Mobile Warfare for Africa – On the Successful Conduct of Wars in Africa and Beyond - Lessons Learned from the South African Border War - Roland de Vries, Camille Burger, Willem Steenkamp

This review has been submitted to The Canadian Army Journal 

Title: Mobile Warfare for Africa – On the Successful Conduct of Wars in Africa and Beyond - Lessons Learned from the South African Border War
Author: Roland de Vries, Camille Burger, Willem Steenkamp
ISBN: 978-1-912174-08-9
Publisher: Helion &Company
Year: 2017
Softcover
Pages: 388
Photos/Maps: 73/42

‘Si vis pacem para bellum – If you want peace, prepare for war’. This was the foundation upon which the South African Defence Force (SADF) was developed in order to counter the threats manifesting themselves throughout Southern Africa. The authors of this work (originally published in 1987 and reproduced in 2018) have all been involved in the historical analysis and doctrinal development of the SADF; none more so than Maj-Gen (ret’d) Roland de Vries, widely considered to be the ‘father’ of the SADF’s bush war doctrine. The degree of practical, ‘hands on’ experience translated in this work and the extent to which additional primary sources were tapped, ranging from senior German Afrka Korps Officers, African officers from across the continent and senior British and African Union security officials, affirms the depth of analysis and breadth of experience that has gone into the research for this book.

Above all, this is a teaching and information manual. The SADF was involved with numerous operations involving actions against both conventional militaries as well as asymmetric/guerilla style forces. Their experiences, captured in this book, covered the spectrum from small unit deep penetration operations, brigade level conventional multi-arms engagements, hearts and minds tasks to multi-element interdiction involving combinations of land forces and fixed and rotary wing assets.   

The narrative culminates in a series of case studies that provide context and concrete application of the lessons gleaned from the Bush War. They are all identically structured in order to facilitate understanding, with detailed maps and photographs. Each case study is directly tied to a chapter in the main text in order to deliver a real life example of the concepts being provided; all are stand alone and may be reviewed independently or in conjunction with the larger narrative.

Throughout the book, and in addition to the case studies, the Angolan Bush War (also known as the South African Border War), is referenced by the authors to provide foundational context to their perspectives. Fought between 1966 and 1989, it extended across modern day Angola, Zambia and Namibia and involved kinetic and asymmetric elements of warfare; ranging from low to high intensity clashes. From this laboratory of African conflict came many of the lessons that were applied in other theatres and regions. Drawing upon these lessons, the authors explain in depth, not only the development and application of tactics and doctrine but also how these lessons were applied to the development of equipment and, more specifically, vehicles and weapons systems that best suited the varied African environments.

Helion has again produced a book of the highest quality and the addition of an included but separate ‘atlas’ book enables the reader to follow the case studies and lessons learned with great ease. This book represents the culmination of literally decades of hard learned lessons in the harshest of classrooms, the battlefield. It not only is an engaging and fascinating read but also serves as an outstanding treatise on methods of combat that will stand any professional soldier, historian or casual militarist in good stead regardless of their geographic location, element or experience level. 

Return of the Barbarians - Jakub J Grygiel

Title: Return of the Barbarians

Author: Jakub J Grygiel

ISBN: 978-1-107-15857-3

Publisher: Cambridge UP

Year: 2018

Hardcover

Pages: 222

The study of history in order to glean methods and hints at how to deal with modern day challenges is well appreciated by strategists and historians. Notwithstanding that, there are many who fail to appreciate the similarities between modern asymmetric warfare and the battles of the past. Grygiel has undertaken an effort to draw a direct line between much of what is happening today and instances where this has been experienced in the pre-modern era.

The author has focused his attention primarily on the later period of the Roman Empire. During that period, the Empire was beset, especially from Germania on the opposite bank of the Danube, by persistent small scale strikes by groups of barbarians. These groups would strike randomly and quickly, pillage and burn before rapidly departing. Because they were operating out of an uncivilized region with no centralized Government, it was very difficult for Rome to draw upon its traditional, conventional means (diplomacy, deterrence or military) of dealing with adversaries such as the Parthians. Compounding the effects of these raids was the psychological fear that they produced; far in excess of their actual damage.

Grygiel succeeds in connecting this environment to the modern one of asymmetric terrorism. Through the advent of technology, these groups are able to strike at random from decentralized cells with little to no warning. These attacks, often very high profile in nature (such as the Madrid train bombing), result in deep disruption amongst the targeted nations far in excess of the damage done. Further, traditional conventional militaries are not equipped to effectively counter these attacks. Therefore despite the advent of technology many of these terrorist cells are still able to operate with a high degree of impunity.

 Much of the success of the barbarians centered upon their ability to undermine the confidence in the population in the State’s ability to provide protection. As Grygiel points out, this resulted in the local population taking on the responsibility for protection themselves. However, and again this is typical in much of today’s Western world, much of the Roman population had lived within the protection of the Empire for hundreds of years and therefore, did not have the knowledge or ability, to fight and respond effectively. This further exacerbated the challenge of response as regions began isolating themselves from Rome as they barricaded themselves within fortified towns and cities.

