerging nation states in turn and discusses their efforts to navigate the complex international waters around them. Thus Finland, each of the Baltic States, Poland and Ukraine are the subjects of chapters in their own right.

Additionally, Buttar addresses a number of elusive questions that have been left unclear in a number of previous accounts of the Eastern Front. Germany, for example had anticipated 45 essentially fresh divisions being freed up for transfer to the West for participation in the final German offensive. Ultimately, only 32 divisions were made available. The why of this centres upon the hubris and misguided national decisions of the Central Powers in their occupation policies and treatment of the Eastern regions. What of the forces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire? Why were they not available for transfer to the west; this also is addressed.

Overall, this is another outstanding book from this author. Encompassing not only the final years of the First World War but also the myriad of ‘successor wars’ that ravaged the region, Splintered Empires is a superb synopsis of the period. The bibliography and notes sections are comprehensive and add additional depth to the narrative. Osprey has published a high quality book that is a fabulous addition to anyone’s library.     

Great Powers, Grand Strategies: The New Game in the South China Sea - edited by Anders Corr

This review has been submitted to the Australian Naval Review 

Title: Great Powers, Grand Strategies: The New Game in the South China Sea

Author: edited by Anders Corr

ISBN: 978-1-68247-235-4

Publisher: Naval Institute Press

Year: 2018

Hardcover

Pages: 327

Photos/Maps: 0/1

Very few arenas of the globe have the potential for overlapping geopolitical interests as does the South China Sea. Replete in resources, focus for international trade routes, experiencing growing populations and border to numerous island and mainland states; it is a region in dispute. Central to this concentration of competing interests sits China who, for the last twenty years, has been increasingly assertive in its dealings with not only neighbouring claimants within the region but also other Great Powers. Presented in a series of individual essays edited by Corr, Great Powers, Grand Strategies provides a timely and insightful analysis of the many facets of this new region of Great Power politics.

Three of the chapters focus exclusively on the Chinese perspective, two from the US perspective and one for each of the remaining powers: Japan, India and Russia. Notably, the book also addresses the perspective of regional ASEAN and EU concerns. The analysis is robust and the data presented in a comprehensive and informative manner. The information provided by each of the authors provides the reader with concrete examples to explain the actions and concerns of the nation states involved.

Interestingly, while the information provided is extremely insightful and useful in and of itself, the narrative, overall, does leave the reader with a sense of there being a lack of an overarching framework within which the contributor’s chapters would be able to be contextually better understood. Great Powers will generally act according to certain broad characteristics that would be better understood if explained at the outset of the work. These characteristics manifest themselves within different international relations theories. Thus if one had been presented with a synopsis of the Realist or Constructivism schools and their sub-components and were then able to view the actions of the Great Powers through these lenses, it would have gone a long way towards providing the reader with improved context to help explain the ‘why’ behind a Great Powers actions while using the data as tangible examples.  Constructivism postulates that a nation will draw upon its belief systems (identified within historical, cultural or social contexts) rather than material gain, as the foundation of its actions. Realism, on the other hand, suggests that the goal of any nation is the accumulation of power in an effort to eclipse or offset the power of its rivals (perceived or otherwise).  

This observation, notwithstanding, Great Powers, Grand Strategies remains an excellent synopsis of the confluence of international interests and challenges within the South China Sea. The work is timely given the ongoing stresses manifesting themselves as China expands its military and economic influence in the region. I recommend this work to those seeking to understand the potential impacts of the Great Power’s actions, the reasoning behind them and the methodologies that support them.

Three German Invasions of France – The Summer Campaigns of 1870, 1914 and 1940 - Douglas Fermer

This review has been submitted to the British Military History Journal

Title: Three German Invasions of France – The Summer Campaigns of 1870, 1914 and 1940

Author: Douglas Fermer

ISBN: 978-1-781593-54-7

Publisher: Pen and Sword

Year: 2013

Hardcover

Pages: 273

Photos/ Maps: 30/11

Germany and France have maintained a difficult relationship stemming back to the pre-German unification period of Prussia and Napoleonic France. Three wars were fought between the two nations during the 70 years from 1970 until 1940; each reflecting a period of political, doctrinal and societal change within each nation state. Fermer’s book looks at the root causes and the execution of these wars with a view towards highlighting the impact on these conflicts upon the French army and society primarily and upon Germany secondarily.

