Meat Grinder: The Battles for the Rzhev Salient 1942-43 - Prit Buttar

This review has been submitted to the British Army Review.

Title: Meat Grinder: The Battles for the Rzhev Salient 1942-43
Author: Prit Buttar
ISBN: 978-1-4728-5181-9
Publisher: Osprey
Year: 2022
Hardcover
Pages: 464
Photos/Maps: 38/17

"Meat Grinder" by Prit Buttar is a meticulously researched and compelling account of the Eastern Front during World War II. Spanning from November 1942 to March 1943, the book delves deep into the four campaigns waged by the Soviets in an effort to dislodge the Germans from their salient, highlighting the immense human cost and operational complexities of the conflict. With a comprehensive analysis of the military tactics, political maneuvers, and personal stories of soldiers on both sides, Buttar offers readers a gripping and harrowing portrayal of one of the most significant, but little known, campaigns of the Eastern Front war.

One of the notable strengths of "Meat Grinder" is Buttar's ability to provide a balanced narrative that gives equal attention to both the Soviet and German perspectives. By examining the decision-making processes of both sides, the author offers valuable insights into the motivations and challenges faced by the commanders and soldiers. Buttar's meticulous attention to detail and extensive use of primary sources, including diaries, letters, and official documents, adds a layer of authenticity to the narrative, allowing readers to gain a deeper understanding of the realities of war.

Moreover, Buttar's writing style is engaging and accessible, making complex military strategies and maneuvers understandable for readers with varying levels of knowledge on the subject. The author excels at breaking down grand strategy into individual battles and engagements, vividly describing the tactical decisions made by commanders and the impact they had on the overall campaign. This approach keeps the readers engaged throughout the book and enhances their understanding of the broader context within which these battles took place.

Buttar also excels in capturing the human side of the conflict. By weaving in personal anecdotes and experiences of soldiers from both sides, he humanizes the war, bringing to life the individuals who fought and sacrificed in these grueling campaigns. From the desperate struggles for survival to the acts of heroism and camaraderie amidst the chaos, these personal stories evoke a sense of empathy and make the reader emotionally invested in the outcome of the battles.

Another notable aspect of "Meat Grinder" is the author's exploration of the role that the personality of Marshal Zhukov (the senior Soviet commander) played in the continuing efforts of the Soviet Forces to dislodge the Germans, despite losses that eventually exceeded over two million dead, wounded and missing, for dubious returns. Buttar effectively demonstrates how the immense resources and manpower dedicated to the Rzhev Salient significantly affected Soviet operations elsewhere on the Eastern Front. Conversely, by diverting Soviet forces and drawing them into a series of protracted and costly conflicts, the Germans were able to stabilize the Central Front, despite significant losses of their own. This analysis offers a fresh understanding of the importance of the campaigns and challenges conventional Stalingrad centric narratives.

However, one slight challenge of the book is its dense and detailed nature. While the extensive research is commendable, at times, the sheer amount of information presented can be overwhelming. Some readers who are less familiar with the Eastern Front might find it challenging to keep track of the numerous battles, locations, and individuals discussed in the narrative. Nevertheless, the book provides a comprehensive glossary and maps that aid in navigation and understanding.

In conclusion, "Meat Grinder" by Prit Buttar is an exceptional work that sheds light on the oft overlooked Rzhev Salient battles that easily matched in intensity but dwarfed in scope the much better known Stalingrad offensive to the south. With its meticulous research, balanced perspective, and engaging narrative style, the book offers a comprehensive and insightful account of the brutal battles fought between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. By capturing the human experiences within the larger context of military strategy and political maneuvering, Buttar delivers a captivating and thought-provoking read that will appeal to both history enthusiasts and general readers alike.

Bazaine 1870: Scapegoat for a Nation - Quintin Barry

This review has been submitted to the Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 

Title: Bazaine 1870: Scapegoat for a Nation

Author: Quintin Barry

ISBN: 978-1-9133-3608-0
Publisher: Helion

Year: 2020
Hardcover
Pages: 308

Photos/Maps: 86/7

"Bazaine 1870" by Quintin Barry is an exceptional historical account that delves into the life and actions of Marshal François Achille Bazaine during the tumultuous year of 1870. Barry's meticulously researched and engagingly written book offers readers a comprehensive examination of Bazaine's role in the Franco-Prussian War and his subsequent surrender of the fortified city of Metz to the Prussian forces.

The book begins by providing readers with a thorough background of Bazaine's early life, military career, and his rise through the ranks of the French Army. Barry deftly sets the stage for the events that would eventually lead to the disastrous Franco-Prussian War. He explores the political and military landscape of the time, discussing the underlying tensions between France and Prussia and the strategic importance of Metz.

What sets Barry's book apart is his ability to present a balanced portrayal of Bazaine. The author does not shy away from showcasing Bazaine's strengths as a military commander, highlighting his tactical brilliance and successes in previous campaigns. However, Barry also critically examines Bazaine's flaws and poor decision-making during the war. He explores the controversies surrounding Bazaine's command, his questionable loyalty, and his controversial decision to retreat to Metz, effectively isolating himself and his army from the rest of France.

Barry's attention to detail is truly commendable. He masterfully captures the essence of the era, vividly describing the battles, the strategies employed by both sides, and the harsh conditions faced by the soldiers. By seamlessly integrating firsthand accounts and primary sources, the author brings the events of 1870 to life, making the reader feel as though they are witnessing the war firsthand.

The book's narrative flows smoothly, guiding readers through the chronology of events with clarity and coherence. Barry expertly balances historical analysis with engaging storytelling, making "Bazaine 1870" accessible to both scholars and general history enthusiasts. The author's clear prose and logical structure ensure that readers never feel overwhelmed by the wealth of information provided.

One of the strengths of "Bazaine 1870" lies in Barry's ability to challenge preconceived notions about Bazaine's actions. The author carefully evaluates the factors that influenced Bazaine's decisions, shedding light on the complexities of his character and the difficult choices he faced. This nuanced approach adds depth to the narrative and invites readers to reconsider their assumptions about this controversial historical figure.

While Bazaine himself is the focus of the authors narrative, the broader internal political machinations of French political and military adversaries undertaking internecine activities against Napoleon III and his government, are woven into the text by Barry to act as the backdrop of this tragic story. The role of Bazaine as pawn within this larger context underscores the bloodsport that represents politics at its most base level and the willingness of those to undertake Real Politique to sacrifice anyone to protect themselves and facilitate their quest for power.

