This review has been submitted to the RCAF Journal
Title: At War’s Summit: The Red Army and the Struggle for the Caucasus Mountains in World War II
Author: Alexander Statiev
ISBN: 978-1-108-42462-2
Publisher: Cambridge UP
Year: 2018
Hardcover
Pages: 440
Photos/Maps: 22/19
In June, 1942 the Axis
powers launched Fall Blau, the southern drive to capture the Caucasus region of
the Soviet Union, thereby securing the oil fields for Germany and depriving the
Soviets of the southern resupply link with the West. Dividing the southern
forces into Army Group’s A and B, the Axis powers initially enjoyed great
success with Gp B driving towards Stalingrad and Gp A thrusting into the Transcaucasus
region towards Baku. Ultimately however, the Axis overextended themselves and
the Soviets were able to break the German advance at Stalingrad. Overshadowed
by the disaster in Stalingrad, the efforts of Army Gp A and, more specifically,
the fighting amongst the unforgiving peaks on the Transcaucus Mountain range,
have been generally relegated to the back pages of history. Statiev’s book is
an effort to not only rectify that shortfall but to also shed light on the
numerous lessons to be gleaned from combat in the brutal high altitude mountain
environment.
While Statiev does
discuss, by way of comparison, the development of mountain troops in both
Russia and Germany, his focus is primarily upon the Russian perspective
throughout the book. He ensures that the reader has a sound appreciation of the
history of mountain operations in Russia by drawing attention to a series of past
conflicts in which Russian forces were fighting in mountainous regions. He is
able to convincingly prove that a plethora of information was available to the
Russians regarding the unique challenges posed by altitude operations and the
means to overcome them. His discussion of the popularity of the climbing during
the interwar period in both Germany and Russia reinforces the fact that both countries
had ample expertise to draw upon.
Statiev comprehensive
discussion/analysis of the German 49th Mountain Corps thrust into
the Caucasus Mountains in an effort to cut off the coastal region, and the
Russian efforts to resist them, is remarkably engaging and educating,
reflecting a writing style that captures the imagination while retaining a
scholarly quality. The Russians retained all of the advantages of numbers,
short lines of communication and unchallenged control of the skies. The
systemic failure of the Russian leadership to properly lead, equip and train
its soldiers to meet the challenges of both the Germans and the environment is all
the more appalling as a result. Their approach of ‘quantity over quality’
reflects an absolute arrogance and desperation with respect to the lives of
their soldiers.
The Germans, for their
part, once again gambled on the quality of their elite mountain forces to
overcome their massive shortfall in numbers. The fact that they came as close
as they did is indicative of the specialist nature of mountain warfare and the
superiority of their leadership and training. The author’s discussion of these
battles, and the unique challenges for support forces, provides the reader with
a clear appreciation the successes and failures of the respective adversaries.
Another element of the
combat in this region that Statiev draws attention to is the fact that the
peoples living here were not supporters of the Russian/Soviet regime. Support
for the Germans was much more forthcoming then for the Russians. Efforts on
behalf of both the Germans and Russians to build relationships with these
groups are interesting as both sides appreciated the benefits of local
knowledge and support. However, from Statiev’s research, it is evident that the
Russians had ignored their opportunities until it was almost too late and that
this resulted in them having a far greater challenge than the Germans in this
respect.
Statiev closes his
work with a discussion of the attitude with which the Russian leadership viewed
the nature of the military as a profession. Looking across the spectrum of
military operations and drawing liberally from available primary sources, he
reveals that, throughout the war, the Russians continuously fell back on their
numbers at the expense of training. This was, to a certain extent, a result of
necessity, and the gap definitely closed as the war progressed. Nevertheless,
the Germans consistently were able to inflict significantly more casualties on
the Russians then they took.
The standard of this
publication by the Cambridge UP is of the highest quality. Detailed maps are
provided throughout that illustrate the battlefields discussed. The author
provides generous endnotes and a comprehensive bibliography for further
research. For those seeking fresh information about the Eastern Front, this
work, highlighting a regional conflict that has heretofore received scant
attention, this is an excellent source.