Fermer’s analysis is balanced and insightful. Despite the breadth of the topics that he has undertaken to review, he does so in a very succinct manner; the renditions of his observations easy to follow and well developed. His approach is to look at each of the individual engagements as a part of a greater whole. This facilitates a linear examination that clearly identifies the connections and causation's between the wars.

He has divided his book into four distinct parts, each addressing the individual conflicts as well as the precursor period in France leading up to 1870. Each section establishes the environment of the period and the main changes that had occurred as well as the main lessons to be learned from each encounter. Central throughout is the political atmosphere which remains the main cause of the military escalation between the nations. The use of the military as a tool of political gain must be balanced and extremely carefully applied; Fermer shows that, leading to 1870, the Germans were extremely adept at this but that limitations in political acumen by both participants made themselves felt to a greater degree as time went forward. Hubris on the part of both French and German leadership was legion.

Fermer also undertakes a detailed evaluation of the impact of success upon both the victor and vanquished both doctrinally and psychologically. His investigation reveals that the German use of lessons learned following their actions were far more in depth (and taken far more seriously) than their French counterparts. The French were further handicapped by their political instability and ongoing intra-national divergence. This manifested itself in inconsistent recruitment and armament policies as well as challenges in foreign policy.

Also, included in the book is a comprehensive listing of the references that he has utilized; of particular note is the number of primary source documents. Overall this is an outstanding rendition of the turbulent period encompassing these three conflicts. The author has drafted a narrative that recounts the characteristics of the conflicts themselves, the underlying causes (primary, secondary and beyond) and the results politically, militarily and socially thus providing the reader with a complete understanding of this period. Fermer’s book is an excellent account and source. 

Enemy in the East - Rolf-Dieter Muller

This review has been submitted to Strategy and Tactics Magazine

Title: Enemy in the East

Author: Rolf-Dieter Muller

ISBN: 978-1-78076-829-8

Publisher: IB Taurus/Raincoast Books

Year: 2015

Hardcover

Pages: 316

Photos/Maps: 22/7

There has been much speculation on the degree of proactive involvement the military leadership of the German Armed Forces had in the conception and planning of the attack on Russia. During the trials following the war, it was consistently suggested that the conception for the idea of the attack was Hitler’s alone and that the military’s role in this was that of following the orders of a legitimate government. Muller seeks to undermine that theory by proving that the military was both a proactive and willing partner in the conception and development of the attack on Russia contrary to long held belief.

This was a very interesting and enjoyable book to read. The author has done a noteworthy job at shedding light upon a period of intense international lobbying and exchange. Perhaps the most fascinating part of this was his discussion and analysis of the close relationship that existed between the Germans and Poles right up until the last few months before war broke out. Poland and Germany held a common view of the threat posed by Russia and were very active partners in planning and executing the breakup of Czechslovakia as well as planning for the further redistribution of Ukrainian land and the resettlement of any Jews in their territory. Muller has painted a very clear picture of two nations with very common interests; further reinforced by the extent to which Germany tried to accommodate Poland’s wishes.

He also clearly relates the rapidly changing international situation that necessitated continuous and re-prioritization of planning by the German military. Additionally, the rapid pace of operations precluded addressing many of the shortfalls recognized by the German military commanders in their equipment and doctrine. It is not clear; however, that the German military proactively worked at pushing political policy East. It is true and is proven by the author that the military was not at all happy with the prospect of striking at the West but, while more confident of their chances with Russia, they were still seeking time and delay in order to build up their experience and capabilities.

The author has also been successful with his analysis of Stalin’s adept handling of the international uncertainty leading up to the outbreak of hostilities. He played Germany for incredible accommodations in spheres of interest and positioning that significantly diminished Germany’s advantages when war came two years later. Not the least of these involved pushing the German start line for an attack into Russian hundreds of kilometers to the west. It is very clear from Muller’s study that the German military and leadership chaffed under this imposed cooperation.

