Dak To and the Border Battles of Vietnam, 1967-1968 - Michael A. Eggleston

This review submitted to Canadian Army Today Magazine.

Title: Dak To and the Border Battles of Vietnam, 1967-1968

Author: Michael A. Eggleston

ISBN: 978-1-4766-6417-0

Publisher: Mcfarland Books (McFarlandBooks.com)

Year: 2017

Softcover

Pages: 224

Photos/Maps: 19/24

The battles in Vietnam were reaching a peak as the 1960’s moved into their final years. Generally, the sense has been that the United States was fighting the wrong war for the wrong reasons and that the advantages lay predominantly with the North Vietnamese. Included in these were the willingness to absorb causalities, the sense that this war was of national importance, the ineffective and corrupt nature of the Southern Vietnamese government, the ineffectiveness of the Southern Vietnamese Army and the control that the communist regime in Northern Vietnam exercised over its people and resources. While much of this was true, the United States and its Allies were not without deep capabilities and the North Vietnamese not without weakness and internal division.

Eggleston’s book sheds light upon some of the key events in the entire Vietnam War: the period leading up to the Tet Offensive. Much has been written about the actual Tet Offensive, while relatively little has looked at the American and North Vietnamese strategies leading up to this Offensive. Each side achieved its initial aims with the Border Battles: the Vietnamese to draw American forces out of the cities and into the countryside and the US to draw Vietnamese forces into more traditional set piece battles where they could be destroyed.

This is an excellent book to read in order to gain an appreciation of the nature of the conflict during this period. He expertly combines a sweeping synopsis of the history and nature of the war up to the Border Battle period and then delves in more detail regarding the scope of this engagement. Of particular poignancy, the author has drawn upon firsthand accounts of participants from both sides; by including them as written, he ensures that the reader has great difficulty putting the book down due to their realism and the raw emotion elicited. I have rarely come across such descriptive and emotive recollections.

This is a book focussed on the soldiers and their experiences at the front; in the thick of battle. Eggleston does not spare those who were not equal to the leadership task nor those who failed in their responsibilities to their soldiers. It is interesting to note the comments related to the American leadership practice of senior commanders trying to conduct operations from helicopters (the idea being that one would be able to maintain a much better grasp of the battlefield). Additionally, discussions about the terrain and the unique nature of fighting the regular North Vietnamese Army units vice Vietcong are also very enlightening. Finally, the failure of the North Vietnamese to appreciate the ability of the US command to reposition its forces undermined the ability of the North to achieve its desired end state with Tet.

I recommend this book. It is not an in-depth analysis of the politics of the war, more a treatise on the nature of tactical level combat in the Vietnam theatre and its effects upon soldiers at the squad and platoon level. Disturbing, enlightening and poignant in equal measure.

A War of Logistics – Parachutes and Porters in Indochina, 1945-1954 - Charles R Shrader

This review has been submitted to Army History Magazine.

Title: A War of Logistics – Parachutes and Porters in Indochina, 1945-1954

Author: Charles R Shrader

ISBN: 978-0-8131-6575-2

Publisher: University Press of Kentucky

Year: 2015

Hardcover

Pages: 488

Photos/Maps: 15/13

The War in Indochina is best remembered today for the decisive French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954; however, the conflict that led up to that was protracted, brutal and new. New in terms of the style of warfare being fought and the impact that the result would have well beyond the borders of Indochina. The author has approached the war from an unconventional perspective, one that has been heretofore a facet but not a central theme of works on the war; that of logistics and its role in the victory of the Viet Minh and the loss of the French. This was a war won and lost entirely on the strength and weakness of the respective logistics capabilities and doctrine of the adversaries.

Shrader has effectively woven an insightful evaluation and analysis of the operational doctrine of both parties while maintaining his central theme of the key impact of logistics. Commencing with a strategic view of the conflict, he looks at the psychology and hubris of the post war French and their assumption of superiority over the Viet Minh. This, combined with an unstable national approach from France, precluded the resources from being assigned in terms of manpower as well as material that ultimately was needed for success.

He leads into the successful recognition by the Viet Minh of the necessity to not only outfight but also to outlast the French. The three stage operational approach combined with a successful utilization of the strengths of the Viet people – human capital – enabled for a flexible and dynamic asymmetric approach to conflict that the European approach of the French struggled to counter.

Shrader discusses at length how, from the French approach, heavy weapons and combined arms operations heavily based upon the lessons learned during the European conflict served as the central method of engagement. Artillery, armour, aircraft and naval contingents enabled the French to control set points but surrendered the countryside to the more mobile and agile Viet Minh and by extension, the initiative. The nature of the French approach to warfare resulted in a heavy logistics bill that had difficulty being met. Strategically, long lines of support stretching back to France or Japan due to a lack of an integral industrial capability in Indochina meant long delays in the meeting of demands. Operationally, the necessity of the French to establish isolated forward operating bases in order to counter the inflow of the Viet Minh forces and supplies required a reliance upon air or naval resupply methods that were costly, inefficient and resource intensive themselves.