In conclusion, "Bazaine 1870" by Quintin Barry is a remarkable work that offers readers a captivating and insightful examination of Marshal Bazaine and the events of the Franco-Prussian War. Barry's extensive research, balanced analysis, and engaging writing style make this book an essential addition to any history enthusiast's library. Whether one is familiar with this period or encountering it for the first time, "Bazaine 1870" provides a thought-provoking exploration of a pivotal moment in European history. It should also be recognized that the publisher of this work, Helion, has once again produced an outstandingly high quality book.

Fortress Budapest Vol 1 and 2: The Siege of the Hungarian Capital 1944-45 - Kamen Nevenkin

This review has been submitted to the Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research

Title: Fortress Budapest Vol 1 and 2: The Siege of the Hungarian Capital 1944-45
Author: Kamen Nevenkin
ISBN: 978-615-80072-5-2
Publisher: PeKo Publishing
Year: 2020
Hardcover
Pages: 1107 Vol 1, 467 Vol 2
Photos/Maps: Vol 2 is all maps and photographs

Periodically one comes across a work of such depth and detail that it must surely be immediately ranked as the standard operational and tactical analysis of a particular event available to historians and military enthusiasts. These books by Bulgarian historian Nevenkin fall into that category. The authors lens encapsulates the entire 108 day campaign by the Soviets to seal off and capture the Hungarian capital of Budapest; transitioning from the macro level to the micro as he focuses upon the 50 days of fighting within the city itself. His narrative seamlessly swings from the Soviets to the Hungarian and German defenders who had turned the city into a fortress of hardpoints and mutually supporting gun positions. Caught between these forces were the civilians, desperate to escape and survive.

Nevenkin was able to draw upon previously unavailable primary source material from Russian and Hungarian archives to augment those from the German military. This has facilitated a level of detail, from multiple perspectives, formally impossible in his discussion of the unfolding combat; of particular note, the author has combined period photographs and maps to recreate visual representations of strongpoints within the city, including arcs of fire for artillery, machine gun and anti-tank nests, right down to the individual city block. In addition to providing the reader with a street level appreciation of the nature of the fighting, he has also provided an unprecedented level of visual detail, at the tactical level, of the complexity of fighting in built up areas. 

Interspersed within the narrative are hundreds of recollections by the officers and soldiers participating in the brutal fighting around and within Budapest. These stories serve to add a more personal sheen to the discussion of unit movement and engagements, serving to remind the reader that behind the words and numbers are real human beings, dying and being wounded in their thousands. Certainly, one is struck by the mass that the Soviets were able to bring to the fight in terms of both men and material. However, it is not only this that stands out; Eastern Front historians will note the progress made by the Soviets in combined arms attacks at the tactical and operational levels as well as the significant improvement in their strategic orchestration at the Corps, Army and Front levels. It is evident that Axis troops still maintained a clear superiority in terms of leadership, soldier skills and equipment; but the gap was noticeably closing. It is also obvious that, whatever delta remained between the Soviet and Axis forces, this was further diminished by the growing material imbalance between the forces engaged. 

It is insightful to note that as the ring closed and tightened around Budapest, the Axis leadership resorted to more and more desperate measures to keep the trapped forces resupplied. Bombers, gliders and transport aircraft were all used to deliver supplies; Nevenkin’s discussion of these efforts is both detailed and very engaging as he draws upon the journals and diaries of aircrew involved in these efforts. It is also indicative of the continued effectiveness of the Luftwaffe at this late point in the war (late 44-Jan 45). 

This two volume set on the battles leading up to investment of Budapest, the siege and ultimate capture of the city and the attempted breakout by Axis forces, may easily be considered to be the seminal work on this event. The level of detail, the seamless incorporation of first person accounts, the research and reproduction of maps and photographs all serve to emphasize the incredible level of research and work of history that the author has produced. This book is not for the casual reader, although the style of writing makes it more than accessible, but rather, fulfils the dual role of outstanding historical resource and battle study superbly. It is also important to note that while this book is an analysis of the combat raging around and within the Hungarian Capital, it is also built upon a foundation of the storied history between Hungary and its eastern neighbours. The author is to be commended for an excellent work and Peko Publishing for their continued superb quality of production.

After Jutland: The Naval War in Northern European Waters June 1916 – November 1918 - James Goldrick

This review has been submitted to the Canadian Naval Review

Title: After Jutland: The Naval War in Northern European Waters June 1916 – November 1918
Author: James Goldrick
ISBN: 978-1-5267-4298-8
Publisher: Pen and Sword Publishing
Year: 2018
Hardcover
Pages: 332
Photos/Maps: 32/13 

The prevalent assumption amongst a significant portion of casual World War 1 enthusiasts is that, following the inconclusive Battle of Jutland, the German High Seas Fleet maintained a very limited presence on the high seas for the duration of the war, the Royal Navy continued, for the most part unchallenged, preserving the stranglehold on Germany and that the Baltic saw little if any activity whatsoever. Of course, this is far from the truth and Adm (ret'd) Goldrick’s work goes a long way in dismissing those misconceptions. His narrative iterates the experiences of the major Northern Theatre Battle Fleets (RN, German and Russian), as they undertake operations from the Gulf of Finland to the edge of the North Sea. While it is true that a second major fleet action along the lines of Jutland did not materialize, Goldrick makes it very clear that significant actions were very much the norm right up until the end of the war. 

The author is a professional Navy man, and that expertise comes through in his analysis and discussion of the engagements and operational challenges/successes of the different navies. Additionally, and just as significantly, he expands the scope of his narrative to include detailed reviews on the technological developments of the adversaries as the war progressed. These include but are not limited to mine warfare, naval air capabilities, gunnery, and submarine development. His observations and explanations on the impact of these areas on offensive and defensive operations are succinct and insightful. 

Navies operate in an international environment, free from the restraints of trench warfare etc. As such, they cannot help but interact with assets of non-combatant nations and these interactions can have far reaching effects well beyond their immediate boundaries. Goldrick incorporates his thoughts on the impact of these international engagements on the course of the war itself. The declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare by the Germans in 1917, for example, was directly responsible for facilitating the entrance of the United States into the war. 