A very well researched and insightful study of the international twists and turns leading up to war in the East. What is patently obvious is that Hitler maintained a clear but consistently frustrated focus on attacking Russia at the earliest opportunity and that the Polish leadership, while tragically misreading German intent and Western capability, inadvertently prevented a German victory in Russia while concurrently sacrificing its territory and populations to the ravages of both German and Russia forces. An interesting book that does much to dispel the myth of a Germany bent on crushing a helpless Poland but does not succeed in proving the case that the German military was any more complicit in pushing for an attack on Russia.

Hitler's Wave-Breaker Concept: An Analysis of the German End Game in the Baltic - Henrik O Lunde

This review has been submitted to War History Online magazine.

Title: Hitler's Wave-Breaker Concept: An Analysis of the German End Game in the Baltic

Author: Henrik O Lunde

ISBN: 978-1-61200-161-6

Publisher: Casemate

Year: 2013

Hardcover

Pages: 278

Photos/Maps: 16/6

The gradual changing of the fortunes of war for the Germans, starting in late 1942, witnessed the transition from offensive to defensive operations for the Wehrmacht. As the forces allied against them grew in size and capability and the operational space diminished, the Germans were forced into ever more dynamic and reactive defensive measures, demanding decision making at the lowest possible level of command. Fronts had opened in Italy, Normandy, throughout the East, the North and in the air and the capacity for OKW (Oberkoammndo der Wehrmacht) and OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres) to provide timely guidance and evaluation steadily diminished. This book evaluates and analyses one region, the Baltic, and how Hitlers command strategy for this vital region developed, influenced in no small part by his strategic perceptions and bias'. The author incorporates into his study, an operational analysis of the impact of Hitlers command approach on the ability of the German Baltic forces to react to their dynamic environment.

The author maintains a three pronged approah in his evaluation; each was critical to the results for the German Army. First he undertakes a study of Adolf Hitler the man and tactician. Specifically, he looks at Hitlers history as a soldier,his perception of his own capabilities and his relationship with senior Nazi officials and Wehrmacht officers. HIs perceptions resulted in a flawed operational policy that squandered hundreds of thousands of his best soldiers in an effort to sustain a failing strategic policy. Following this he evaluates the political dynamic of the Scandinavian region focussung primarily upon the two main players - Finland and Sweden- and their ongoing relationship with Germany as the war progressed. Lunde incorporates into this the economic, geopolitical and military aspects of these relationships and how they impacted HItler's thinking. Finally, he looks at the relationship between Hitler and his commanders and, more importantly, their ability to influence operational decision-making. It is telling the degree to which, even at the eleventh hour, they acquiesced to his flawed operational logic irrespective of their professional assessment of the situation within their regions.

Lunde's arguments are  both logical and easily followed. He has addressed a series of very complex facets of German leadership dynamics and international relations and presented them in such a way that, while the evident complexity is not lost upon the reader, it is not only comprehendible but also thought provoking. For example, the relationship between Germany and Finland is extremely challenging and nuanced. With a battle-hardened army of over 600,000 soldiers, Finland was a key linch-pin in the potential success of German force of arms in Russia but was also reliant upon German arms to ensure its safety from Russia. This inter-dependence increased as the war continued with Germany doing all it could to retain Finland as an active or at least passive ally in the conflict. The international dance between the two is fascinating to follow and expertly dissected by Lunde.

The lessons for political masters and military commanders in this book are numerous and they speak to the challenges of juggling operational and strategic balls concurrently. Lunde has written a very telling book about a region and a campaign that did not adjust to the changing strategic and operational realities on the ground. Casemate has published a high quality book and I would strongly recommend it for those interested in further appreciating the multi-faceted approach required in the interaction between international relations and military operations.

Crisis on the Mediterranean: Naval Competition and Great Power Politics, 1904-1914 - Jon K Hendrickson

This review has been published in the Journal of the RCAF.

Title: Crisis on the Mediterranean: Naval Competition and Great Power Politics, 1904-1914

Author: Jon K Hendrickson

Publisher: Naval Institute Press

ISBN: 978-1-61251-475-8

Year: 2014

Hardcover

Pages: 219 

The world of today is so radically different from that of pre-World War 1 that it is difficult to even appreciate the challenges and concerns that nations of that period faced as they struggled with international relations. Central to this, the Mediterranean Sea, represented for many nations a key transport and security concern as well as a common border between many of the (then) worlds leading powers: Italy, France, the British Empire, the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Each of these had its own agendas and visions of the region and, in many cases, these were at odds with the desires of their neighbours. Hendrickson's book traces the convoluted lines of international naval diplomacy between the nations of the Mediterranean during the period 1904-1914. It reinforces the fact that the consistent underlying theme in international relations is the fact that nations are never altruistic in their dealings with each other and that these relationships are nothing if not flexible.  