Conversely, the Viet Minh acknowledged their inability to counter the French in set piece battles and, for the most part, did not allow themselves to be drawn into fights where they may be subjected to superior French armament. Shrader identifies how the Viet Minh leaders played a superior international hand by securing their lines of support from China. In addition, their requirements were far less extensive. The author has undertaken extensive in-depth research that backs up his conclusions. The typical Viet Minh soldier, for example only required approximately half of the daily weight of requirements compared with his French counterpart. The depth to which the author goes in his analysis of the typical demands of the respective forces is highly educational and telling for the reader; the French demands far outstripped their capability while the Viet Minh adjusted their tactics in line with their logistics capability and expertise.

The book also illustrates the flexibility of the Viet Minh logistics methodology compared to the French. Being far less technologically encumbered, they were significantly more agile in their mobility and much less rigid in their operational doctrine; thereby being able to manipulate their procedures far faster than the French. Unlike the French who were, for the most part, confined to pre-existing Indochinese transport infrastructure and vehicles, the Viet Minh developed a national level mobilization process whereby non-combatants were obliged to support operations through their use as porters. Regional command structures were created that facilitated the uninterrupted flow of supplies from one section to the next through its transfer between regionally assigned porters. They also developed the science of camouflage to previously unseen levels and maintained field craft discipline rigidly. The French were never able to develop a counter strategy to effectively undermine this tactic.

Shrader makes it clear that the French were not incompetent, merely hamstrung through a lack of logistics flexibility, non-responsive doctrine, a paradigm of their adversary based upon pre-existing hubris, a non-supportive National Government and a logistics dogma rooted in a European operational theatre. They were able to achieve some successes against the Viet Minh and their use of air and riverine resupply systems supported off road operations well. Unfortunately, the depth of capacity was heavily in favour of the Viet Minh as theirs was viewed as a national struggle and, consequently, given the support required through a more universally supported approach. The French certainly had the upper hand during periods of the conflict such as when they cut off Viet Minh access to critical rice growing regions (which served as a trade currency as well as supply for the Viet Minh). The logistics limitations suffered by the French were simply too great to enable them to follow up on their local successes.

Shrader’s book is an excellent study of the critical importance that logistics plays in the effective execution of tactical operations and strategic campaigns. For a vast majority of the conflict French technology heavily outweighed the Viet Minh; that they were unable to defeat them is testament to the ability of the Viet Minh to offset French advantage through non-traditional tactics and supply doctrine. The author has presented a balanced and in-depth study of this conflict and his conclusions are well supported through the use of primary source material from both sides. This is a book well worth reading for operators and supporters alike.  

Counterinsurgency - David Kilcullen

Title: Counterinsurgency

Author: David Kilcullen

ISBN: 978-0-199-73749-9

Publisher: Oxford UP

Year: 2010

Softcover

Pages: 251

Photos/maps: 7/1

Those of you actively involved in counterinsurgency operations are most likely to have heard about David Kilcullen. Both an experienced operator (infantry in East Timor, Indonesia as well as tours in Iraq and Afghanistan) as well as a renowned student of the insurgent/terrorism ‘art’ he has, in this book, put together a practical and common sense approach to tackling the challenges of insurgency and terrorism (he clearly delineates between the two) in different environments.  The book is a compilation of articles and concept papers that he has drafted based on firsthand experience, immediate debriefs with those involved in conflict, follow-on interviews with combatants from both sides as well as a deep engagement with local civilians.

His first chapter covers the 28 articles or ‘rules of thumb’ that a counterinsurgent must remember to maintain effectiveness. Based, very  loosely, as a companion piece to the original 27 articles of TE Lawrence (of WW1 Arabic uprising fame), it is updated and adjusted to reflect the realities of the modern counterinsurgent battle space. Each article is also preceded by an explanatory introduction that sets the stage for the focus of the article and provides for the reader the context within which to approach it. His points are succinct and eminently relevant and logical.

His next chapter discusses the value and merit of metrics. He acknowledges the critical requirement of being able to measure success (or failure); however, he posits that the traditional methods of measurement are not relevant or accurate to the asymmetric conflicts that we are engaged in. For example, the traditional body counts or military accessibility levels into regions do not provide for accurate measurements of enemy capability. Rather, he suggests that a series of non-traditional metrics based upon the four ‘pillars’ of counterinsurgency (the population, the supported government, the security forces and the enemy forces) should be adopted. Examples that he provides are not exhaustive but do adjust the paradigm of the reader into a more correct avenue. Things such as: price of exotic vegetables, tax collection or participation in sponsored programs can act as indicators for population stability, Government Indicators: where officials sleep, capital flight, rate of budget execution; Security Forces: ratio of guilty to innocent detainees, ratio of kills to wounds/captures, night operations and, finally, Enemy Forces: Insurgents villages of origin, insurgent medical health, price of black market guns and ammunition and midlevel insurgent casualties.