A particular strength of this book is the section that the author refers to as the ‘Reflections’. In this area, he finalizes the work with a series of conclusions on the overall conduct of the naval war by each of the main protagonists. His observations are telling and prescient. He is critical of the method by which the German Navy was utilized, suggesting that its strengths were not fully recognized specifically in the areas of surface raiders, submarine warfare (not unrestricted however), and operational doctrine in the use of mixed-use flotilla’s and scouting groups. Nevertheless, the author also recognizes the limitations imposed on the fleet by external factors such as the expanse of the submarine service on personnel and the deterioration of the ships themselves as the war progressed due to (presumably) the impact of the blockade on engineering supplies. The British, for their part, missed significant opportunities regarding mine warfare and the advent of naval aviation. Additionally, its failure to pursue more aggressively a coordinated effort with the Russians that may well have squeezed the German ability to respond on two naval fronts concurrently. The author also makes note of the Russian reluctance to engage in the Western regions of the Baltic Sea. Surely here was a missed opportunity to interdict the flow of resources, particularly iron ore, from Sweden to Germany. 

This was a very enjoyable book to read; educational, relevant, and featuring a good balance of technical insight as well as flowing narrative. It is strongly recommended for the casual historian as well as the dedicated researcher. The publisher has produced a very high quality book to go with the excellent read.

Retribution: The Soviet Reconquest of Western Ukraine, 1943-44 - Prit Buttar

This review has been submitted to Iron Cross Magazine. 

Title: Retribution: The Soviet Reconquest of Western Ukraine, 1943-44
Author: Prit Buttar
ISBN: 978-1-4728-3532-1
Publisher: Osprey Publishing
Year: 2019
Softcover
Pages: 472

Retribution follows as the fourth book in the author’s World War 2 Eastern Front series. Picking up the narrative following the climactic Battle of Kursk, the author details the gradual withdrawal of the German forces back towards the western edge of the Ukraine. Despite continued superior German tactical skill and equipment, it was evident that Soviet tactical and operational competence were steadily improving. Regardless of desperate German resistance and their success at blunting many of the Soviet drives, German forces were gradually but inexorably being worn down by the unremitting Soviet pressure. Hampered by Hitler’s micromanagement and ‘not one step back’ orders, German commanders struggled to maintain operational cohesion. Nevertheless, through the use of ‘fire-brigade’ mobile forces and the selective ignoring of Hitler’s orders, the Germans were able to avoid the destruction of their depleted, but still intact, armies as the they fell back towards the Ukrainian border. Such was the depth of Soviet strength that even the significant natural barriers of the Dniepr and the Donets rivers proved insufficient to halt them. Ultimately, it was the reality of extended lines of logistics and the massive loss of men and material that led to the halt of the westward drive of the Soviets and allowed the Germans a respite within which to regroup. 

The authors weaving of individual experiences and stories, from both sides of the conflict, into the greater narrative lends both depth and a human element to his work. The reader is able to appreciate that behind the units and causality lists, there are individuals who were experiencing a degree of drama that truly beggars the imagination. It is this skill that sets this author’s work apart from many of the more academic works of operational analysis that have been written about World War 2. Additionally, one is better able to appreciate the true vastness and complexity of the operations taking place; what has to happen to ensure the continued forward drive of the frontline units, how are commanders able to manage millions of soldiers and their equipment across thousands of kilometers of battleground and a myriad of other trials to be overcome. The ability of the author to capture the essence of these types of questions and be able to give the reader a small sense of the pressure and challenge experienced daily by the soldiers and officers involved is truly noteworthy. 

Included in this work are a series of excellent maps and notes as well as a comprehensive bibliography. For lovers of military history, military professionals from both an operational and support background, and students of the art of war, this work is an outstanding addition to anyone’s library and professional development reading list. Buttar is to be commended on another outstanding contribution to the history of a theatre of war that has not had the attention that it deserves.

COSSAC: Lt.Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan and the Genesis of Operation Overlord - Stephen C Kepher

This review has been submitted to the Journal of the Society for 

Army Historical Research

Title: COSSAC: Lt.Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan and the Genesis of Operation Overlord
Author: Stephen C Kepher
ISBN: 978-1-68247-508-9
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
Year: 2020
Hardcover
Pages: 300
Photos/Maps: 16/3

The development of the plan for the Allied invasion of the European mainland (Op Overlord) remains as one of the most complex military operations in history. Much has been written and studied relating to the actual invasion itself; however, the effort that went into the conceptualization and development of the plan itself has been generally overlooked in the discussion. Kepher’s book sheds light not only on the method by which the plan unfolded but also the myriad of other factors that had to be taken into account that were unique to this operation: the amphibious element, the multinational C2 issues, the integration of naval, air and land elements, the political facets and, central throughout, the role of LGen Morgan to the success of the project. 

This is the authors first book and he does an admirable job of recreating the environment within which Morgan was to operate. The author undertakes a noteworthy discussion and analysis of perhaps the greatest obstacle facing Morgan, in explaining to his readership, who have grown up in the era of multinational operations and NATO, what it was like for the Allies to create, from scratch and with little to no precedence, a planning team for the invasion. Exacerbating this challenge was that while Morgan as COSSAC (Chief of Staff Supreme Allied Commander) was expected to develop and plan the operation, there was no Supreme Allied Commander appointed. Thus he had no ‘top cover; for the decisions that he was making, nor guidance on the myriad of questions to be answered. Kepher’s liberal use of Morgan’s diaries of the period add additional depth and resonance to the narrative. 

This work serves as an excellent reference for anyone (military or civilian) undertaking a role in which they are working with a consortium of different nationalities, industries or political affiliations. Morgan’s experiences and those of his staff, highlight the benefits and pitfalls associated with these kinds of interactions. What serves as the best means of interaction, how does one undertake conflict resolution, what is the method to best address accusations of external favoritism by ones own government and military? All these examples, and more, are discussed at length through Morgan, and his staffs, own words and experiences. 

The author has included significant additional data in the annexes, thus providing the reader with tangible references covering command structures and relationships, force structures, actual documentation from Morgan providing synopsis of his planning as well as selected abbreviations and acronyms. Kepher deliberately refrains from excessive use of military acronyms and slang in an effort to keep the narrative accessible to the average reader. Additionally, he provides comprehensive endnotes and bibliography that serve to suggest additional avenues of inquiry for the reader. 

