The German Failure in Belgium, August 1914 - Dennis Showalter, Joseph P Robinson, Janet A Robinson

This review has been submitted to Strategy and Tactics magazine.

Title: The German Failure in Belgium, August 1914

Author: Dennis Showalter, Joseph P Robinson, Janet A Robinson

ISBN: 978-1-476-67462-9

Publisher: McFarland Books

Year: 2019

Softcover

Pages: 217

Photos/Maps: 22/9  

Germany entered the First World War confident that it would be able to deal a crushing blow to the Western Front Allies within a few weeks, thereby freeing its forces to turn East in order to deal with Russia in turn; events turned out quite differently. The authors have undertaken an in-depth analysis of what circumstances and practices contributed to this over-estimation. The book is a succinct and insightful review; not long but telling in its conclusions.  

The authors look at two distinct but critical shortfalls amongst the German execution of the invasion plans of the West. They are: critical failings within the planning itself, and most tellingly, a failure of reconnaissance. Each exacerbated the shortfalls of the others and resulted in crucial errors in decision making, ultimately leading to the failure of the German efforts in the West.  

Von Moltke committed a number of key errors in the development of the plan itself. These were related to both strategic and operational planning and reflected interesting elements of the German General Staff’s relationship with other government departments. Moltke made the decision to avoid crossing the Maastricht Corridor of Holland in order to provide for a potential neutral access point to the North Sea should Germany require it. This judgement was clearly a Foreign Affairs and Kaiser responsibility; however they were not part of the process. It is estimated that the resulting Liege bottleneck cost the Germans at least three days. He also decided to reshuffle the allocation of cavalry assets away from the Northern Wing of the German advance without any reduction in the task allocation. They were therefore unable to complete any of the activities effectively. Additionally, he created ad hoc Cavalry Corp’s with Headquarters that had not been exercised in peacetime, resulting in confusion and inefficiency. Finally, in the planning phase, the Germans assumed away elements that ran contrary to their vision of how the invasion would work; specifically, the fact that the Belgian Army would fight and not allow for free passage. 

The authors then presents a detailed account of the first four weeks of the War; focussing on the challenges that arose as a result of the issues identified above. For an Army and General Staff that had an almost mystical reputation, fundamental errors in planning exacerbated challenges in execution. These were further compounded by a failure to fully appreciate the reconnaissance capabilities of the nascent air and cavalry elements. This failure in reconnaissance resulted in the Germans not having the visibility of the battlefield that was essential to the effective control of the complex operation that they were trying to execute. The conclusions postulated by the authors as to why this occurred are reasonable and applicable to modern command staffs.   

An comprehensive bibliography and notes section round out this excellent text. The author’s style is succinct and very readable. They have taken an interesting and unique perspective on the shortfalls which, as they point out, the Germans came very close to overcoming despite them. An outstanding addition to any library or reading list.

The Winter Fortress: The Epic Mission to Sabotage Hitler’s Atomic Bomb - Neal Bascomb

This review has been submitted to The Canadian Army Journal

Title: The Winter Fortress: The Epic Mission to Sabotage Hitler’s Atomic Bomb

Author: Neal Bascomb

ISBN: 978-0-544-36805-7

Publisher: HMH

Year: 2016

Hardcover

Pages: 378

Photos/Maps: 49/6

Following the invasion and capitulation of Norway in 1940, as a theatre of operations the region became a sideshow, overshadowed by the massive conflagration being played out in mainland Europe, Russia and the Far East; however, despite the focus elsewhere, perhaps one of the most important dramas of the war was being played out in the quiet, snow covered but brutal region of the Norwegian interior. Few people have heard of Kompani Linge and the heavy water production plant at Vemork (the only plant of its kind in the world); fewer still are aware of the multiple efforts of Allied forces and operatives to destroy the capability of the plant to provide heavy water (critical to the production of an atomic bomb) to the German scientific and war effort and scarcer still are those aware of the success of nine Norwegian operatives who parachuted into the inhospitable Vidda region, survived a crushingly hostile environment and succeeded not only in penetrating the plant and destroying critical infrastructure but also escaping with no loss of life (on either side). Bascomb’s book recounts their story.

Deeply researched and written in a style that relates the stress, dangers and profound knowledge and cohesion of the men involved, the author removes any sense of the glamour of covert warfare. Rather, his narrative relates the effects of stress, boredom and fear on the human psyche as well as accurately describing the courage and dedication required to make this mission a success. It is a vivid rendition of the mental and psychological strength required of those undertaking this style of clandestine warfare and should be studied as a case study in special operations.

He does not only focus upon the successful Norwegian led mission but also the numerous efforts of the RAF, USAF and, most noteworthy, of the 261^st Company of the Royal Engineers who tried to penetrate the German defences via glider insertion and were lost to a man through accident and execution by the Axis forces. Bascomb provides a very sobering account of their exertions and sacrifices.

The author paints a vivid picture of life in Norway under occupation; the efforts to continue ‘normal’ life or at best moderate co-existence, the impact of collaborators and the challenges of trying to build and maintain an element of resistance to the Axis. Of particular note is the ability of the Norwegians resistance fighters to survive in one of the harshest climates on earth; their capacity to hunt and live off of the land even at the height of winter (albeit on the edge of starvation) is in itself an epic tale.