In the following chapters he discusses the success of the Indonesian forces in suppressing the West Java insurgents in the late 1950’s and how the tactics used so successfully there were a failure when it came to East Timor (and why). This chapter is extremely interesting as it reinforces the importance of appreciating how there is no standard solution to an insurgency that can be applied universally. Changes in motivation, geography and technology (to name a few) can have profound effects upon the methodology best suited to countering it. The Indonesian example is particularly relevant when viewed from the perspective of the impact of world opinion on the activities of Indonesian security forces in East Temor mirroring the of ‘media’ and communication technology as a factor (both positive and negative) on operations.

He next discusses the environment within which insurgencies are able to flourish. He postulates that identifying regions as being pro-government or pro-insurgent is missing the fundamental truth that populations seek security, predictability and stability and they will follow whatever group or organization that can guarantee it locally. This is one of the main reasons for the frustrating tendency in Afghanistan for locals to ‘switch’ from government to Taliban and back. It is not loyalty; it is pragmatism that is their driving force. Thus it is that concurrent to an armed challenge of an insurgency, it is imperative that issues of poor governance, corruption and mismanagement amongst the governing body be addressed aggressively.

He concludes with an examination of the modern phenomenon of the global insurgency, its make-up, methods of operation, strengths and weaknesses.  Starting with an assessment of the differences between ’terrorism’ (seen today as synonymous with any act of violence against the government) and ‘insurgency’ he clearly delineates not only the difference between  two, but also, the forces behind them and the paradigm shift needed to address them effectively. He concludes with a discussion on the critical weaknesses of the global jihadist style movements and how best to exploit these weakness in the ‘competition for government’.

Kilcullen has a great wealth of experience to draw upon when contemplating these issues. There are those who would make the argument that much of what he writes is common sense and not new revelations. That may be; however, it is also true that while many of the successful techniques used against jihadist movements have been used in the past, it took much blood and treasure to begin applying the lessons of yesteryear. The shift in paradigm and approach to the modern global jihadist with its access to instantaneous communications requires not only a reinforcement of our previously learned but forgotten lessons, but  further enhancement to meet the unique challenges of today’s modern insurgent. Kilcullen’s book is an excellent place to further enhance that education.

Devil's Guard - George Robert Elford

Title: Devil's Guard
Author: George Robert Elford
ISBN: 978-0-440-12014-8
Publisher: Dell Publishing
Softcover
Pages: 336
Photos/Maps: 0

Elford's book has become, in the opinion of many, a classic biography of a soldier engaged in asymmetric warfare. The main character,　ex-Waffen SS partisanjaeger Hans Josef Wagemueller, is pro-ported to have met with the author in the far east and to have related his life story to him. The author recounts his tale, with as little change or embellishment as possible, of him leading his German troops west during the last days of the World War 2, escaping to Switzerland and ultimately joining the French Foreign Legion. The main thrust of the narrative centres upon his time with the Legion fighting in Indochina against the Viet Cong as part of an all-German battalion of veterans and his experiences there-in.

The story has generated a great deal of controversy over the years as there is no record of an all-German battalion nor of an individual named Wagemueller ever having fought as part of the Legion. Regardless of whether the story is truth or fiction really is however, beside the point as the lessons to be gleaned from it resonate either way.

Given the experiences that Western forces have had in Afghanistan and Iraq fighting asymmetric opponents, the question of what constitutes acceptable methods of executing a war has again become a central point of discussion and contention. Wagemueller's character in the book takes the position that war is, by its very nature, violent and horrible, but must be fought to win and, in order to do so, the conditions must be established and maintained whereby the side wishing to prevail does what it must to enforce its will upon the population and the enemy. It is a testament for the Real Politique approach to conflict.

Additionally, Elford's narrative translates doctrine into action as he describes through the storyline the how, what, where and why's of a unit doing what it has to in order to win. Wagemueller's character is uncompromising in his rendition of the toll that fighting to win takes upon all of the elements of society involved and, more importantly, the mental strength that soldiers must have in order to do what they have to do. Finally, and perhaps most telling, Wagemueller describes the methods by which his unit was recalled and disbanded as a result of a lack of support from the French government and population. The similarity to the impact of popular opinion on modern warfare is striking.

The story itself reads very well and is extremely engaging; the characters are presented with a human face, not enjoying what they are doing but undertaking it regardless. It is not a comfortable read and will tend to polarize its readers between those agreeing with and those appalled by the actions of the main characters. Its strength, I believe, lies in the fact that it was first published in the early 1970's during the height of the Vietnam conflict and yet, it still retains its relevance today as a means to stimulate healthy debate and discussion amongst military professionals and their leaders.