The Naval Institute Press have published a high quality book that is both an outstanding rendition of the staff and planning work behind one of the most complex military operations in recent times as well as an excellent professional development tool. Highly recommended for the casual and professional historian alike. 

I Will Run Wild: The Pacific War from Pearl Harbour to Midway - Thomas McKelvey Cleaver

This review has been submitted to the RCAF Journal.

Title: I Will Run Wild: The Pacific War from Pearl Harbour to Midway
Author: Thomas McKelvey Cleaver
ISBN: 978-1-4728-4133-9
Publisher: Osprey Publishing
Year: 2020
Hardcover
Pages: 320
Photos/Maps: 68/5

The title of this book is drawn from the Commander of the Japanese Navy, Adm Yamamoto’s, comment when advised that war with the United States was inevitable: “For the first six months I will run wild. After that I can promise nothing”. Indeed the Japanese did, repeatedly defeating the Far East forces of the UK, Holland, the Commonwealth and the US. Cleaver’s is a fastidiously researched account of those months; with a particular emphasis upon the US experience. 

Conventional wisdom suggests that this period was one of predominant success for the forces of Imperial Japan; however, as the author demonstrates, the angel of fortune flies on wings made up of a combination of opportunity, competency and luck. As Cleaver’s narrative unfolds, repeated examples are presented where this assertion is proven: 

1.    The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour crippling the US Pacific Fleet while missing both its carriers as well as the maintenance and fuel storage reserves of the harbour;
2.       The Japanese codes (that had been broken by the US in early 1942) being changed on 27 May, 1942; seven days before the attack on Midway but too late to prevent the US from knowing the order of battle and the anticipated attack date;
3.       The US relief fleet for the garrison at Wake Island (under attack by land and sea forces of Japan) being turned back 24 hrs before their anticipated engagement with the Japanese (who were not aware of their presence and were not at all prepared for a sea engagement); and
4.       A Japanese Zero ditched during an attack on the Aleutian Islands being found completely by chance by a lost Catalina , intact, because the pilots who had been escorting the crippled aircraft did not want to destroy it from the air (despite standing orders to do so) for fear of possibly injuring their friend and fellow pilot. Up to this point the US had not been able to capture a Zero; the Japanese considered it a loss no less serious than the Battle of Midway itself. 

As with his other books, Cleaver draws heavily upon first-hand accounts from a myriad of sources and ranks, adding a poignancy to his narrative and a very human face to the fighting. His style skillfully captures the breadth of the geographic canvas that was the Pacific Theatre of Operation; concurrently presenting it in a style accessible to both the avid historian and the casual reader. 

An eminently comprehensible and informative work that presents the reader with all of the hubris, drama and humanity from a myriad of perspectives. A recommended addition to those seeking a deeper appreciation of the challenges of the Pacific War.

The Reckoning: The Defeat of Army Group South, 1944 - Prit Buttar

This review was submitted to Soldier Magazine. 

Title: The Reckoning: The Defeat of Army Group South, 1944
Author: Prit Buttar
ISBN: 978-1-4728-3791-2
Publisher: Osprey Publishing
Year: 2020
Hardcover
Pages: 496
Photos/Maps: 34/29 

The Reckoning continues Buttar’s outstanding series on the titanic struggle on the Eastern Front in WW2. A consummate master at the art of bridging historical analysis with riveting prose, the author addresses not only the events leading up to the defeat of the Axis in the South, but also the misconceptions surrounding the capabilities of Germany’s Allies and their Soviet adversaries. Conventional wisdom has not given these groups enough credit regarding their effectiveness and development; Buttar’s work goes a long way in addressing this. A comprehensive bibliography and notes section rounds out this book. Very highly recommended.

  

The World of the Battleship - Edited by Bruce Taylor

This review has been submitted to Military History Online. 

Title: The World of the Battleship
Author: Edited by Bruce Taylor
ISBN: 978-1-84832-178-6
Publisher: Seaforth Publishing
Year: 2018
Hardcover
Pages: 440
Photos: 100’s

The Battleship was, for decades, a symbol of beauty and raw power; epitomizing the authority of the State for which it sailed. Despite the fact that advances in technology has heralded the close of the Battleship era, it remains for many the quintessential example of the height of tangible State supremacy and influence. The World of the Battleship is a culmination of hundreds of hours of research and coordination to bring together a history of specific vessels spanning the period of 1882-1992 and twenty-one different navies. 

Each section of the book is drafted by a naval historian of the particular navy or region who focuses upon one ship that best represents the cream of that force. Replete with rare and fascinating photographs, the narrative describes the history, operational life and passing of these warships. The stories are presented in a thoughtful and engaging manner; focussing more upon the life of the ship and the crews experiences as opposed to exclusively the technical elements of ship design. Any engineering information is presented to provide context and background, rather than be the focus of the narrative. 

During the period covered by this book, Battleships were used by governments as a visible extension of their power and thus were an overt political, diplomatic as well as military tool. As such, the authors have incorporated into their studies, examples of the influence wielded and the perilous path the national governments trod as they tried to balance the enormous cost versus benefits of these ships. 

Attention is also paid the lives and interactions of the crews. Given that many of these ships had crew compliments in excess of a thousand crewmen, discipline, ethnicity, political machinations and professionalism (amongst others) all played very significant roles in the moral, effectiveness and confidence of these crews and ships. The authors draw upon examples to illustrate how these crews and their ships reflected the strengths and weaknesses of the States themselves. Often times, naval officers represented the cream of society and the lower decker’s those from ‘lower economic’ element’s. These communities were interdependent as the complexity of the ships demanded absolute focus and attention. Poor leadership, excessive discipline or even the quality of the food all had far greater impacts in the closed world of the ship that they would elsewhere. Instances of mutiny are addressed and discussed, as are catastrophic technical failures; each representing still relevant lessons to the modern reader. 

The community and comradeship of the crews on board these ships is emphasized as the true indicator of the strength of the Battleship. This loyalty served as the effective foundation of the ship. Ultimately the ship was a tool, but the care and attention needed for it to perform effectively and the common danger and hardship experienced, required a well-trained and motivated crew. 