This story is an adventure tale for the ages and the men who undertook to see the sabotage of the German atomic program are as great hero’s as those that fought on the front lines in the major theatres of war. Theirs was a silent, unheralded effort and it is to Bascomb’s credit that their names and achievements have not been forgotten. A well written account that should be part of any library dedicated to special operations of the Second World War.

The Sword Behind the Shield - Norbert Szamveber

This review has been submitted to Strategy and Tactics magazine.

Title: The Sword Behind the Shield

Author: Norbert Szamveber

ISBN: 978-1-909982-19-2

Publisher: Helion

Year: 2015

Hardcover

Pages: 491

Photos/ Maps: 0/16

In early 1945 the world’s attention was focused on the tightening vice on Berlin as the US and British drove in from the west and the Soviets from the East, relatively little attention was given to the fighting in the southeastern region around the besieged Hungarian capital of Budapest. It was in this region that, in an effort to both relieve the garrison as well as keep Hungary in the war, that the Germans (with Hungarian forces) launched a series of operations dubbed Konrad I, II, III. Ultimately they proved to be unsuccessful at relieving Budapest but not for operational or tactical reasons; it was the strategic decisions made in Berlin that ultimately undermined the ability of the Axis to succeed. While the Axis came close to succeeding, the direction that the garrison was not to attempt a breakout to meet up with the relief efforts as well as Soviet pressure in the direction of Berlin that resulting in forces being withdrawn that ultimately prevented operational success.

It is the attention that the book brings to the continued operational effectiveness of the German forces even as late as February, 1945 that stands as one of the most interesting aspects of the narrative. The German ability to continue to plan and execute combined operations effectively is underscored, as an example, by the fact that the Luftwaffe and Hungarian air force was flying up to 455 sorties per day in ground attack and air interdiction operations in support of Konrad. This at a time when it was assumed that the Luftwaffe was a spent force. Szamveber shows through his use of combat reports and other primary source material that, despite logistical as well as material shortages that the Axis were able to execute deep penetration operations against the opposing Soviet forces.

He balances his narrative very effectively by analyzing Soviet capabilities and efforts to block the German advances. The Soviet forces continue to prove themselves masters at the art of battlefield camouflage as well as the use of prepared defensive positions (anti-tanks nests had multiple overlapping weapon systems for example). The author notes that the Germans still felt themselves to be more than equal to the Russians in weaponry and operational/tactical skill sets but that there was a definite improvement in the Soviet capability at the junior and senior officer level; the mid-level officers still were a weakness. Also, it is interesting to see that the Soviets were also suffering significant challenges as the quality of their infantry was markedly lower as the war progressed; a result, no doubt, of the appalling casualties of the previous three years.

Szamveber’s work is an outstanding operational and tactical analysis of the German efforts outside of Budapest and the Soviets determination to thwart them. A detailed map section helps to visualize the operations (although a separate map book would have been better). The author has provide detailed summaries of tables of equipment and casualty rates to show the deltas under which the units were operating. This is a book for the reader with an eye for operational and tactical detail. Helion continues to provide outstanding quality in its book production. 

Forgotten Victory - Mark Zuehlke

This review has been submitted to War History Online Journal 

Title: Forgotten Victory

Author: Mark Zuehlke

ISBN: 978-1-77162-041-3

Publisher: Douglas and McIntyre

Year: 2014

Hardcover

Pages: 500

Photos/maps: 29/7

The Canadian Army was involved in three major actions during the latter portion of the Second World War: the Normandy Invasion, the Battle of the Scheldt and the operations to clear the west bank of the Rhine and northern Germany: Operations Veritable and Blockbuster. Canadian command and troops undertook key leadership and personnel roles in each of these ops. The authors book, Forgotten Victory, refocuses attention on the critical Canadian role in the final of the three above listed campaigns. Overshadowed by the Battle of the Bulge, the American/British drive in the South and the Soviet juggernaut in the East, the Canadians nevertheless played a decisive in creating the conditions whereby the Allies could drive across the Rhine and into the heart of Germany.

Zuehlke takes a holistic approach to his discussions of the Operations as well as the minor ops leading up to them. Thus the reader is provided with information relating to Command relationships (both formal and interpersonal), logistics demands and concerns, operational considerations and the complexity of combined (what would today be referred to as ‘joint’ operations) involving allied land and air forces (both tactical and strategic). It is worth noting that, for this campaign, the Commander of the First Canadian Army, Gen Crerar commanded an army (comprising mainly Canadians but also allied forces) of 500,000 men – the largest in Canadian history. Additionally, the author paints a vivid picture of the environment within which the Canadians and their Allies were operating. The winter was brutal and made all the more so by the frequent freeze thaw cycles that reduced mobility to a crawl; further hampered by the vast flooding operations by the Germans that limited lines of approach to grimy and barely passable high ground pre-registered by German artillery and machine guns.

Zuehlke has an eminently readable writing style encompassing a vast array of information and data that presents a deep and comprehensive picture for the reader. His books have almost exclusively focused on the role of the Canadian Army in the European theatre of war and his appreciation and depth of knowledge is evident throughout the book. This is a thoroughly enjoyable book that conveys accurately the horrors and challenges of these operations as well as the heroism, competence and drive of the officers and soldiers so engaged.