A Street in Arnhem: The Agony of Occupation and Liberation - Robert Kershaw

This review was submitted to the Canadian Army Journal.
 
Title: A Street in Arnhem: The Agony of Occupation and Liberation

Author: Robert Kershaw

ISBN: 978-1-7110-3754-0

Publisher: Ian Allen

Hardcover

Pages: 304

Photos/Maps: 39/4 

Operation Market-Garden, its ambitious goals, challenges and ultimate failure are well known to both historians and the general public; however, the details of the fighting that took place between the German defenders and Allied attackers within the towns of Oosterbeek and Arnhem are not nearly as well understood or documented. Even less so is the trial by fire that the civilian population living in Oosterbeek underwent as the adversaries grappled with one another.  

Kershaw's book commences with a broad perspective on the history of the town and its people as well as the Battle of Arnhem itself before focussing upon the effect of the fighting on its epicentre, two streets: Stationsweg and Utrechtseweg. Over the course of eight days of intense combat, these streets, their populations and an entire way of life was utterly transformed.  

Kershaw's style is very personal; while he draws in the broad strokes of the units, fighting styles, larger influences of the Western Campaign and the regional actions of the Market-Garden Operation, the real strength of the book lies in its rendition of the personal reminisces of those involved in the fighting (including civilian, Allied and German sources). This adds a great deal of depth and understanding for the reader of the real impact on those participating and, more importantly, their motivations, fears and observations as their world was turned on its head. 

There are a number of central lessons to be gleaned from this book: 

1. The impact of five years of war had had upon the individual quality of the German soldier. Throughout the book, comment is made (especially by the civilian population) of the changes in quality, deportment and professionalism compared to the German Army that had passed through the region in 1940; 

2. The frustration and disillusionment of the Allied soldiers with their high command with the poor planning and lack of support as they fought for their lives with relief only 10 km away; 

3. The resiliency of the civilian population, completely unused to war suddenly forced into basements with no food or water or access to medicine for their wounded; 

4. The ability of German forces to undertake offensive operations this late in the war and the hubris with which the Allied planners assumed away resistance; 

5. Language barriers amongst the Allied forces which prevented effective cooperation (Polish and English paratroopers); 

6. The vulnerability of Allied air forces as they attempted to drop reinforcements and supplies to the beleaguered Allied paratroopers. The intervention of Luftwaffe anti-aircraft units and the engagement of Luftwaffe fighter units amongst the Dakotah aircraft of the Allies was frightful; and  

7. Sometimes the cure is worse than the disease as the Allies, in an effort to liberate Holland and progress the end of the war, caused the utter destruction of a region of the country previously untouched by the ravages of conflict.

The publishers have produced a very high quality book with excellent coloured overview maps in the inside front and rear covers. The font is very easy to read and the author has provided a very comprehensive bibliography and end note sections. Canadians played a significant role in the operation as it was Canadian Engineers who evacuated the British and Poles across the Lower Rhine river to safety. A strongly written, educational, balanced and engaging book well worth a read.

 

 

Nomonhan, 1939: The Red Army's Victory That Shaped World War II - Stuart D Goldman

This review has been published in the magazine: Army History http://history.army.mil/armyhistory/index.html

Title: Nomonhan, 1939: The Red Army's Victory That Shaped World War II

Author: Stuart D Goldman

ISBN: 978-1-5891-14339-0

Publisher: Naval Institute Press

Hardcopy

Pages: 240

Photos: 24

The Battle of Nomonhan has been described by author, Stuart Goldman as “the most important World War II battle that most people have never heard of” (p. 5). Indeed, in many respects this is true and it comes across with striking clarity in this definitive work on the subject. Nomonham, 1939: The Red Army’s Victory that Shaped World War II, is two narratives that are mutually complementary, one providing critical background information for the other.