This is an excellent book. It is of the highest quality in terms of publication and research. Each author presents a comprehensive bibliography about the national navy discussed, at the end of each section. It is a worthwhile addition to anyone’s library. 

Mobile Warfare for Africa – On the Successful Conduct of Wars in Africa and Beyond - Lessons Learned from the South African Border War - Roland de Vries, Camille Burger, Willem Steenkamp

This review has been submitted to The Canadian Army Journal 

Title: Mobile Warfare for Africa – On the Successful Conduct of Wars in Africa and Beyond - Lessons Learned from the South African Border War
Author: Roland de Vries, Camille Burger, Willem Steenkamp
ISBN: 978-1-912174-08-9
Publisher: Helion &Company
Year: 2017
Softcover
Pages: 388
Photos/Maps: 73/42

‘Si vis pacem para bellum – If you want peace, prepare for war’. This was the foundation upon which the South African Defence Force (SADF) was developed in order to counter the threats manifesting themselves throughout Southern Africa. The authors of this work (originally published in 1987 and reproduced in 2018) have all been involved in the historical analysis and doctrinal development of the SADF; none more so than Maj-Gen (ret’d) Roland de Vries, widely considered to be the ‘father’ of the SADF’s bush war doctrine. The degree of practical, ‘hands on’ experience translated in this work and the extent to which additional primary sources were tapped, ranging from senior German Afrka Korps Officers, African officers from across the continent and senior British and African Union security officials, affirms the depth of analysis and breadth of experience that has gone into the research for this book.

Above all, this is a teaching and information manual. The SADF was involved with numerous operations involving actions against both conventional militaries as well as asymmetric/guerilla style forces. Their experiences, captured in this book, covered the spectrum from small unit deep penetration operations, brigade level conventional multi-arms engagements, hearts and minds tasks to multi-element interdiction involving combinations of land forces and fixed and rotary wing assets.   

The narrative culminates in a series of case studies that provide context and concrete application of the lessons gleaned from the Bush War. They are all identically structured in order to facilitate understanding, with detailed maps and photographs. Each case study is directly tied to a chapter in the main text in order to deliver a real life example of the concepts being provided; all are stand alone and may be reviewed independently or in conjunction with the larger narrative.

Throughout the book, and in addition to the case studies, the Angolan Bush War (also known as the South African Border War), is referenced by the authors to provide foundational context to their perspectives. Fought between 1966 and 1989, it extended across modern day Angola, Zambia and Namibia and involved kinetic and asymmetric elements of warfare; ranging from low to high intensity clashes. From this laboratory of African conflict came many of the lessons that were applied in other theatres and regions. Drawing upon these lessons, the authors explain in depth, not only the development and application of tactics and doctrine but also how these lessons were applied to the development of equipment and, more specifically, vehicles and weapons systems that best suited the varied African environments.

Helion has again produced a book of the highest quality and the addition of an included but separate ‘atlas’ book enables the reader to follow the case studies and lessons learned with great ease. This book represents the culmination of literally decades of hard learned lessons in the harshest of classrooms, the battlefield. It not only is an engaging and fascinating read but also serves as an outstanding treatise on methods of combat that will stand any professional soldier, historian or casual militarist in good stead regardless of their geographic location, element or experience level. 

Battle for Angola: The End of the Cold War in Africa 1975-89 - Al J Venter

This review has been submitted to the Canadian Army Journal.

Title: Battle for Angola: The End of the Cold War in Africa 1975-89

Author: Al J Venter

ISBN: 978-1-911096-41-2

Publisher: Helion

Year: 2017

Hardcover

Pages: 527

Maps/Photos: 5/100’s (colour, b/w) 

Al Venter is one of the most prolific writers of the myriad of African wars that has beset that continent in the years following independence. His works have an added level of authenticity due to the fact that he is anything but an armchair historian, he has actually participated in and been wounded in a number of them, including the Border Wars with Angola. Much of the history of the African Wars has been forgotten with the advent of ISIS, Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria but there is much to learn about symmetric response to both symmetric and asymmetric enemies.  

In his review of the wars, the author encompasses the conflicts technological, doctrinal and societal impacts and how these changed over the course of the war. He also draws upon first-hand accounts of operational commanders, weapons designers and soldiers to provide for a more nuanced and realistic sense of the success and challenges faced by the protagonists. Included in this are discussions of the asymmetric elements of the war; specifically UNITA and SWAPO as well as the Angolan Army (and their material and personnel supporters Cuba, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact). Much of the book is a discussion of the tactical and operational effectiveness of these organizations, their doctrine and how it was countered by both the Portuguese (before independence in 1974) as well as the South Africans. The role of mercenary groups such as Executive Outcome is also deeply intertwined within these conflicts. Venter discusses the influence of other regional conflicts and the role that they played in South African planning; the Rhodesians’ Fire Force concept, lessons learned from Biafra, the Portuguese Special Forces and tribal Bushmen all played a role and are analyzed in depth. 

The technological advances that resulted from the nature of the conflict as well as the self-sufficiency required of the South Africans (due to the international arms embargo) is very interesting. The requirement for vehicles that were specifically designed to provide effective protection against mines while still enabling a robust cross country capability resulted in the development of an entirely new class of vehicles: Ratels, Eland’s and Buffel’s all put South Africa at the very forefront of Infantry Fighting Vehicle technology.  

Venter’s work encompasses the complex nature of the war spanning the strategic Cold War period, the regional conflicts between the various tribal and national groups and the tactical nature of the traditional and asymmetric elements of the war. His analysis is deep and thoughtful and based upon first hand and expert knowledge. His discussion of the various paramilitary and Special Forces and some of their more notable successes and failures further enhances the scope of the work. This is a highly readable account of the struggle for South West Africa and the impact that it had both internationally and regionally. Helion has published a superb book replete with high quality photographs; the bibliography is extensive. There are many lessons to be learned from the engagements in Africa and without a doubt Venter and his work is an outstanding source.

Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905 Vol 1, 2 - Julian S Corbett

This review was submitted to the Canadian Naval Review.

Title: Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905 Vol 1, 2

Author: Julian S Corbett

ISBN: 978-1-59114-197-6

Publisher: Naval Institute Press

Year: 2015

Softcover

Pages: 1134 (two volumes)

Photos/ Maps: 0

The Russo-Japanese War has continuing historical significance because it represents the coming of age of a Far Eastern power (Japan) who, for the first time, successfully challenged and destroyed a European superpower in both a land and, more significantly, naval conflict. Corbett’s work was drafted originally as a classified report for the British Committee on Imperial Defence shortly after the war. It received very limited release and was only made available to the general public seventy five years after his death.