The author takes a chronological approach to the period, each chapter focussing upon a specific component of the interactions. This follows an initial synopsis of the environment and history of the region in order to set the tone for the reader as well as providing a start point from which to move forwards. His contention is that the natural state of affairs for the Med is anarchistic with no clear player holding a dominant position for an extended period of time; thus the British presence, controlling the Med for the last quarter of the 19th century, was a deviation from and not the norm. The start point for the books narrative is 1904 and the recognition by the British that they are no longer able to retain their naval hegemony in the Mediterranean. This has a series of knock-on effects for them including but not limited to: their ability to retain influence over the Ottomon's, the requirement for additional ground forces in order to retain control of their territories in Malta, Egypt and Gibraltar and the necessity to proactively seek allies with whom to share the burden of 'presence'. 

Hendrickson then goes on to trace and analyze the key milestones that delineated the relations between the international players as the Med came into play once again. Thus chapters are assigned for the rise of the Italian and Austro-Hungarian navies during their war scare between 1909 and 1911, their ultimate raproachment and the impact that this had on their strength in the Med. Following this, the decision by the Italians, bolstered by their confidence in their relations with Austro-Hungary and desirous of a greater influence in Med affairs, to invade Libya. The unanticipated impact of this was profound for Italy's relationship with both the Alliance countries and France. He then looks to the reaction of Britain and France to these unfolding events and how the international situation with Germany forced Britain to adopt agreements that were counter to her natural inclinations. The author goes on to shed light on the deepening relationship between Italy and the Alliance as a result of the reaction of the Entente nations to her expansionism. He then closes the main narrative with a discussion on the strategic impact to Frances war plans of the 19th Corps. Composed of the most most hardened and battle experienced soldiers in the French arsenal, it was stationed in Algeria and needed to be transported to France in order to fulfil its role in the Western campaign plan. The importance of this unit to France and the Entente is underscored by Hendrickson dedicating his final chapter to how France and Britain grappled with this problem.

Hendrickson masterfully balances technical analysis of fleet capabilities with a broader study of the operational and strategic implications of the political maneuverings being undertaken by the key players. His narrative style is clear, concise and facilitates an easy understanding of the complex issues facing the different dancers at the 'Med' Ball. He provides a comprehensive bibliography for further research and at the end of each chapter, a synopsis of the events covered. A fascinating and thoroughly researched book. Provides an in-depth look at the role of Italy and Austro-Hungary in the lead up to the First World War, covering areas normally lost in the German/British Naval race and the emphasis on the armies. An outstanding book.

The Liberty Incident Revealed: The Definitive Account of the 1967 Israeli Attack on the U.S. Navy Spy Ship - A Jay Cristol

This review has been published in the Canadian Naval Review.

 

Title: The Liberty Incident Revealed: The Definitive Account of the 1967 Israeli Attack on the U.S. Navy Spy Ship

Author: A Jay Cristol

ISBN: 978-1-61251-340-9

Publisher: Naval Institute Press

Hardcover

Pages: 392

Photographs/maps: 14 b/w//3 

On June 8, 1967, during the height of the Arab-Israeli ‘6 Day War’, units of the Israeli Air Force and Navy attacked the US intelligence gathering vessel “Liberty”, torpedoing and strafing said ship multiple times; the result was significant damage to the ship, 34 dead and 171 wounded. Given that the ship was in international waters (12-14 NM off of the Sinai Peninsula), the attack deliberate and the fact that she was openly identifying itself as an American ship, significant controversy resulted that has continued to play itself out over the succeeding years regarding the reasoning behind Israel’s actions. 

This most recent edition of Cristol’s book expands upon his original copy by incorporating additional material that has been declassified in the intervening years (his original book was published in 2002). The author makes it clear at the outset of his position that the attack was made in honest error by the Israeli’s as a result of a series of internal communication and Command and Control failures. These errors were compounded by concurrent failures within the US naval communications system. The tragedy was made all the more poignant by the fact that the Liberty itself was exactly where she had been ordered to be and undertaking activities that she had been directed to perform. 