Grygiel asserts that much could be learned from the responses attempted by Rome to counter these threats from small, mobile barbarian cells. It is an interesting and compelling argument that he puts forward. Of course the tools available to the Nations of today are far more sophisticated than the ones of the Roman Empire, but the enemy is also far more sophisticated. The lessons of history remain for us to use should we look; Grygiels book suggests that very little happening today is new and that much remains a rehash of previous experiences. A fascinating read.

Three Sips of Gin – Dominating the Battlespace with Rhodesia’s Elite Selous Scouts - Tim Bax

This review has been submitted to British Army Review. 

Title: Three Sips of Gin – Dominating the Battlespace with Rhodesia’s Elite Selous Scouts

Author: Tim Bax

ISBN: 978-1-909384-29-3

Publisher: Helion and Company

Year: 2014

Softcover

Pages: 423

Photos/ Maps: 134/1

The Selous Scouts were an organization that acted as the forward eyes and ears of the Rhodesian military during their long and brutal bush war with the ZIPRA and ZANLA revolutionary groups. This autobiography of the experiences of the author as he made his way into the Rhodesian military first as a member of the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) and then as a member of the Selous Scouts is multifaceted as he discusses his personal experiences, the doctrine of the two units in which he served, the larger challenges of the national and international environment during this period and the leadership styles of those with whom and for whom he served and their immediate effect upon his life and character.

One of the key themes that runs throughout the book is the paradigm with which the RLI and Selous Scouts approached their operations. Dynamic, out of the box thinking and a recognition of the need for leadership that could make decisions at the very lowest level combined with a high degree of aggression and expertise were hallmarks of these Rhodesian units. Bax recounts numerous operations that were successful due to the unorthodox nature of their execution and the confidence of the command structure in allowing for a broad span of independence amongst members. His willingness to relate tales of failure and embarrassment about himself and those who were seen to be some of the finest leaders within the RLI and Selous Scouts, provide balance and recognition that even the best will not succeed at times; lessons in humility that are never reiterated enough.

His discussions about particularly successful commanders reinforce both the primary strength and weakness of these asymmetric units – that being the extremely rare number of individuals who can truly lead in these environments and the critical loss of capability when they are not present. His narrative also reveals the challenge that governments and conventional forces have in fully appreciating and utilizing these units to their full potential.

Bax also provides excellent descriptions and analysis of the effectiveness of the ‘fire-force’ doctrine built around the Alouette 3 helicopter and the four man tactical unit or ‘stick’. His discussion about the international embargo necessitating Rhodesia’s unique tactical and operational doctrine clearly displays the influence of external factors on capability. His discussion plainly show that Rhodesia’s dominance lay not in equipment but the training of its soldiers and the methodologies developed to use the equipment that it had to greatest advantage.

His numerous renditions of the hijinks and trouble that he and his fellow soldiers got into while off-duty and the results would never be tolerated in today’s more politically correct militaries but they speak to an issue that has been subsumed beneath the mantle of acceptable behaviour; this is the nature of esprit des corps and morale. An entertaining and useful book.   

ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror - Michael Weiss, Hassan Hassan

Title: ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror

Author: Michael Weiss, Hassan Hassan

ISBN: 978-1-6824-5029-1

Publisher: Regan Arts Publishing

Year: 2016

Softcover

Pages: 411

Photos/Maps: 0

As the war against terror expands beyond the borders of Iraq and Syria, it is increasingly more important to understand not only the nature of the conflict that the world is facing, but also the history of the organizations that comprise our adversaries. Too often we perceive the fundamental Islamacists as a solid entity when in fact they are comprised of not only multiple facets, often with tenuous (at best) alliances, but also varying priorities and goals. It is in this aspect that the author’s book carries its greatest benefit. Weiss and Hassan do not suggest means of combatting the varying organizations that make up ISIL but they do provide invaluable analysis of its history, development and composition.

It is a very convoluted and complex path that ISIS has taken; with many actors and influences. The authors have done a noteworthy job of tracing this route and providing the depth and breadth of scrutiny in order for the reader to grasp the history and goals of this organizations. One of the key takeaways is the sheer number of players engaged in this fight. Additionally, their ability to quickly morph and adjust their operating procedures to meet the changing battlespace is striking. It is interesting; however, that one of their strengths also represents one of their greatest weaknesses; that of building a Caliphate.

When Al-Qaeda and ISIS were operating as asymmetric terror groups within the societies that they wished to control, it was very difficult for the governments to directly challenge them due to the fluidity and flexibility of their modus operendi. However, these groups were also hampered by this approach due to the fact that they remained on the periphery of rule. By establishing a caliphate with its fixed responsibilities and tasks, they were able to more formally impose their brand of theocratic rule upon the population. However, this in turn, meant that they no longer could rely upon the camouflage of the population and were now much easier to engage.

This book does not limit itself to a study solely of the Army of ISIS but incorporates the broader scope of the regional and international influences and goals. Players such as Syria, destabilized by internal revolution from a number of fronts, is suggested as clandestinely supporting ISIS operations within its borders in order to garner international sympathy and support. Iran is shown to be vigorously expanding its regional influence and control through its active and ‘passive’ support to not only the incumbent Iraq government but also the Syrian regime. A myriad of others such as the Free Syrian Army, Al-Nusra, Russia, the US, the Kurds and the Iraqi government all play host to the mosaic of individual interests at play.