Traditionally, historians have focussed their attention on the Battle of Tsushima Strait, where the Russian Baltic fleet was utterly destroyed by the Japanese High Seas fleet; however, this was a small, albeit significant, aspect of the overall war. Corbett’s analysis takes a much more holistic approach; undertaking to examine the conflict in its entirety and embedding Tsushima into a larger strategic engagement supporting Japanese land operations. Additionally, he traces the operational doctrine of each nation, their strengths and weaknesses and how this impacted operational decision making. There were in fact three Russian fleets engaged at various times during the course of this war; all were effectively destroyed by the Japanese. Corbett, in addition to discussing the battles themselves, puts this fact into context when he identifies that the Japanese only had one fleet available to them; if it had been lost, then the entire underpinning of its Imperial program would be removed. This was key to the Japanese war planning and operational execution.

The author, while generally viewed as one of the pre-eminent naval historians of his era, excels in this report at seamlessly weaving between the strategic, operational and tactical levels of the war; clearly explaining the role of the various arms and how they interacted. He also discusses the influence of the international situation on the decision making processes of the governments and the field commanders. As an example, one of the key factors that drove strategic decision making was the perspective that each of the nations had on the relative importance of the region. Corbett identifies that Japan saw the challenge of Russia as a direct threat to its strategic interests with direct and far-reaching implications for its future. Conversely, Russia viewed the same situation as, at best, having only regional implications and did not view the situation nearly as seriously. 

The publication would benefit from maps of the region and the naval combat as it unfolded. While he provides detailed descriptions of the combats, it is difficult for the naval layman to follow the maneuvers. Additionally, providing regional maps would greatly benefit the perspective and appreciation of expanse and distances.

Notwithstanding this point, Corbett has drafted an exceptional analysis of the Russo-Japanese war. His style and is very engaging and easily maintains the reader’s interest throughout. His analysis and ability to succinctly capture the broad canvas of this conflict makes this book mandatory reading for commanders at all levels (regardless of element) who wish to appreciate the complexities of combined operations. Very highly recommended.

Instrument of War: The German Army 1914-18 - Dennis Showalter

This review was submitted to Strategy and Tactics magazine. 

Title: Instrument of War: The German Army 1914-18

Editor: Dennis Showalter

ISBN: 978-1-4728-1300-8

Publisher: Osprey

Year: 2016

Hardcover

Pages: 304

Photos: 43

The German Army had a reputation leading up to the beginning of World War 1 that placed it squarely at the top of equivalent European Armies. Based mainly upon its performance during the Wars of German Unification (Denmark and Austria) and the Franco-Prussian War, it was perceived to be, in many respects, the standard to be emulated. Showalter approaches his topic with this in mind and investigates whether this reputation was still deserved just prior to World War 1. He further examines how the Army and its command structure morphed as the War continued and the impact that this had on its effectiveness and resiliency.

His analysis commences with a brief overview of the national character of the army and its various levels of personnel readiness. This sets the stage for his discussion of the army and the commencement of the war. Showalter is very balanced in his praise and criticism of the army and the reputation that it had. He postulates that the Army was the wrong tool for the Schlieffen Plan and that German Senior leadership failed to appreciate its limitations, specifically in the areas of mobility and communications, ultimately resulting in the plans failure. He further  convincingly postulates that, while the Army was superior in many ways to its contemporaries, the German Leadership was extremely limited in their strategic grasp and could not decide upon priorities of effort following the failure of the Schlieffen Plan.

Showalter effectively encapsulates the rise and fall of German fortunes as the war descends into one of stalemate and attrition in the West and supporting a weakened Austro-Hungary in the East against Russia and Italy. He shows that for a good part of the war, Germany was superior at the tactical and operational levels; engaging in the use of aircraft, gas, storm troop tactics and the command empowerment of NCO’s and Junior Officers. He is, however, merciless in his criticism of the senior German leadership; its infighting, hubris, political intrigue and ultimate failure to acknowledge the necessity of working in tandem with the diplomatic elements of the Government as well as not recognizing the self-destructiveness of the war.

The theme throughout his book is that the main enemy of Germany was time. Every year weakened them and strengthened their adversaries, allowing the Allies to learn and close the gap between their respective armies. Compounding this was the diminishing pool of manpower available to Germany with which to make good its losses.

Showalter has proven himself to be an impartial judge of the German Army of this period; balanced in his praise and criticism. He draws attention to elements of German leadership and planning that are not necessarily readily apparent in many of the narratives of this war. There is no question that the Germans could have won the war given slightly different circumstances but, as Showalter points out, this would have been in spite of rather than because of the strategic level decision making. Despite its institutional weaknesses, the German Army proved itself to be an instrument of formidable depth and resilience; able to match the Allies right up until the last months of the War. Showalter gives the reader much to think about and ponder from his noteworthy analysis of this machine. A well-researched and very interesting book.

On Tactics: A Theory of Victory in Battle - B.A. Friedman

This review has been submitted to Strategy and Tactics Magazine.

Title: On Tactics: A Theory of Victory in Battle

Author: B.A. Friedman

ISBN: 978-1-682471-63-0

Publisher: Naval Institute Press

Year: 2017

Hardcover

Pages: 241

The authors starts this work with the premise that Tactics, as a concept of war fighting, requires a reanalysis in light of the changes that have occurred in both the nature and execution of warfare. The re-examination focuses upon the elevation of tactics to a level that supplants the ‘operational’ level of command and a discussion on the traditional principles of warfare and their application to the modern battlefield.  

The book is not an easy read and requires patience to really glean what the author is looking to achieve. That is not to say that it is not well written but doctrine in and of itself requires thought and focus. In that light, this book demands considered deliberation.

He starts from the Clauswitzian school of the principles of war and decries the standard scholastic approach of rote learning and application. He emphasizes the need to avoid the trap of doctrine and its principles becoming dogma. Notwithstanding this position, Friedman does suggest an abridged, updated version that he identifies as being Tenets of War vice Principles. He postulates the difference as being one where Principles are rigid whereas Tenets are not. It is somewhat challenging to see where the line between the two is drawn but certainly, his suggestion is a good place for discussion and engagement. He divides his Tenets into three distinct categories: Physical, Mental and Moral. Follow-on chapters address each in more detail.