The first half of Goldman’s book sets the environment at the macro level. Drawing on extensive access to both declassified Soviet/Russian and Japanese archival material, Goldman provides insight into the intensity of the political, economic, and national turmoil that gripped the nations of Japan and the Soviet Union during this period. This baseline information is critical to understanding the Battle of Nomonhan; indeed, taken in isolation this conflict would make absolutely no sense to the reader as it was fought over nonstrategic ground for seemingly irrelevant reasons. From the Soviet perspective, a series of critical factors influenced not only its actions, but those of its adversaries. It was terrified of strategic isolation between two powerful opponents: Germany and Japan. Therefore, its behavior during the first half of the 1930s was initially focused on placating Japan while trying to turn the attention of Germany west. The thawing of relations with Germany in the latter half of the 1930s and the commencement of Japan’s war with China (and the subsequent weakening of the Japanese Manchukuo Army) resulted in a more confrontational regional stance. Unfortunately, Stalin’s subsequent purge of the USSR military leadership starting in 1937 undermined the message of the less accommodating Soviets and reinforced the preconceived low opinion of the local Japanese command to the Soviet military.

Japan, for its part, was undergoing its own internal challenges. Perhaps more than any other country, Japan had been experiencing internal machinations unlike anything that had happened is the west. An aggressive, agrarian society built upon the tenants of the Bushido Code of the Samurai had been supplanted within a few short decades into a modern  technological and industrialized society led by a government that was dominated by serving military officers. Racist, assertive, and lacking in domestic resources, it followed an expansionist policy bound to bring it in conflict with its neighbors, especially China and Russia.

A unique and traditional aspect of the Japanese code of honor was absolute subservience to the will of the emperor and to those in high office; however, with the rapid onset of technological change this subservience adapted itself under a concept called gekokujo or “rule from below.” Basically, this entailed the younger generation of the Japanese military seeing themselves as the experts in the new Japan with a duty to force decisions that older, more traditional members of society were unable or unwilling to make (as determined by the subordinate officers). The traditional reluctance against losing face or causing another to do so resulted in these younger leaders having a inordinate amount of authority and influence over their seniors. This perverted sense of honor and command and control would have profound consequences in the subsequent battles between the Soviets and Japanese.

The second part of the book delves into the battle itself, commencing with a precursor engagement at a location called Changkufeng. What is important about the geography of this region (both at Nomonhan and Changkufeng), situated at the intersection of the Soviet Union, Manchukuo, and Mongolia, is not its strategic relevance, but the fact that the border was not clearly defined because of the area’s isolation. Therefore, there was ample flexibility for an aggressive staff looking for a fight as movements close to the borders could be interpreted as incursions.

Goldman’s discussion about the battle—which was actually a series of escalating strikes and counterstrikes—is illustrative of the hubris and fanatical courage of the Japanese and the determination of the Russians. During this period the degree of blatant insubordination by Japanese commanders on the ground, against clear direction from Tokyo,was breathtaking. Conversely, the failure of the Japanese senior command to deal effectively and aggressively with the out of control local commanders is equally shocking and telling. This conflict served as a clear indicator to those paying attention of what would become both the strengths and weaknesses of the adversaries. The final tally of between 30,000 and 50,000 casualties and over 100,000 soldiers engaged in this undeclared war is a sobering indicator of the intensity of this conflict.

Nomonhan, 1939 is a particularly noteworthy book on this four-month battle. Goldman’s writing style is engaging and absorbing. As a historian, he brings a unique ability to inform and entertain; his topic is complex and vast but he deftly navigates the reader in a clear and logical way. The book has extensive endnotes and a comprehensive bibliography. This reviewer would recommend the book very strongly to anyone, historians and casual readers alike, who wish to comprehend the intricacies of the Far East in the months prior to Japan’s entry into World War II.