Cristol has included verbatim texts from the flight recorders between Israeli Air Controllers and their pilots as well as the same for Israeli naval assets as they track onto target. It is very clear that there was significant confusion amongst Israeli Commanders regarding the nationality of the ship; potential identification went from Egyptian to Soviet to American. Working back from this the author describes in detail not only the operational deficiencies within the US and Israeli Command systems but also the subjective factors that influenced decision making. The Israeli Navy was the poor stepchild of the Israeli military with the Army and Airforce consistently receiving the lion’s share of funding and public recognition. Further exacerbating this, inter-service relations between the airforce and navy were very poor; thus Naval Commanders were actively looking for an opportunity to grab some of the glory from the war before it was too late. 

Cristol’s investigation of this aspect of the incident is fascinating as it reinforces the impact of the ‘human factor’ and the ‘fog of war’ on the derailment of the effective execution of operations. Further, the potential escalation as a result of this misunderstanding threatened to spin into a global conflagration between the US and Soviet Union as the US suspected that it was a Soviet submarine that had attacked the Liberty. 

The book is very well written with a logical and well founded thesis. The author acknowledges the arguments of those who feel that the attack was in fact deliberate on the part of the Israeli’s and refutes their points through studied and well-structured argument. His inclusion of copies of the official reports as well as the transcripts of the communication logs between the Naval and Air assets of the Israeli forces and their command centre provides excellent insight for the reader into the confusion and dysfunction existing within both the US and Israeli militaries. The production value of the book is very good and it is an excellent read relating to a side incident often overlooked in the histories of the 6 Day War.

Lawrence in Arabia - Scott Anderson

Title: Lawrence in Arabia

Author: Scott Anderson

ISBN: 978-0-771-00768-2

Publisher: Signal Books

Softcover

Pages: 577

Photos/maps: 42/5 

Altruism is not a principle of war nor is it a principle of international relations and it is with this pretext that one must approach the machinations and deal-making that typified the Middle East during the years leading up to, during and immediately following the First World War. Anderson’s book presents the reader with a road map of the toing’s and froing’s between the key actors and nation states of the period and the impact that it has had on the long term social and political development of the region. Certainly, the decisions made then have reverberated down through the decades and continue to be felt in the challenges that we are dealing with today. 

Anderson has been able to effectively cut through the Gordian knot of Middle Eastern societies and politics and break down the story into a manageable and traceable narrative. It is truly awe inspiring the degree of naked ambition (both personal and national) that manifested itself at the expense of all else during this period. The example of France refusing to sanction an attack on Alexandretta in 1915 (resulting in the Gallipoli Campaign) because of its fear that it would lose its post war claim to Syria (this despite the fact that militarily it made eminent sense to strike there) boggles the mind with both its hubris and expectation. 

Turk vs Arab, House of Saud vs Hussein, British vs French, Entente vs Central Power, Lawrence vs Sykes, Tribe vs Tribe, Egypt vs India the list is endless of the competitive agendas that were undertaken as the dance of the Middle East carried on. A consistent theme throughout was Lawrence and his role as guide, intermediary, policy maker and manipulator between all of the various parties. The book is not about Lawrence specifically, but the central role that he plays in this drama is key to the long term results. The author does a very credible job of providing the reader a clear understanding of the personalities involved, what drives them, their bias’s, strengths and weaknesses; none more so than Lawrence. Lawrence holds himself aloof from those around him and forges his own path regardless of the intent or direction from his superiors; a true loose cannon. In doing so, he also contributes to the tragedy that unfolds in the region even while he plunges into cynicism and disillusionment with the Great Powers.

 

This book was a finalist for the National Book Critics Award and it is easy to understand why. Anderson has drafted an eminently readable and, more importantly, comprehendible synopsis of the years leading to the collapse of the Ottoman’s, the intricacies of the war years, the betrayal of promises made to the Arabs and the realignment of the Middle East in the vision of the victorious Western Powers. Additionally, Anderson provides an extensive bibliography and notes section for further study. For those seeking an in-depth yet engaging backgrounder for the modern challenges of the Middle East, this is a book to be read.