A central aspect of his analysis is his rejection of the Operational level of war. His position is that anything involving operations below the level of strategy is in fact tactics. To define an intermediary level is to inject un-necessary friction and confusion in the application of the Tenets. He does however, readily acknowledge the utility of an operational designation for those aspects that do not have a clear ‘home’ within the tactical or strategic levels (logistics, cyber, asymmetric, etc).

His assertion that those areas outside of the strategic/tactical sphere are in fact elements of operational art but not strategy or tactics in and of themselves is somewhat confusing. After all, in the modern age, cyber warfare for example, has become a means of engaging ones adversaries without any physical interaction and could therefore be defined as a method of achieving strategic aims.

The main body of the book is followed by a series of appendices that expand upon his positions vis-à-vis asymmetric warfare, the operational level of war, centre of gravity, training and structure. These are very helpful in clarifying how these various elements are incorporated (or not) into his assertion that Strategy and Tactics are the only two viable levels of war.

Overall, this work is an interesting salvo into an area that does deserve review. His position is certainly understandable; however, rejection of an operational level of command does run the risk of muddying the delineation of responsibility between commanders. Changes in capability, technology and methodology certainly underscore the need to look at how militaries control and command in war. This work suggests some interesting proposals.

From Victory to Stalemate: The Western Front, Summer 1944 - C J Dick

This review has been submitted to the British Army Review.

Title: From Victory to Stalemate: The Western Front, Summer 1944

Author: C J Dick

ISBN: 978-0-7006-2293-1

Publisher: Kansas UP

Year: 2016

Hardcover

Pages: 465

Maps: 14

Photos: 0

In this, the first of a two volume set, the author has undertaken to ascertain the causes behind the Western Allied forces failure in their efforts to knock Germany out of the war in 1944. Certainly, there was every reason for confidence that this was attainable once Allies had overcome the German defences at Normandy and broken out into the French interior. The re-establishment of maneuver warfare against a greatly degraded German military should have sounded the death knell for Axis defensive efforts in the West.

While the author does discuss in detail the elements of the Western Campaign, starting with the invasion of Normandy, he is clear that the focus of the book is not another rendition of that series of battles. Rather, he uses the campaign as a means of facilitating his analysis of where, how and why the Allies diverged from a focussed drive at the destruction the Wehrmacht and its combat capability into a series of costly (in terms of time, effort and logistics) secondary and tertiary efforts that ultimately diluted their operational effectiveness. Thereby enabling the Germans to retain a defensive capability and thus prolong the war.

Dick looks at the foundations of the operational level of war and how these building blocks were applied in the development of and the execution of doctrine in the different Allied nations (in this case American, British and Canadian). Given the lack of experience amongst senior Allied commanders under combat conditions, he further discusses the strengths and weaknesses of each of the army’s as they undertook the buildup and follow-on operations in Normandy and beyond. He follows this with a detailed discussion and analysis of national logistics capabilities and their performance under operational conditions. His book winds up with a comprehensive review of each of the senior (Army and Army Group) commanders performance through the lens of the relative doctrine each was operating under.

This is a particularly strong book in that explains in clear, concise terms the reasons behind the Allies failure to effectively overcome a drastically weakening Wehrmacht for 11 months, despite their unchallenged command of the air and logistic dominance. His balanced examination is uncompromising in its conclusions. It provides the reader with an outstanding assessment of the influences that coloured the Allies decision making. Focussing on elements such as divergent doctrine, media critique, political interference, hubris (an assumption that the collapse of German resistance was imminent), an application of doctrine as dogma vice guidance, failure of effective command, inter-service rivalry and a failure to oversee and plan for the efficient execution of logistics support, Dick’s work underscores challenges that transcend World War 2 and are as applicable today as they were in 1944. Very strongly recommended for the senior commander regardless of element.

Whispers Across The Atlantick - David Smith

This review has been submitted to the Canadian Army Journal. 

Title: Whispers Across The Atlantick

Author: David Smith

ISBN: 978-1-4728-2795-1

Publisher: Osprey

Year: 2017

Hardcover

Pages: 292

Maps:  5

Photos: 15

General William Howe was appointed the Commander of the Crown forces deployed to crush the rebellion that had broken out in the United States in 1776. The British Navy had unchallenged control of the seas and its land forces a heavy professional advantage over the American rebels. Things unfortunately did not go nearly as planned for the British; hampered by hubris, personal animosity between the commanders of the different British and German (the British Crown had hired German mercenaries) units, a failure to prioritize and focus on the primary task of destroying the rebel army and a marked failure to undertake operations with drive and urgency resulted in a growing dissatisfaction and a loss of confidence with Howe by the British Government. His resignation after the 1777 campaign season and the subsequent public enquiry in the House of Commons form the basis of the book.

I particularly enjoyed Smith’s approach to his narrative. Each chapter commences with the pertinent element of Howe’s speech to the House followed by an evaluation of the contents by the author (taking advantage of the benefit of hindsight). The chapter that follows expands upon the actions of the various antagonists during the period covered. This approach makes for a much clearer understanding of what the perceptions of Howe were at the time as compared to the reality of his actions on the ground.

The degree to which commanders relied upon the initiative of their subordinates during this period is clear. Limitations in communications and the challenges of operating along very limited axis’s of advance (in many cases consisting of rivers or game tracks) resulted in decisions being made based upon information that had been overtaken by events. More to the point though an explanation of the failure of the British to attain victory during these critical early years, lies in the authors analysis of Howe as a commander and his failure to grasp the operational and strategic options that would have destroyed the capacity of the Americans to continue the war. It is clear that Howe was not an incompetent General but that he was a man out of his depth in the combined symmetric and asymmetric styles of warfare that constituted the Revolution.

Additionally, Howe’s efforts were impeded by the inflexible position assumed by the British government in relation to the demands of the American colonists. His orders to destroy the various colony’s infrastructure as a means of undermining the will of the revolutionaries combined with a refusal to even acknowledge their grievances, ensured a steady and growing level of support for the insurrection. Smith discusses this challenge in some detail.   

