Author: Michael B Barrett
ISBN: 978-0-253-00865-7
Publisher: Indiana University
Press
Year: 2013
Hardcover
Pages: 399
Photographs/Maps: 33 b/w//15
1916 was characterized by huge
and bloody battles that chewed up literally 100,000’s of men for little or no
gain to either side (the Brusilov Offensive in the East and Verdun and the
Somme in the West standing as key examples). Romania, who had up to this point,
remained neutral despite initial leanings towards the Central Powers (CP), had
its eye on the Transylvania region of the Austro-Hungarian Empire; an area that
had traditionally rested within the Romanian sphere of influence. With
assurances for material and manpower support from both Russia and the West,
Romania made the decision to undertake a surprise strike on 27 August into Transylvania.
The German-Austrian response, against all expectations in the West, was both
decisive and conclusive; within 135 days the Romanians had been crushed. The
significance of this victory can be gauged by a comparison between the Somme
and Romania. In an almost identical period the Central Powers covered 360 miles
in Romania while the Allied powers moved 7 miles in the Somme.
Barrett’s book analyses what was
done differently by the Germans and Austrians and the effect that it had upon
tactics at the operational level. Two significant issues set the conditions for
CP success: the limited resources available to counter the Romanian incursion
and the removal of General von Falkenhayn from his post as German Chief of
Staff (due to the Verdun debacle) and his resultant availability to command in
Romania. Barrett shows that the limited resources necessitated a significant
change in traditional tactics in order to maintain both momentum against and
disruption of superior Romanian forces. Additionally, the presence of a German
commander determined to rehabilitate his reputation allowed for greater leeway
and drive.
Falkenhayn took advantage of
Romanian hesitation after their initial successes (they had driven through the
Carpathian Mountain passes against very limited Austrian forces) by launching a
strike utilizing Bulgarian, Turkish and Austrian forces under German Commander
von Mackesen from the south into the Dobrogea region while concurrently driving
back through the mountain passes from the north using combined arms operations
of German and A-H forces. He also used large cavalry units to cover his flanks
and to strike deep into Romania, keeping them both off-balance and blind. Falkenhayn
demanded speed and audacity from his subordinates at the expense of flank
security and was therefore able to retain the advantage of momentum and initiative
over his adversaries.
Barrett’s explanations and
insights into Falkenhayn’s strategies and the impact that it had on the Romanians
is excellent. The book is very well written and researched encompassing not only
the operational success of the CP strategy but also the impact of the lack of coordination
at the strategic level between the Allied forces, specifically the Russians. The
Austro-German success left the Romanians and Allies stunned and provided for them
the resources to continue the war. The author sheds light on the lessons that
were overlooked by many due to the ‘sidebar’ nature of this campaign and is
able to draw a direct line between the German success in Romania and the seeds
of blitzkrieg. Well researched and argued.