Panzer Operations - Hermann Hoth

Title: Panzer Operations

Author: Hermann Hoth

ISBN: 978-1-61200-269-9

Publisher: Casemate Books

Hardcover

Pages: 215

Photos/maps:14/16  

Hermann Hoth is considered by many to have been one of the greatest armoured commanders serving in the German Army during the Second World War. A veteran of the First World War, he commanded Panzer Group 3 during the initial drive into Russia, following which he was given responsibility for 17^th Army and subsequently 4^th Panzer Army. Despite being the recipient of the Swords to the Oak Leaves to the Knights Cross of the Iron Cross for exceptional bravery and leadership, he was blamed by Hitler for the loss of Kiev in Nov 1943 and relieved of command.

In 1956, Hoth drafted his memoires relating to the operations of 3 Panzer Group from the commencement of Barbarossa (June 1941 - the invasion of Russia) until October, 1941. This book is the first translation of said memoirs into english and represents an outstanding assessment of not only the operational command of armoured forces but also the interaction (both positive and negative) between Hitler, the strategic German Army command and the operational units. His observations on the delineation between ‘strategic’ and ‘operational’ lines of command as well as the overarching political considerations driving decision making are both relevant and insightful even today.  

Throughout, Hoth centres his assessments on the teachings of such giants of military thought as Scharnhorst, Clausewitz and Moltke and the necessity to learn from the lessons of the past. He also assesses the climate within which the German military planners operated at the strategic level – namely one in which Hitler continuously fluctuated in clearly identifying the main objective of the campaign: the destruction of the Red Army and the capture of Moscow or the economic crippling of the Soviet Union; the challenge therein being the fact that one is clearly military and the other socio-economic in nature. The vacillation between the two would hamper operations throughout the early days of the campaign. 

The meat of the book however, centres upon the effective command of armoured forces in the field and the best use that may be made of them. He draws extensively from the pre-invasion assessments made of the Soviet Union, its transportation infrastructure, military and anticipated response to invasion. He also discusses various invasion planning courses of action that were developed by the German High Command. These are fascinating as they are outstanding examples of high level planning and the process by which they were considered and rejected. Included was an option to combine all armoured and motorized infantry divisions into one massive mailed fist that would drive forward from a start point on the northern flank of Army Group Centre directly towards Leningrad thereby cutting off Russian Baltic forces and securing the Northern flank. Following this, the mobile forces would drive southwards cutting off Moscow and the Russian Army from its resupply and reinforcement options from the Urals and forcing it to fight on reversed fronts; all this while Army Group’s Centre and South would drive inexorably forward pinning Russian units in place. Such an example emphasizes the bold and risk accepting nature of effective armoured operations. 

The main body of the text traces the operations of Panzer Group 3 during the initial period of the Operation Barbarossa and the factors that affected his decision making. In his conclusion, Hoth encapsulates the essence and fundamental tenants of the operational command of mobile units and what are the key factors in the achievement of success (in relation to the campaign in Russia). Additionally, he reiterates the absolutely critical requirement to clearly establish and maintain the aim of operations regardless of the temptations that may present along the way. He includes in his work a series of annexes outlining key assessments and orders that he received and drafted during the course of the campaign. He also includes a discussion on the decision to undertake the final drive on Moscow in October, 1941 incorporating/emphasizing the responsibility of the commander in the decision making process.

 

Hoth’s writing style is direct and to the point; yet it remains very readable and thought-provoking. He is a commander who cares very deeply about his soldiers and their well-being but also for the mentorship and development of his leaders. Included in this book is an annex by the translator that assesses of Hoth’s political and social views. I found this to be somewhat jarring as it seemed out of place given that this was an operational treatise written by Hoth and not a biography; however, it is very much a sidebar issue. I would strongly recommend this book for any leader wanting to clearly understand what command (highlighted by bold, decisive action) entails in an operational context.