The book is, for the most part, well balanced. The authors show their bias at times in their criticism of the role that Assad, the Syrian leader. While his activities are without question, brutal, they must be seen in light of his efforts to retain power within a ‘real politique’ context. The book reads very well and does an admirable job at unraveling the Gordian Knot of ISIS and the region. It is worth reading in order to gain a better appreciation of the nature of the region, the adversaries and the goals within this conflict.

Counterinsurgency - David Kilcullen

Title: Counterinsurgency

Author: David Kilcullen

ISBN: 978-0-199-73749-9

Publisher: Oxford UP

Year: 2010

Softcover

Pages: 251

Photos/maps: 7/1

Those of you actively involved in counterinsurgency operations are most likely to have heard about David Kilcullen. Both an experienced operator (infantry in East Timor, Indonesia as well as tours in Iraq and Afghanistan) as well as a renowned student of the insurgent/terrorism ‘art’ he has, in this book, put together a practical and common sense approach to tackling the challenges of insurgency and terrorism (he clearly delineates between the two) in different environments.  The book is a compilation of articles and concept papers that he has drafted based on firsthand experience, immediate debriefs with those involved in conflict, follow-on interviews with combatants from both sides as well as a deep engagement with local civilians.

His first chapter covers the 28 articles or ‘rules of thumb’ that a counterinsurgent must remember to maintain effectiveness. Based, very  loosely, as a companion piece to the original 27 articles of TE Lawrence (of WW1 Arabic uprising fame), it is updated and adjusted to reflect the realities of the modern counterinsurgent battle space. Each article is also preceded by an explanatory introduction that sets the stage for the focus of the article and provides for the reader the context within which to approach it. His points are succinct and eminently relevant and logical.

His next chapter discusses the value and merit of metrics. He acknowledges the critical requirement of being able to measure success (or failure); however, he posits that the traditional methods of measurement are not relevant or accurate to the asymmetric conflicts that we are engaged in. For example, the traditional body counts or military accessibility levels into regions do not provide for accurate measurements of enemy capability. Rather, he suggests that a series of non-traditional metrics based upon the four ‘pillars’ of counterinsurgency (the population, the supported government, the security forces and the enemy forces) should be adopted. Examples that he provides are not exhaustive but do adjust the paradigm of the reader into a more correct avenue. Things such as: price of exotic vegetables, tax collection or participation in sponsored programs can act as indicators for population stability, Government Indicators: where officials sleep, capital flight, rate of budget execution; Security Forces: ratio of guilty to innocent detainees, ratio of kills to wounds/captures, night operations and, finally, Enemy Forces: Insurgents villages of origin, insurgent medical health, price of black market guns and ammunition and midlevel insurgent casualties.

In the following chapters he discusses the success of the Indonesian forces in suppressing the West Java insurgents in the late 1950’s and how the tactics used so successfully there were a failure when it came to East Timor (and why). This chapter is extremely interesting as it reinforces the importance of appreciating how there is no standard solution to an insurgency that can be applied universally. Changes in motivation, geography and technology (to name a few) can have profound effects upon the methodology best suited to countering it. The Indonesian example is particularly relevant when viewed from the perspective of the impact of world opinion on the activities of Indonesian security forces in East Temor mirroring the of ‘media’ and communication technology as a factor (both positive and negative) on operations.

He next discusses the environment within which insurgencies are able to flourish. He postulates that identifying regions as being pro-government or pro-insurgent is missing the fundamental truth that populations seek security, predictability and stability and they will follow whatever group or organization that can guarantee it locally. This is one of the main reasons for the frustrating tendency in Afghanistan for locals to ‘switch’ from government to Taliban and back. It is not loyalty; it is pragmatism that is their driving force. Thus it is that concurrent to an armed challenge of an insurgency, it is imperative that issues of poor governance, corruption and mismanagement amongst the governing body be addressed aggressively.

He concludes with an examination of the modern phenomenon of the global insurgency, its make-up, methods of operation, strengths and weaknesses.  Starting with an assessment of the differences between ’terrorism’ (seen today as synonymous with any act of violence against the government) and ‘insurgency’ he clearly delineates not only the difference between  two, but also, the forces behind them and the paradigm shift needed to address them effectively. He concludes with a discussion on the critical weaknesses of the global jihadist style movements and how best to exploit these weakness in the ‘competition for government’.

Kilcullen has a great wealth of experience to draw upon when contemplating these issues. There are those who would make the argument that much of what he writes is common sense and not new revelations. That may be; however, it is also true that while many of the successful techniques used against jihadist movements have been used in the past, it took much blood and treasure to begin applying the lessons of yesteryear. The shift in paradigm and approach to the modern global jihadist with its access to instantaneous communications requires not only a reinforcement of our previously learned but forgotten lessons, but  further enhancement to meet the unique challenges of today’s modern insurgent. Kilcullen’s book is an excellent place to further enhance that education.