Osprey has published a very good quality book. The main drawback to the content of the book itself is the quality of the maps. They are reproductions of the original maps produced at the time for the consumption of the British public and are, unfortunately, difficult to read and follow. Otherwise the narrative is excellent, the bibliography extensive and the font large enough to read easily. I very much enjoyed this book as it shed light upon the nature of 18^th century command as well as the challenge of conducting a war from a distance. Recommended.

1918: Winning the War, Losing the War - Matthias Strohn

This review has been submitted to the British Army Review.

Title: 1918: Winning the War, Losing the War

Author: Matthias Strohn

ISBN: 978-1-4728-2933-7

Publisher: Osprey

Year: 2018

Hardcover

Pages: 304

Maps:  8

Photos: 19

Those who have studied the First World War in any way will agree that the key front between victory or defeat was the Western Front. They will also agree that for the duration of the war, the Western Front, unlike the East and Southern Fronts, was static except for two brief periods: 1914 leading up to the Battle of the Marne and 1918 with the final offensives of the Germans and the subsequent Last 100 Days of the Allies. 1918, as its title implies, focuses upon the final year of the war, but not as an analysis of the movements and activities of the different protagonists; but as a discussion of the relative capabilities, the strengths, weaknesses and the influencing factors that reflected the different armies as they faced each other after 4 years of warfare.

This book draws upon the knowledge of a number of respected military historians, each well published and hailing from a variety of teaching institutions in Austria, Germany, the UK, the United States and Ireland. Each of the 10 contributors has been given a nation or subject to discuss (ie the Air Campaign, Naval Warfare, the British Army, the German Army etc) covering off all of the major facets of the war as it was in 1918. Each is a stand-alone analysis and may be read independent of the others. Austro-Hungary, Russia, the Ottomans and Italy are not covered as chapters but are lumped together in the sections: The Forgotten Fronts of Europe and the War Outside of Europe. This is unfortunate as certainly the three nations of Italy, Austro-Hungary and Turkey were still very active participants in their own right.

The chapters are drafted in a format similar in nature to a university lecture; not surprising given the backgrounds of the contributors. This also ensures that the content flows logically, is lucid and engaging. This improves both the quality of the reading experience as well as facilitating the knowledge that wishes to be passed.

The narrative of the book is bookended by an initial introductory chapter that places the impact of the final year of the War into a modern day context as well as a final installment that captures a number of the lessons to be gleaned from the results of the year’s events on the Western Front. On the German side, the campaigns of 1918 revealed a completely revamped operational and tactical engagement methodology based upon the ‘Stormtrooper’ infiltration tactics and vastly improved artillery utilization. It proved to be extremely effective at breaking the deadlock of trench warfare but could not be sustained due primarily to logistical limitations. On the Allied side, it was the lesson of interdependence between Allies. Up to that point in the war, nations had worked together but retained their operational independence. The crisis of the German offensives set the conditions on the Allied side for the appointment of a senior commander for all Allied armies, something that was never achieved amongst the Central Powers; this in turn significantly improved the Entente’s operational effectiveness and focus.

Overall, 1918 is an excellent analysis of the final year of the war, drawing upon the expertise of a number of different subject matter experts. The analysis is clear, concise and in-depth; it is unfortunate that Austro-Hungary and Turkey do not have their own chapters but they are not ignored. The conclusion is comprehensive and draws attention to a series of lessons that still resonate a century later. It is clear, from the discussion, that the war was still very much undecided as the protagonists entered the summer of 1918 and could easily have had very different results given just a few changes. A book well worth reading and discussing.

Confronting Case Blue: Briansk Front’s Attempt to Derail the German Drive to the Caucasus, July 1942 - Igor’ Sdvizhkov

This review has been submitted to War History Online.

Title: Confronting Case Blue: Briansk Front’s Attempt to Derail the German Drive to the Caucasus, July 1942

Author: Igor’ Sdvizhkov

ISBN: 978-1-911096-43-6

Publisher: Helion

Year: 2016

Hardcover

Pages: 420

Photos/Maps: 9/8

During the summer of 1942, the Germans were well into their drive to the Caucasus and the capture of vast areas of the southern Soviet Union. The Soviets, desperate to try and blunt the German efforts, launched a series of spoiling attacks into the flanks of the stretched German Forces. The author has analyzed one of the more significant of those attacks with a view to shedding light on the strengths and weaknesses of the adversaries at this point in the war. His perspective is primarily from the Soviet side and he is brutally honest in his evaluations of the leadership and C2 (command and control) of the Soviet and German forces.

The author breaks down his analysis into chapters representing days as well as sides. Thus he will present a synopsis of the Russian actions on July 25^th in one chapter followed in the next chapter by an analysis of the German actions over the same period. His extensive use of primary source material makes it very interesting for the reader to note how the adversaries were interpreting each other’s actions. This method also provides for an outstanding comparison between the command and control methodologies of the two sides.

The Germans by this point on the war were acknowledging that some Russian equipment (specifically the T-34) was superior in both quality and quantity to the front line German tanks. Additionally, Russian manpower reserves were beginning to make themselves felt; however, the Germans still had a clear advantage in combined/joint warfare capability (especially regarding the use of airpower) and in their combat and support leadership. The author relates numerous examples of opportunities that the Russians squandered as a result of their leadership (focussing primarily on Major and above) failing to make decisions or assuming control with the loss of a commander. Conversely, German leadership proves itself to be dynamic, proactive and engaged. Senior commanders are at the front assessing situations and providing guidance and direction as required. The soldiers on both sides are brave but it is the leadership that makes a telling difference in this campaign.

It is also fascinating to see the degree to which the political arm of the Soviet military takes precedence and exerts influence upon operations. Reports quoted by the author repeatedly speak in ‘Bolshevik’ and draw attention to the failings of leaders within a political vice a tactical or operational context. It speaks volumes as to why there was a dearth of initiative within the Russian leadership. Additionally, the author draws attention to the experience and educational background of the key Russian commanders. The instability of the interwar years within the Soviet Union culminating in the deep purges of the late 1930’s and the devastating results of the first year of the war, resulted in many of these Officers being promoted quickly into positions that they were not prepared properly for.

Helion’s publishing quality is excellent and the translation by Britton of top quality. The writing style of the Russian historians is quite different from Western authors but does not detract from the content. An interesting book worth the time.