Lawrence in Arabia - Scott Anderson

Title: Lawrence in Arabia

Author: Scott Anderson

ISBN: 978-0-771-00768-2

Publisher: Signal Books

Softcover

Pages: 577

Photos/maps: 42/5 

Altruism is not a principle of war nor is it a principle of international relations and it is with this pretext that one must approach the machinations and deal-making that typified the Middle East during the years leading up to, during and immediately following the First World War. Anderson’s book presents the reader with a road map of the toing’s and froing’s between the key actors and nation states of the period and the impact that it has had on the long term social and political development of the region. Certainly, the decisions made then have reverberated down through the decades and continue to be felt in the challenges that we are dealing with today. 

Anderson has been able to effectively cut through the Gordian knot of Middle Eastern societies and politics and break down the story into a manageable and traceable narrative. It is truly awe inspiring the degree of naked ambition (both personal and national) that manifested itself at the expense of all else during this period. The example of France refusing to sanction an attack on Alexandretta in 1915 (resulting in the Gallipoli Campaign) because of its fear that it would lose its post war claim to Syria (this despite the fact that militarily it made eminent sense to strike there) boggles the mind with both its hubris and expectation. 

Turk vs Arab, House of Saud vs Hussein, British vs French, Entente vs Central Power, Lawrence vs Sykes, Tribe vs Tribe, Egypt vs India the list is endless of the competitive agendas that were undertaken as the dance of the Middle East carried on. A consistent theme throughout was Lawrence and his role as guide, intermediary, policy maker and manipulator between all of the various parties. The book is not about Lawrence specifically, but the central role that he plays in this drama is key to the long term results. The author does a very credible job of providing the reader a clear understanding of the personalities involved, what drives them, their bias’s, strengths and weaknesses; none more so than Lawrence. Lawrence holds himself aloof from those around him and forges his own path regardless of the intent or direction from his superiors; a true loose cannon. In doing so, he also contributes to the tragedy that unfolds in the region even while he plunges into cynicism and disillusionment with the Great Powers.

 

This book was a finalist for the National Book Critics Award and it is easy to understand why. Anderson has drafted an eminently readable and, more importantly, comprehendible synopsis of the years leading to the collapse of the Ottoman’s, the intricacies of the war years, the betrayal of promises made to the Arabs and the realignment of the Middle East in the vision of the victorious Western Powers. Additionally, Anderson provides an extensive bibliography and notes section for further study. For those seeking an in-depth yet engaging backgrounder for the modern challenges of the Middle East, this is a book to be read.

Gallipoli: The Ottoman Campaign - Edward J Erickson

Title: Gallipoli: The Ottoman Campaign

Author: Edward J Erickson

ISBN: 978-1-78346-166-0

Publisher: Pen and Sword Books

Softcover

Pages: 271

Photos/maps: 17/24 

Much of history is based upon perception and not necessarily upon reality; such is the case with the military forces of the Ottoman Empire. Viewed through the lens of “the sick man of Europe”, the march of Allenby into Jerusalem and the drama and romance of Lawrence of Arabia, it is easy to overlook or forget that the Army of the Ottoman’s was actually quite successful against the combined military’s of France and Great Britain. The successes of the Ottoman’s in the First Battle of the Dardanelle Strait (1915), Gallipoli (1915), Kut (1916) and the First and Second Battles of Giza (1916) are just as often credited to their German advisors as opposed to any integral capability. Erickson’s book, an operational review of the Gallipoli Campaign from the exclusive perspective of the Ottoman’s, does much to address this. 

The author begins his narrative with a detailed analysis of the years leading up to the 1915 campaign; the experience of some of the key commanders (both in terms of training and combat), the lessons resulting from the First Balkan War (1912-1913), the upgrades to the fortifications of the Dardanelle Straits, the doctrinal adjustments made to the Ottoman Regimental system and the training regime of the Ottoman’s for their army. The last two are of particular note as the Ottomans changed their regimental system from a square (four battalion) to a triangle (three battalion) system. This was found to be a much more manageable and responsive construct (and one in fact that the allies ultimately adopted in 1918). Additionally, the author discusses the fact that the Ottoman’s mobilized their forces in July, 1914 (a full three months before commencing hostilities) and this, given that they were not actively engaged in a land campaign until Gallipoli, provided them almost an entire year of work-up training for their forces. 

Erickson’s analysis of the Battle itself is insightful and detailed. Drawing upon primary source material from the Turkish archives, he is able to trace the actions and decision making of the Turkish commanders and the actual role that the German advisors (such as von Sanders) played. It is interesting to note that over the course of the campaign, there were series of individuals relieved of command by the Turkish General Staff including German officers. The reader comes away from this analysis with an appreciation of the complexity of the operational and tactical actions of the Ottoman forces. Advances to contact, transfers of authority, reliefs in place both night and day, combined support operations, multiple operational reorganizations of forces, a detailed reporting system, proactive command and decision making and dynamic leadership by the officer corps all speak to a modern and competent military structure and hierarchy. 

The author does not spare the rod in his analysis either and he is quick to point out the flaws and weaknesses of the Ottoman forces with equal clarity. This provides both balance and perspective in the overall analysis. He also provides discussion (although not to the detail or depth of the campaign itself) of the service support elements of the Ottoman forces operating on the Gallipoli Peninsula including medical, veterinary, supply and transport services. Finally, he also looks to the strategic level and the impact that operating within the most technologically advanced and infrastructure wise, the most developed part of the Ottoman Empire had upon the capability of the Ottoman forces within the region. 

Erickson provides numerous maps that are of benefit to the reader in following the actions of the Turkish forces as the Campaign unfolded; unfortunately, they are original maps from the Turkish archives and, as such, are very difficult to read and follow. Additionally, I would have enjoyed seeing more photographs of some of the key players in the Ottoman hierarchy such as Brig Esat Pasha and Enver Pasha. The bibliography is very extensive citing a series of memoires, primary (mainly from the Turkish military) and secondary sources that collectively provide the reader a plethora of options for further reading. The same may be said for the appendices citing command billets, ammo usage and orders of battle.

 

The author’s writing style is extremely engaging and easily maintains the reader’s interest. This is an operational study of this campaign and as such, does not contain many ‘personal experiences’ with some notable exceptions such as the valour of Cpl Seyit during the Battle of the Dardanelle Straits; this, however, is clearly identified by the author at the outset. This book would be an excellent addition to any library and serves as an outstanding counterpoint to the copious works on Gallipoli that speak only from the perspective of the Entente.

A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940-1945, Vol 2: North African Desert February 1942-March 1943 - Christopher Shores and Giovanni Massimello

Title: A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940-1945, Vol 2: North African Desert February 1942-March 1943

Author(s): Christopher Shores and Giovanni Massimello

ISBN: 978-1-909166-12-7

Publisher: Grub Street

Hardcover

Pages: 736

Photo’s/Maps: 100’s b/w//6 

Building on the success of their previous volume in this series, Shores and Massimello have compiled a massive amount of data and detail into a book outlining the experiences of the varying combatants as they head into their second year of desert fighting. Written as a calendar compilation, they provide both a synopsis of the day’s activities and highlights of the unique or noteworthy events of the period.

Photographs are incorporated throughout the narrative providing a stunning visual representation for the reader and, what’s more, they are not centrally printed but co-located within the storyline they are representative of. Each of the discussions are broken down into an outline of the day’s events followed by a detailed rendition of the casualties of the British, Germans and Italian adversaries (broken down into unit and a brief synopsis of the engagement, results and crew status) and claims (broken down into columns signifying unit, crew names, attacking aircraft type and designator, damaged or destroyed aircraft type, location and time). 

The extent and breadth of the research is truly remarkable while the presentation is such that the book does not read as a dry rendition of facts but leaves the reader with a true sense of the adrenalin, terror and courage of the aircrew involved. The authors also incorporate stories of those aspects of the conflict that have received, relatively speaking, very little attention. Take for example their discussion of the unique JU-86 pressurized reconnaissance aircraft (with an operational ceiling of over 48,000 ft)  that operated out of Kastelli, Crete. These aircraft undertook high altitude reconnaissance over the Nile Delta and all along the northern coast of Africa. Specialized Spitfires from 103 Maintenance Unit specifically stripped down were able to intercept and neutralize this Luftwaffe capability. Another excellent example of this is the story of Capt J.E. ‘Jack’ Parsonson and his first hand related experience of combat on the 10 November, 1942 when he was involved in a harrowing dogfight with, ultimately nine ME-109’s. He ends his recollection with a German Lieutenant pleasantly offering him a cigarette and food; telling him sardonically: “Well, for you the war is over. Here, would you like this egg?” This after he had just slammed his Kittyhawk into the desert floor and evacuated it as the 109’s circled above. 

Shores lead a team of researchers each with a specific national affiliation (German, Australian, Italian and American) who have each contributed a phenomenal amount of detail and anecdote towards the final publication. The book commences with a synopsis of the tactical and operational situation in the desert at the beginning of 1942; it sets the stage for the narrative that follows. Additionally, a number of noteworthy veterans (such as Ernst Dullberg, II Gruppe JG 27, John Waddy, 4 SAAF, James ‘Stocky’ Edwards, 260 Sqn and Neville Duke 112 and 92 Sqn and many others) provide lengthy and detailed recollections about Squadron life and combat operations in the desert. The reader is provided an intimate introspection by these men of their experiences and the respect that they shared not only for each other but also their adversaries and ground crew. One is definitely left with the sense that war in the desert was not personal but a deadly business. 

Grub Street has published a book of outstanding quality. For those looking for a book outlining the experiences of the air war in the desert, it would be difficult to find a better source. This is volume two and volume three will focus on operations around Tunisia. While the book may be read in isolation from volume one, I would strongly recommend reading in order to get a real sense of the ebb and flow of the desert air war.

‘Neath Verdun - Maurice Genevoix

Title: ‘Neath Verdun

Author: Maurice Genevoix

ISBN: 978-0-85706-208-6

Publisher: Leonaur

Hardcopy

Pages: 171

Photos/Maps: 0

This book is a reproduction of the author’s diary running for the first few weeks of World War 1    (25 August – 4 October, 1914). It is not a book about the Battle of Verdun, but more the experiences, observations and thoughts of Lt Genevoix as he and his fellow soldiers grapple with the stresses and challenges of war for the first time in the region of the Meuse Valley. 

What makes this book quite unique is the degree of detail which the author recalls and remarks upon. Written in the immediacy of the moment, he is able to convey a sense of the frustration, fear, confusion, doubt, hope and comradeship that pervade these early days. One is struck by his horror at seeing soldiers with horrific wounds desperately seeking medical aid, the crushing exhaustion of endless marches in rain and mud, the joy at the prospect of a warm meal, the struggles with preventing melancholy at not receiving mail and the sad empathy at the suffering of wounded horses that he comes across. 

He and his soldiers are not hardened to war as of yet; they are still learning and struggling with the new reality of their existence and what it entails. The author is able to convey his concerns and fears of his own leadership and the terror of the prospect of combat and death (or even worse wounding). In battle, especially on the front line, ones focus is drawn into a very narrow field, bracketed by the soldiers within one’s immediate responsibility. This isolation and the necessity to make decisions under the stress of being exposed to maiming, death, exhaustion and fear is eloquently conveyed in Genevoix’s comments.

 

He is a sensitive, observant and thoughtful man, capable of seeing and capturing the essence of his surroundings and experiences through the written word in a way that many diarists fail to achieve. His work is short, but it leaves one feeling profoundly introspective and humbled at the massive undertaking that Genevoix and his soldiers were embarking upon. This is made all the more poignant with the reader’s benefit of hindsight and the knowledge of what the war would degenerate into. This book is well worth reading for junior and mid-grade officers as well as historians or those curious to get a bit of an appreciation of early field life of a combat command soldier.